WARNING ASSESSMENT - USSR-EE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B01027R000300040041-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 23, 2007
• Sequence Number: 41
• Publication Date: February 18, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

pproved For.Release 2007/04/24 :, J W P83B0 1027R000300040041
THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Council
NOTE FOR: See Distribution
18 February 1982
SUBJECT : Warning Assessment: USSR-EE
1. Attached is the assessment prepared
following the monthly Community warning meeting
held on 16 Februar 1982. Comments would be
most welcome.
2. The next warning meeting will be held on
Tuesday, 16 March, at 1400 hours in Room 7E62,
CIA Headquarters. I solicit suggestions regarding.
any topics or contingencies you feel we may be
overlooking, and request that such recommendations
be forwarded to me by COB Tuesday, 2 March. 0
Attachment
DDI #1391-82
SECRET
 ? Approved For Release 2007/04WR Tl -RDP8 B01 027R000300040041-9
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
DDI #1391-82
18 February 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
VIA : National Intelligence Officer for Warning
Acting National intelligence Officer for USSR-EE
SUBJECT : Monthly Warning Assessment - USSR/Eastern Europe
(Meeting held 16 February 1982)
1. The Effect of Polish Events on Hungary. Kadar's main goal during the
entire Polish crisis has been to shield Hungary from it, primarily to prevent
any calls for orthodoxy in all of Eastern Europe from jeopardizing Hungarian
economic reforms and relatively tolerant domestic political course. Since
13 December, Hungary has attempted to stay out of the limelight by publicly
arguing that it should not be considered a model for the rest of Eastern
Europe, but privately (and possibly at Soviet instigation) sending high-level
emissaries to Warsaw with advice for Jaruzelski. On the economic front,
although Hungary has suffered from Poland's inability to deliver promised
goods and lately from the Moscow-imposed obligation to provide aid, its
greatest current concern is to retain its credit-worthiness in the West. In
1982, it will probably need to borrow an additional net sum of some $500
million or cut back on imports and measurably slow down its rate of growth.
To obtain the credits needed, it has conducted high-level negotiations with
Western banks and begun investigating the possibility of Arab loans. In
domestic politics there is no sign of popular unrest or of any challenge to
Kadar. He has carefully groomed a follow-on political generation which seems
committed to continuing his political line, provided Hungary is able to
maintain its relative freedom of action in setting domestic policies.
2. Soviet-Iranian Relations. Despite the recently announced increase in
Soviet-Iranian trade, rumors of military sales and speculation about a
friendship pact, there is no hard evidence so far of a significant improvement
in relations. As far as covert Soviet internal security assistance to the
regime and simultaneous increase in Soviet support to anti-regime-ethnic
groups, DIA argued that there might be more here than meets the eye. Although
some reports are probably sensationalist, DIA suggested that they should not
be dismissed simply because they do not fit into our preconceived notions of
Soviet and Iranian policies.
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3. Soviet-Cuban Military Developments. Soviet military deliveries in
1981 are second only to-those of 1962 in tonnage and amount to about $500
million dollars (out of a total of $2.7 billion dollars since the
establishment of the Soviet-Cuban military relationship). Particularly
significant equipment being provided to the Cubans for the first time are
self-propelled howitzers, Fan Song E (which extend the range of SA-2s by about
12 miles), and SA-6s (the first mobile surface-to-air missile systems in
Cuba. So far, 1982 deliveries have continued at the same pace and include
MIG-23s. Although these extensive deliveries can be explained in terms of
needed replacements for obsolescent equipment and of materiel needed by Castro
to defend Cuba without active Soviet involvement, they must also be seen in
the context of Cuban activities in Central America and in Africa as well as
of other possible purposes which are not yet readily apparent.
4. Soviet Moves in Southern Africa. CIA noted that information obtained
since the production of the IIM on Namibia strongly supports the thesis that
the Soviets are trying to torpedo the Namibian negotiations; further they are
acting to prevent any Angolan group (particularly dos Santos) from developing
ties to the West. These actions may be the Soviet answer to perceived US
efforts to diminish the Soviet role in the Third World.
Approved For Release 2007/04/24: CIA-RDP83BO1027R000300040041-9
 Approved For Release 2007/04/24: CIA-RDP83BO1027R000300040041-9
Approved For Release 2007/04/24: CIA-RDP83BO1027R000300040041-9