MONTHLY WARNING ASSESSMENT: LATIN AMERICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B01027R000300040038-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 23, 2007
• Sequence Number: 38
• Publication Date: March 31, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
SECRET/
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25X1
NIO/W
National Intelligence Council
DDI-2645-82
31 March 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH . National Intelligence Officer for Warning
FROM : National Intelligence Officer for Latin America
SUBJECT . Monthly Warning Assessment: Latin America
1. Central America - After the El Salvador Elections*
The enormous popular participation in the El Salvador elctions was an
affirmation of democratic hopes and a repudiation of the extreme left.
Despite four months of political and military plans to disrupt and, if
possible, prevent the elections, the guerrillas were able to do much less
damage in the closing days than had been feared--this should prompt a close
look at our estimates of their numbers and their tactical skills. It also
points to the likely effects of the combination of good intelligence and
eem
tive
t
il
_
ov rnmen
m
itar o erations throwing the guerrillas off
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The prospect of a coalition in El Salvador which includes ARENA and
excludes the Christian Democrats raises potentially serious issues of
continued international support from Venezuela and the international Christian
Democratic parties. However, it is possible that the military will work with
other forces to require that any new Salvadoran government promises not to
reverse the reforms, not to persecute or prosecute Christian Democrats, and
not to interfere with the military chain of command. A real con
on the
first two issues might sustain moderate international support. 25X1
From a warning perspective, another critical issue is the probable
post-election strategy of the extreme left. Most likely the Salvadoran
extreme left and its Soviet bloc supporters will continue the main elements of
the consistent strategy they have pursued in El Salvador by efforts to: (1)
*The discussion of the situation in Guatemala and El Salvador at
the 22 March warning meeting mostly has been overtaken by
events. This section of the warning report provides an updated
assessment reflecting the objective but individual com of
the NIO/LA. 25X1
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fragment the civil-military coalition and accelerate polarization by provoking
counter-terrorism; (2) isolate and delegitimate the El Salvadoran government
internationally" (31 use propaganda to bring about a cutoff of US 25X1
assistance.
In the next weeks the extreme left may use its deployed forces and
ammunition stockpiles to launch various military, sabotage and terrorist
actions; but its essential tactics over the next months (perhaps till
July 1982) will probably repeat those used after the failure of the
January 1981 military offensive: increased emphasis on national and
international political operations (such as negotiations) to undermine the
Salvadoran government while guerrilla mi i ary strength, operational unity and
morale is built to higher levels for additional assaults. 0 25X1
2. Guatemala
The coup of 23 March 1982 seemed to derive from a combination of
junior officers, the far right MNL (National Liberation Movement) Party and
other disappointed politicians. It is still unclear how the balance of forces
will evolve; and, there is a need for additional information and close
monitoring. Surprisingly, the extreme left has not taken advantage of what
must be a dis army to launch major attacks. That could change in the
next weeks. 25X1
3. Nicaragua
Violence along the Honduran border has increased considerably during
the past month, both in terms of increased anti-Sandinista activity and
clashes between the Nicaraguan and Honduran military. Recent flight activity
from Cuba to eastern Nicaragua and increased military in the region could
reflect not only Nicaraguan concern over the border situation but, some
believe, efforts to provide more support to insurgent f o region or
even preparations for the introduction of MIG aircraft. 25X1
4. Cuba
The extensive military activity in Cuba during past months reflects
Castro's continuing effort to deter any US military action and his desire to
promote a seige mentality on the island. Recent military construction
activity appears designed mostly to increase Cuba's ability to survive an air
attack. We expect such activity to continue with possible big increases in
paranoia when two carrier battle groups begin exercises from 8 April to
17 May 1982. 25X1
We see no major shifts in Cuban policy toward Central America. Some
analysts think that the Cubans felt the guerrilla election offensive in El
Salvador was ill advised. However, Castro remains optimistic that even a
stalemate in El Salvador wll produce a guerrilla victory because he believes
that prolonged conflict eventually will force the US to pull out. Recent
Cuban efforts to increase help to the guerrillas in Guatemala is equally a
function of the need to see more progress made in El Salvador. Castro does
not see quick victory (6-12 months) in Guatemala, and he believes insurgents
in Honduras still lack the necessary infrastructure to wage a meaningful
struggle. Strategy for now will be to convince the Honduran military to
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remain Oplitral s buying more time before the struggle can be escalate(~5X1
there.
5. Brazil
The November 1982 elections amount to a plebescite on the
government. An unprecedented number of posts could change hands, and the
election will determine the composition of the electoral college that picks a
presidential successor. The government has not been successful in
manipulating the electoral rules, and many analysts believe that the best it
now can hope for is not to lose badly. It probably will not try to void the
electoral results because this could provoke a major political crisis and
risk, splitting the military. Moreover, an effort by hard-core conservatives
to overthrow the election probably would not suc cppd because there is not
sufficient military backing for such a step. 25X1
6. Force Totals
Please note that the size of El Salvador's active security forces has
been increased on the att h d
ace chart to 28,600. This includes the 1,500
officer candidates and soldiers receiving trainin i +t,
U
group on military/guerrilla force estimates will be convened.b The NIO LA 2X1
(A/NIO/LA) in ord to reassess our estimates of guerrilla stre g in 25X1
Salvador.
S U- -- /\/
Constantine C. Menges
Atts: (2)
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CENTRAL AMERICA:
GUERRILLA FORCES, March 1982
Country
Category
Strength
Confidence Classi- Unclassified
Level* fication
Nicaragua**
Full-time
less than
D
less than
guerrillas
1,000
1,000
Militia/
part-time
guerrillas
El Salvador
Full-time
4,500-
D
5,000
guerrillas
5,000
Militia/
5,000-
D
5,000-
part-time
10,000
10,000
guerrillas
Guatemala
Full-time
4,000-
D
4,500
guerrillas
5,000
Militia/
part-time
guerrillas
Honduras
Full-time
100
C
guerrillas
Militia/
part-time
guerrillas
* Reflects the level of confidence in the relevant reporting, ranging from A
(highest level) to D (lowest level), follows:
A = uncertainty is less than 20 percent.
B = uncertainty is less than 35 percent.
C = uncertainty is less than 50 percent.
D = uncertainty is greater than 50 percent.
** Anti-Sandinista forces operating mostly from Honduras.
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QDJ #2645-82
Di stri bution:
1 - DCI
1 - bDCI
1 - C/NIC
1 - NIO/W
1 - DDI
1 - DDO
1 - NIO/AF
1 - NIO/EA
1 - NIO/GPF
1 - NIO/NESA
1 - NIO/AL
1 - NI0/USSR-EE
1 - NI0/WE
1 - NIO/SP
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1 - Senior Review Panel
1 - SA/NPI
1 - SA/CI
1 - D/OCO
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1 - D/NESA
1 - D/OEA
1 - D/OGI
1 - D/OSWR
1 - D/NPIC
1 - C/CA/IAD
1 - D/OHC/ICS
1 - ER
1 - NFAC Reg
3 - NI0/LA