WARNING REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B01027R000300040035-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 24, 2007
• Sequence Number: 35
• Publication Date: March 26, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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0 SECRET 0
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Council
DDI #2
482-82
/1
26 Mar
ch 19
82
MEMORANDUM FOR: Di
De
rector of Central Intelligence
puty Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH
FROM
. N
. L
N
ational Intelligence Officer for Warning
. Gray Cowan
ational Intelligence Officer for Africa
SUBJECT
: W
arning Report: Sub-Saharan Africa
1. Action Requested: None; the attached report is for your
information. 25X1
2. Background: Community representatives and specialists met on
23 March 1982 with the NIO/AF as chairman. The attached report has not
been coordinated with the other participants, but is being circulated to
them. If they feel their views have been misinterpreted, or y have
25X1
significant additional concerns, I'll report ~'u ~ her to .
Attachment
DDI #2482-82
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9 SECRET .
DDI #2482-82
26 March 1982
WARNING REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA* No. 41
HORN OF AFRICA
Analysts are concerned about the continuing deterioration in Ethiopian-
Sudanese relations. We do not expect that Mengistu will be responsive to
Sudanese objections to Ethiopian support for Libyan efforts to destabilize
Sudan. The Sudanese threat to support Eritrean insurgent troops threatens to
prolong the current Ethiopian campaign in Eritrea. The mood is one of growing
irritation on both sides. The Sudanese may lose patience with Mengistu 5X1
fails to commit himself to refrain from assisting in toppling Nimeiri.
SOMALIA
Increased Libyan aid will permit the SDSF to step up its campaign to
destabilize the Somali regime. Recent bombing incidents in Mogadishu and
Berbera--the one in Berbera coincided with a US ship visit--highlights this
enhanced threat. The SDSF terrorist campaign poses growing risk to American
personnel in Berbera and Mogadishu, although the incidents in the sties
appear not to have been targeted specifically against Americans. 25X1
MOZAMBIQUE
Growing activity of the South-African-backed NRM within Mozambique
continues to cause serious problems for the Machel regime. The insurgents
seem to be aiming to move closer to the major cities of Beira and Maputo. If
a serious threat to these urban areas develops, it may prod Machel into
seeking more external aid, probably from the Cubans. Mozambique's rail lines
are becomin unreliable for the inland countries who use them, especially
Zimbabwe. 25X1
ZAMBIA
Kaunda's concern about his own and the internal security of the country
is mounting. He seems to have been listening to fears expressed to him by the
Cubans and others in his regime. There is a possibility that in the next
three months South Africa may well engage in raids either on Lusaka or in
western Zambia to punish Kaunda for Zambia's continued aid to the ANC. The
projected meeting between Kaunda and Prime Minister Botha--if it to ace--
would not lessen Kaunda's paranoia about South African intentions. 25X1
*This memorandum is one of a series produced monthly by NIO/AF. Its purpose
is to review possible developments in the short-term future that would be
damaging to US interests. Obviously, many of these developments will not
occur in the time frame or in the manner suggested, or will not occur at all.
SECRET
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SECRET
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ANGOLA
Recent fragmentary intelligence suggests that the Cubans are taking a -?
more active part in operations against UNITA in southern Angola. There is as
yet insufficient evidence to in "e the nature of Cuban activity, but Cuban
casualties may have increased.
CHAD
Continuing efforts to resolve the internal Chadian situation are leading
nowhere. The immediate future appears to involve continued instability
combined with indecisive military actions. Should the Peacekeeping Force
depart within the next three months, the GUNT will probably collapse. The
likelihood of active Libyan military involvement in the situation is extremely
limited, ,at st until Qadhafi assumes the chairmanship of the OAU in
August. u 25X1
FC R
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