WARNING REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B01027R000300040027-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 24, 2007
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: April 22, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
DDI #3335-82/1
22 April 1982
THROUGH : National Intelligence Officer for Warning
FROM : L. Gray Cowan
National Intelligence Officer for Africa
SUBJECT : Warning Report: Sub-Saharan Africa
1. Action Requested: None; the attached report is for your
information. 25X1
2. Background: Community representatives and specialists met on
20 April 192828 with the NIO/AF as chairman. The attached report has not
been coordinated with the other participants, but is being circulated to
them. If they feel their views have been misinterpreted, or if they have
significant additional concerns, I'll report her to you. 25X1
1_2 F71
Attachment
DDI #3335-82
This memorandum is UNCLASSIFIED
when separated from Attachment.
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DDI #3335-82
22 April 1982
WARNING REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA* No. 42
ZAIRE
Analysts noted increasing reports that younger officers within the FLNC
are planning to undertake sabotage within Shaba province. While there was
general agreement that the FLNC was still weak and divided as a movement, if
the young militants were to focus on European expatriates as targets, serious
consequences could result. There have been false alarms regarding Shaba
frequently before, but the potential for disturbances caused by small groups
of militants is becoming stronger, particularly if they succeed in disrupting
local elections that are scheduled shortly. 25X1
ANGOLA
The recent raid by SWAPO into northern Namibia in substantial force will
almost inevitably prompt a South African response. While we do not see
preparations for an immediate attack by South African forces, it can be
expected that within the next three months they will engage in further raids
on SWAPO concentrations in southern Angola to prevent further SWAPO
incursions. II 25X1
ZIMBABWE
The expected arrest of Nkomo may well create widespread violence.
Tension between adherents of ZAPU and ZANU is growing as are the numbers of
desertions from the army and there is a higher level of banditry in rural
areas. Analysts did not believe that the regime is threatened by the
situation, but greater numbers of whites may leave the country if the violence
spreads. The South African government will make every effort to see that
internal strife in Zimbabwe receives full publicity er to prove its
thesis that Mugabe cannot maintain a stable regime. 25X1
ZANZIBAR
Some analysts believed that there could be a possible attempt by Zanzibar
to secede from Tanzania within the next 90 days, although it was generally
agreed that Nyerere would not hesitate to use force to prevent such a move.
If Jumbe's poor health leads to his death, tension n the island caused by
disagreements on new leadership could accelerate.
*This memorandum is one of a series produced by NIO/AF. Its purpose is to
review possible developments in the short-term future that would be damaging
to US interests. Obviously, many of these developments will not occur in the
time frame or in the manner suggested, or will not occur at all.
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CHAD
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and natural disasters could well lead to vio en in -1
and even famine. Tanzania, Mozambique, Chad, a agasc
singled out as countries in which the combination of poor harvests, drougl]t
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t ' t nal disturbances
Subsequent to the meeting, it has been reported that Goukouni has invited
the Libyans to return in order to shore up the shaky GLINT. Qadhafi's price is
likely to be the outright secession of the Aozou strip. It is unlikely1
however, that any Chadian politician could. pay this price and survive. 2~2
GROWING FOOD SHORTAGES
Over the next three months, prior to the new harvest season, disturbances
may arise in a number of African countries because of serious food shortages
M d my, and Ghana were
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