WARNING REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP83B01027R000300040012-1
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
4
Document Creation Date: 
December 20, 2016
Document Release Date: 
April 23, 2007
Sequence Number: 
12
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
June 25, 1982
Content Type: 
MEMO
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PDF icon CIA-RDP83B01027R000300040012-1.pdf136.93 KB
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Approved For Release 2007/04/24: CIA-RDP83BO1027R000300040012-1 SECRET THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE S DDI #5220-82/1 25 June 1982 MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence Deputy Director of Central Intelligence THROUGH : National Intelligence Officer for Warning FROM : L. Gray Cowan National Intelligence Officer for Africa SUBJECT : Warning Report: Sub-Saharan Africa 1. Action Requested: None; the attached report is for your information. 25X1 2. Background: Community representatives and specialists met on 22 June 1982 with the NIO/AF as chairman. The attached report has not been coordinated with the other participants, but is being circulated to them. If they feel their views have been misinterpreted, or if they have significant additional concerns, I'll report Wither to y0 A. 25X1 L. Gray Cowan Attachment DDI #5220-82 Approved For Release 2007/04/24: CIA-RDP83BO1027R000300040012-1 Approved For Release 2007/04/24: CIA-RDP83BO1027R000300040012-1 0 DDI #5220-82 25 June 1982 WARNING REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA MOZAMBIQUE Maputo is rife with rumors that a move to oust President Machel could take place soon. Analysts agree that there is a strong possibility over the next 90 days of a coup attempt against Machel in light of his failure to check the operations of the South African-backed insurgent NRM who have been moving toward the capital. Evidence of a plot is very sketchy; one report hints at possible South African involvement in a coup attempt. Given the murkiness of the internal political scene and the serious collection problems that complicate the Community's efforts to analyze the personalities and factions within the Machel regime, we are unable to predict with any certainty who might emerge as leader in a post-Machel government. A successor regime could be pro-Soviet or pro-West, depending on which internal faction emerges the stronger from a successful coup. 25X1 SOMALIA The recent arrest of several high officials on vague allegations of plotting is indicative of President Siad's erratic efforts to cast about for ways to shore up his eroding position. Growing discontent in the military, tribal unrest, and the seriously weakened economy add to Siad's frustration. His actions are now perceived by many within Somalia as indecisive, further exposing the shakiness of his regime. DIA does not preclude the possibility of a change in leadership in the next 90 days and fears that anti-US leaders might emerge because of the lack of substantial US aid to the government. While most analysts agree that Siad's departure could take place soon, the fact that Siad is seen by some in the military as the major impediment to receiving more US assistance indicates to them that anti-US feeling would not necessarily result from his ouster. 0 25X1 heavy-handedness may complicate US efforts to provide assistance to a lo time friendly country with whom the US has a military access agreement. KENYA The recent spate of detentions and the enactment of a constitutional provision making Kenya officially a one-party state reflect President Moi's heightened sensitivity to internal criticism at a time when Kenya's economic problems are mounting. While detentions took place during the Kenyatta years, such actions are unprecedented for the Moi government. Most observers agree that Moi has overreacted and fear that these moves may indicate a weakening of his position and his uncertainty about coming to grips with the country's worsening economic and social problems. While it is too early to tell if Moi's actions are the harbingers of a more authoritarian regime, they do not augur well for Kenya's future. The possible negative reaction abroad to Moi's SECRET Approved For Release 2007/04/24: CIA-RDP83BO1027R000300040012-1 Approved For Release 2007/04/24: CIA-RDP83BO1027R000300040012-1 ? MAURITIUS Analysts are awaiting indications that the anti-US rhetoric of the MMM election campaign will be translated into concrete actions by the new leadership. The MMM will probably curtail US ship visits. T are reports of wider Soviet and Libyan contacts with the new government. 25X1 ANGOLA There are conflicting indications that Cuban reinforcements may have arrived in Angola. UNITA says that its forces are encountering more Cubans during UNITA's operations and there have been some indications the Cubans have been taking casualties. DIA believes there may have been an augure~nt n of Cuban forces, but there was no consensus that this has happened. I I 25X1 The economic situation remains desperate and Mobutu appears more isolated than ever. He is surrounded mainly by tribal supporters, many of whom are sycophants unwilling to advise him to make the tough decisions necessary to attack the country's serious problems. The Community remains concerned that the FLNC apparently continues its efforts to prepare for suba activities inside Shaba, possibly during elections there in September. 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/04/24: CIA-RDP83BO1027R000300040012-1 Approved For Release 2007/04/24: CIA-RDP83BO1027R000300040012-1 Approved For Release 2007/04/24: CIA-RDP83BO1027R000300040012-1