WARNING REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP83B01027R000300040012-1
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
4
Document Creation Date:
December 20, 2016
Document Release Date:
April 23, 2007
Sequence Number:
12
Case Number:
Publication Date:
June 25, 1982
Content Type:
MEMO
File:
Attachment | Size |
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Body:
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SECRET
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
S
DDI #5220-82/1
25 June 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH : National Intelligence Officer for Warning
FROM : L. Gray Cowan
National Intelligence Officer for Africa
SUBJECT : Warning Report: Sub-Saharan Africa
1. Action Requested: None; the attached report is for your
information. 25X1
2. Background: Community representatives and specialists met on
22 June 1982 with the NIO/AF as chairman. The attached report has not
been coordinated with the other participants, but is being circulated to
them. If they feel their views have been misinterpreted, or if they have
significant additional concerns, I'll report Wither to y0 A. 25X1
L. Gray Cowan
Attachment
DDI #5220-82
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0
DDI #5220-82
25 June 1982
WARNING REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
MOZAMBIQUE
Maputo is rife with rumors that a move to oust President Machel could
take place soon. Analysts agree that there is a strong possibility over the
next 90 days of a coup attempt against Machel in light of his failure to check
the operations of the South African-backed insurgent NRM who have been moving
toward the capital. Evidence of a plot is very sketchy; one report hints at
possible South African involvement in a coup attempt. Given the murkiness of
the internal political scene and the serious collection problems that
complicate the Community's efforts to analyze the personalities and factions
within the Machel regime, we are unable to predict with any certainty who
might emerge as leader in a post-Machel government. A successor regime could
be pro-Soviet or pro-West, depending on which internal faction emerges the
stronger from a successful coup. 25X1
SOMALIA
The recent arrest of several high officials on vague allegations of
plotting is indicative of President Siad's erratic efforts to cast about for
ways to shore up his eroding position. Growing discontent in the military,
tribal unrest, and the seriously weakened economy add to Siad's frustration.
His actions are now perceived by many within Somalia as indecisive, further
exposing the shakiness of his regime. DIA does not preclude the possibility
of a change in leadership in the next 90 days and fears that anti-US leaders
might emerge because of the lack of substantial US aid to the government.
While most analysts agree that Siad's departure could take place soon, the
fact that Siad is seen by some in the military as the major impediment to
receiving more US assistance indicates to them that anti-US feeling would not
necessarily result from his ouster. 0 25X1
heavy-handedness may complicate US efforts to provide assistance to a lo
time friendly country with whom the US has a military access agreement.
KENYA
The recent spate of detentions and the enactment of a constitutional
provision making Kenya officially a one-party state reflect President Moi's
heightened sensitivity to internal criticism at a time when Kenya's economic
problems are mounting. While detentions took place during the Kenyatta years,
such actions are unprecedented for the Moi government. Most observers agree
that Moi has overreacted and fear that these moves may indicate a weakening of
his position and his uncertainty about coming to grips with the country's
worsening economic and social problems. While it is too early to tell if
Moi's actions are the harbingers of a more authoritarian regime, they do not
augur well for Kenya's future. The possible negative reaction abroad to Moi's
SECRET
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MAURITIUS
Analysts are awaiting indications that the anti-US rhetoric of the MMM
election campaign will be translated into concrete actions by the new
leadership. The MMM will probably curtail US ship visits. T are reports
of wider Soviet and Libyan contacts with the new government. 25X1
ANGOLA
There are conflicting indications that Cuban reinforcements may have
arrived in Angola. UNITA says that its forces are encountering more Cubans
during UNITA's operations and there have been some indications the Cubans have
been taking casualties. DIA believes there may have been an augure~nt n of
Cuban forces, but there was no consensus that this has happened. I I 25X1
The economic situation remains desperate and Mobutu appears more isolated
than ever. He is surrounded mainly by tribal supporters, many of whom are
sycophants unwilling to advise him to make the tough decisions necessary to
attack the country's serious problems. The Community remains concerned that
the FLNC apparently continues its efforts to prepare for suba activities
inside Shaba, possibly during elections there in September. 25X1
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