THE STRATEGIC WARNING STAFF

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B01027R000200140003-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 3, 2005
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: February 22, 1978
• Content Type: MF

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HE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGEN
Notional Intelligence Officers
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH
FROM
Deputy Director, National Foreign Assessmen
National Intelligence Officer for Warning(-
r~
t,
1. Attached, at long last, are the Warning Working Group's
study,and recommendations on the SWS and on my own staff. When we
last discussed the subject, you indicated you would seek the DCI's
approval orally if you thought it necessary.
2. The DCI has shown no enthusiasm for continuing SWS; when he
accepted the recommendation last fall that NIO/W and the Working Group
be established, he saw this as a first step, leading eventually to
discontinuing SWS. While I can understand his reaction to SWS as it
is, I believe any radical reduction in the resources devoted to
strategic warning would be a political mistake, especially in the
present atmosphere. He doesn't have to have SWS, but he has to have
a functioning organization of some kind answering to him that meets
his "Pearl Harbor" responsibilities. NIO/W, by himself, is not enough.
We chose not to address the political aspect of the problem in our
formal report, but we agree nonetheless that this is an important issue.
3. The Working Group believes that the real weakness in SWS is
in the quality of its personnel and particularly in the character of
its Director, who is a brilliant officer but was not made to be a
leader and manager. Our recommendation of Option C, which may appear
to be a defense of the status quo, is in fact a recommendation for
revitalization with.a new manager and new analysts. One difficulty
in drafting our report was to say this tactfully without under-
cutting officers who are doing as well as they can. Perhaps we have
been so tactful the message does not come through.
ILLEGIB
25)
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4. Speaking personally and not for the working Group, I think
there is no better than a 50-50 chance that we can make the SWS a
strong and stimulating element in the system, even if we can find
the right officer to lead it (and induce him to spend two or three
thankless years in the Pentagon basement). If we cannot attract
the right people, we should abolish forthwith rather than prolong the
agency.
5. Again speaking personally, I could live with a smaller, elite
staff at Langley (Option E) and I believe we could recruit one relatively easy.
DIA would be pretty unhappy, however, and several of the slots would prob-
ably have to come from those now used by agencies other than CIA to man
SWS.
6. Once you and the DCI have come to some conclusion on SWS, I
will amend the draft DCID to conform. As SWS is Community-manned,
decisions regarding it should get some sort of NFIB review. Formal
coordination of the DCID, a step we are already committed to, will
serve this purpose.
Richard Lehman
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STAFFING FOR THE NATIONAL WARNING SYSTEM
I. Introduction
1. In the fall of 1978, the Warning Working Group* set up an
ad hoc study committee to review the future of the Strategic Warning
Staff. The WWG met on 10-11 January to consider the study group report.
This report presents the WWG's findings both as to the SWS and as to
other staff needs of the National Intelligence Officer for Warning.
These two components should be treated together and functions allocated
to each.
II. Functions of a National System for Warning
2. Responsibilities at the national level divide easily into
two parts. The first is managerial, those measures undertaken to make
the warning activities of the Intelligence Community more effective.
The second is substantive, the act of warning itself or of bringing the
analytic techniques of warning intelligence to bear on Community assessments
of a current situation. We have identified four functions, in each of
which there is a managerial component and in two of which there is also
a major substantive component.
3. "Procedures". This function deals with incremental changes
to information flows and wiring diagrams in the national system that make
it work better. It includes planning arrangements that would enable the
DCI to provide effective intelligence support to the national authorities
in crisis. The latter is, however, a planning function only; the actual
provision of that support in crisis is a line responsibility for Community
managers.
4. Systems and Budget. There is an indications and warning
return from most if not all major collection systems, and substantial
NFIP funds go to I&W. While these are not defined and at least in the
budget case are probably not fully definable, usefulness to I&W is often
put forward as a justification for programs. Conversely, the critical
nature of certain programs for I&W is sometimes not apparent at the
level of aggregation at which budget decisions are made. A staff
capable of dealing in detail either with system evaluation or with
budget analysis would be expensive and duplicatory, but the NIO/W
should have available enough expertise to be able on a selective basis
to give advice in these matters.
*Membership given in Annex A
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5. Warning, Broadly Defined. The goal of the national system
is to avoid surprise of the President and the National Security Council
by events abroad that really matter to them.* This definition establishes
a spectrum ranging from the "bolt from the blue" to a deliberately
undefined point at which it trails off into matters of evanescent interest
to the national authorities. The more critical end of the spectrum,
involving as it does warning of impending hostilities, is what is usually
called "strategic warning."** We consider this a subset of the warning
problem as a whole. Next come third world crises that contain a threat
of escalation, or political upheavals in countries of major importance
to us, and so on down the scale of criticality until one reaches the
coup in Benin that clearly does not matter to the NSC.
6. The mix of disciplines required to provide warning varies
across this broad spectrum. At the less critical end the questions are
largely political and the techniques of political analysis must be
applied. As one moves up the scale toward nuclear war, the military
component grows and with it the application of the "indications" methodology
to warning problems. Even at the nuclear end, however, there is a
critical political component; a decision to go to war is a political
decision. Indeed, our failures have largely been the result of weakness
in political intelligence. There is a need to focus the national system
on these broader political problems of warning. Specifically we must
find ways to sensitize analysts to their warning responsibilities, to
provide a check against their analysis, to build mechanisms for extracting
warning from day-to-day political analysis, and to train political
analysts in more systematic approaches to critical problems.
7. Strategic Warning. As noted above, strategic warning can
be considered a subset of the broader warning problem. It is, of course,
the most critical and the most difficult, because it involves bringing
about a melding of political analysis and military-oriented indications
analysis, two quite different cultures and disciplines. It requires,
*Defined as follows in a revised DCID 1/5 now in preparation:
Warning encompasses those measures taken, and the intelligence
information produced, by the Intelligence Community to avoid surprise
to the President, the NSC, and the Armed Forces of the United
States by foreign events of major importance to the security of the
United States. It includes strategic warning.
**Defined as follows in the revised DCID:
.Strategic Warning is intelligence information or intelligence
regarding the threat of the initiation of hostilities against the
US or in which US forces may become involved; it may be received at
any time prior to the initiation of hostilities. It does not
include tactical warning.
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we believe, special and detailed attention simply because the issues are
so important to the national interest. That attention includes all of
the tasks listed under broad warning, and in addition requires specialized
attention to indications techniques, including the organization of a
research program in depth. It is only by studying how the Soviets plan
to go to war and how they conduct themselves in crisis that valid lists
of indicators can be developed. Moreover, judgments as to the length of
warning time that intelligence can provide are crucial to major national
budgetary decisions. There is therefore a need to develop and monitor
both indications systems and research programs in support, thereof.
These needs are central to the question of the Strategic Warning Staff.
III. The Problem of Strategic Warning
8. The Strategic Warning Staff was established in 1974 as a
replacement for the National Indications Center. It is located in the
National Military Intelligence Center, which provides it its support,
and is jointly manned by the agencies of the Intelligence Community.
The Director is by charter to be a CIA officer. (Staffing details are
given in Annex B.) While there has been general agreement in the Community
that such an organization is needed, there is equal agreement that the
Strategic Warning Staff needs improvement. Community agencies must give
it full support, particularly in ensuring that its billets, including
the vacant ones, are filled by first-rate personnel. Fundamental to
this is a clearer definition of its mission and more visibility for its
functions.
9. The Warning Working Group believes that there are certain
functions that need to be carried out at the national level in the
strategic warning field, i not by the SWS then by some other organization.
These include:
Synthesis. There needs to be a place in which political,
military, and economic intelligence is brought together
systematically, where the indications methodology inter-
sects with the less structured output of political analysis.
(We note that this is easier to say than to do.)
Conscience. There needs to be an organization that can
"think ominously" about strategic warning. This does not
mean devil's advocacy -- an institutional bias toward
crying wolf -- but rather having professional analysts
schooled in the discipline of warning intelligence who can
bring that perspective into Community deliberations. An
example is the present situation in Indochina. There was
every reason in logic for the Vietnamese not to go all out
in Cambodia, and there was every reason in logic for the
Chinese not to commit themselves to retaliation, but
accumulated indications pointed the other way; the SWS
insisted.that this be recognized.
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Dialogue. There needs to be a mechanism for encouraging and
monitoring discussion among Washington agencies and between
Washington and the field commands on warning matters.
Research. There needs to a mechanism for carrying out,
leading, and coordinating fundamental research on strategic
warning topics and in support of national estimates of warning
capabilities. NIT II.1 calls for such a program.
Methodology. There needs to be a mechanism for coordinating
and assisting in the development of indicators and I&W tech-
niques. Both the analytic and collection disciplines are
involved. The SWS., jointly with Collection Tasking Staff
and the CCF, can be the focus for this activity. Finally,
there needs to be a repository of expertise on indications
methodology that can be used to assist NIOs when regional
problems escalate.
10. In the abstract, these functions sound impressive. His-
torically, however, organizations seeking to carry them out have faced
serious challenges:
Genuine strategic warning situations are rare. If
the charter is defined narrowly, it leads to stagnation.
If to avoid this it is defined broadly, it leads to
diffusion of effort and overlap with current intel-
ligence.
To be effective, an organization must have a rhythm to
its work; it needs.the discipline of a periodic review
of its efforts. Moreover, it must maintain visibility
in the Community if it is to get the support it needs.
This inevitably leads to the issuance of a periodical,
yet such periodicals tend to become stereotyped and lose
the attention of the policy officer.
Even with a relatively narrow charter, it must receive
great volumes of cable traffic. With a small staff,
however, it can become drowned in paper; cable-reading
will crowd out thinking.
A responsibility to "think ominously" has often re-
quired carrying analysis beyond what the evidence will
fully support. It is difficult in such cases to avoid
being seen by line organizations as an adversary and
trouble-maker. This can cause unnecessary resistance
to new theses and break down essential exchanges of
ideas and information between SWS and these organizations.
Moreover, thinking ominously can drift into crying wolf,
at considerable cost to credibility.
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11. Knowledge that such predecessors of the SWS as the National
Indications Center could not overcome these problems has made it diffi-
cult for the SWS to attract the personnel it needs; this in turn magnifies
the problem. Nonetheless, we believe that a generally understood concept
of operation, strong management, good personnel and the backing of the
Community can do a great deal. With the NIOs now explicitly charged
with a broad warning function, the SWS should concentrate on the strategic
end of the spectrum. (But NIO/W should have authority to define where
its limits should be and to make exceptions.) We believe that the
problems of stagnation and sterility can be met by provision of enough
personnel to carry out a daily or weekly discipline and a research
program, while leaving adequate time for critical thought. Management
can then arrange for a rotation of personnel among functions. Despite
the traps, we favor a periodical issuance, in normal times a vehicle for
encouragement of dialogue within the Community, with a dissemination
limited to intelligence officers engaged in or responsible for I&W.
In crisis periods, on decision of NIO/W, this periodical would be
disseminated to the policy officer, who would then need detailed reporting
of this kind. The difficulties of being a conscience without becoming
an adversary can be met by mutual understanding frequent rotation, and
a delicate managerial hand. (Any such program, however, is dependent
on the quantity of personnel as well as quality; see our recommendations
below.)
12. If there continues to be an organization devoted to
strategic warning, as we recommend, there are several secondary questions
that must be answered: its location, its subordination, its manning
policy, its scope, and its name.
-- Location. The present SWS is located in and supported
by NMIC. We believe this arrangement makes sense,
both for reasons of function and of economy. Location
in the NMIC provides access to relevant intelligence
and ready interface with the DoD I&W system. More-
over, SWS is close to the National Intelligence Tasking
Officer for Warning and Crisis Management, and to the Con-
solidated Collection Facility. Location in a fully-
developed intelligence center obviates the need for an
expensive 24-hour operation in the SWS except in crisis.
NIO/W, on the other hand, needs to be at Langley, where
he is close to the DCI, DDCI, and the other NIOs.
Subordination. The DCI has placed the SWS under the
NIO/W. This makes sense, but the necessary physical
separation of the two elements will create problems.
These can be overcome if NIO/W can spend a portion of
his time in the NMIC and if he ensures that SWS has a
strong Director. The present arrangement is that the
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Director/SWS shall come from CIA. We believe this
arrangement should continue in the short run, but we
would not wish to rule out a different arrangement in
the future.
Manning Policy. The present SWS is manned jointly by
the Community agencies. We believe it is important
to continue agency representation if the purpose is
to rebuild links between the individual agencies and
commands and.the SWS as a central node of the national
warning system. As we have noted, however, the con-
tributors of personnel need to put a better foot
forward. We believe, too, that greater flexibility
is in order, and administrative measures to achieve
this should be developed once basic decisions on the
size and functions of SWS are made.
Scope. As noted above, we believe SWS should concentrate
on the strategic warning subset, but we recommend against
a hard demarcation line between its responsibilities and
those of the NIOs. It cannot, however, spread itself
thin, and NIO/W should limit its interests to issues of
major importance. We believe that it should contribute
to the warning activities of the NIOs when those activities
approach the strategic, and that it should, under the
guidance of the relevant NIOs, assume the "conscience"
role for those questions that are at the core of warning --
Soviet attack, North Korean attack, etc. Its research
activities, moreover, should be directed primarily at
Soviet strategic preparations and should be conducted
under a steering committee of NIO/W, NIO/SP, NIO/CF, and
NI0/USSR-EE. (In effect, we are recommending that NIO/W
in consultation with other NIOs as appropriate, be re-
sponsible for the issuance of warning on these central
problem.)
Name. We believe a decision to retain and strengthen
the SWS should be symbolized by renaming it. Among the
possibilities are "National Center for Strategic Warning,"
"National Warning Staff," "Central Warning Group," etc.
For convenience, we have continued in this paper to use
SWS.
13. Decisions on the strength and functions of SWS must take
into account those on NIO/W and his staff at Langley, as developed in
Paragraphs 3-6. The present arrangement calls for NIO/W, an assistant,
and a secretary, We believe that, at a minimum, there should be two
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additional professionals to carry out the functions listed in Paragraphs
3, 4, and 5. One senior substantive officer would assist the NIOs in
their warning responsibilities, and one staff officer would deal with
"plumbing," crisis management, and contingency planning. Under such an
arrangement, the Assistant NIO would be responsible for system and
budget matters. One additional clerical would be required, for a total
of four professionals and two clericals. How the strategic warning
function would be handled is developed in the options below, all of
which assume that NIO/W has at least this number of staff, and in some
cases several more. The reader should be reminded that the present
14. We present below a series of options ranging from a larger
SWS to none, and analyze their impact on the functions an SWS might
perform. See also the attached matrix.
number of Positions assigned national warning -- NIO and SWS
IV. Options
Option A: A Larger SWS. Under this option the SWS would
be increased to 20 professionals and -8 clericals. Such a staff would
maintain a working discipline by issuing a daily national-level warning
report. Its report in normal periods would be primarily a device for
maintaining dialogue and warning consciousness in and with the Community
in Washington and the field. In major crisis, however, it would serve
as a vehicle for periodic reporting to policy officers. Manning to
this level would permit the Director/SWS to issue such a report without
becoming consumed by routine. His analysts would have time to think and
to bring their expertise to bear on Community analyses, and..the staff::would
be strong enough to maintain round-the-clock manning in crisis without
the augmentation that could be had only with great difficulty in such
periods.. At the same time,.the Staff could make a serious contribution
to an inter-Agency research program. Five-six analysts working full-
time on important questions would provide the core around which a coherent
program could be built.
Pro: - Could perform effectively all the functions listed
in Paragraph 9.
- Flexibility in manpower recruitment and use.
- Minimal disruption in crisis.
- Strong contribution to research.
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Con: - Requires an augmentation ofi ver present levels
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- Danger of becoming competitive to existing organi-
zations rather than complementary.
- Effective performance heavily dependent on acquiring
large number of highly-qualified personnel.
- Daily publication significantly increases risk that vehicle
will become stereotyped.
Option B: SWS at Its Present Strength. With~rofes-
sionals and Elericals, SWS could either issue a daily repor`Pas in
Option A or do this weekly and supply some working manpower for research.
Crisis operations would require augmentation.
Compared with A:
Pro: - Weekly exercise is probably as useful in normal
periods as daily, and less enervating for par-
ticipants.
- Manpower requirement is smaller.
- Smaller number more easily recruited and led.
- Some research capability.
- Danger of competition much decreased.
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Con: - Requires
ver present levels
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- Danger of being swallowed by paper and routine.
- Loss of flexibility; crisis augmentation would
be difficult.
- Manning more dependent on individual agency
contributions; high standard more necessary and
more difficult.
-- 0 ption C: Maintain Present Man ower Levels. Under this
option SWS manning would be reduced by professionals and 0
.clerical needed to provide the NIO sta suggested in Para raph 15.
This would leave an unbalanced SWS o professional and clerical
officers, and thought might be given o converting at least one clerical
position to professional. An SWS with =professionals would be only
slightly less capable than that in Option B, and the same arguments
would apply.
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Option D: A Sharply Curtailed SWS. Option D would add
two more professionals to the NIO's staff, raising its strength to
There would be an SWS of perha s six, four professional and two
c erica1, reducing total manpower by ercent. At this level the SWS
could 1) provide some synthesis and en urage dialogue through a periodic
reporting mechanism or 2) develop challenging analyses or 3) lead an
interagency research program. We believe that task 2) cannot be conducted
effectively if task 1) has not been carried out to provide a foundation
for it. We propose under this option to shift task 3) to the NIO/W's
staff, and have provided him an additional officer to lead a research
program. A second staff officer is added, for systems and budget, in
recognition that, as functions are transferred from SWS to NIO/W, ANIO/W
will be too heavily engaged to give detailed attention to these matters.
Thus we believe that such an SWS should be limited to task 1), in effect
a "central node" in the system's wiring diagram. It could synthesize
agency contributions and probably could encourage a dialogue between
Washington and the field. Any larger analytic or "conscience" role
would have to be assumed by appropriate NIOs.
Compared with B and C:
Pro: - Reduced manpower demands.
- Greater flexibility in NIO/W's staff.
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- Research program may profit from being directly
under NIO/W.
- Possible contributions from greater participation
by NIO/CF, SP, etc.
Con: - Manpower very thin, even for curtailed respon-
sibilities.
- NIOs will give less attention than dedicated
staff.
- No flexibility in SWS.
- No specialized attention to methodology.
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-- Option E: No SWS. Further reduction in manning would
make maintenance of a separate SWS inefficient. This option would
therefore further augment the NIO/W staff by two professionals and one
clerical, giving a total of These positions would provide the
nucleus for a strong researc a ort and provide some additional backup
to the NIOs responsible for strategic warning.
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Compared with D:
Pro: - Further reduction in manpower.
- No ambiguity as to responsibility.
- All activities concentrated at Langley under
NIO/W.
- Greater attention to research.
Con: - No structured links between civilian agencies
and NMIC.
- Dialogue greatly reduced.
- Heavily dependent on NIOs, who have other re-
sponsibilities.
- No provision for crisis product.
-- Option F: No Special Attention to Strategic Warning.
This would not only eliminate SWS but somewhat reduce NIO/W's staff from
that in Option E. He would have ANIO, three officers responsible for
plumbing, systems and budget, and support to the NIOs, and two clericals,
for a total of seven.
Compared with E:
Pro: - Greatest manpower savings.
- Small group can be high quality, effective
stimulator.
Con: - Strategic warning problem needs attention,
especially research. (See NIT).
- Political vulnerability.
VI. Recommendations
15. We strongly recommend that SWS be continued. Options B
and C represent the minimum level at which the functions we.think essential
can be carried out. There is little choice between them, but C is less
expensive and we therefore recommend it. In making this recommendation,
we are not simply advocating the status quo. We are calling for an SWS
that is more vigorous, more sharply focussed, better staffed, and better
integrated with the Community.
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16. While we believe that Option A offers the greatest po-
tential for the Community, we recognize that, given the history of such
efforts there is considerable chance that SWS will be unable to deliver
as advertised. Moreover, in the present state of budgetary stringency
additional positions will be hard to come by. (Indeed, given its lack
of visibility in normal times, SWS at any strength may seem to Community
managers a luxury that can be done without.) If further reductions are
desired, we see D and E as about equal, although with different advan-
tages. On balance, the existence of the NIT, as well as manpower con-
siderations, would suggest a preference for E. We recommend strongly
against F as running counter to the priority implied by the NIT, and
politically difficult in any case.
17. Finally, we recommend that you make clear to the Community
your desire for its maximum support for SWS at whatever level you decide.
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Annex A
Membership of the Warning Working Group
Richard Lehman, Chairman
Mr. Peter C. Oleson
Vice irec or or Production, DIA Office of the SecDef/Policy Review
NSA/V
Mr. Theodore G. Shackley
AD/DCI/Collection Tasking
Mr. Robert H. Baran
State/INR
Requirements & Evaluation Staff/CIA
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