CURRENT INTELLIGENCE AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B01027R000200120004-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 30, 2004
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: November 10, 1977
• Content Type: MF

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
y`,qc_ x970- 7 7
10 November 1977
X1
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Robert R. Bowie
Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence
I
Deputy to the DCI for Collection Tasking
SUBJECT: Current Intelligence and Crisis Management
1. Action Requested: None; for information only.
2. Background: This is in response to your query concerning the
papers attached (Tab A). Actually, the paper on a National Current
Intelligence Center is the prospectus for a study later issued by the
Center for Intelligence Studies (Tab B).
-- The CIS paper recommends a ainst such a
national center (pp. 29-32), and we agree with its
findings. Such a Center would be torn between
national and departmental needs, and no.depart-
mental agency would be willing to give its best
analysts to such an organization, especially in
crisis when it would need them most for its own
purposes; your analytic support in crisis must
come from the substantive analysts in NFAC (see
Paragraph 3).
. -- On the other hand, the reorganization
last year that eliminated the Office of Current
Intelligence, in order to strengthen our capa-
bilities for political analysis, did make it
important to assure that our capabilities for
quick and flexible response in crisis are main-
tained. But we should do so without reinventing
OCI: dedication of 200-300 positions for
current intelligence is too high a price.
3. The National Intelligence Tasking Center provides one key element
in our crisis capabilities; without it, we have had a period of improvisa-
tion in the first few days of every major crisis. When NITC is in business,
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there will be a mechanism to handle the coordination of collection in
crisis, both to support you directly and to respond to analytic require-
ments as they develop. But we do not think NITC should get into production.
That would badly confuse functional lines of authority and result in
serious duplication. Analysis and production cover a continuum stretching
from the current intelligence spot report through the analytic current item
in the PDB, the careful response to Presidential questions, the NIE, to the
long-range study. Looked at either way, the job is to treat the same issues
for the same customers using the same kinds of raw information; it makes
sense to use the same analysts as well. Moreover, the range from "normal"
times to crisis is also a continuum. In short, we-should not divide the
substantive or analytic responsibility in any way, but rather devise pro-
cedures to move smoothly from our normal mode to crisis arrangements. This
may mean that we should form an NFAC task force if the situation requires
it, and that such a task force should work closely with the NITC.
4. What then should we do on the NFAC side? The short history of
OCI points out some of the qualities of that organization that made it
responsive: high-level attention and access, a trained cadre of analysts,
established and generally understood procedures for crisis support to the
DCI, responsive supporting and logistic elements. These all are latent in
NFAC today. The analysts in ORPA, OER, and OSR are no less experienced than
before. The Operations Center is stronger than it ever was. Under our
reorganization, Dick Lehman's duties regarding current intelligence will
provide the needed leadership. It will be his responsibility to ensure that
our crisis procedures are in working order, and to work out arrangements
with NITC.
5. In short, we believe we have a sound organization that can meet
your needs on the production side. When the NITC is established, we will
have the same on the collection side.. The important thing is to link them
together properly. We are working together to see that is done.
6. This memorandum was prepared before our breakfast on Wednesday., It
does not treat the question you raised there` We will be getting our. ideas
on this together in the next few days.
STA
Robert R. Bowie
Attachments:
As Stated
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FROM : D/DCI/NI
D/DCI/CT
SUBJECT : Current Intelligence & Crisis Management
Original - Addressee
1 - D/DCI/CT Watts
1 D/DCI/NI Chrono w/o atts
- ER w/o atts
- AD/NFAC/SS w/o atts
1 - C/Collection Liaison Staff w/o atts
1 - NFAC Registry w/o atts
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20505
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
1. Action Requested: None; for information only.
2. Background: This is in response to your query concerning the
papers attached (Tab A). Actually, the paper on a National Current
Intelligence Center is the prospectus for a study later issued by the
Center for Intelligence Studies (Tab B).
Current Intelligence and Crisis Management
-- The CIS paper recommends against such a
national center (pp. 29-32), and I agree with its
findings. Such a Center would be torn between
national and departmental needs, and no depart-
mental agency would be willing to give its best
analysts to such an organization, especially in
crisis when it would need them most for its own
purposes; your analytic support in crisis must
come from the substantive analysts in NFAC (see
Paragraph 3).
-- On the other hand, the reorganization
last year that eliminated the Office of Current
Intelligence, in order to strengthen our capa-
bilities for political analysis, did, make it
important to assure that our capabilities for
quick and flexible response in crisis are main-
tained. But we should do so without reinventing
OCI: dedication of 200-300 positions for
current intelligence is too high a price.
3. The National Intelligence Tasking Center provides one key element
in our crisis capabilities; without it, we have had a period of improvisa-
tion in the first few days of every major crisis. When s in
business, there will be a mechanism to handle the coordination of
collection in crisis, both to support you directly and to respond to
analytic requirements as they develop. But I do not think NITC should get
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into production. That would badly confuse functional lines of authority
and result in serious duplication. Analysis and production is a continuum
stretching from the current intelligence spot report through the analytic
current item in the PDB, the careful response to Presidential questions,
the NIE, to the long-range study. Looked at either way, the job is to
treat the same issues for the same customers using the same kinds of raw
information; it makes sense to use the same analysts as well. Moreover,
the range from "normal" times to crisis is also a continuum. In short,
we should not divide the substantive or analytic responsibility in any
way, but rather devise procedures to move smoothly from our normal mode
to crisis arrangements. This may mean that we should form an NFAC
task force if the situation requires it, and that such a task force
should work closely with the NITC.
4. What then should we do on the NFAC side? The short history of
OCI points out some of the qualities of that organization that made it
responsive: high-level attention and access, a trained cadre of analysts,
established and generally understood procedures for crisis support to the
DCI, responsive supporting and logistic elements. These all are latent
in NFAC today. The analysts in ORPA, OER, and OSR are no less experienced
than before. The Operations Center is stronger than it ever was. Under
our reorganization, Dick Lehman's duties regarding current intelligence
will provide the needed leadership. It will be his responsibility to
ensure that our crisis procedures are in working order, and to work out
AT
5. In short, I believe we have a sound organization that can meet
your needs on the production side. When the NITC is established, we will
have the same on the collection side. The important thing is to link them
together properly.
6. Frank and I have talked over this problem in some detail. He
has authorized me to say that he concurs in this memorandum.
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CENTRAL. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM . Robert R. Bowie
Director, National Foreign Assessment Center
SUBJECT : Current Intelligence and Crisis Management
1. Action Requested: None; for information only.
2.' Background: This is in response to your query concerning
the papers attached (Tab A). Actually, the paper on a National Current
Intelligence Center is the prospectus for a study later issued by the
Center for Intelligence Studies (Tab B).
-- The CIS paper recommends against such a
national center (pp. 29-32), and I agree with its
findings. Such a Center would be torn between
national and departmental needs, and no depart-
mental agency,would be willing to give its best
analysts to such an organization, especially in
crisis when it would need them most for its own
purposes; your analytic support in crisis must
come from the substantive analysts in NFAC (see
Paragraph 3).
-- On the other hand, the reorganization
last year that eliminated the Office of Current
Intelligence, while it achieved its purpose in
greatly strengthening our capabilities for polit-
ical analysis, did result in some weakening of our
capabilities for quick and flexible response in
crisis. To my mind, the problem now is to ensure
that we are able so to respond without reinventing
OCI; dedication of 200-300 positions for current
intelligence is too high a price.
3. The National Intelligence Tasking Center provides one key
element in our crisis capabilities; without it, we have had a period
of improvisation in the first few days of every major crisis. When
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AT 's in business, there will be a mechanism to handle the
coordination of collection in crisis, both to support you directly
and to respond to analytic requirements as they develop. I believe,
however, that we should keep functional lines of authority clear. We
are dealing with a continuum stretching from "normal" times to the
most intense crisis. Moreover, analysis and production is another
sort of continuum stretching from the current intelligence spot re-
port through the analytic current item in the PDB, the careful re-
sponse to Presidential questions, the NIE, to the long-range study.
Looked at either way, the job is to treat the same issues for the
same customers using the same kinds of raw information; it makes sense
to use the same analysts as well. In other words, we should not divide
the substantive or analytic responsibility in any way, but rather de-
vise procedures to move smoothly from our normal mode to crisis arrange-
ments. This does not mean that we should not form an NFAC task force
if the situation requires it, or that such a task force should not
work closely with the NITC.
4. What then should we do on the NFAC side? The short history
of OCI points out some of the qualities of that organization that made
it responsive: high-level attention and access, a trained cadre of
analysts, established and generally understood procedures for crisis
support to the DCI, responsive supporting and logistic elements. The
elimination of OCI removed the web that held these together, but it
did not destroy them; they all are latent in NFAC today. The analysts
in ORPA, OER, and OSR are no less experienced than before. The Oper-
ations Center is stronger than it ever was. Under our reorganization,
the redefinition of Dick Lehman's duties to include current intelligence
will provide the senior leadership. It will be his responsibility to
ensure that our crisis procedures are in working order, and to work
AT out arrangements with He has promised me some recommendations
in a few weeks on how to get better current intelligence without major
changes in organization or resource allocation.
5. In short, I believe we have a sound organization that can
meet your needs on the production side. When the NITC is established,
we will have the same on the collection side. The important thing is
to link them together properly, and I think both Frank and I under-
stand this.
Robert R. Bowie
Attachments
Tab A
Tab B
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MEMORANDUM FOR: ear owie
As the Director has sent this both to you
I have arranged for
copy of my memo.
to get a
STA
STA
Richard Lehman
AD/NFAC/SS
5.75 lvl EU DITI OR NSIOUS
Date 13 October 1977
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may' 25
MEMORANDUM FOR: Robert R. Bowie
Director, National Foreign Assessment Center
FROM
SUBJECT
. Richard Lehman
Associate Director-Substantive Support, NFAC
. DCI's Interest in Current Intelligence Arrangements
1 You will remember that, in response to a DCI query 25
I lasked me to write a description of the Office of Curren n el-
ligence. (I gave you a copy.) 0 then gave this to the DCI as "some-
thing to think about," and packaged it with a paper he had been holding,
on the origin of which he was unclear.
2. The folder that went to the DCI has returned with a brief
instruction and is attached (Tab A). I recognize the second paper as
the prospectus for a study by the Center for Intelligence Studies. The
study was subsequently prepared, unknown to l and is at Tab B. 25
It recommends against the proposal for a National Current Intelligence
Center. See on. 29-32.
3. I believe you should respond to the DCI as follows:
-- The production of finished intelligence is
a continuum reaching from crisis reporting
to long-range research. It makes no sense
to divide this responsibility, with one set of
analysts (under one Deputy to the DCI) respon-
sible for one kind of analysis and estimating
and another (under a different Deputy) respon-
sible for another.
-- The concept of a national current intelligence
organization hangs up, as the Tab B study con-
cludes, on the difficulty any agency has in
giving up to such a center control of its best
analysts, the ones it will rely on most in a
crisis, to do a variety of urgent jobs including
current intelligence. And a center would not ------ -
xl
'ihk cocumeniSfft're
eo non-codewor
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work without really good people. (This is
the problem with forming a National Task Force
in a real crisis.) The idea of centralization
has got to mature a great deal more before
this idea will march (and that kind of cen-
tralization implies some costs to analytic
competition I doubt we want to take.)
-- The strengths of the OCI organization still
exist in the present DDI organization. The
key is to restore high-level attention. I
think (diffidently) that the new definition
of my duties will provide that. After a few
weeks of renewed experience, I plan to develop
some (modest) proposals for building on these
latent strengths. In addition, the NITC will
help solve many of these problems. With an
effective relationship between NFAC and NITC,
I believe we can assure the DCI that he will
be properly served in crisis.
-- In general, fancy schemes won't work. What
you need in crisis is the arrangements and
the help that permit the responsible pro-
fessionals to do the job they know how to do
under much more difficult circumstances. You
don't need a different set of people or a
radically different set of working relation-
ships.
25
Richard Lehman
Attachments:
Tab A
Tab B
X1
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1. The Office of Current Intelligence was established in 1951 and
disestablished in 1976. In the major reorganization carried out when
General Smith became DCI, he created an office to handle the SIGINT ac-
tivities of the Agency, then considered highly sensitive. To the SIGINT
function was soon added that of producing a daily current intelligence
bulletin. President Truman had specifically requested that such a bulletin
be produced, and, when the Office of National Estimates resisted taking
on this task, the SIGINT office was seen to be the unit most closely re-
lated to current intelligence.
2. As the Agency's SIGINT activities broadened, however, and as the
mystique surrounding SIGINT -- a legacy from World War II -- was gradually
dissipated, the need for a compartmented and self-contained inner organi-
zation to handle all aspects of SIGINT policy, collection, production, and
dissemination was eliminated. OCI continued to produce all-source current
intelligence, but its, specific SIGINT responsibilities were gradually
reduced to those of overall SIGINT policy and relations with NSA. These
were finally transferred out of OCI in the early 1960's, but the original
concept of a self-contained organization gave OCI significant operational
strengths that carried over into its current intelligence mission. (See
Paragraph 12).
Mission
3. OCI had four primary functions, although there was considerable
variation over time in the way these were handled. In addition, there
were a number of major responsibilities that were derivative from these
primary ones.
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 APl&Fo d 4 FUL98 /rl~ Pn~i - D r3~1~ t0 ogd1I 004' cal
intelligence. At ?st this was interpreted as conlined to the production
of political analysis for current intelligence periodicals, but OCI's
activities gradually broadened to include a great variety of memoranda
and other policy support papers. Ultimately the drafting of political
contributions to National Intelligence Estimates was assigned to OCI
after the disestablishment of the Office of National Estimates in 1973.
5. Second, the Office was responsible for the synthesis of CIA's
current reporting. This responsibility derived from the central role of
political analysis in assessing the intentions of foreign countries.
Thus, OER and its predecessor organization supplied current economic
analysis to OCI. Until the formation of OSR in 1967, OCI had a small
military division through which current military reporting was obtained
from the Defense intelligence agencies. OSR absorbed this unit and took
over the responsibility for current reporting, including that of DDS&T.
6. Third, OCI was responsible for the issuance of current intel-
ligence peridocials as a major means of conveying this integrated analysis
to the policy.levels. It issued a hierarchy of publications, increasing
in sensitivity as the breadth of dissemination was reduced. The top of
the pyramid was the President's Daily Brief, established for President
Kennedy in 1961. The original Central Intelligence Bulletin continued
through several metamorphoses until it was absorbed into the present
National Intelligence Daily, first issued in January 1974. The Current
Intelligence Weekly Review, established in 1954, has run continuously
in various formats ever since. In addition, there were a number of more
specialized daily and weekly publications including regional reviews,
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 crisis SApga ~%i Fffr s%;FW3*?di PW'RW iWJ1V%qAKVgM etai led
reporting on subjects of great and continuing national interest. For
instance, such a report on Vietnam and the problems surrounding it was
issued from about 1965 to the early 1970's, most of that period daily.
7. Fourth, the production of political intelligence was extended
in 1962 to include a particular kind of longer-term political research,.
the drafting of the political and sociological sections of the National
Intelligence Survey. Beyond this, the Office was given an amorphous
mission to do longer-term policy-oriented "research." This was never
clearly defined, however, and successive Directors of the Office had
great difficulty in grappling with it. Moveover, it competed, as the NIS
did not, for quality personnel who could not easily be spared from their
current and policy support responsibilities. In 1973-74 the NIS program
was terminated and the "research" mission was assigned to the Office of
Political Research, newly created to deal with these problems.
8. OCI's secondary responsibilities sometimes loomed larger than its
fundamental ones. They included:
-- Indications and warning, including the chair-
manship of the USIB Watch Committee, now defunct,
and the staffing of its 24-hour secretariat, the
National Indications Center. (The present Strategic
Warning Staff is the lineal descendant of this oper-
ation.)
-- Development, and management as an integral part
of its own organization, of the CIA Operations Center.
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creasinglyooency-wide role, it became independent
of OCI.)
-- Substantive support of the DCI in crisis.
These activities are described in more detail below.
-- Preparation, based on contributions from all
appropriate Agency elements, of the DCI's substantive
briefings of the NSC and of Congress.
Substantive support to DDO stations overseas,
both through the provision of periodical cables and
through the assignment of OCI officers to certain major
stations.
Organization
9. The Office's organizational position was unique. While it was
a subordinate element of the DDI, the Director of Current Intelligence
worked under the direct supervision of the DCI as much as he did under
the DDI. He was executive agent for the DCI's Operations Center, he was
the officer responsible for preparation of the DCI's briefings, and he
was editor and publisher of the PDB and other publications for the DCI's
personal custcm9rs. In recognition of this key role, the D/OCI was a
regular member of the DCI's Morning Meeting, which he customarily opened
with a short current intelligence briefing.
10. These arrangements provided two great strengths for the Agency's
overall current intelligence effort: The D/OCI's presence at the Morning
Meeting and his relationship with the Director enabled him to be fully
aware of high-level policy concerns and sensitivities and to shape the
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 1 product accordingly; at the same time his ppos tion a11eh the
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clout to extract frrother elements of the Agency the support he needed
to do the job. In the view of many, however, this led to an over-emphasis
on current intelligence at the expense of longer-range work.
11. Internally, OCI analysts were organized in country desks, pro-
viding worldwide coverage. Several analysts might be assigned to specific
aspects of a major topic such as Soviet foreign policy, while a single
analyst would be responsible for half a dozen small African countries. Inter
al.ia, each was responsible for reading, hour-to-hour, all the substantive
electrical traffic on his area of responsibility. Country analysts were
grouped in conventional regional branches and divisions. Their number
ranged between 100 and 150 as the mission, particularly with regard to
research, was changed.
12. OCI's overhead was considerably larger than that of other pro-
duction offices. In addition to the Operations Center and the editorial
element necessary for the production of periodicals, it initially con-
tained a virtually self-sufficient support apparatus. Thus it at one time
had its own security, communications, printing, graphics, and courier
elements. Over time, these were reassigned to the appropriate Agency
organization, although a number of them remained dedicated to the support
of OCI.
Crisis Activities
13. In crisis, OCI became the DCI's command post in his role as
substantive adviser to the President and the NSC. A DDI task force,
drawing together the analytic skills necessary for the subject at hand,
was assembled in the Operations Center under the direction of the OCI
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to the problem were supplemented from other offices and divisions to
provide 24-hour manning. One major mission of the task force was to
produce all-source, comprehensive situation reports. These were designed
to place the policymakers on a common information base by reducing the
mass of confused and contradictory incoming traffic into a single, co-
.herent and timely account of what was actually happening. Sitreps were
usually produced at six-hour intervals. The operation was flexible,
.however, and reports were often timed to be available for NSC or WSAG
meetings. Other agencies also produced such reports, but Cabinet and
sub-Cabinet officers generally appeared to find the CIA product the most
useful.
14. In addition to the situation reports, the task force responded
with analytic or factual memoranda to needs identified by the DCI through
his participation in policy deliberations. Sometimes these were prepared
as briefings for him to give at the next meeting, sometimes as separate
memoranda, and sometimes as attachments to the situation reports them-
selves. Some sample situation reports are attached.
15. Until the creation of the National Intelligence Officers, the
task force chief was the DCI's senior staff officer for the crisis and
often accompanied him to his meetings downtown. This responsibility was
taken over by the NIOs, who then served as the link between the DCI and
the task force.
16. The effectiveness of this system depended on:
-- The unique relationship of the D/OCI to the
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consequent close integration of its activities with
those of the OCI divisions.
-- A corps of analysts trained in and responsive
to the demands of crisis work, again under 0/OCI's
control.
-- The availability of dedicated support resources.
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MEMORANDUM FOR: D/DCI/NI
SUBJECT : Organization of the NITC
1. You asked for my reaction to Friday's discussion of the NITC.
Two points particularly struck me. The first is the one you mentioned:
Too much emphasis is being given to the ad hoc or crisis functions of the
Tasking Center at the expenses of the less dramatic but more fundamental
business of systematic collection over the long term. The former can be
extremely important from time to time, but -- as was brought out -- ad
hoc tasking is a small fraction of the whole. Moreover, the better the
long-term task is done, the less adjustment is necessary in crisis. I
cannot imagine`a 24-hour watch office of the Tasking Center being a very
busy place under normal' conditions, however essential its existence.
2. It is true that when an analyst knows what picture he wants,
he can ask and the system will provide. In that sense, the present system
works. But it is not true that, because he states a less specific need
for information about a situation, the system will be equally responsive.
The analyst does notfully'know comprehensively what sources are avail-
able or can be made available, or what sources he thinks are available
and are in fact not. Nor can he judge whether the price in other infor-
mation not collected is worth it. Nor can he do his analytic job and at
the same time systematically monitor collection in his area or topic.
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3. None of thes sks,.i'e now carried out on a IWtematic basis.
Because they are not, we are faced with a need to improvise when we must
cope with something new. (We must not only improvise collection arrange-
ments, we must improvise mechanisms to devise these arrangements and
must use inexperienced people to man them, e.g
Because they
are not, we do not follow up to see if anything is done about areas of
priority interest after we identify them, e.g., South African nuclear.
Because they are not, any systematic long-term attack on a priority sub-
ject requires special skills and arrannements not normally found in the
Community, e.g., Soviet civil defense, where the success of our effort
has to a considerable extent depended on the efforts of one uniquely
.qualified.retiree.
4.. What should be learned from this in organizational terms?
First, that the organization's emphasis must be on planning the long-
term attack.. If this is.done well, the short term will be greatly sim-
plified. Planning for the long-term, however, should not be allowed to
hold up routine analyst-to-collector requests.
5. Second., that an NITC should be problem-oriented, not discipline-
oriented. Obviously; its ultimate product will be tasks for the individual
collection disciplines, but these must always be part of a coherent
whole.
6. Third, that the organization must be producer-oriented. If it
exists for any purpose other than to serve the producer then it will
become a barrier to good intelligence rather than a gateway. The producer
defines the problem; the NITC solves it. Since a solution required' knowl-
edge of both production and collection worlds, the NITC's key personnel
should be drawn from a mix of collection and analytic disciplines.
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7. Fourth, t the NITC should be responsiv The analyst,
production manager, or DCI himself should know where to take his problem
and be able to go directly there. The officers in the decision process
should be small in number but high in quality. They should be able to
work informally, not hampered by cumbersome staff procedures or committee
coordination (the Committees should be advisory only, not part of the
operational process). Under no circumstances should the NITC incorporate
any element with "plans and programs" in its title. Note that I am
arguing for a small decisional element only. There is no reason why such
aIN ITC cannot organizationally incorporate those elements of the Com-
munity that routinely process routine requirements and still keep its
central operative mechanism small and informal. Responsiveness also de-
mands, of course, that these central operations not impede the rapid pro-
cessing of routine requirements.
8. Fifth and finally, the NITC should provide continuity over the.
full range from intense crisis to routine requirement.. We cannot have one
group of people responsible for crisis and ad hoc requirements, and another
for routine and aoong-term. It is not only inefficient, it is confusing
and even destructive' to the overall effort. Continuity also requires
that the DCI's overall national requirements continue to be expressed
and considered in the tasking process when the Secretary of Defense is
in charge of tasking.
9. My scond concern is with Dan Murphy's remarks about crisis
management; it bears not only on location of the NITC but also on its
makeup. Dan cited four "crises": the Korean tree-cutting incident; the
Mayaguez affair, the Son Tay operation, and the raids on Hanoi. In my
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experience none of e, except posse y the Hanoi ds, e:,aiify as
crises. Rather, they were unique US military operations, and the logical
place to follow them, I agree, was the NMCC. But by the time they were
launched, the underlying intelligence job had largely been completed
and the DCI was naturally a spectator rather than an actor.
10. Real crises are run out of the White House Situation Room.
This has been true since there was a Situation Room, beginning with the
Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. In recent years, the India-Pakistan War
of '71, the Middle East War of '73 and the Cyprus affair of '74 have all
found the action in the West I-ling basement. Typically, there are one or
two meetings a day of the principal players, including the DCI. Typically,
also, the DCI comes out of these meetings with requirements for additional
analysis, not additional collection. Once the initial adjustments of
coverage are made when a crisis opens, the collection systems operate
more intensely, but there is not much high-level decision-making iiwe-l-ved.
The exception is the big operation that requires careful coordination.
11. I see no reason why this administration would operate any dif-
ferently.under stress than its predecessors. Therefore:
-- We should not expect that an NITC can provide
a new dimension in crisis. It can make the
initial adjustment more efficient, it can pro-
vide the DCI with more and more current infor-
ST
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mation out what is going on, and it help
him coordi,a?nte the big decisions in an orderly
way. The new dimension is the careful, compre-
hensive collection strategy work done in the ab-
sence of or in anticipation of crisis. This is
again an argument not to let the ad hoc tail wag
the long-term dog.
-- In terms of location, I find Dan's argument ten-
dentous. In the crises where intelligence still
matters, the action is in the White House. This
would seem to argue for F Street, but only if the
DCI is hit with new collection requirements rather
than analytic ones. To me, it argues for Langley,
where the analysts are, and where the DCI can
state his needs after an SCC meeting and have
troops answerable to him ready to respond. If
further collection is needed, the analysts must
define i t.
-- That said, there remains the obligation to turn
the con over to SecDef on Presidential decision.
If everything said so far calls for a small "watch
element," it should not be difficult to duplicate
its facilities, itnot its People, at Langley, the
Pentagon, and even, though I doubt the necessity,
at F Street. This, plus secure phones, would pro-
vide maximum flexibility. But, whatever else, let
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us keche central decisional element Langley,
close to where the DCI is based and where the
analysts are.
12. Bill Colby had the idea that his NIOs could deal with collection
as well as production. His reach, however, was beyond his grasp. The
NIOs had all they could do to ride the production horse without moving
more than nominally into the collection field. This doesn't mean it
wasn't a good idea, only that he asked too much of them. We could use
a group (a small group) of National Collection Officers, working with
the same informality of approach, breadth of charter, and individual drive
and experience, of the NIOs. If you create these, establish underneath
them a mechanism to get at the collection disciplines (with the sacred
committees only advisory), and append to the whole a small watch element
for crisis, you have what you need. With that established on the leanest
possible basis, you can then hang on it all the routine processing elements
in the Community moving'them physically and without losing the essential.
benefits of smallness.
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