CHINA-VIETNAM-USSR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B01027R000200030028-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 26, 2006
• Sequence Number: 28
• Publication Date: January 19, 1979
• Content Type: MF

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Washinbton. D. C.20505
ALERT MEMORANDUM
Copy No.
19 January 1979
MEMORANDUM FOR: National Security Council
Attached for your information is an alert memorandum on
China-Vietnam-USSR. The Chinese appear to be completing a
deployment of forces and a propaganda groundwork that will
enable them to take military action against Vietnam at a
time of their choosing. There are formidable political ob-
jections to such action but considerations of prestige appear
to play an important part in Chinese calculations. Should the
Chinese initiate action, a drive into Vietnam followed by re-
latively rapid withdrawal is the most likely option. Action
could occur even before Vice Premier Deng's visit to the US.
Soviet response to a Chinese attack on Vietnam will be con-
tingent on the extent and severity of the Chinese action.
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
National Intelligence Officers
Copy No.
19 January 1979
Since our Alert Memorandum of 5 January, which warned
of possible direct Chinese military action against Vietnam,
China has continued its military buildup along the Sino-
Vietnamese frontier. The manner of the buildup, its timing
and the mix of forces involved suggest offensive rather than
defensive preparations. Chinese propaganda is building a
case that the Vietnamese are intruding on Chinese territory,
and Chinese officials abroad are spreading the word that
China is prepared to "strike hard" in retaliation for Viet-
namese troublemaking. A few officials have asserted that
China is deliberately seeking an occasion to "teach the Viet-
namese a lesson." In sum, the Chinese appear to be completing
a deployment of forces and a propaganda groundwork that will
enable them to take military action against Vietnam at a time
of their choosing. El
There are formidable political objections to such action.
The Chinese must weigh the impact of military action on Sino-
US ties and the risk of undermining domestic support in the
US for the normalization arrangements just worked out. China
must also consider possible-Soviet reaction to any action
against Vietnam, as well as the effectiveness of the Cambo-
dian resistance. Considerations of Chinese prestige and a
desire not to be considered a "paper tiger" by nations in
Southeast Asia, on the other hand, appear to play an impor-
tant part in Chinese calculations. These points have particu-
larly been stressed by the more candid Chinese officials. fl
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Should the Chinese initiate action against Vietnam, they
would certainly attempt to avoid a protracted conflict with
their southern neighbors. A drive into Vietnam territory,
limited in time and distance, followed by a relatively rapid
withdrawal, in the manner of China's 1962 conflict with India,
is the most likely option. We still cannot rule out more
forceful action nor can we rule out a miscalculation that
would make an early Chinese withdrawal difficult, thus ex-
tending and raising the level of action. The Chinese could
strike at any time -- even before Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping
(Teng Hsiao-ping) arrives in the US. F-1
Soviet media, while maintaining a drumfire of criticism
of Peking for border provocations against Vietnam and for
using military pressure, including troop concentrations, in
an effort to "intimidate" Vietnam, have avoided addressing
the contingency of direct Chinese military action -against
Vietnam, much less characterizing it as imminent.
The failure of Soviet media to raise the Chinese attack
contingency, relieving Moscow of the need to address the
question of Soviet response, suggests either that the Soviets
do not regard it as a serious possibility, or if they do,
that they wish to avoid committing themselves to any par-
ticular course of action in response. In any case, they have
not issued any clear public warning designed to deter Peking.
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We believe the Soviet response to any Chinese attack on
Vietnam will be contingent on the extent and severity of the
Chinese action and its political effects. The USSR may con-
clude that a shallow and short-lived Chinese incursion would
not threaten important Soviet interests and might generate
important political benefits for Moscow and Hanoi without
requiring more than demonstrative measures of support for
Vietnam, short of direct military action. Such measures
might include consultations, additional conspicuous aid, a
naval show of force, and troop movements on the Soviet side
of the border. A deeper and more sustained Chinese invasion
would be more likely to evoke more significant Soviet actions.
These might include demonstrative air and ground patrolling,
and ultimately to some sort of military action, probably
measured, for example, reoccupation of one or more of the
Sino-Soviet border river islands now held by the Chinese. 1^
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