DRAFT WARNING REPORT: CHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B01027R000200010008-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 3, 2005
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: October 27, 1978
• Content Type: MF

Approv
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ATE i ~ 78
. All NIOs
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REMARKS:
This is preparatory o our
meeting tomorrow afternoon.
FROM: Richard Lehman, NIO/Warning
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1 FEB 55 )A I REPLACES FORM 38-8 (47)
WHICH MAY BE USED.
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
SC-03656-78
Notional Intelligence Officers 27 October 1.978
FROM James R. Lille"
National Intelligence Officer for China
SUBJECT Draft Warning Report: China
1. Attached is our draft initial warning report
based on our discussion of last Thursday. Jim Lilley
has asked me to take charge of this endeavor in his
absence. Although this report will not be coordinated
we welcome your comments, especially if you find what
you consider errors of omission or misreflections of our
discussion. Please rememberthat rather than offering
judgments as to the likely we are being asked to lean
well forward in considering the possible.
2. N%e will be in touch about next month's meeting:
there ma:! he further guidance from the NIO/`?7a.rnina after
he has considered our initial effort. Could I nle:ise
have any comments either on rnaner or bv phone
by 2 November.
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DISTRIBUTION LIST
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WASHINGTON, D. C. 20303
Notionol Intelligence Officers
30 October 1978
i'tE`IORA i FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA : National Intelligence Officer for Warning
Director, National Foreign Assessment Center
FRO''-I ; National Intelligence Officer for the
Near East and South Asia
SUBJECT : Monthly Warning Meeting for the Near East and South Asia
1. Initial Meeting of the NESA Warning Group. On 26 October repre-
sentatives from tate, D IA,,
_NS
A, t e Army, and Navy net at CIA
.Headquarters for the first monthly warning meeting for the Near East and
South Asia. Dick Lehman, the NIO for Warning, began this first meeting with
a brief discussion of the purposes of the new warning mechanism. Discussion
then followed on.a country by country basis.
2. Summary. The MESA group recognized that many countries in its
area of concern are the focus of continual attention (Egypt, Israel, Iran,
Saudi Arabia, and India) and that unless we saw trends not covered in on-
going analytic activities we would not warn the already warned. Of immediate
concern is the possibility of political upheaval in Algeria following the
possible demise or incapacity of President Boumediene; a miscalculation by
either side along the Egyptian-Libyan border in view of the heavy troop build
up; an increase in terrorist and civil disobedience activities in Israel in
the wake of Camp David; political instability in Syria as a result of a combina-
tion of factors; further anti-regime activity in the YAR; increased demonstra-
tions in Iran during the holy month of Muharram and the possible ouster of
Pakistani Chief Martial Law Administrator Zia. Of a general nature, the type
of decision taken at the Baghdad Summit could cause problems in the ranks of
the moderate Arab States.
3. Al eria. Since we don't know the condition of Algerian President
Boumediene, w o is ill in Moscow, an Algerian succession problem could occur.
Algeria's Third World role, its role in OPEC, and the possible impact of a
change in Algerian leadership on the western Sahara dispute with Morocco, make
Boumediene's health and the lack of a system of succession important factors
to watch.
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4. Lihyan-E tiara Border. US policy makers have been adequately
of the massive buildup informed of Egyptian forces along its border with
Libya (currently twice the size of forces in the Western Military District.
in July 1977 during the last outbreak of fighting). However, it is probably
worth pointing out from a warning point of view that the initiative for
beginning hostilities does not lie wholly with the Egyptians. The July 1977
war resulted from an escalation of a series of border clashes, which had
been provoked by forces on both sides. The action ball does not lie wholly
in the Egyptian court and what occurs at the Baghdad Summit may cause Libya
to be more adventurous.
5. Israel. US policy makers should not be surprised by unrestrained
Israeli reaction to any Arab terrorist attack that might occur over the next
few months -- no matter how tenuous any negotiations with Egypt at the time
of such an attack. Although not considered likely, Arab riots in the West
Bank in reaction to Israeli expansion of settlements must be mentioned as
one of the "less than probable contingencies" suitable for this report.
6. Syria. There are numerous sources of instability in Syria: Events
in Lebanon,, tie health of President Assad, Baath Party in-fighting, and
relations with Iraq. The possibility of Iraqi troop deployments to the
Golan Heights is of particular warning concern, because of the potential for
Israeli military reaction.
7. The Yemens. A coup in either Yemen is considered likely almost at
any time, but this is the way most policy makers have grown accustomed to
seeing the southern tip of the Arabian peninsula. No amount of Saudi (or US)
propping up of the Sana regime is likely to forestall a series of coup
attempts in the YAR.
8. Iran. It was agreed that probably everyone in the US government
was sensitize to the current unrest in Iran. However, it was considered
worth mentioning that the likelihood of further unrest is increased by the
occurrence of the Shia holy month of '?buharram in December.
9. Pakistan. With a decision on the fate of former prime minister Bhutto
coming up wit n e next several weeks, the Army generals are becoming
increasingly upset with Chief 1IL Zia and may move to replace him.
10. The next monthly warning meeting for the Near East and South Asia
will be conducted on Tuesday, 21 November at 1430. Rather than a country-by-
country analysis, discussion of several major topics such as "The Arab-Israeli
Dispute" may be attempted. Suggestions from all agency participants have been
encouraged.
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Robert C. Ames
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Officers
NFAC 4806-78
31 October 1978
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA . National Intelligence Officer for Warning kV
Director, National Foreign Assessment Center
National Intelligence Officer for Western Europe
SUBJECT Organizational Meeting on Warning and Initial
Report - Western Europe
1. Following a briefing by the National Intelligence Officer for
Warning, the West European group had a brief discussion of procedures and
agreed as follows:
-- that we will plan to meet every fourth Wednesday at 1000;
-- I will circulate an agenda of items to be discussed two days
before the meeting;
-- all agencies are invited to propose items for the agenda,
and these will include a one sentence statement of the gen-
eral thrust;
-- ad hoc meetings may be suggested by anyone and may be used
to initiate or coordinate an Alert Memorandum;
-- the regular sessions will also provide occasion to discuss
any pending community business even if not necessarily asso-
ciated with warning.,
2. Concerning how the concept of warning might be made meaningfully
applicable to Western Europe, I suggested that we might have a report con-
sisting of two categories of items: The first would be more or less spe-
cific things involving some potential "nastiness" the US should be alerted
to. This might become a kind of check list of contingencies, and many of
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them could perhaps be handled briefly. The second category would be more
in the nature of adverse trends leading up to some untoward consequence
for US interests. This seemed to make some sense to most. I then dis-
tributed an illustrative agenda, and with some changes and the addition
of a couple of other topics, this served as the basis for the following
first report:
a. Contingencies Checklist. Berlin - The Soviet and East German
governments have again protested that the election of a Berlin mayor as
president of the Bundesrat is a violation of Allied agreements. Mayor Stobbe
is scheduled to preside over Bundesrat sessions in November and December,
and there are precedents for East German attempts to deny him use of ground
transit routes to take up his post. The eastern protests have thus far
seemed pro forma, however, and we doubt that Moscow will allow its displeasure
to threaten larger interests in the West. Azores - There is a new crop of
rumors that the Front for the Liberation of the Azores (FLA) may attempt to
depose the regional government and declare the islands independent. II 25X1
doubt that a FLA-engineered coup attempt would attrac pu c
support, and while the regional government itself has had ties with the sep-
aratist movement, it is currently more interested in the autonomy-under-
Lisbon route.
b. Portugal - The designation of Carlos Mota Pinto as prime min-
ister suggests an easing of the three-month government crisis. Mota Pinto
is a compromise between the feuding President and the Socialists-who, together
with the other parties, may now be willing to lend the prime minister limited
support. The outlook is nevertheless guarded, and Mota Pinto's failure would
likely lead to early -- and probably polarizing -- elections.
c. Spain - With tensions rising in the Basque country, the gov-
ernment is deeply concerned by the continuing problems of low morale and
indiscipline in the security services.
open talk of work stoppages and strikes has spread from the armed police to
the civil guard in the wake of recent terrorist attacks. Resentment of the
government's efforts to replace hardliners in key command positions with
loyalists to the new regime adds uncertainty to the reliability of either
service should the Basque situation seriously worsen.
d. Belgium - The recent collapse of the Tindemans government will
prolong indecision on long-pending economic and defense issues, and perhaps
adversely affect Belgium's role in the shoring up of Zaire's economy. The
new elections, which the caretaker government is expected to hold in about
three months, seem unlikely to ease the ethnic issue that has virtually para-
lyzed the central government in recent years and come close to putting Belgium
as a national state in question.
e. Italy - Some community observers are reducing the odds that the
Andreotti government will last into next year, and possibly, until after the
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elections to the European Parliament next June. Working against Andreotti
are the increasingly hard attacks on the Communists by the "rejuvenated"
Socialists, pressures from the rank and file on Berlinguer to bid for a
larger slice of influence, and within Andreotti's own party, restiveness on
the part of those who are uncomfortable with the role of the Communists and/or
are simply ambitious. Working for Andreotti are the Socialists' need to
consolidate their recent gains, the unresolved leadership problem of the
Christian Democrats, anticipation of some clarification of the Communists'
future line at the party congress next March, and the desire of most poli-
ticians, particularly the Communists, to avoid an early parliamentary elec-
tion.
f. Greece-Turkey-NATO - Efforts to achieve Greece's early reinte-
gration into NATO are hung up on Greek-Turkish differences over how to divide
up the Aegean commands. The Turks have rejected the interim solution of "no
boundaries" that was worked out by General Haig and General Davos and are
insisting that agreement be reached at a political level. But both countries
think definitive arrangements affect not only their security, but may also
set precedents for other, politically-sensitive issues in the Aegean. There
are differences of view whether Ecevit's authority has already been seriously
eroded by Turkey's continuing economic problems and the unending violence,
but it will not be easy for him to appear magnanimous toward the Greeks.
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
National Intelligence Officers
NFAC-4685-78
24 October 1978
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH . Director, National Foreign Assessment Center
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
FROM : Acting National Intelligence Officer for Latin America
SUBJECT : Latin America -- Warning of Impending Developments
1. Action Requested: None; for your information only.
2. Background: The convergence of severe economic, social, and
political problems suggest that political turmoil will characterize
the nations of Central America over the next 60 to 90 days. Challenges
to government stability will be particularly strong in Nicaragua, where
the FSLN plans to launch another guerrilla attack from Honduras and
Costa Rica with logistic support from Venezuela and Panama. In preparation
for this attack, President Somoza is doubling his National Guard, but the
loyalty of new. recruits and their military capacity is questionable.
We should anticipate that Somoza might call on the OAS to protect his
country from military incursions from his neighbors -- a step which
could place the US in the awkward position of voting in the OAS to
protect Somoza.
3. The Nicaraguan situation is causing consternation in El Salvador,
where the stability of the government is precarious. This tiny, over-
populated country is next to the poorest in Latin America. Demographic
problems create pressures difficult to contain. There are currently
205 persons per square kilometer in El Salvador compared to 25 elsewhere
in Central America, and 12 elsewhere in Latin America. With its current
birthrate of 2.9% per annum, the population density will increase to
297 by 1990. Terrorism has been on the upswing for the last two to three
years with political figures and the prominent families which control
the economy the prime targets. There are indications that some of the
prominent families are preparing to abandon the country with as much of
their wealth as they can muster unless outside help can be obtained to
control terrorism.
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4. Elsewhere in Latin America there is a potential for conflict
between Argentina and Chile over the Beagle Channel despite the
negotiations in train. Argentine military
movements in the vicinity of the Chilean border. While this may be
an Argentine tactic to intimidate Chile, it could result in frontier
clashes and possibly in Argentine occupation of the contested islands
in the Beagle Channel. While these islands are of no strategic
importance to the US and US national interests are not directly affected,
the US could become involved in restoring peace to the area.
5. Finally, the economic situation continues to deteriorate in
Peru, and there is some possibility Peru will default on its IMF
commitments. Peru is not quite poor enough to benefit from low-interest
loans available to the poorest nations, but its per capita income is
rapidly descending to that point. In 1976 the per capita income was
$800., A year later it was $740. By this year it dropped to $680.
At this rate it will cross the poverty line of $580 by August 1979,
or possibly even before because of the drought. Only at this point will
Peru be able to apply for low-interest loans. Peru's grave economic
condition will prevent that country from embarking on a military
adventure in Chile, should there be a conflict between Chile and
Argentina.
6. The above judgements are made as a result of consultations
on 19 October 1978 with the "Latinos", the senior intelligence analysts
and collectors in the intelligence community who specialize in Latin
America.
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Distribution:
1 - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - D/NFAC
1 - NIO/W
State
NSA
Treasury
1 - DDO Representative
1
- Mr.
OE R
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- Mr.
OGC R
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- Mr.
, FBIS
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- Mr.
1
- Mr.
n, OSR
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- Mr.
1
- Mr.
FAC/RES
1-ER
1 - NFAC Reg
2 - NIO/LA
Warning of Impending Developments
, DIA
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
National Intelligence Officers
NFAC #4642
20 October 1978
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH : Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
FROM . National Intelligence Officer for Africa
SUBJECT : Warning Report: Sub-Saharan Africa
1. Action Requested: None; the attached report is for your
information.
2. Background: Community representatives and specialists met on
the afternoon of 19 October with the NIO/AF as the as the chairman and
rapporteur. The attached report is the NIO's understanding of what was
said and thought at that meeting; it has not been coordinated with the
participants, but is being circulated to them. I will of course report
to you cases where they feel their views have been misrepresented or
where they believe they have significant additional thoughts. We stand
ready, as always, to use these discussions to address topics of a warning
character that you may wish us to take up.
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WARNING REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
Summary - Intelligence Community specialists are particularly con-
cerned this month that the situation in Rhodesia and adjacent areas is
moving downhill more swiftly than it has in previous periods -- they have
a sense of impending crisis that is accompanied by a general feeling that
the Soviets/Cubans place increasing emphasis on supporting the creation
of conventional forces which would have political roles in both Namibia
and Rhodesia under black rule. Specialists also sense the possibility
of a new phase in military operations in Ethiopia, with more direct Cuban
involvement despite the political arguments against this. Other areas
of particular concern are Zaire, Chad, and Uganda. Analysts do not
believe there is imminent danger of the Soviets obtaining new facilities
in Cape Verde.
Rhodesia - We have a sense that the Rhodesian situation is now tilting
more steeply both toward intensified military operations on all sides and
toward the possibility of a sudden break in white morale with a consequent-
collapse of orderly process. We feel that the Rhodesians' military situation
is constricting so that they may soon be left with no alternative but the
dramatic cross-border strike (with the political complications this brings)
if they wish to demonstrate that they still have significant military
capabilities. Specialists in the Rhodesian economic scene have noted
increased evidence that whites are preparing to make a sudden flight if
they have to, and that white farmers are delaying planting this year for
the first time because of political uncertainty.
At the same time, our concern over the situations in the surrounding
Front Line states -- on whose leaders the US has been relying diplomatically has sharpened. While we have long doubted that Front Line unity, fragile
and partial as it is, could survive the transition to an independent
Zimbabwe, we now see real danger of an even earlier collapse. If this
occurs, civil war among the black nationalists in Zimbabwe appears an even
surer bet that it has been previously.
If, as we fear, the situation continues to deteriorate, Botswana could
well be drawn into a more active and turbulent role as fighting spreads to
its territory, while Kaunda's position in Zambia will become more desperate.
Although we still think he can win his forthcoming elections without trouble
in a technical sense, he will very likely be calling urgently for help from
the US and the UK -- the latter apparently having promised support that it
is reluctant to provide.
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The arrival of Nigerian elements on the ground in. Zambia appears to
us to be an ominous development, possibly opening the way to broader
complications in ways we cannot yet clearly see.
In sum, the Rhodesian situation has reached a point where a dramatic
turn is ir: the offing.
Southern Africa/USSR/Cuba - We are concerned over the possibility that
the situation in southern Africa may be passing, or indeed may have already
passed, into a phase where the Soviet/Cuban role is shifting from supporting
"liberation movements" in their essentially guerrilla/terrorist operations
to helping build, out of the same elements, conventional military forces
which can be used to dominate the internal political situations in Zimbabwe
(Rhodesia) and Namibia after independence under "majority rule" and,
ultimately, to threaten South Africa. A number of specialists have teen
fragments of information which they believe point in this direction, in-
volving possible Soviet conventional training for SWAPO as well as the
better known Soviet/Cuban efforts with ZAPU, ZANU, and South African groups.
If the South Africans should come to see something like this happening,
or to believe that they needed to strengthen their position by further
military demonstrations, we would look for signs of new South African
military and covert action in southern Angola. Such a development would
make it more difficult, of course, for Neto to reduce his dependence on
the Cubans, as we have hoped he would do, while the general deterioration
of the situation in the region would work to the advantage of Soviet/Cuban
influence by sharpening the security anxieties of all the black nationalist
groups and of the Frontline leaders. Recent Rhodesian actions, we believe,
also net out to push the situation in this direction.
Ethiopia - Military analysts tend to think that in Eritrea a new
phase in military operations, involving more direct Cuban participation,
may open within the next 60 to 90 days if the Ethiopians are unable to make
further gains with the level of Soviet/Cuban help they are already receiving
and if the Soviets continue to be unsuccessful in bringing about negotiations.
Political analysts tend to agree, but note that the political factors which
have militated against deeper Cuban involvement are still present. In the
Ogaden, analysts are again concerned that we may see Ethiopian retaliatory
air strikes into Somalia, while they think the danger of ground incursions
has diminished with the transfer of Ethiopian troops to the Eritrean front.
The danger that the Ethiopians will activate anti-Siad ethnic Somali
"liberationists" still appears some distance off; little has been heard of
these groups lately.
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We are, incidentally, much less concerned than earlier over the
possibility of an Ethiopian expeditionary force in southern Africa.
Cape Verde - We may be seeing a fresh Soviet effort to acquire
facilities or a more substantial presence in this territory, but we
believe (while admitting large areas of ignorance) that President Pereira
will resist this as long as he is around. [State/INR has done a paper
on this which it circulated to other agencies for comment and will publish
shortly.]
Western Sahara - There is a danger that the continued failure to
move toward a settlement among Mauritania, Morocco and the Polisario may
generate a fresh upheaval in Mauritania and/or another clash between
Morocco and Algeria.
Uganda - We are of course worried that Amin has some new move against
Americans under consideration, despite reporting that he has decided against
it for the time being. Both the nature of the situation and the character
of Amin make it virtually fruitless to speculate on just what form such
a move might take.
Zaire - Economic analysts are attempting to resolve what they see as
a contradiction between the reports of remarkably good cobalt production
from Shaba and the absence of evidence that these supplies are reaching
the world market. There is suspicion that we may have been misled and that
our original concerns about the impact of Shaba II on production were more
valid than subsequent reporting indicated. Even if this suspicion is
unfounded, we are still worried that the production situation will deterior-
ate in early 1979.
Political analysts find Mobutu's mood disquieting; he is reacting
again against the pressures -- heavier from the US than from other members
of the "reform club" -- to get his house in better order. We do not know
what he might do, other than some kind of diplomatic refrigeration, but
we may be in for another turbulent period in US-Zaire relations.
Chad - The situation is still worrisome; the new compromise
government is not working well, and a collapse is possible. This could
lead to a resumption of hostilities and a fresh Libyan intervention.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Officers
Thanks for your presentation to the
IIWG/NP. Attached is my distillation of subse-
quent discussion and reflection. Please let me
know how this suits your needs. Since national
security policy is ultimately concerned with
the possible deployment and use of weapons by
new nuclear powers, as I see it, warning of
nuclear proliferation will need to be incor-
porated into the strategic as well as the
political warning system. So I will be
interested in following if not joining in
the development of new procedures for strategic
NIO/NP
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NFAC 4641-78
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Officers
NFAC 4641-78
20 October 1978
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
FROM: National Intelligence Officer for Nuclear Proliferation
SUBJECT: Monthly Warning Report (Initial)--Nuclear Proliferation
1. Action Requested: None; for your information only in conjunction
with the new procedures for warning intelligence.
2. Background: I convened a meeting of the Interagency Intelligence
Working Group on Nuclear Proliferation (IIWG/NP) on 18 October to identify
possible items for this report and to introduce Richard Lehman (NIO/W) who
led a discussion of the procedures and criteria for warning. The discussion
during the two and one-half hour meeting was about one-half substantive and
one-half procedural. 25X1
3. Among the numerous items discussed, several are worth noting:
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4. Attached is a checklist of the kinds of items on which warning
would be desirable in the area of nuclear proliferation according to the
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The list should be expanded to
include the following:
--Preparations for the deployment or employment of suspected nuclear
weapons by a non-weapon state anywhere and of known nuclear weapons
by a nuclear weapon state in a nuclear weapon free zone or against
a non-weapon state.
--Indications that anti-nuclear political forces or movements will
nullify the authority of important governments.
--Plans for the disclosure or transfer of critical technology for
nuclear weapons, reprocessing, ehment, p-r-.heavy water production.
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