SOVIET OPTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B01027R000100200018-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 13, 2005
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: August 10, 1979
• Content Type: MF

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10 August 1979
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MEMORANDUM FOR: NIO/USSR-EE, NIO/NESA, NIO/CF
SUBJECT : Soviet Options in Afghanistan
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1. In the accompanying memo, the Director, SWS recommends issuance
of an Alert Memorandum on Soviet options in Afghanistan. I concur with
2. While there is as yet no evidence of military preparations to
intervene beyond the present level, it must be obvious to the Soviets
that the situation is deteriorating and that their options are becoming
fewer. One must logically deduce that they cannot maintain the status
situation?
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Attachment
3. May we meet Monday afternoon at 2:00 p.m. to discuss the
Si g.ner
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 amiza
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S-0033/Sws'l
10 August 1979
MEMORANDUM FOR:_ National Intelligence Officer for Warning
FROM Doug acEachin, Director, SWS
SUBJECT Soviet Options in Afghanistan
1. We believe that the Soviets must choose between one
of the following three general courses of action in Afghan-
istan.
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A. Continue the present course of providing material
support and advisors and technicians,' but refrain from com-
mitting Soviet combat units. (Possibly at the same time
continuing to seek a political solution.)
B. Commit a limited amount of Soviet combat forces,
sufficient to insure at least the security of Kabul and its
immediate area, and perhaps a few other key centers.
C. Commit large combat forces for the purpose of in-
flicting major military defeats on the insurgent forces
and recapturing much of the territory now in rebel hands.
2. Like most other community analysts, we believe
Moscow views the last option as undesireable both in terms
of practical military considerations and the political cor-
resequences that it would entail. We believe there is a
strong likelihood, however, that the Soviets will undertake
the second option, and probably in the near future. We be-
lieve they must consider that if no additional military
force is introduced at least to the Kabul area the USSR
forces the likelihood of being forced to evacuate its mis-
sion from Afghanistan. For reasons discussed below, and also
in the attached memo by we believe that:: oscow25X1
will view the consequent o such a development as worse
than the political costs of introducing limited combat forces
of their own and will be willing to gamble that further esca-
lation can be contained.' Once having undertaken the increase
in their military units, however, the Soviets are likely to
find themselves being drawn to the large operation despite
whatever resolve they might have to avoid it.
~ECREI'
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3. We r ave no concrete evidence that the Soviets are
now preparing for or have decided upon a move of even limited
combat formations. We nevertheless believe that the case is
sufficiently strong to warrant the issuance of an Alert Mem-
orandum. Although there are divided views in the community
on this issue, waiting until there is clear evidence to re-
solve the difference of opinion among intelligence analysts
may rule out the Intelligence Community's ability to provide
anything more than "tactical" warning of the first movement
of Soviet troops to Afghanistan. If, as we believe, the most.
likely form of initial military intervention is through the
airlift of special combat units, the first may be on their
way to or landing in Afghanistan before we can report unequiv-
ocally that the intervention option has been chosen. We be-
lieve the Alert Memorandum should be the vehicle for stating
the case because its use clearly indicates the Community's
intent to "warn" as opposed to "repot."-
Situation Now Confronted By Soviets in Afghanistan
4. Soviet military support to the Taraki-Amin regime
already has gone about as far as it can short of direct
action by Soviet combat .ts. The military momentum of
the insurgency continues to grow, however, and unless it
is at least halted -- preferably reversed -- the Soviet-
backed Marxist government is likely to be militarily over-
thrown. Thb1 chance for a Soviet-engineered change.in the
Kabul governme-T which could both protect Soviet interest
and at the same time diffuse the insurgency appears to
have been overtaken by events, if indeed there ever was
a realistic prospect for carrying it off.
5. The DRA army units in Kabul have so far maintained
their loyalty to the Taraki regime. These forces have
squelched the most serious uprising from within the Kabul
garrisons, and as long as no further erosion in loyalty
occurs it is likely that they would be able to continue to
keep Kabul secure. The events of 5 August, however, clearly
demonstrate that the Kabul-area forces are not immune from
the defections that have been taking place elsewhere in the
army. As the ring of insurgent forces draws closer to Kabul,
defeatism is likely to spread, and the Army leaders may start
to ponder their long term future. The Soviets must at least
consider the possibility of another, more serious uprising,
occuring with little or no warning, which could confront them
with a fait accompli and in effect eliminate whatever options
they still have.
5ECRE
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6. In sum, it must be evident to the Soviets that unless
they inject some additional military strength their investment
in Afghanistan is likely to go under, and there is at least a
growinc possibility that this could happen with unexpected sud-
denness.
Soviets Faced With Choosing "Least Bad" Option
7. The Soviets doubtless recognize that they would be
pilloried by much of the rest of the world if they sent com-
bat units into Afghanistan, and they would have to consider
that taking such a step would damage the chances for Congres-
sional ratification of the SALT II treaty. Moreover, Moscow
would have to be concerned that introduction of even small
forces -- a few battalions or regiments, for example. -- would
deepen the commitment to what could grow into an open-ended
military operation.
S. On the other hand, the likely consequences of not
sending in combat units go far beyond replacement of a client
government by a hostile one in an area which, although on the
USSR border, has no great strategic significance.
-- Moscow will not be able to represent the result as
anything less than a forced eviction by a native insurgency
that is not even well organized.
-- There is no graceful way out. Evacution of the So-
viet mission in Kabul could not be portrayed as anything other
than abandonment of the Taraki regime.
-- The manner in which these events would have been.
brought about would add to the aura of the growing strength
of Islamic militancy in the region. The latter may be of
even more concern to the Soviets than'the particular situa-
tion of Afghanistan itself.
-- The Soviets would have shown themselves unable or
unwilling to use their military power even to save a client
government in a country snaring a common border with the USSR
and ,in a situation in which there is little chance of direct
confrontation with another major military power.
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X) In this situation, psycholoc;ic l :actors and the So-
viet big power self-image is likely to influence the decision
making process at least as much if not more than the politi-
cal considerations. While it is true that Soviet public
statements of support for the Afghan regime have been low key
of late, it is nevertheless also true that strong public
statements have been made by the highest level of Soviet lead-
ership, as is discussed in the attached memorandum.
is 10. Moreover, the cause and effect relationship of the
no-action" alternative appears more certain than in the case
of the intervention option. The fall of the Taraki regime
with all it would entail seems virtually unavoidable if the
Soviets commit no combat elements. On the other hand,
Soviets may the
persuade themselves that they can insert some com-
bat forces without succumbing to pressures for escalation.
Insofar as SALT II is concerned, the Soviets can have no as-
surance that the U.S. ratification process will result in some-
thing they can accept, no matter what they do in Afghanistan.
As regards world opinion, the Soviets have shown the ability
to live with criticism in the past, andTi s problematical which
form of world impression would be more unacceptable to them --
that of a bellicose power or that of a power unable to use its
military force in directly contiguous areas.
11. Commitment of troops to the defense of Kabul also
would at least have some benefits to weigh against the costs.
As long as Kabul is secure, the Soviets can at least maintain
the arguement that their client continues to govern Afghanis-
tan and that the USSR is living up to its commitment. Moscow
would have demonstrated its willingness to use its power. The
Soviets also would have bought some time to find ways to de-
fuse the situation, perhaps continuin? to seek a cast of char-
acters which might provide the basis for the hoped-for politi-
cal solution.
12. At least some Soviet leaders probably will continue
to argue that all this is merely rationalization and that
sending in combat forces -- albeit limited -- only commits
Moscow further down the road to a large scale military occupa-
tion of Af~,hanistan. They will argue that the increment of
combat unitslwi_11 offer at.best a holding action. Ultimately
the Soviets probably would confront pressure to increase further
their military commitment or face an evacuation made all the
more distasteful by the fact that the involvement will by then
have grown.
ECR.
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13. While we tend to agree with this assessment of the
likely consequences of a "limited" intervention, we doubt
that Soviet leaders holding this view will be able to with-
stand the combination of arguements regarding consequences
of no action and rationalizations that the escalation can
be contained.
Indications And Collection
14. The airlift of a Soviet regiment (2,000 or so troops)
without much equipment other than infantry weapons would re-
quire on the order of 130 flights of AN-12 aircraft. These
could originate from almost any part of the Soviet Union
where there are ground force units with ready access to an
airfield. The most likely source for-the troops is an air-
borne division, but they could be drawn from motorized rifle
divisions as well. If the troops are to be airlifted, there
is no great advantage in drawing them from the part of the
USSR closest to Afghanistan. The Soviets might elect to draw
troops from the Western USSR, keeping those in the Afghan
border area in reserve for further contingencies.
15. A complete airborne division with all of its weapons
and equipme t would require on the order of 600 AN-12 flights.
(The numbeflights would of course vary depending-on the
type of aircraft used and the amount of equipment brought in.)
This would be more easily detected and would mean that the
likely origins of the troops would be more limited in number.
16. There is a good chance that if the Soviets do elect
to bring in combat troops they will t,'ry to do it -- at least
in the initial stages -- in as low key a manner as possible.
As long as they control Bagram airfield the Soviets can move
in their own troops incrementally. The civil air fleet --
Aeroflot -- is used to effect the rotation of some 120,000
Soviet conscripts in Ea-` Europe twice annually.. Using
Aeroflot aircraft to bring in troops and using military air-
craft only for major equipment would enable the Soviets to
mute someat the telltale sizes of military intervention
at least uril a substantial number of troops were in-the
country.
17. For these reasons, it may be difficult to obtain
much advance warning that the Soviets have in fact undertaken
to introduce combat elements into Afghanistan.
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18. If the Soviets intend to use combat forces in
Afghanistan for more than static defense they will need to
provide them with some mobility -- por;sibly substantial heli-
copter support. It is also possible that the initial form
of increased Soviet mili':ary support may be to provide Soviet-
piloted helicopter units -- both transport and attack. That
alone, however, is unlikely to have much effect and if whole
Soviet helicopter units do start appearing in Afghanistan it
would -- in our view -- mean commitment of ground combat troops
probably is in the off4a ng.
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the Afghan border. We have no assurance, however, that we
will identify the initial preparations for movement of Soviet
combat troops to Afghanistan.
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10 August 1979
,n,2-10: ~1I -L.< .20:x: I`110 for :yarning
SUBJE~JT . Afghanistan-Pressures for Soviet 1,1i---itary Escalation
1. In examining I Maosco.:'s perceptions of its stances and options in
Afghanistan, it would be prudent to bear in mind the legacy of more than
a century of competitioj for predominance in that country between Russia,
on the one hand, and Britain and the latter's successors in the power
rivalries of South Asia and the Middle East, on the other. Because of this
long record of Tsarist and Soviet ambitions and involvement in Afghanistan,
the outcome of the present struggle for power carries much greater signifi-
cance for the Soviets than the fortunes of other Third World "liberation
movements" or ventures in "national democracy." In a word, Afghanistan is
a special case, with close parallels to the role x? Persia/Iran has played
in the history of Russian expansion southward into the Trans-Caucasus
and eastward into Central Asia.
2. Soviet perceptions of the stakes in Afghanistan-conditioned by
these historical and geopolitical factors -hould be distinguished from
Moscow's aspirations and behavior, for example, in Angola, Somalia,
Ethiopia, South Yemen and even in Southea-t Asia. In the hierarchy of
national and security interests, Afghanistan occupies roughly the same
position as other non-Wars:uwd Pact contiguous states such as Finland, Iran,
and Mongolia. Africa and Southeast Asia rank ;ell b--,low; these contiguous
states in terms of Soviet priorities and are viewed primarily as targets of
opportunity in the global competition i;;ith tie US and China for povier,
influence and prestige.
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3. The perc, ptions and motives of the Soviet loaders al:-o: r
~t certainly
have been strongly influenced by the history of Russian advance and retreat
in tfghanistan. Tsarist mid-nineteenth century enna~ision in central Asia
led to a confrontation with Great Britain over Afghanista in 1378-79 in
,,which the Russians were obliged to retreat and "stand. idly by" .chile British
forces occupied the greater part of the country. The British established
a protectorate which gave them control of Afg-hanistan's foreign policy and
of the tribes on the fghan-Indian frontier. Renewed Russian, expansionist
Probes received another humiliating rebuff at the hands of the British in
1884. For several weeks war between Russia and Britain seemed inevitable,
but the Tsarist government again backed down rather than risk provoking a
war.
4. After the Bolshevik Revolution, the Soviet regime cultivated the
new King Amanullah, leader of a Young Afghan movement which was anti-British
and reformist. In 1919, Lenin congratulated the "independent Afghan people
heroically defending itself against foreign oppressors" and proposed
"mutual aid" against foreign attack. During the Third Afghan ,ar in 1919,
which ended with British troops on Afghan soil, Lenin offered military aid
against England and frontier concessions. The Soviets signed a treaty of
friendship with Amanullah in 1921. In a striking parallel -.:ith events
under the Taraki regime, Amanullahts reforms in the early 1920s alienated
the Muslim hierarchy and tribal chiefs who sa-w a menace to tseir traditional
autonomy. IW rien Amanullah was overthro.,n, a modest intervention by the Red
Army might have saved him, but the Soviets were then in no position to
provide forc:,s or material assistance in response to the King's ar.peal.
(Arnanullah died in exile in Italy). The Taraki regime has depicted itself
as the heir to the Amanullah tradition of nationalism and reform.
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5. after ":orld ;jar II, of course, 3ritain's retreat from empire
enabled ti,e Soviets to achieve their historic aim of as..urin ; a "friendly"
Afghanistan on t!ieir southern border. ,successive regimes in Kabul say: no
real alternative until the mid-19'70s. The relationship ww;as altered. significantly
by President Daoud's shift toward closer relations with Iran and by his
break with the Parcham Communists--a process vihich culminates in the
"revolution" in April 1978. The Soviets embraced the Taraki regime not only
as an ideological client but as a valuable ally in combatting perceived
Iranian and Pakistani designs to draw Afghanistan out of the Soviet orbit
anti-Soviet
of influence and into a new/alignment. This combination of ideological and
geopolitical interests and motives led the Soviets into .:hat they probably
now recognize to have been an exc,.ssive arid imprudent commitment to the
Taraci regime-including; the friendship treaty last December which provides
for consultations and "appropriate measures" to insure each country's
security, independence, and territorial integrity.
6. In sum, the legacy of Tsarist aspirations and Soviet involvement,
coupled with changes in the internal Afghan equation in the mid-1970s, which
led to the April revolution aM steady gro:th in Soviet commitments of
economic and military aid, perso:nel, and prestige to the success of the
revolution. .,;ould seem to rule out the theoretical option of Soviet wit hdrawdl
and cutting of losses. In view of the events over the past five years, the
Soviet lea:'ers probably judge that the defeat of the Tara ki re, ime would not
be followed by the installation of a successor government that would pursue
the traditional Afghan policy of neutraliisr:, and acco:i:rod..tion .:with the USSt.
Cn tie cont_ ary, the :soviets apparently are operating on the assumption
that a successor regime would be omin,:.';e-:d by Muslim 11counterrevolutionaries"
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aligned ..ith he Khomeini and Pakistani goVernzments and co:a fitted to anti-
Soviet policies. P o ..t:ou prc)b:abl r fea ?s m ~{
r ~ Cih(; %L~'. .-?, t~,::;tu Pakistani
in:flu,3ncc: in i