INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO I&W

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B01027R000100090017-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 14, 2004
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: July 10, 1981
• Content Type: PAPER

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INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF
TO: Warning Working Group
FINAL VERSION OF RESOURCE PAPER ATTACHED.
THANKS FOR ALL YOUR SUPPORT.
VR
INFORMATION
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INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO II&W
GENERAL FINDINGS
The mid-80s will be a period of increasing challenge from the standpoint
of indications and warning intelligence. We must continue close surveillance
of the military threat while improving our ability to deal with more subtle
political and economic warning situations. especially in the Third World. To
achieve that, we will have to make the warning process more systematic and
better able to integrate political, economic and military intelligence into a
cosap-vehensive, nstional warning product.
Additional resources will be needet in particular:
-- Manpower - More trained personnel will be needed, especially
experienced warning analysts. Programs must be undertaken now to provide
the training and incentives needed to assure that such personnel are on
hand in sufficient numbers.
-- Surge Capacity - We must have the ability to handle more than one
crisis at a time. This requires the deliberate creation of capacity in
excess of standing requirements for all phases of intelligence:
collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination..
-- More and Better HUMINT - The increasing emphasis on Thi
warning orobl
problem.
-- Preparations for New Collection Systems - We must assure that our
personnel are adequately trained and facilities adequately prepared to
maximize the utility of expected new collection systems to the warning
^racces4
-- Better Co;?r uriications - More extensive, dzdiceted co unication
support is required if the widely dispersed elements of the Warnir
Community are to exchange information with the speed me !wsary For the
tai d-M warns nr,a; probl en.
This paper does not treat the above wubjects in sufficient detail to be
characterized as progras atic. The Warnir Working Group's involvement in
resource metters has been rather small and our collective knowledge of such
matters As sketchy. b'e would like that to changa. To dent end, we endorse
hero a recondation r~.ide previously by this Croup that the current Stratogic
Warning Staff be reconfigured to provide staff support for management of the
nation l 1se'nln rly2tccc.
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INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO I&W
1. Introduction
This report provides the views of the Intelligence Community's Warning
Working Group, membership of which is shown in the attachment. on the subject
of resource requirements for Indications and Warning during the National
Foreign Intelligence Program period. FY 1983-1987. It recaps the challenges we
anticipate during those years, assesses our general capability to handle those
challenges, and offers certain points which bear on development of the
1983-1987 NFIP. It is not a programmatic review. It does, however, treat
general matters which underlie consideration of warning-related programs.
Some introductory remarks on the mission and nature of indications and
warning are appropriate. I&W is that aspect of intelligence which seeks to
identify impending threats to US interests and warn policymakers of such
developments in sufficient time for meaningful counteraction. Its purview is
not confined to simple warning of hostilities. Indeed, consumrs generally
expect we will provide warning of any sudden development--political, economic
or whatever--that may significantly affect US interests. (See DCID 1/5, 23 May
1979. paragraph 1.A.) This has become known as the so-called "No Surprise
Doctrine" and significantly expands the scope of the IV mission.*
Several other-characteristics of I&V should be noted:
- it deals with situations of the gravest potential consequence. It
is difficult to imginde a more Important intelli nce judge nt being
rendzreJ than warning of an impending strategic attack on the con'~inental
US.
oes nogree with a "no surprise" 'definition of warning, and therefore
disassociates itself from Sections I and II of this paper which are based on
such an approach to warning. This extremely broad definition tends to divert
attention from the key warning mission--a possible attack on the US--by
suggesting that other issues are of comparable importance. It also leads to
wide-ranging, and in some cases ambiguous. proyr suggestions in Section III
which we cannot fully endorse on the basis of I&U. For example. the
recoenendations related to surge and manpower could divert resources away from
analysts who provide the assessments necessary for a warning system in favor of
multiple. and perhaps competing, alert centers. hareover, INR doubts that a
National Warning System based on such a broad definition would be practical.
Such a .arnir.U system would overlap current lntelligancs functions so much that
it would appear likely to create far more monagerant problems then it could
solve.
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It is the most highly visible form of intelligence. where so-called
"intell19Gnce failures" occur.
- It is the most time-sensitive form of intelligence. requiring high
technology support and dedicated communications to meet the necessary time
lines.
- It depends on the broadest possible data base, including access to
not only all-source intelligence, but also privileged Information on US or
allied military operations, policy initiatives, etc. Without such total
access. the warning analyst risks misinterpreting events, issuing an
incorrect warning or failing to issue any warning.
- It covers a broad spectrum of threats, ranging from local riots
which might endanger Military Airlift Command aircraft to the possibility
of strateVic attack itself.
- It is very difficult to manage centrally. Its mission overlaps
other aspects of intelligence and is shared by all elements of the
Ccinunity. It is managed differently by the different elements and its
assets are spread through the CCP, CLAP, GDIP, et al.
Liavin~ attempted to clarify what I&W is, we should also note what it is
not. I&W is not current intelligence. 1&7-concentrates on predicting
sTgni f icant developments affecting US interests whereas current intelligence is
much more journalistic, reporting broad intelligence matters as they occur.
I&w is also not tactical warning. The latter provides notice that an attack
has already cam.:.:aced, e.g., radar detection of a penetrating aircraft, whereas
I&If seeks to warn of attack before it begins. Finally, I&W should be
distinguished fry crisis management, which transcends the intelligence field
to policy formulation and command and control of friendly forces. The point is
that, while IN is distinct from all three of the above fields--current
intelligence, tactical warning and crisis management--it is closely related in
operation. It is a part of the same functional continuum, employs many of the
same personnel and draws on many of the sama resources. That adds to the
problem referer cd earlier regarding the difficulty of managing the IN process
centrally.
In sump IN is costly, complex, highly visible and probably the most
important single task facing the Intelligence Community. We therefore believe
this effort to address its resource requireants through the mid-80s is
p'arrtlculcrly eell-advized.
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11. i arning Cap abilities and Gaps in the ON
The following highlights those geographic areas we expect to be of
particular warning concern in the 1983-1987 tine fr4ii . We have included in
the discussion of each area an evaluation of our capability to provide warning
of impending threats in three functional areas: military, political, and
economic. Although such judgments are necessarily impressionistic and
subjective. they may prove useful as a starting point for projecting future
needs. We have employed for this purpose a simple three point adjegtivial
scale: "poor," "fair," and "good." Our ratings are made from the perspective
of final product quality,and are not an assessment of any individual component
or collection system.
The Soviet Union: The USSR will continue to be of primary IN interest
througl a i JO . This entails a broad spectrum of threats ranging from
limited adventures such as Afghanistan, through conventional attack on NATO, to
allout strategic nuclear attack on the continental US. During this period, the
Soviets will become a more difficult warning target. Their military readiness
will continue to Improve. Cover, concealment and deception (CC&U) will becom
more widespread, and the US-USSR, strategic imbalance will likely peak during
the mid-8Os, possibly tempting Moscow toward more risky courses. As' Brezhnev
and his colleagues advance in age, the political succession issue and its
implications for US policy will also become more important. Russian economic
problems. including energy production and a proportionally smaller work forcce,
will be tore acute. The possibility of a major technological breakthrough--a
": upar weapon"--*will continue to be with us. And the impact of technology
transfa to the Soviet Union will become increasingly important.
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Eastern and Western Europe: In Eastern Europe, the after effects of the
Polish s ` ua on r- continue to felt into the mid- QCs. No matter how
Warsaw (or bscow) finally comes to grips with the liberalization process in
Poland, there will repercussions within the Pact. Western Europe will
become increasingly independent of the US and our ability to perceive their
role in any warning problem will decrease co. uensurately. The Western European
inclination to view the Soviet-US relationship as separate from and not
directly related to Soviet-European affairs will increase, as will the economic
interdependence btxn Western Europe and the Pact. European dependence on
raw arterials fron the Third World and the resultant economic vulnerabilities
will pzrsist.
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The Middle East (North Africa to Syria/Jordan : The supply of oil to the
West an Japan/Korea will continue to be the dominant issue in the Middle East,
complicated by numerous other factors such as the ultimate fate of the
Palestinians, the US commitment to ensure Israel's security, the potential
intrusion of Soviet influence, the growth of Islamic fundamentalism, the split
between the more moderate and radical Arab nations, the possibility of nuclear
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make the Middle East a highly volatile warning problem through the mid 80s.
Southwest Asia and the I
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numerous. Fragtiity of many of the yovernmencs? in r.ne area, Lie cricicdliit' 01
Persian Gulf oil, intra-regional entanglements. Islamic fundamentalism, nuclear
proliferation, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and a myriad of other
factors combine to make this a most volatile area from a warning point of view.
n ocean (including the Horn of Africa and the
Persian u to es otent aT warning problems in this area are also
Africa South of the Sahara: Political turmoil will continue in this
region. The-Soviets will see to expand and consolidate their influence. The
stability of new regimes will be debilitated by racial and tribal strife as
well as national confrontations. Growing competition for mineral resources by
the developed nations will further complicate Africa's problems in this area.
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Korea: We must be prepared to handle the North Korea military threat
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China: The Sino-Soviet struggle will continue as a major warning concern.
Problem with Southeast Asia including insular Southeast Asia may increase.
Taiwan is also a matter which bears watching.
Southeast and Northern Asia: The Soviets and Chinese will continue to
Fare danger points--" intelligence failures waiting to happen."
ros ec s for Singapore and Malaysia are somewhat better.
The Western Hemisphere: Social and economic unrest south of the Rio
Gramin par cu ar-antral America, will continue to breed opportunity for
Soviet and Cuban penetration. Although there appears no immediate threat. the
long term stability of will be matters of warning
concern in the mid-80s
In summary, our tour d'horizon of mid-80s warning problems makes it
abundantly evident that I&W will become generally more difficult during
1983-1987. We see no area, with the possible exception of China, where a
relaxation of effort appears acceptable. we must continue to monitor the
set-piece military threats--the Soviet/Warsaw Pact, Korea, USSR-China, the
Middle East, etc. -- while improving our ability to deal with more subtle
political and economic situations, especially in the Third World.
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III. p rar atic lications
Having reviewed the various challenges we anticipate through the mid-80s,
we offer, the following observations bearing on resource allocations. These are
not listed in priority order. We have indicated those of particular concern
with a statement to that effect.
Timely Introduction of New Systems: We are relying heavily an
p o ranan mprGVements n to ect of n air processing systems achieving IOC
on schedule to monitor the increased Soviet threat. Delays in their
introduction or possible initial unreliability could seriously affect our
warning effort. We therefore recommend retaining present or redundant
systems until the new or unproved systems perform consistently.
adequately, and reliably.
- du rge Ca acJ; We must bolster our I&W surge capacity. The need
to 'handwo or wore developing crises Is a current and growing problem.
we :must, therefore, have reserve manpower, reserve collection capabilit
and reserve system support. and it must be truly reserve capacity. !
- Preparation for New System ; The introduction of new collection
and prodss ng ssyyste" u-r ny a raid-1980s will provide l&W major new
capabilities. We must be prepared to accept and integrate the data from
those s eons into the warning process and make full use of them from the
very outset. Adequate training must be provided. In particular. we are
not satisfied that enough is being done to prepare the Cutmunity for the
New ADP capabilities such as machine readable
message formats, automated report handling and easily accessible common
data bases are needed as well. Without careful preparations at this
stage, the new data flow could exceed our ability to analyze it.
We consider this a very significant requirement.
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- that HUMIdT can contribute to the warning problem more
effectively by emphasizing quality over quantity reporting;
- that the usefulness of HUMINT to the warning problem needs to
be improved through greater timeliness; and
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M ana ysts and an improved analytical product.
- Communications: The very life-blood of I&W analysis is the ability
to Comm n 'ca"'a rap `d~ly and effectively, even under crisis conditions.
This means the creation of separate, dedicated communication nets for 11W.
Improve
113 corwnun cati ins faci es are un amen a o mprov
co+opera on ainony Cosrmunit l
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- Broadened Clearance Levels: Closely related to the matter of
cunicat ohs Eie needfor' re balanced security restrictions. We
recognize the difficulties of providing a common set of clearances.
Nevertheless, we believe that I&W must be given certain privlledged access
if it is to perform its mission,
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- Manpower: As in most aspects of intelligence, I&W has developed a
manpowerr shortfall. We believe it is more pronounced in the warning field
because a single position in a 24-hour warning center must be filled by no
less than five personnel. Moreover, most personnel elect to spend only
the minimum necessary tour on shiftwork, necessitating cons ic;-~rable
training for replacements and causing frequent manning yaps. A
particularly difficult subset of this general problem is the shortage of
properly trained warning analysts. Years are required to develop a senior
analyst. Attention must be paid now to training, career patterns, and the
necessary incentives to have analysts remain within the warning field. We
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Analytical Skills: Closely related to the need for more analysts
is the need to maintain a m inimnum base of essential analytical skills.
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shortages in analytic specialis,s will intensify. At the same time we
must develop more generalists on the Soviet Union. In the latter area,
our analytic community has tended to become overspecialized for warning
purposes. This should not be interpreted as an aryumuent for fewer Soviet
analysts, but rather a better balance of analysts capable of addressing
broad warning problems. In all cases, we must sensitize our analytic
community to the warning aspects of the information they analyze and
expose them to topics such as cognitive learning to guard against being
blinded by their mind set.
- Methodology : The mid 80s will require faster, more accurate, and
more comprehensive treatment of data by warning analysts. This need not
involve ADP. More rigorous procedures for considering alternative
hypotheses can be devised without the assistance of a computer. Where ADP
can be applied, we should take every opportunity to do so. Basic work has
already been done with such techniques as hierarchical modeling and
decision analysis.- This should be continued. Two points are germane
here: First, ADP is much more amenable to the problems of the military
warning analyst than his political counterpart. The latter deals with
much more subtle matters and our expectations for the utility of ADP in
this area must be more modest. The second point has to do with the need
for manual backup. We believe a written, conventional data base
constitutes a valuable insurance policy. A scaled down program analagous
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to the long defunct National Intelligence Survey could produce the needed
effort. It would offer the advantages of being fully reliable, mobile
enough to be taken anywhere, and its preparation and upkeep could be
designed to offer a training experience.
- National I&W Management: Improvements have been made in the
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The problem is exacerbated by the
disparity of agencies, organizations, collection systems, etc., which
participate in one way or another in the warning process. While the
NIO/Warning theoretically is at the center of this activity, his office
has not been staffed adequately in nonsubstantive, management-related
areas. We therefore endorse our previous recommendation that the
Strategic Warning Staff (SWS) be reconfigured to provide the needed
management support to NIO/W. This will enable him to discharge?uro re
actively his responsibilties vis-a-vis budgetary matters and to move
toward a "national warning system", building on that which exists within
the Department of Defense. It should also give him the wherewithal to
improve the integration of political and economic with military
intelligence, develop a systematic approach to focusing the I&W
contributions of the Intelligence Community, and generally create a more
effective national warning apparatus.
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ATTACHMENT
The Intelligence Community Warning Working Group was established by
DCID 1/5. Its membership is as follows:
Richard Lehman, Chairman, U10/W
NSA
Robert A. Martin, State/1411
Peter C. Oleson, OSO
Richard J. Kerr, CIA
D/ICS
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