AGENDA FOR NIC WARNING MEETING: POTENTIALS FOR SURPRISE IN THE NEXT THREE TO SIX MONTHS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B01027R000100040013-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 20, 2005
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: June 14, 1982
• Content Type: AG

The attached agenda item for the NIC staff meet-
ing on 16 June'is intended as a device to stimulate
discussion. It is not meant to exclude other potential
warning developments you may wish to raise.
Once a month, I want the NIOs collectively to re-
view a warning agenda. You are encouraged to comment
on any item regardless of your respective regional re-
sponsibilities. I hope to tap the wide experience and
insights of the NIOs as a collective group, not as in-
dividual area specialists.
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14 June 1982
Agenda for NIC Warning Meeting, Potentials for Sur rise
in the Next Three to Six Months
II. Iran-Iraq
1. Iran will take full advantage of the impasse over Lebanon to extend
its influence in the Arab world and promote its hegemony in the Gulf. The
Khomeini regime's prompt recognition of the opening to pose as defender of
Syria and the PLO suggests that Tehran believes the Lebanon crisis has made
Saddam Hussein even more vulnerable to Iranian military pressure and political
subversioi. Iran will either invade Iraq in the next two to three months or
initiate paramilitary and subversive actions to overthrow Saddam.
2. With the deadlock over Lebanon fueling growing anti-US agitation
in the Arab states, Iran will lean even harder on the Gulf regimes to "return
to the fold of Islam" and curtail ties with the US. Israel's policy in
Lebanon will reduce the ability and willingness of moderate Arab governments
to resist Iran's pretensions in the Arab world and to cooperate with the US
in containing an expansion of Iranian influence in the Gulf.
III. Falklands Fallout
1? An Argentine military defeat, after a brief period of rallying
around the flag and junta, will generate an internal upheaval, radicalization,
and reemergence of a mass movement based on labor and Peronist groups.
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2. Failure of the Falklands venture will increasingly alienate
Argentina from the West and establish a favorable political climate for growing
ties with the Soviet Union and Cuba.
3. Post-Stanley Argentine attempts to maintain a war of attrition
against the British fleet and presence on the islands will oblige the Thatcher
government to take harsh reprisals, ranging from reimposition of the sea and
air blockade through a blockade of Argentine ports to attacks on Argentine
airfields.
4. British reprisals will fuel Latin American sentiment for a modified
OAS excluding the US. Growing anti-US-UK pressures will make it more difficult
for L.A. governments to support US policies in Central America and the Caribbean.
These trends will undercut pro-US governments and favor the emergence of
military and/or leftist authoritarian regimes hostile to US interests.
5. Shifts in internal and foreign alignments will alter L.A. perceptions
of Cuba and Nicaragua and result eventually in Cuba's return to a reorganized
OAS. Leftist insurgency movements in Central America will draw strength and
credibility from anti-US trends.
IV. Pol and
1. The issue of whether to approve the Pope's visit in August will
aggravate strains in the military-party relationship. Disagreements would
encourage party leaders such as Olszowski to increase opposition to Jaruzelski's
steady expansion of the military's role in governing the country.
2. Solidarity and student activists will take advantage of disarray
in the regime to organize new demonstrations. Party and police provocateurs
will incite incidents in an attempt to force a showdown in the martial law
leadership.
3. Growing disorder in Poland will sharpen the Soviets' dilemma at
a time when they are preparing for a summit meeting with the US. Moscow will
face a choice either to protect its interest in proceeding with the summit
by continuing to back Jaruzelski's leadership or to risk the summit by pressing
the regime to outlaw Solidarity and other free unions, ban strikes, and move
toward restoration of party rule.
1. Dirk Mudge's 3 May call for elections with or without international
supervision and a Cuban withdrawal from Angola signals a major step toward a
unilateral "internal settlement." South Africa's declared intention to disengage
from Namibia next year implies a coordinated scenario with the Turnhalle Alliance.
2. In the next three to six months, South Africa will intensify attacks
on SWAPO bases in Angola and attempt to provoke confrontations with Cuban troops.
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SECRET
3. The frontline states will be obliged to end discussions with the
Western Contact Group and shift to more assertive support for SWAPO and
greater reliance on Soviet and Cuban political and military assistance.
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