CHINA S 1 BILLION: IMPLICATIONS OF GROWTH

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• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00851R000400120002-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
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• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 21, 2008
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: December 1, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of SeCtet
Intelligence
China's 1 Billion:
Implications of Growth
State Dept. review
completed
Secret
GI 82-10282
December 1982
Copy ~ ~ n~
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Intelligence 25X1
China's 1 Billion:
Implications of Growth
Secret
GI 82-10282
December 1982
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China's 1 Billion:
Implications of Growth) 25X1
Summary The population of China, which stood at slightly more than 1 billion as of
Ir{/ormation avai/able mid-1982, is increasing at the rate of 1.2 million persons a month. We be-
ar of 6 December 1982 lieve that by the year 2000 the population will probably range between 1.25
was used in then re?orr. billion and slightly more than 1.3 billion, substantially above Beijing's goal
of 1.2 billion.
Despite a comprehensive family planning program targeted to slow
population growth, the birth rate has surged in the past two years. The in-
crease results, in part, from new rural economic policies that have not only
weakened local authority essential for effective family planning efforts but
have also put a premium on larger families by linking income to production
and giving greater economic decisionmaking authority to peasant house-
holds. Other reasons for the increased birth rate include the large number
of young people who are now entering marriage and childbearing age and
the 1980 Marriage Law that lowered the legal age of marriage and
provided a legal basis for children to support their elderly parents.
The massive population and its increased rate of growth have major
domestic and international implications. At home these include:
? Increased demands for food and basic necessities.
? Growing unemployment and underemployment.
? Intensification of a number of social problems, including youth disaffec-
tion, crime, overcrowded housing, inadequate medical and child care, and
substandard educational training.
? Rising political tensions as a result of unfulfilled economic goals and
festering social problems, leaving the leadership more open to criticism.
Internationally, China will have to favor food over imports of capital goods
and will probably continue its recent policy of expanding Third World
market opportunities for its large pool of labor and skilled personnel.
Secret
cl s2-IO2sz
December 1982
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Contents
'wP. age
Summary `
Over';a Billion=25.More Each. Minute ;
-Family Pl"arming Targets and Techniques .
Factors Behind Iricreased=.Gi?owth Rate'
Economic Implications: More Equals Less?
The Food and`Population Dilemma ' _ ,. :9
Tlie:Uriemployment.brag
Social and..Political3mplications
10
1~2
Looking Ahead- ~ ~ ` ' 13.
Appendixes
A. Family Planning in China: Origins`and Implementation
Reporting From the Provinces:~Cause foi?.~Concern
'~-Figures
1: China: Projected Population Under Different Family ..
3. "Just One Will Do"
6. China:.Age-.Sex Pyramid, 1981
7. China:.Population.Density and Regional Comparisons
Tables
China:.Population and Estimated Vital .Rates ,
---
China: Compound Rates of Change in: Population; Gian
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China's 1 Billion:
Implications of Growth
Over aBillion-25 More Each Minute
Excessive population growth is an ancient problem in
China. The problem is even more pressing today,
threatening to jeopardize the painfully achieved eco-
nomic gains of recent years and to thwart the full
realization of an array of social and economic goals
that form the objectives of Beijing's modernization
efforts. The magnitude of the problem was highlight-
ed by the recently released preliminary census for
China which tallied the population as of mid-1982 at
1.008 billion-a ffgure that represents roughly 22
percent of the world's population (table 1). In addi-
tion, the data indicate a recent upsurge in births. In
1979 the Chinese stated that the population growth
rate was 1.17 percent; preliminary census data indi-
cate the 1981 growth rate at 1.45 percent.' Because of
the size of the population base, even slight changes in
growth rates translate into huge absolute numbers of
people. The difference between a 1.45-percent growth
rate and a 1.17-percent rate over the 1980-90 decade
would amount to 30 million people.
The leadership has been increasingly concerned over
the implications of these trends:
A recent People's Daily editorial complained that
some individuals still lack "sufficient understand-
ing" of the urgency of controlling population
growth, a few are "even apathetic," and in some
places population growth is "out of control."
In January 1982 State Councilor Chen Muhua,
former head of the State Family Planning Commis-
sion, warned against a repeat of the baby boom of
'Preliminary results of the 1982 census were released in late
October. Population data used in the tables are based on the census
and on statistics compiled by the Foreign Demographic Analysis
Division (FDAD), Bureau of the Census. Population estimates from
FDAD, Aird's Model 3, June 1982, fit closely with official Chinese
census data for 1953, 1964, and 1982. Slight adjustments have been
made. Chinese data are used for vital rates. Figures 1 and 6 have
been constructed from data in Chen, Charles H. C., and Tyler,
Carle W., "Demographic Implications of Family Size Alternatives
in the People's Republic of China," The China Quarterly 89,
March 1982, pp. 65-73. Chen and Tyler used an earlier 119801
Table 1
China: Population and Estimated
Vital Rates
Year
Population
(millions)
Crude
Birth a
Crude
Death a
1953
583
37.0
14.0
19$4
596
38.6
13.2
19$5
610
32.6
12.3
19$6
624
31.9
11.4
19$7
639
34.0
10.8
19$8
6$4
NA
NA
19$9
668
32.6
NA
1960
673
NA
NA
1961
670
NA
NA
1962
669
NA
NA
1963
678
43.9
10.1
1964
695
39.3
11.5
196$
715
38.1
9.6
1966
734
35.2
8.9
1967
752
34.1
8.4
1968
772
35.8
8.3
1969
793
34.3
8.1
1970
815
33.6
7.6
1971
838
30.7
7.3
1972
860
29.9
7.7
1973
880
28.1
7.1
1974
898
25.0
7.4
1975
915
23.1
7.3
1976
930
20.0
7.3
1977
942
19.0
6.9
1978
955
18.3
6.3
1979
968
17.9
6.2
1980
981
NA
NA
1981
993
20.9
6.3
1982
1,008
Note: Demographic analyses prepared by the Foreign Demographic
Analysis Division, as well as those by many foreign demographers,
argue that the birth and death rates were considerably higher
during the 1950s than reported by the Chinese; differences between
various estimates of vital rates from the late 1960 onward and
Chinese figures are much smaller.
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Counting the Population
The size of China's population has always been a
mystery. Entering Beijing in 1644, the Manchus
discovered that officials of the deposed Ming Dynasty
already had the population returns completed for the
year 1651 ! No modern census was undertaken until
1953 when a population of 583 million was an-
nounced-a~gure that exceeded earlier estimates by
about 100 million. meter 1957 almost no population
data were released, although another census was
taken in 1964; in 1971 then Vice Premier Li Xiannian
admitted in an interview that different government
ministries used population estimates varying by as
much as 80 million people.
The nationwide census conducted 1-10 July 1982 had
the benefit of assistance in the planning stages from
.foreign demographers and the United Nations Mis-
sion in China. Computers were imported from the
West to assist the 5 million census workers with the
collection and processing of data. Questionnaires
were designed to ascertain 19 demographic factors;
data on the number of children born last year and
women of childbearing age in each household will be
sign cant for gauging current and future population
grc>wth rates.
the 1960s, when China's growth averaged slightly
more than 20 million people a year from 1964 to
1973. Chen emphasized that "the hundreds of mil-
lions who were born during the decade of uncon-
trolled growth in the 1960s are now entering mar-
riageable age. If they are not guided into the orbit
of family planning, it will be almost impossible to
keep our population within the limit of 1.2 billion at
the end of the century."
? General Secretary Hu Yaobang in his report to the
12th Party Congress in September 1982 warned
that excessive population growth not only threatens
modernization objectives but may even "disrupt
social stability."
The announced census, however, does not end specu-
lation about its accuracy. One reason is that the
census total is virtually identical (a less-than-l-
million person difference) with previously published
Chinese statistics based on household registration
tabulation. Unresolved problems include reliance in
the census enumeration on household registration
tabulations that are updated yearly, the lack of a
independent household lists compiled by a door-to-
door survey, and the admission by officials that
during the Cultural Revolution the registration sys-
tem "turned into a mess. "Births in some rural areas
may have been underreported to avoid penalties 25X1
exacted for failure to meet one- or two-child family
planning quotas. There is concern that the contradic-
tion between the census results and population data
previously submitted will expose earlier data ma-
nipulations by local officials attempting to show
"success" in family planning campaigns. More ques-
tions also remain concerning previously published
Chinese population data, particularly those on vital
rates, that do not jibe, or seem plausible, with
analyses made by Western demographers.
? Premier Zhao Ziyang in his 30 November report to
the National People's Congress said that success of
the current economic plan hinges on "strictly con-
trolling" population growth.
Family Planning Targets and Techniques
The ticking of the Malthusian clock has caused the
Chinese leadership to embrace increasingly stringent
family planning policies over the past several years
(appendix A). In 1979 Chen Muhua unveiled Beijing's
population targets. The goals were ambitious: to lower
the population growth rate from 12.05 per thousand in
1978 to less than 10 per thousand by 1980, to five per
thousand in 1985, and to achieve zero population
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growth by the year 2000. The one-child family norm
was introduced at this time as the means by which
population growth could eventually be halted and
reversed.
The leadership has vacillated in its approaches to
achieve these targets. As the birth rate began to rise
in 1980, accounts of "remedial measures"-often
meaning abortions-began to appear in the press.
In some areas
monetary penalties for noncompliance with family
planning goals have been increased. Recent press
reporting indicates that the harsher methods em-
ployed in 1981-82 have also led to female infanticide
by parents desiring a son. Premier Zhao Ziyang
recently denounced this practice, demanding punish-
ment for those responsible. Apparently, greater atten-
tion and emphasis are to be placed on education of the
people (appendix B). A national family planning prop-
aganda work conference, convened in Beijing on
1 November, developed materials for propagandizing
more widely that "family planning is a national affair
concerning the future of Communism."
family-size projections (figure 1).
Despite these efforts, optimism began to fade over
reaching the original 1979 targets within a year after
their unveiling. Although Chinese officials have pri-
vately admitted to American officials that the~original
population targets cannot be met, publically they
continue to stress the 1.2-billion goal and its impor-
tance as a target. According to recent Chinese projec-
tions, if the present number of children (2.3) per
woman is maintained, the population would reach
1.282 billion by the end of the century-far in excess
of China's goal. But if the family planning program
has some success and the average number of children
per woman of childbearing age is reduced to two, then
the population forecast is 1.217 billion-a difference
of 65 million. Even greater differences are apparent
using different-and somewhat more unrealistic-
Figure 1
China: Projected Population Under
Different Family Size Assumptions
1950 60 70 80 90 2000 10 20
aThree children per family.
bTwo children per family.
One child per family.
dGoal for year 2000.
Factors Behind Increased Growth Rate
A number of factors have caused the resurgence of
the birth rate and rate of natural increase in recent
years:
? Rural economic policies that encourage individual
initiative to spur production but weaken the author-
ity of local officials.
? The effects of the new marriage law on the age of
marriage and the large cohort of young people of
marriageable age; in 1979, half the total population
was below 21 years of age.
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Rural responsibility systems were introduced in
1978-79 as part of Deng Xiaoping's package of eco-
nomic reforms. Although many variations of the
responsibility system exist, all are designed to in-
crease productivity by giving peasants a much larger
role-and stake-in production and marketing deci-
sions and by compensating individuals according to
the amount they produce. Beijing claims that 90
percent of the peasants have adopted some form of
the production responsibility system; probably haUor
more are using a system in which individual house-
holds make some or all key agricultural decisions.
Regardless of the system adopted, the state retains
ownership of the land and requires a certain propor-
tion of the output for tax and various collective
needs. Part of'the rural reform package includes the
reopening of free markets to sell above-quota output
and an increase in procurement prices paid by the
state for agricultural products.
Because of the improved economic conditions in rural
areas, the responsibility systems have also created a
number of problems, rangingfrom a growing reluc-
tance of young males to volunteer for military service
to a decline in influence of state and local cadre
attempting to implement national directives. The
most serious in the long run, however, is an increase
in birth rate in many rural areas, since in some of the
more popular responsibility systems farmland is as-
signed on the basis of family size.
? Several traditional factors, including old-age securi-
ty fears.
? The general difficulty of implementing unpopular
programs in the more remote and tradition-bound
hinterland of China.
? A weakened system of rural control affecting family
planning efforts.
? The political apathy of the population to govern-
ment campaigns and distaste for its intrusion into
family-size decisions.
Government policies designed to spur agricultural
production have had the unintended side effect of
reinforcing traditional values toward children as an
economic asset. Rural responsibility systems in which
income is linked directly to production benefit fam-
ilies with the most laborers. As rural family income
increases, the economic incentives and disincentives
associated with the one-child certificate become less
useful methods to enforce compliance. In areas where
individual households are the productive units, cadres
have even less control over peasants who work their
own land, raise their own food, and make their own
decisions as to childbearing.
Although it was intended to modernize, regulate, and
stabilize marriage and family life, the 1980 Marriage
Law undermines family planning goals. It raises the
age of marriage to 20 years for women and 22 years
for men, two years more than the 1950 Marriage Law
but two to four years below the regulations estab-
lished (though never based in law) in the 1960s and
1970s and in regular use until 1980. As a People's
Daily editorial recently stated, this has resulted in a
"high tide of marrying younger and having children
earlier."
The new law also sends conflicting signals by estab-
lishing children as the legal source of old-age support
for their parents, while pressing for family planning.
The traditional dependency relationship continues to
motivate couples to have more than one child to
ensure the survival of the family name and to relieve
the burden on the single child. There is no national
social security system or comprehensive rural retire-
ment program. The few old-age homes widely publi-
cized at earlier times by the media and Western
visitors were built by the wealthier communes for old
people without families. While generous pensions
provide for about 8 million retired industrial and
professional workers, the bulk of the working popula-
tion-the hundreds of millions of agricultural work-
ers-have no choice, but to devend upon their children
for old-age support.
The geographical remoteness of millions of peasants
further impedes the progress of family planning. The
static nature of peasant life, lack of mobility, poor
transportation and communication, and distance from
the cities contribute to the peasant's resistance to
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Figure S. A traditional rural family-three generations under one
roof-will bent from rural reforms rewarding household units
family planning, an idea that strongly conflicts with
their tradition. There are also marked regional differ-
ences in the acceptance and implementation of policy
directives from the central government, particularly
in those pr9vinces whe~e ethnic minority groups are
numerous.
Problems of implementing family planning policy are
greater in rural areas, where bureaucratic administra-
tion is often inefficient and where many cadres-
party or government workers-are part of the com-
munities in which they work. Cadres are torn between
their responsibility to uphold and be models for an
often unpopular governmental directive and their
empathy for the economic and social perceptions of
the peasants with whom they live. Beijing continues to
pressure cadres to vigorously promote family planning
goals as they did successfully in the 1970s and
threatens to hold them personally responsible for
achieving local targets with monetary or other penal-
ties implied. Nevertheless, motivation and enthusiasm
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are lacking and the cadres' political clout is waning,
according to Chinese press comments and editorials.
Further resistance to family planning involves disaf-
fection of the population at large, and of the younger
generation in particular. According to Embassy re-
porting and the views of scholars who have had lasting
contacts, government policy vacillations and the nu-
merous ideological campaigns of the past have trau-
matized much of the populace; widespread indiffer-
ence and cynicism exist toward the ideological
pronouncements of the party. In addition, the official
intrusion into family relationships, traditionally a very
private matter, is much more pervasive than in the
past and is resented by the conservative-minded peas-
antry. Chinese media commentary have chided those
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Traditional values still persist. The heritage of a
feudal patriarchal social system which permeates
village life is a significant obstacle to family plan-
ning. The expectation of living in an extended family
situation surrounded by children and grandchildren
is ingrained in the consciousness of the Chinese
peasant. Although the government has long attempt-
ed to stamp them out, ancient customs and traditions
continue to give meaning to an otherwise monotonous
and stolid rural l(fe. Peasant marriages, often ar-
ranged and including the bride price, are still cele-
brated with elaborate feasts as is the birth oja child,
especially a son.
The traditional preference for male children has
rational justifications, especially in rural areas where
males have greater economic value. Men produce
more in the fields and so earn more because they are
stronger and are uninhibited by child care. Although
the 1980 Marriage Law gives women the right to
work outside the home and guarantees equality for
women, these new ideals have been selectively accept-
ed. Women work in the fields, but they work fewer
days than men because they are still responsible for
overseeing the household and rearing children. Wom-
en have less education-girls are often taken out of
school to help with domestic chores-and less time to
participate in community ctlfairs. Men remain with
and support their parents all their lives; most women
leave their parents when they marry to live with and
help support their in-laws. Girls are considered an
economic liability by their own parents; the incentive
to have at least one son, preferably two, is still strong
in rural areas.
who feel that the party's mixing into family affairs is
in opposition to the recently adopted legal code with
its emphasis on the rights of the individual.
Economic Implications: More Equals Less?
China's leaders are committed to transforming the
world's largest underdeveloped country into a modern
industrialized state. The attainment of Beijing's eco-
nomic development goals depends on the ability of the
economy to generate the necessary amounts of invest-
ment capital, the acquisition and effective absorption 25X1
of a wide variety of advanced technologies, and
consistency and coherency in economic planning.
China's massive and growing population threatens
modernization goals in numerous ways. At the most
fundamental level, the demands of such a large.
population for food and the bare essentials place a
burden on the economy, making it extremely difficult
to generate enough surplus funds for investment in
modern industrial plant. Should the agricultural sec-
tor be unable to increase food supplies apace with
population growth, not only will limited funds be
diverted to supply consumer needs, but precious for-
eign exchange will be required to purchase grain.
Premier Zhao Ziyang, speaking to the delegates at the
Fifth National People's Congress, December 1981,
bluntly stated the problem: if population growth is not
controlled, the standard of living cannot be raised and
"economic, cultural, and defense construction (that is,
modernization) will not be carried out successfully."
consequences are to be averted.
The overabundance of labor relative to land, capital,
and entrepreneurial expertise further hampers eco-
nomic modernization. The agricultural sector has
absorbed large increases of workers in the past, but its
ability to continue doing so is limited; further in-
creases in agricultural production will depend less on
additional labor inputs and more on increased techno-
logical inputs-mechanized irrigation, fertilizer, hy-
brid seeds, and modern machinery. Furthermore, an
increase in the cultivated acreage is unlikely. None-
theless, the huge cohort of working-age individuals
must be kept employed at wages adequate to satisfy
their minimal consumer needs if social unrest and its
Modernization goals are further threatened by the
effect of the population factor on economic planning.
The unpredictable and complex nature of demograph-
ic projections complicates the planning process be-
cause seemingly minor variations in growth rates
translate into such large absolute numbers that the
margin for success or failure of development plans is
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Table 2
China: Compound Rates of Change in Population,
Grain Production, and Grain Production Per Person
Period
Population
Average
Grain Production
Average
Grain Production Per Person
Average
Millions
Percent
Million Tons
Percent
Kilograms
Percent
1952-55
590
2.28
167
4.00
284
1.63
1955-58
632
2.35
188
2.88
298
0.56
1958-61
662
0.81
170
-9.77
258
-10.51
1961-64
683
1.23
164
8.32
239
6.95
1964-67
724
2.66
201
6.01
277
3.31
1967-70
784
2.72
229
3.26
292
0.46
1970-73
848
2.59
253
3.36
298
0.79
1973-76
905
1.86
276
2.57
305
0.77
1976-79
949
1.34
309
5.10
326
3.65
1979-82
988
1.36
334 a
0.30
338
-1.08
Note: The early years (1952-58) reflect rapid agricultural recovery
and growth following restoration of peace and stability in 1950. The
1958-61 period clearly illustrates the effects of the political
extremism of the Great Leap Forward years, coupled with poor
agricultural weather (1959-60). The period 1961-67 illustrates the
subsequent economic recovery but overemphasizes growth ingrain
output resulting from the abnormally low grain output levels
recorded between 1959 and 1961. The effects of a high population
growth rate on per capita output is shown in the data for the years
between 1967 and iy73, despite continuing improvement in grain
production. The impact of the family planning campaign on the rate
of population growth is suggested by the compound rates of change,
1973-82. The decline in grain output on a per capita basis since 1979
coincides with the introduction of agricultural policies deemphasiz-
inggrain targets and the shift of some cropland to growing profitable
agricultural cash crops.
very thin. In addition, the sociopolitical reactions to
the policies required to achieve the population growth
projections desired from an economic standpoint may
themselves cause difficulty
The population problem also impinges on moderniza-
tion goals in the critical area of foreign trade and
exchange. To keep the population employed, labor-
intensive methods must be maintained and markets
found for labor-intensive products. To move into the
world of modern industrial technology and competi-
tion, the foreign exchange so earned must be chan-
neled into purchase of modern labor-saving industrial
technology and plant rather than returned directly to
the worker-consumer. To the extent that the agricul-
tural sector cannot sustain personal needs, technologi-
cal imports will be curtailed and grain imports in-
creased.
The Food and Population Dilemma. Improved agri-
cultural performance is required not only to supply
basic food needs and to improve living standards but
also to make commodities available for export and 25X1
otherwise release foreign exchange for investment
capital. The leadership's awareness of the food prob-
lem is exemplified by then Vice Premier's Li Xian-
nian's 1978 statement-"the saying: `for the people
the supreme thing is food, food comes first,' should
never be forgotten. If we neglect the problem of food
we shall have to face turmoil some day." Despite
population growth that has nearly doubled in the
more than three decades of Communist rule, grain
production generally has kept pace and there has even
been a slight improvement in grain production per
capita (table 2). The improvement in the overall
agricultural picture over the last 30 years, however
masks several important features of the record.
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Primarily as a result of the political aberrations of the
Great Leap Forward (1958-59), grain production de-
clined precipitously, food shortages were widespread,
and population growth virtually ceased. One result
was the beginning of grain imports in 1961, mainly
wheat, averaging between 2 and 5 percent of yearly
grain output; since 1977 grain imports have been
rising both in absolute and percentage terms. Al-
though grain output increased steadily after 1961 and
by 1965 reached the 1957-58 level, it was not until the
mid-1970s that per capita production levels reached
those achieved during the mid-1950s. During the past
three years, production per person has virtually stag-
nated. Whether this trend will continue is uncertain,
but the implications are serious as to the realization of
China's modernization goals (table 2, note).
Severe physical limitations and nagging environmen-
tal problems pose a major constraint to agricultural
growth. According to Chinese statistics, only 10 per-
cent of the total land area (99.4 million hectares) is
cultivated; most of the little additional land suitable
for agriculture is located in remote areas, is costly to
develop, and is generally of comparatively low produc-
tivity potential. The small amount of land added
annually has been offset by land taken out of cultiva-
tion-often in .highly productive areas-for urban
expansion, new industry, and other agricultural uses.
In addition, there is growing environmental deteriora-
tion. The deforestation of key watersheds and destruc-
tion of grasslands, attributed to poor management and
political campaigns calling for growing more grain
regardless of terrain conditions, has grieviously wors-
ened erosion in many areas. Chinese officials and
scientists have warned of the serious short- and long-
term effects of environmental degradation on land
availability, quality, and productivity.
The Unemployment Drag. Until 1979 there was little
mention of unemployment in China, and the general
impression-fostered by Beijing and visitors to Chi-
na-was that almost everyone was working happily
and productively. Since then Beijing has admitted
that unemployment and underemployment are serious
problems. Although publicity has been focused on
urban areas and on the plight of returned youth from
the countryside, there is also a growing problem of
unemployment and underemployment in rural areas
Figure 6
China: Age-Sex Pyramid, 1981
o- a
80 60 40 20 0 20 40 60 80
Million persons
Crude birth rate 20.9 per 1,000
Crude death rate 6.3 per 1,000
Natural increase 14.6 per 1,000
as well. The problem is a major one, of both current
and long-term concern to the Chinese leadership. The
age structure of the population means that by the end
of the century, the population will most probably
increase between 20 and 30 percent, and the labor
force will grow between 40 and 50 percent. The great
surge in the birth rate from the mid-1960s through
the early 1970s is the major cause of this rapid
increase in the labor force (figure 6).
Approved For Release 2008/07/21 :CIA-RDP83B00851 8000400120002-8
 Approved For Release 2008/07/21 :CIA-RDP83B00851 8000400120002-8
Secret
Figure 7
China: Population Density and Regional Comparisons
Persons per square kilometer
0 _1 10 _ 100__T 200
0 2.6 26 260 520
Persons per square mile
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
ChonOging~~
EastePn and Coastal
PPObince$
(plus Sichuan Basin)
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