UN SPACE CONFERENCE: KEY ISSUES AND COUNTRY POSITIONS

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00851R000100180002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 26, 2008
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: August 1, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

Intelligence
Key Issues and
Country Positions
UN Space Conference:
State Dept. review completed
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GI 82-10172C
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Intelligence
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IJIN Space Conference:
Key Issues
10,11
r Positions 25X1
An Intelligence Memorandum
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This paper was prepared by 25X1
Resources Division Office of Global issues, with
contributions by 25X1
Office of Scientific and Weapons Research.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief Minerals and Resources 25X1
Branch, OGI,
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August 1982
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Summary
Key Issues and
Country Positions
UN Space Conference:
The UN-sponsored conference on space-UNISPACE-82-is being held
this month in Vienna. Numerous issues will be addressed by the more than
100 nations represented. The issues will range from technical discussions
on satellite communications to questions of jurisdiction and access to
Western technology. Few, if any, of these issues will be resolved at the
Conference, and the final report will not be binding. But the Conference
will serve as a sounding board for positions that will carry over into follow-
on meetings.
We expect the Third World delegations to press their view that the
developed countries have an obligation to the less developed nations in the
use of the space resource and to begin a campaign to create an internation-
al space authority. Such an authority might:
Control the activities of remote sensing satellites and the distribution of
their products.
? Ensure that all nations have access to satellite programs, satellite
technology, and the geostationary orbit.
? Possibly administer a scheme to share any revenue from space
manufacture.
Although they are apt to act as a bloc on this issue, the LDCs have little le-
verage on space matters. If the Conference gets deeply involved in the
polemics of such issues, however, UNISPACE-82 will be a turning point in
international sessions on the use of outer space; heretofore, space forums
have been mainly technical meetings at which the developed nations
planned cooperation in essentially scientific space ventures.
On other issues, the LDCs will be less united. The equatorial nations
acknowledge they must dilute claims to control of the geostationary orbit
to collect support from other LDCs. As a result, their special interests will
be couched in "common heritage" language. Access to remote sensing
products is important mainly to the mineral-rich LDCs. And Yugoslavia,
Chile, Brazil, and Nigeria are especially concerned about the militarization
of space.
The Soviets may use the Conference to again allege US militarization of
space, but the USSR shares US concerns about the regulation of space
activities by the United Nations or any international entity. Thus, Moscow
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will probably play the role of friend of the developing world by sympathiz-
ing with Third World goals but will avoid firm commitments. Besides
working to hinder US military developments where possible, they will
campaign to vilify the United States in the eyes of the Third World.
The Western industrial countries hold basically similar views on outer
space issues dealing with control and use of the geostationary orbit and the
need to contain the growth of the UN roe in space. France, Japan, and the
Nordic states, however, may subscribe to some of the Third World
rhetoric, as they have in other international forums. Canada and France
are also disturbed about communications satellites eroding their sovereign
right to regulate broadcasting.
Information available as of 31 July 1982
has been used in the preparation of this report.
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Key Issues and
Country Positions
UN Space Conference:
The space-interested nations of the world are meeting in Vienna this month
for the Second Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space (UNISPACE-82). ' Heretofore, space conferences have been mainly
technical and scientific forums at which the developed nations planned
future cooperation in essentially scientific ventures. At this Conference,
however, we expect the LDCs to fire the opening salvos in their drive to
have the space resource declared a global commons to be exploited by the
developed countries for the benefit of all nations, particularly the less
developed countries. The Indonesians, for example, have already served
notice that they are not coming to UNISPACE-82 to witness another
developed country show and tell. The issues will range from technical
discussions on satellite communications to questions of jurisdiction and
access to Western technology. Few, if any, of the issues will be resolved at
the Conference, and the final report will not be binding. But the
Conference will serve as a soundin board for positions that will carry over
into follow-on meetings. 25X1
During the deliberations of the Committee On the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space (COPUOS) in New York last spring, delegates from more than 50
nations reached consensus on most of the UNISPACE-82 Conference
report to be completed this summer. They did not, however, resolve a
number of issues:
? Militarization. Should the Conference's final report include a statement
concerning the military use of space? If so, then a statement must be
drafted.
? Geostationary Orbit (GSO) and Frequency Allocation. Should changes
be made in the scheme that allocates frequencies and controls the
location of the geostationary satellites which serve communications and
broadcasting interests? Who has sovereignty over the GSO?
? Responsibilities of the Developed World. What obligations do the
industrialized countries have to share with the LDCs the benefits that
will come from development of the space resource?
? Expansion of UN Responsibilities. How far should the UN role in space
be expanded and by what institutional mechanism?FI 25X1
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From COPUOS deliberations, we expect. other issues not on the Confer-
ence agenda to arise in the course of committee discussions or as part of the
above deliberations:
? The Boundary Between Outer Space and Airspace. Should a definitive
boundary be set and if so how should it be determined?
? Products of Remote Sensing. Do nations have a right to "guaranteed
access" to remotely sensed information about their own natural
resources?
? International Broadcasting Satellites. Does satellite television and radio
broadcasting violate the "sovereign right" of each country to regulate its
telecomrnunications? 25X1
Third World Positions Third World solidarity is not as strongly developed in the space forum as it
was in the recently concluded Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS III). The delegates have not worked together long enough to
develop easy familiarity with one another or to fully agree on positions.
Also, the self-interests of some LDCs-and the suspicions of others-still
tend to pull them apart, as, for example, in the debate over control of the
geostationary orbit. Nevertheless, the Third World delegations will proba-
bly act as a group-whenever possible--to face the developed nations with
unified positions, although they lack the leverage on outer space issues that
they have had at other international forums. 25X1
The Common Heritage Issue
The assertion that the world's great commons-the unclaimed territory
and resources of the deep seabeds, outer space, and possibly even Antar-
tica-ought to be developed for the benefit of all, particularly the less
developed, nations, is by now a fundamental policy in many Third World
To buttress their position, we expect LDC spokesmen to cite the 1967
Outer Space Treaty, which declares that outer space shall be used for the
benefit and the interest of all peoples, irrespective of the status of their eco-
nomic or scientific development. It is possible that Brazil and Nigeria may
propose an international mechanism that:
? Controls the activities of remote sensing satellites and the distribution of
their products, possibly including the analysis of that data.
? Shares the other economic benefits from outer space ventures, for
example, space manufacturing.
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? Creates one-nation, one-vote governance to assure that all nations have
access to satellite programs, satellite technology, and the geostationary
satellite orbit.
Such proposals mirror those made at UNCLOS III when the Third World
created a specific institution-the International Seabed Authority-to
serve these ends. 25X1
accept some of the Third World notions.
The United States and the Soviet Union, both signatories to the 1967
Treaty, do not interpret "benefit of all mankind" to represent an obligation
to redistribute the wealth of the world. In the US view, the "common
heritage of mankind" principle means that space is open to development on
a first-come, first-served basis. Judging from their behavior at UNCLOS
III we believe that Germany and Great
Britian will join the two major space powers in working to keep space 25X1
development options open. France, Japan, and the Nordic states may
The Geostationary Orbit
Third World unity might well give way to individual country interests on
what may become the most heated controversy at the Conference, the
geostationary orbit, that is, control of access to the orbit and the
distribution of radio frequencies among orbiting satellites. 2 US Embassy
reporting suggests that countries such as Iraq, Mexico, and Nigeria will
lead the LDCs in arguing for fixed spacing assignments and a relaxation of
satellite construction standards. Both proposals would permit use of lower
powered, less expensive vehicles that are within the financial reach of
poorer countries, thus assuring them access to the GSO. With technologi-
cal change and demand for GSO services moving ahead briskly, the space-
using nations do not want to inhibit that growth by artificially reducing the
capacity of the GSO. The developed nations, relatively united on this issue,
will argue that the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) Confer-
ence this fall is a more appropriate forum in which to discuss these
questions. 25X1
In the past, Brazil and
Colombia asserted that the equatorial states should have sovereignty over
GSO satellites operating over their territory. Brazil, however, has modified
2 Geostationary satellites orbit over one location on earth and thus can monitor or maintain
continuous contact with the same terrestrial location to serve telecommunication and
broadcasting interests. Their size, stability, and tolerance of electromagnetic interference
determine spacing of these satellites in the orbit.F____1 25X1
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its position-realizing that the developed nations would not surrender
sovereignty over their satellites-and now argues that the GSO is a
"unique" global resource. Bogota has similarly changed its position,
prompted by the realization that the other developing countries fear that
the equatorial nations might try to gain economic benefits at the expense of
other lesser developed countries.
The Boundary Between Outer Space and Airspace
Much of the attention given the sovereignty question will focus on the
delimitation of the space boundary. The Chicago Convention' of 1947
defined airspace by the principle of territoriality, that is, each nation
exercises sovereignty over the airspace above its land and territorial sea.
No international treaty, however, defines the upper limit of airspace. From
COPUOS discussions, we know that Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, and
Nigeria want to establish a cap on airspace to provide a clear region for the
definition of the limits of national sovereignty and to protect the security of
national airspace.
we believe that the Soviet Union, its Eastern
allies, and. France as well as Brazil, Colombia, and other LDCs support a
fixed-altitude cap on airspace. A fixed-altitude limit would set the lower
boundary of space at a designated altitude, 100 kilometers for example.
The functional approach, supported by the Netherlands and Spain, defines
outer space by designating activities that take place there and objects that
are found there.
Remote Sensing
A sovereignty issue potentially more disruptive than airspace boundaries is
the claim by Argentina and Brazil that the developing nations should have
"guaranteed access" to remotely sensed information about their own
natural resources. Heretofore, they and other developing countries and the
Eastern Bloc, according to US Embassy and UN Mission reporting, have
only called for "prior consent" before dissemination of high resolution data
1947.
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to third parties. Recently, however, the Argentines and Brazilians changed
their claim from prior consent to the right of guaranteed access to not only
the data acquired by remote sensing but also to the analysis of that data.
Such claims are based on national security concerns and possibly fear that
other nations will use resource information obtained from satellites to their
advantage in negotiating the development of the natural resources of
nonspace nations. Similar concerns for the protection of national resources
were evidenced during UNCLOS III. In that forum, developing coastal
nations argued for jurisdiction over scientific research in their 200-mile
economic zone and continental shelf. And the land-based producers of
minerals, fearing competition from states that will mine minerals from the
sea, sought and won limitations on seabed minerals production
uses, a number of less developed countries are using open literature
Having learned the value of remote sensing in resource and transportation
to express their concerns about the future
costs, the continuit of the information and the compatibility of remote
sensing systems.
(France and Japan will
probably join the United States in opposing any UN coordination mecha-
nism that deals with questions of compatibility and complementarity of
systems. Both nations plan to market remote sensing materials and
probably are not anxious to have a UN overseer on the scene.
Militarization
This issue is not a separate item on the Conference agenda, but
cussions,
The UN Committee on Disarmament is assigned such dis
ut recent media campaigns and frustration with the stalemate in the
Special Session on Disarmament will cause the more concerned
press for some statement in the final UNISPACE-82 report.
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The 1967 Outer Space Treaty states that the moon and other celestial
bodies shall be used for peaceful purposes and prohibits the orbiting of
nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction and their placement on ce-
lestial bodies. However, the treaty authorizes the use of space "in the
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interest of maintaining international peace and security" and follows the
UN Charter in recognizing a nation's right of self-defense. The treaty also
states, "The use of military personnel for scientific research or for any
other peaceful purposes shall not be prohibited."
United States interprets peaceful purposes to mean :ionaggressive inten-
tions, permitting the use of military satellites for communication, naviga-
tion, strategic warning, and arms control verification. A third position-
and the one held by most nations-is that the present limited military uses
of space are permissible, but the gaps in. existing space treaties that would
nermit de to ment of new weapons must be filled.
Third World nations
such as Egypt, Brazil, and Chile adhere to this more moderate view.
The Soviet Perspective In the UN space arena, the USSR and the United States, as superpowers
in space, find themselves together on many issues. The Soviets oppose
Third World language about the so-called obligation of the developed
world to assist the developing countries. Recently a Soviet Embassy official
in Washington informed US UNISPACE-82 officials that the Soviets
want to emphasize the scientific and technological side of the conference,
but he added that Moscow attaches political importance to the meeting. In
our judgment, based on Moscow's performance at UNCLOS III and in
other forums, the Soviets will campaign to vilify the United States in Third
World eyes and appear to sympathize with LDC objectives, but avoid firm
commitments.
Weapons in Space
We believe that Moscow's chief concern in space matters is the potential
threat of US space capabilities and the strong technology base supporting
these capabilities. US systems that could be used to destroy or interfere
with Soviet satellites appear to be of particular concern to the USSR:
? Last summer, during the US shuttle's first space flight, Brezhnev
proposed a ban on the militarization of space, including the banning of
weapons of mass destruction onboard existing and future piloted space
vehicles.
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? In the fall of 1981, Moscow fully endorsed the Mongolian-sponsored
General Assembly resolution for space arms control. (The General
Assembly assigned the arms race and limitation question to the Commit-
tee on Disarmament.)
? The Soviet press has repeatedly accused the Reagan administration of
taking a step along the path of militarization by placing military
satellites as well as killer-satellites into orbit and accused Washington of
planning to place laser weapons in space.
Such reports suggest that the Soviets are interested in the demilitarization
issue. We believe they will avoid the issue if possible and certainly will not
take a leadership stance in promoting a militarization statement; in our
judgment they fear the issue will get away from them. 25X1
International Broadcasting Satellites
This issue has been debated in the United Nations for over a decade and
has come to an impasse on the question of "prior consent"-whether or not
a nation being beamed by a satellite broadcast must give its consent prior
to launching or broadcasting. It is of prime concern to the USSR, which
fears the political and cultural impact of information not under its control.
The Soviets argue that unauthorized broadcasting is an illegal intrusion on
their sovereignty, and they demand the right to protect themselves against
satellites that deliberately engage in "hostile" or "illegal" nonweapon
activities. Moscow can be expected to support broadcast limitation propos-
als. They will find support among some Western democracies, particularly
France and Canada, who are worried about the erosion of their sovereign
right to regulate broadcasting into their territory 25X1
Expansion of UN Functions
Because the Soviets are reluctant to give out data on their space operations,
are traditionally resistant to international control efforts, and dislike
increased financial obligations, we expect them to join the Western states
in resisting efforts to expand the UN's role in space and to establish an
Outer Space Center to replace the existing Outer Space Affairs Division
(OSAD). The Soviets have already informed the United States of their
opposition to a new Space Center. Judging from the UNCLOS III
negotiations, Moscow can also be relied upon to resist the creation of any
mechanism that controls space developments or promotes the transfer of
technology. At the moment, a Soviet has supervisory authority over the
principal UN agency concerned with space affairs, which is headed by a
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we perceive that most
US allies have the same general approach to UNISPACE-82 as the United
States and the Soviet Union-they want the Conference to enhance the
peaceful uses of outer space through the exchange of views on space
technology and applications. We also believe that they will seek maximum
freedom of maneuver in developing the space resource since several of them
plan to have space programs before 1990.
On specific issues, we expect that Western unity will be greatest on issues
of the geostationary orbit and the role of the United Nations:
? On the GSO. Our allies believe that the ITU Conference this fall is the
appropriate forum to debate jurisdictional and radio frequency allocation
issues. The looming competition of our allies in communications may
raise GSO questions to a heated three-corner debate in the ITU.
? On Expansion of the UN's Role in Space. The allies accept growth of
UN involvement in space as inevitable, but they do not want to expand
the international bureaucracy or its funding, or to constrain the growth of
technology.
The Western group will probably split on the meaning of the common
heritage principle, the militarization of space, and the need for UN control
of international broadcasting from satellites. At UNCLOS III, both
France and Japan were hesitant to openly reject proposals of the Third
World, even though mandatory technology transfer and production con-
trols do not appeal to them.
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Appendix
The Current Status of Space Law
The present body of international space law does little to restrict the
exploitation of outer space. Four international treaties establish broad,
legal parameters for space ventures. A fifth treaty, informally known as the
Moon Treaty, contains controversial provisions for the exploitation of
celestial bodies; two more countries must ratify the treaty before it enters
into force. All of these treaties have been negotiated under the auspices of
COPUOS. Originally 24 countries participated in COPUOS and 53
countries are now involved in deliberations. The United States is a
signatory to all but the Moon Treaty.
The five treaties are:
? Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,
1967 (entered into force 10 October 1967).
? Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and
the Return of Objects Launched Into Outer Space (entered into force
3 December 1968).
? Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space
Objects (entered into force 1 September 1976).
? Convention on Registration of Objects Launched Into Outer Space
(entered into force 15 September 1976).
? Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies (completed in 1979, but not in force). 25X1
Other multilateral and bilateral agreements which affect space law include
the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer
Space and Under Water (entered into force, October 1963) and the Anti-
Ballistic Missile Agreement(entered into force, October 1972). In addition,
provisions of the International Telecommunications Convention (entered
into force, January 1973) and associated radio regulations contain sections
pertaining to broadcast satellites and the use of the geostationary orbit.
Outer Space Treaty The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 is the basic international document that
regulates the use of outer space. It establishes the principles and provides
the framework for the evolution of space activities. The other four
agreements in effect elaborate on the provisions of the Outer Space Treaty
which states that the exploration and use of outer space should be carried
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out for the benefit and in the interest of all countries and shall be the prov-
ince of all mankind. It prohibits states from making claims of sovereignty
or appropriating space, but, it does not address delimitation between
airspace and outer space. 25X1
This treaty stipulates that the exploration and use of space shall be for
peaceful purposes and that nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons
of mass destruction shall not be sent into orbit in outer space. The United
States has declared that "peaceful" connotes nonaggressive as opposed to
nonmilitary purposes and therefore considers military uses of space, if
nonaggressive, to be legal. Later in the document, the treaty allows
military personnel to be used for scientific research or other peaceful
purposes.
Although the treaty bans the orbiting of nuclear weapons and other
weapons of mass destruction, it fails to specify these weapons. Further-
more, it does not expressly prohibit weapons not put into complete orbit or
fractional orbit weapons. Therefore, conventional weapons, lasers, and
particle beam weapons in space and the passage of intercontinental ballistic
missiles through space could be interpreted as being; exempt.
The treaty contains the principles for international responsibility for
activities in outer space, calls for assistance to astronauts both civil and
military, calls for the registration of objects launched into outer space, and
provides for international liability. There is also a clause that no party shall
engage in any activity or experiment in outer space that would harmfully
interfere with activities of other parties without first undertaking appropri-
ate international consultations. 25X1
In the spirit of the Outer Space Treaty and international cooperation in
space, international communications satellite organizations such as
INTELSAT (1973) and INTERSPUTNIK (1971) Gave been established.
Today INTELSAT provides communications links to more than 100
countries; INTERSPUTNIK with 13 members provides links mainly with
the Eastern Bloc but is expanding to the Third World. Singapore has
applied for membership in INTERSPUTNIK, and Nicaragua recently
announced its intention to join. 25X1
Rescue and Return This agreement requires cooperation and assistance among parties to the
treaty in the event of an accident or distress. If a space object returns to
earth, the state in which it falls is to notify the launching state of the acci-
dent, rescue and give assistance to the astronauts, and assure the safety and
prompt return of the astronauts to the launching state. If requested, the
launching state is to cooperate in the search and rescue. 25X1
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Liability
The treaty also provides steps to be followed on the request of the
launching authority for the recovery and return of space objects. In 1978, a
Soviet nuclear-powered satellite, Cosmos 954, reentered the atmosphere
and disintegrated over Canada. Deliberations are continuing on what to do
with the debris. During the spring 1982 session of the legal subcommittee
of COPUOS, part of the discussion centered on assistance and liability in
the wake of such disasters. The Canadians, along with the United States,
argued that the launching state should take back debris if requested by the
affected state. Although Canada has sent two diplomatic notes since the
Cosmos 954 cleanup, the Soviets have not accepted the satellite debris.
While higher orbits will become more common in the future, the lower
orbit levels are becoming heavily trafficked. The lower the orbit, however,
the more likely a satellite is to return to earth, either whole or in pieces,
and cause contamination and pollution. The use of the space shuttle and
the orbiting of larger objects into space increase the likelihoood of damage.
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The 1972 Liability Convention states that a launching state shall be liable
for damage to the earth's surface or to an aircraft in flight caused by the
launching state's space object. Furthermore, the state must restore the
damaged area to the condition which would have existed had the damage
not occurred. If damage is caused to a space object of another state, the
launching state shall be liable only when it is at fault. The Convention al-
lows for prompt and adequate payment with compensation for direct
damage and for moral damages based on pain, suffering, and humiliation.
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The crash of Skylab debris into the Australian desert and the reentry of
Cosmos 954 raised the possibility of human and property damage as well as
damage to the environment. In January 1979, Canada presented a $6
million claim to the Soviet Union for damages from the Cosmos 954
reentry. This sum represented US and Canadian costs of cleanup and
necessary monitoring operations in Canadian territory. Eventually, the
Canadians received a $3 million settlement; they did not press for
collection of US assistance costs. The members of COPUOS will continue
to debate state responsibility in cleanup situations 25X1
The Liability Convention does not deal with accidents which occur on
board an orbiting space vehicle. In addition, there is no provision for
imputing negligent conduct to others or for the attribution of a principal's
vicarious liability for an agent or employee. 25X1
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Registration
The Registration Convention has the potential to be restrictive, but at
present is so loosely constructed that it does not restrain space activities.
This 1976 convention requires parties to it to register all objects launched
into space. All countries with a launching capability, including the Soviet
Union, abide by it. 25X1
When a space object is launched, the launching country must keep a
registry of the launch, register the launch with the Secretary General of
the United Nations, and should have marked the space vehicle. Consider-
able leeway is given as to how much information must be recorded and the
timing of reporting; the only requirements are the name of the state, a
number or designator, the launch date, the place of launch, basic orbital
parameters, and the general function of the space object
A new question can be posed with the evolution of multiple launches. The
European Space Agency's new launcher, Ariane, can place two satellites in
orbit with one launch, and both the Soviets with their space stations and
the United States with its shuttle can place numerous objects in orbit with
one launch from the earth. The law is unclear whether each object placed
in orbit must be registered or if only registration of the launch of the
vehicle is required.
Canada has requested that notification of satellites with nuclear power
sources be specially designated. This point is in conjuction with other
questions under COPUOS deliberation relating to these satellites.
The Moon Treaty After the moon landings of the late 1960s, UN member nations realized
that the 1967 Outer Space Treaty did not cover exp;:oitation of resources on
the moon. Thus, during the 1970s the committee crafted a treaty governing
the activities on the moon and other celestial bodies. Three countries have
ratified it as of May 1982-Chile, Philippines, and Uruguay. Only two
more ratifications are needed for the treaty to enter into force. In addition,
eight other countries' have signed the document. While not necessarily
committing a country to ratification, signing does commit a state to do
nothing to violate the spirit or intent of a treaty. As of 31 July 1982, the
Moon Treaty has been neither signed nor ratified by the United States or
the Soviet Union.
Mining the moon is not now economically feasible or likely to be so in the
next 10 to 15 years. The most important raw materials discovered on or
just below the moon's surface thus far are aluminum, iron, silicon,
magnesium, and oxygen, all of which would be useful in supporting a lunar
colony or base, or a space colony near the earth-moon system. In addition,
France, Romania, Austria, Morroco, Guatemala, the Netherlands, India, and Peru
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25X1
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Ton Secret
some have suggested capturing meteorites and moving asteroids to the
place of construction of a space colony. Article 7 of the Moon Treaty states
that, "States Parties shall take measures to prevent the disruption of the
existing balance of its environment, whether by introducing adverse
changes ... or by its harmful contamination . . . ," and might be a stum-
bling-block to such proposals. 25X1
States in the benefits derived from the moon's natural resources.
of all countries. The treaty goes on to call for an equitable sharing by all
The prospect of crafting a universally acceptable mining regime for the
moon looks gloomy after the recent experience with developing a law of the
sea treaty. Like the UNCLOS III Treaty, the Moon Treaty states that the
natural resources of the moon are the common heritage of mankind and
that use of the moon shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests
United States, Japan, the United Kingdom,Germany, and France.
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Proponents of the treaty indicate that the models of international agree-
ments in space, such as INTELSAT, are based on equitable sharing in the
sense of contribution by use. That is, as one's share of the use of the system
increases, so does one's financial obligation. This is not the case in
UNCLOS III's Authority, where contributions will be based on UN 25X1
funding, and 65 percent of the upkeep would come from the USSR, the
The Moon Treaty does, however, give some credence to private ownership
with respect to mining which the Outer Space Treaty does not. The Outer
Space Treaty states that outer space including the moon and other
celestrial bodies is not subject to national appropriation. The Moon Treaty
phrasing is different-"Neither the surface nor the subsurface of the
moon, nor any part thereof or natural resources in place, shall become
property of any State, international, intergovernmental, or nongovernmen-
tal organization, national organization, or nongovernmental entity or of
any natural person." The key words "in place" can be interpreted to mean
that minerals removed from the moon can be owned privately.
The Moon Treaty gives States parties the right to exploration and "use" of
the moon. However, it states that when "exploitation" is about to become
feasible, the States must undertake to establish an "international regime"
to govern exploitation. Even though the United States made a unilateral
statement at the close of negotiations that the treaty does not pose a
moratorium on mining the resources in space, the developing countries
would probably disagree. Without knowing what the "international re-
gime," which will regulate all activities on the moon, will be, states find it
difficult to commit themselves to this treaty 25X1
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