CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IN NARCOTICS AND TERRORISM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00851R000100160008-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2008
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: August 1, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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Intelligence
Cuban Involvement
in Narcotics and Terrorism
DHS Review Completed.
DOJ Review
Completed.
Secret
GI 82-10169
August 1982
?y 400
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Intelligence
Cuban Involvement
in Narcotics and Terrorism
This paper was prepared b
Terrorism Branch, Instability and
Insurgency Center, Office of Global Issues, with
substantial contributions by National
Intelligence Council, Central Intelligence Agency,
and by the Drug Enforcement Administration.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, International Terrorism Branch,
The report was coordinated with the National
Intelligence Council and the Directorate of
Operations.
Secret
GI 82-10169
August 1982
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Secret
Cuban Involvement
in Narcotics and Terrorism
Summary Information gathered
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hrough the arrest of known 25X1
narcotics traffickers indicates that Cuba has facilitated narcotics traffick-
ina in the Caribbean region for at least two years.
the Castro regime developed a relationship with a key
Colombian drug trafficker who, on Cuba's behalf, purchased arms and 25X1
smuggled them to a Cuban-backed insurgent group in Colombia. In return
the trafficker received safe passage for ships carrying marijuana and other
drugs through Cuban waters to the United States.
Given the involvement of senior Cuban officials and at least two Cuban
embassies, we believe this activity was approved at the highest levels of the
Cuban Government. It almost certainly was not a case of corruption of
mid- or low-level Cuban officials.
Despite the potential for profit in drug trafficking, we doubt that Havana's
initial motivation was related to its current hard currency problems. The
Castro regime's harsh and immediate denunciation of published accounts
of its link to the Colombian drug smuggler underscores Havana's acute
sensitivity to anything that tarnishes its international image. It also
suggests that the Cubans are-as they have been consistently in the past-
unwilling to jeopardize plausible deniability by deep involvement in the
drug business. 25X1
the Cuba-drug 25X1
trafficker connection is of relatively recent vintage and=Havana has
developed such contacts in an effort to support insurgent groups abroad. By
dealing with experienced drug smugglers, Havana availed itself of an
established logistic apparatus to move contraband efficiently and secretly.
Use of a third party also offered Cuban deniability in the event of
disclosure.
Information available as of 12 July 1982
has been used in the preparation of this report.
iii Secret
GI 82-10169
August 1982
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Information) (since late 1981 links Cuba with
known Colombian narcotics traffickers and the illicit movement of arms
and ammunition to the April 19 Movement (M- 19) terrorist organization in
Colombia. The Central Intelligence Agency convened the Conference on
Cuban Involvement in Narcotics and Terrorism in April 1982 to examine
and assess the information, to formulate judgments regarding Cuban
involvement, and to identify information gaps and subsequent operational
and analytic requirements. Representatives from the following agencies
participated: Central Intelligence Agency, Department of State, Defense
Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, Drug Enforcement Ad-
ministration, Secret Service, Customs Service, and Coast Guard.
The conference considered the problem in three main parts: evidence of
Cuban involvement in narcotics, terrorism, and illicit arms movement in
the Caribbean region; Cuban policy, attitudes, and motivations regarding
this activity; and US policy interests. This Conference Report presents the
evidence and findings of the first two parts of the conference.
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Cuban Involvement
in Narcotics and Terrorism
The Guillot and Crump Cases
Since 1978 the US Government has been exploring
Cuban links to narcotics traffic in the Caribbean,
particularly that originating in Colombia. During the
period of 1980-82, the Drug Enforcement Adminis-
tration (DEA) obtained several reports of varying
reliability that indicate Cuban ties to drug smugglers.
According to Crump, the Cubans gave
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him permission in 1980 to refuel in Cuba aircraft used
for smuggling.
Guillot began his
trafficking activities under official Cuban protection
during the summer of 1980. Under Guillot's agree-
ment with Cuban officials, his motherships traveled
from Colombia to Cuban waters where they awaited
feeder boats from Florida and the Bahamas. When
the smaller boats arrived, the mothership moved into
international waters, unloaded the narcotics, and then
returned to Cuban safe haven. Crump has indicated
that during 1980-81 Guillot's vessels made almost
monthly shipments to the United States using Cuban
safe havens. 25X1 25X1
The first concrete evidence of Cuban involvement in
narcotics trafficking, as well as of a Cuban narcotics-
terrorism-gun running nexus, was gained from the
arrests of Colombian narcotics traffickers Jaime Guil-
lot Lara in Mexico City (November 1981) and Juan
Lazaro "Johnny" Crump in Miami (January 1982).
Information provided by the two men complemented
earlier reports from DEA informants and other
sources in the Caribbean region.
At this juncture, Guillot appears to have been the key
to the connection. Guillot is a native Colombian from
Santa Marta, the capital of Magdalena Department
on the North Coast, a major smuggling region on the
Caribbean side of Colombia. He is a career smuggler
who has trafficked in cocaine, marijuana, and quaa-
ludes since at least 1976, according to more than 75
DEA case files.
Ravelo intervened on Guillot's behalf and
obtained the release of a mothership detained by the
Cubans. The ship went on to deliver 5 million quaa-
ludes to Miami.
=Guillot's motherships were granted re ue ing
rights and used waters near the Cuban Coast Guard
base on the North Coast across from Andros Island.
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in exchange for facilitating nar
ics shipments to the United States, Guillot paid the
Cubans in hard currency and used his vessels and
smuggling network to move arms into Colombia.
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Guillot's hard currency payments to the Cu'aans
apparently totaled several hundred thousand dollars
per shipment. the
Cubans charged $10 per pound o marihuana for safe
haven transit and that Guillot paid $200,000 for one
shipment in 1981. Crump has reported that the
Cubans charged Guillot $500,000 to $800,000 per trip
and that, because some of Guillot's shipments were
seized by US authorities, which deprived Guillot of
payments, Guillot owed the Cubans about $8 million.
According to Guillot, his involvement in gun running
to terrorists on behalf of Cuba began in January 1981.
Under instructions from M-19 terrorist group mem-
ber Ivan Ospina, Guillot met with M-19 leader Jaime
Bateman and Cuban diplomat Bassols in Panama to
arrange for Guillot's receipt of an arms shipment for
M-19. Guillot revealed to DEA authorities that he
had known Bateman since childhood and had been
associated with Ospina since the late 1970s, when
Guillot served as an M-19 courier. Bateman told
Guillot that he had been chosen for the mission
because of his familiarity with the Guajira region of
Colombia, where the arms were to be transported, and
because of his participation in an arms purchase for
the M-19 during the fall of 1980.
Bassols provided
Guillot $ million in the fall of 1981 to purchase arms
in the United States for the M-19. Guillot confessed
to Mexican authorities that on 16 October he traveled
to the Colombian port of Dibulla, where his boat Zar
de Honduras had arrived with part of the arms cargo.
The arms had been transferred to the Zar from the
Karina off the coast of Panama. From Dibulla the
arms were trucked to a clandestine airstrip, where
they were guarded by M-19 members until 14 No-
vember. Then the M-19, using a hijacked Aeropesca
cargo aircraft, transported them to the Orteguaza
River in the Colombian Department of Caqueta. On
the same day, the Colombian Navy sank the Karina,
with the remaining arms on board, off the west coast
of Colombia. On 25 November the Zar was seized.
Guillot met with Bate-
man in Managua, Nicaragua, in early November, and
then traveled to Mexico City, where he met with
Bassols regarding a cocaine deal and further procure-
ment of arms for M-19. Crump indicated that, at this
time, he was under Cuban instructions to procure 25X1
arms in Miami for shipment by Guillot.
Presumably concerned that Colombian authorities 25X1
were aware of his activities because of earlier seizures
of his arms-laden ships off the Colombian coast,
Guillot, I met
with two Cuban military o icers at the Nicaraguan
Embassy in Mexico City on 24 November. The 25X1
Cubans reportedly provided Guillot with a large sum
of money for living expenses and obtaining Mexican
documentation and legal assistance
the Cubans offered Guillot
political asylum at the-Cuban Embassy in Mexico 25X1
City, should he need sanctuary.
lot on immigration charges.
Crump was arrested in
Miami in January 1982 on an immigration charge.
Following Guillot's arrest, Colombian authorities re-
quested that Mexico extradite him to Colombia. 25X1
Mexico rejected the request on the grounds that it did
not meet Mexican legal standards. A subsequent .
request has been submitted and is being processed
through the Mexican courts.
Cuban Involvement in Terrorism
Cuba, in addition to serving as the role model for
insurgent groups in Latin America, has provided
guidance and encouragement to revolutionaries
throughout the world, as well as political and paramil-
itary training in Cuba.
Havana has given logistic support
and training for both the M-19 and the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), Colombia's two
sanctuary for Colombian insurgents.
predominant terrorist groups. Cuba also serves as
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The strongest Cuban-Colombian connection has been
with the M-19-a predominantly Marxist-Leninist,
urban-based group, numbering 1,000 to 1,500-
whose goal is to overthrow the elected government of
Colombia. The leader of the M-19, Jaime Bateman,
has publicly admitted receiving training in Cuba and
the Soviet Union,
well as in Libya
Although the M-19 gained fame from a number of
daring urban operations over the last 10 years, it has
enjoyed only limited success recently. When some 165
Cuban-trained M-19 insurgents landed in northern
Colombia in February and March 1981, they were
intercepted by Colombian military forces and most
were captured or killed. Other M-19 operations in
Caqueta Department in southern Colombia also were
countered by the government. More than 100 insur-
gents, some Cuban trained, surrendered to the mili-
tary forces, and substantial amounts of arms and
supplies were seized last October. M- 19 activity along
the Pacific Coast has increased since January, report-
edly because of the small-scale infiltrations of Cuban-
trained insurgents.
The FARC, the oldest and largest of Colombia's
terrorist groups, has maintained links to the Central
Executive Committee of the Colombian Communist
Party since the 1960s,
Membership is estimated at between 1,500
an&-2,000. FARC leader Pedro Antonio Marin has
links to Cuba, Libya, and the Soviet Union.
goals
The Cubans have en-
couraged Colombian guerrilla groups to unify their
activities and work toward a joint plan of action, but
M-19 and FARC leaders apparently have not over-
come traditional differences in operations and
Cuban Policy and Motivations
Regarding Narcotics Trafficking
The Guillot case represents the first solid evidence we
have obtained of Cuban Government involvement in
narcotics trafficking. The Castro government has
traditionally taken a puritanical stance on narcotics
use, viewing it as symptomatic of moral weakness and
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capitalist decaderrce. Domestic enforcement has been
vigorous and has stressed repression rather than reha-
bilitation. Cuban authorities have traditionally
cracked down hard on smugglers who strayed into
Cuban territory. Most aircraft and ships seeking safe
haven have been searched thoroughly, and, in some
cases, their crews have been jailed simply on suspicion
of transporting illegal cargoes.
We do not know who in the Cuban Government
controlled the Guillot operation or whether similar
arrangements have been made with other traffickers.
Given the level of Guillot's Cuban contacts and the
political implications of the arrangements, the opera-
tion was almost certainly approved at the highest
levels of the Havana government. If the Guillot affair
were simply a case of corruption by local or midlevel
security officials in Cuba, it is unlikely that the
Cuban Embassies in Bogota and Mexico City and
officers from the America Department of the Cuban
Communist Party Central Committee would have 25X1
been involved. Moreover, senior Cuban officials re-
ceive ample material benefits from the state, and
Cuba offers few expensive attractions that would
absorb such enormous proceeds.
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Because much of the evidence of Cuban involvement
comes from apprehended traffickers, we have no 25X1
direct information regarding Cuban motivations.
However, several possible motivations were examined
at the conference. 25X1
Plausible Denial. Use of established contraband fa- 25X1
cilities to transport arms to insurgent and terrorist
organizations allows the Cubans to support revolution
while maintaining plausible denial.
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The Cubans have an interest in being able to deny
their part in such operations. In the case of Colombia,
Havana maintains diplomatic relations with Bogota,
and the Cubans probably felt compelled to deny that
they had transported the arms seized in the capture of
the M-19 guerrillas in 1981 by the Colombian Army.
Havana also flatly denied knowledge of Guillot's
activity when allegations of the Cuba-Guillot connec-
tion appeared in the Miami Herald in early 1982.
Finances and Leverage. Given the volume of narcotics
transiting the area surrounding Cuba and the fees
reportedly charged Guillot, DEA estimates that such
arrangements could generate as much as $100 million
annually. While such an amount would do little to
mitigate Cuba's serious economic problems, it could
fund insurgents' purchases of munitions and equip-
ment for Latin American insurgents.
Some conference participants also suggest that reve-
nues could be used to create slush funds for intelli-
gence or large-scale covert insurgency and terrorist
operations, although we do not have specific evidence
that Havana has such plans.
A less likely motivation is that, by increasing the flow
of narcotics to the United States and thereby increas-
ing US enforcement problems, Havana could offer to
reduce the flow as a bargaining chip in bilateral
negotiations with the United States. To exploit this,
however, Cuba would have to acknowledge involve-
ment with narcotics traffickers and gun runners, a
concession that Havana might view as toc costly.F_
If substantial added revenues and leverage on Wash-
ington are, in fact, motivating Havana, Cuba would
have to maintain such arrangements over an extended
period. A decision to increase support to insurgents in
Latin America while facing a hard currency squeeze
at home could encourage other Guillot-type arrange-
ments.
Aftermath
The Cubans have not yet been markedly damaged by
the Guillot case.' Following US revelations of Cuban
links to Guillot, the Cuban Government publicly
announced its termination of the agreement with the
United States to cooperate in apprehending traffick-
ers in and around Cuban-claimed waters. The ar-
rangement had provided for exchanges of information
on such matters as search and rescue, illicit traffick-
ing, and navigational hazards. According to the US
Coast Guard, however, such cooperation had in effect
ended in 1980 during the Mariel refugee exodus. The
Cubans may believe that termination of this arrange-
ment will make US enforcement efforts more difficult
and enhance prospects for Guillot-type operations.
We have no evidence as to the impact of Guillot's
arrest on other Cuban M-19 arms smuggling deals.
However, M-19 is doing badly in Colombia and may
require fresh infusions of su=pplies, munitions, and
trained manpower. M-19 failed to sabotage Colombi-
an elections as it had publicly promised. Terrorist
incidents throughout Colombia were down in April
and May from the highs in March. In light of M-19's
weakened condition, the Colombian Government in
June terminated the state of siege, which had provid-
ed special counterterrorist powers to the military since
1975.
comprehensive public statement by the United States on such
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