THE FALKLAND ISLANDS AND LEBANON CRISES: IMPACT ON GLOBAL HIGH-TECHNOLOGY ARMS TRANSFERS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00851R000100080002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 53
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 19, 2008
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: August 1, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of ,Y Top Secret
Intelligence
The Falkland Islands
and Lebanon Crises:
Impact on Global
High-Technology Arms Transfers
August 1982
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Directorate of Top Secret
Intelligence
The Falkland Islands
and Lebanon Crises:
Impact on Global
High-Technology Arms Transfers
This report has been prepared by the Communist
Activities and the Weapons Proliferation Branches,
Office of Global Issues, and by the Office of
Scientific and Weapons Research, with a contribution
from the Defense Intelligence Agency. Comments
and queries may be addressed to the Chief, Internal
Security Issues Division, OGI,
Top Secret
GI82-10151J
SW 82-10064J
August 1982
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The Falkland Islands
and Lebanon Crises:
Impact on Global
High-Technology Arms Transfers
Key Judgments The dramatic effectiveness of high-technology weapons in the Falkland
Islands conflict and in the recent Israeli experience in Lebanon will have a
marked impact on global arsenals, particularly in the Third World. The
success of such weapons as the French-produced Exocet missile in the
Falklands and the US-supplied and Israeli-built equipment used by Israeli
forces in Lebanon will accelerate the Third World race for more sophisti-
cated weapons, increase the need for technical training, and cause many
nations to reevaluate their conventional military doctrine and tactics.
The control of arms transfers will be more difficult with increased demand
and availability of advanced weapons. We expect that the growing
competition among major suppliers-the United States, the USSR,
France, Great Britain, and Italy-will further reduce controls on arms
transfers since if one country refuses to sell for political reasons, another
probably will.
The prestige of US military hardware and support systems has been
further boosted by the demonstrated effectiveness of such weapons in the
Israeli and British arsenals, and foreign demand for advanced US arms
should rise markedly over the next few years. Budgetary constraints and
the greatly increased need for technical training and support are likely to
stretch out Third World purchases of firstline equipment, except in the
Middle East.
Some Third World countries will probably reconsider their military supply
relationships with the USSR in light of the poor showing of Soviet
equipment in the Middle East. Jordan, for example, may reduce follow-on
orders for the surface-to-air missile system it recently purchased from
Moscow. Most Soviet client states, however, will not be able to shift to
Western suppliers because of political or financial constraints.
It is too soon to assess the full effects of the reevaluation of military
doctrine and tactics inspired by these conflicts. It is already clear, however,
that the increasing availability of sophisticated weapons, particularly
Information available as of 9 July 1982
has been used in the preparation of this report.
GI 82-10151 J
SW 82-10064)
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fighter aircraft and missiles, will have some effect on the deployment and
potential use of conventional military force by the United States and other
major powers in the Third World. Moreover, the spread of such weapons
will probably be uneven thus causing a significant impact on regional
power balances in the Middle East, Latin America, and South Asia.
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Key Judgments
The Falklands: Missiles Highlighted
The Israeli Incursion: Training and the Technology Key Factors 1
Current Supply Patterns and Policies 4
A. Deliveries of High-Technololgy Equipment, 1976-81
B-5. Deliveries to Greece, Turkey, Cuba, and Vietnam
E. High-Technology Equipment Availability to Third World 31
Countries Within Five Years
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The Falkland Islands
and Lebanon Crises:
Impact on Global
High-Technology Arms Transfers
The Falkland Islands conflict and Israel's recent push
into Lebanon have demonstrated the value of sophisti-
cated missiles and high-technology weapon systems
against conventional surface combatants as well as
the effectiveness of superior tactics, training, and
equipment. The success of the French-built Exocet
missile, as well as the effectiveness of US-supplied jet
fighters, Sidewinder (AIM-9L) air-to-air missiles, and
Standard antiradiation missiles, and British surface-
to-air missiles are forcing a number of nations to
reevaluate arms supply requirements and the mix of
weapons in their orders of battle.
The Falklands: Missiles Highlighted
Guided missiles have attracted the greatest amount of
attention as a result of the Falklands crisis.' A
number of navies are reexamining the offensive capa-
bilities of antiship missiles while others are assessing
what equipment and tactics are needed to defeat
them
several navies are already
revising their naval modernization plans, training
programs, and tactics.
'The term "high-technology weapon" is used in this paper to refer
to a wide variety of modern weapon systems that for the most t
are produced only by the more highly industrialized nations.
2 Surface-to-surface cruise missiles have been successfully employed
in other conflicts-the 1967 and 1973 Middle Eastern wars-but
never before have several large surface vessels been sunk or
damaged by missile fire in a single campaign. Even the most
-advanced Third World country is at least five years away from
The British have noted that their lack of an effective
air defense system-including airborne early warning
aircraft, integrated detection and fire-control systems,
and adequate numbers of long-range interceptor air-
craft with lookdown radars-made possible the suc-
cessful Exocet and bombing attacks. Others, such as
India and Brazil, believe that with additional Exocet
missiles, Argentina could have inflicted far greater
The Israeli Incursion: Training and
Technology Key Factors
The combined use of drones and air-launched US
Standard and Shrike antiradiation missiles enabled
Israel to destroy Syria's Soviet-provided air defense
system. In addition, US-built F-15 and F-16 jet
fighters armed with Sidewinder (AIM-9L) air-to-air
missiles and flown by highly trained pilots enabled
Israel to destroy more than 80 Syrian MIG jet fighter
aircraft in air-to-air combat with virtually no losses.
Heavy Syrian tank losses resulted from Israeli attack
helicopters equipped with TOW antitank missiles and
from Israeli armored task forces, including M-60s,
Centurions, and indigenous Merkava tanks.
Other key factors in the Israeli victory were advanced
planning, good tactics, well-trained forces, and a
knowledge of modern electronic warfare. The Israelis
have demonstrated once again that it is as important
to have a highly motivated, well-trained armed force
as it is to have large quantities of modern equipment.
Israel devotes far more time to basic and technical
training than almost any other country.
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The lessons drawn from these recent conflicts will Third World Purchases of Naval
have far-reaching implications both for Third World Surface Combatants, 1972-8:1 a
arms buyers and for Western and Soviet arms sellers.
In the short run it is clear that:
? Many countries will reevaluate their need for so-
phisticated weapons, both for offensive and defen-
sive systems. Demand will increase for weapon
systems, like the Exocet antiship missile, that offer
an effective, relatively cheap military capability.
Orders for large new "blue-water" ships are likely
to be reconsidered; more emphasis will be placed on
state-of-the-art shipboard radars and de;.ensive
weapons as well as on airborne early wa:-ning
systems.
? Key clients of the USSR will probably closely
examine their military supply relationship with
Moscow in light of Syria's poor performance against
Israel. This will put additional pressure on Moscow
to sell more modern weapons and promise better
training programs.
? Countries will reevaluate the competence of their
forces in the use of high-technology weapons. F-
Over the longer term, the 10-year-old trend toward
introducing modern weapons throughout the world
will probably accelerate:
? The poorer, less developed countries with no securi-
ty threats will likely continue their current buying
patterns, which heavily favor ground forces equip-
ment, combat patrol boats, and light aircraft.
? The more affluent arms clients, like those in the
Middle East and possibly the larger Latin American
countries, will purchase the more sophisticated
weapons not already in their inventories.
? The increased emphasis on training and logistic
support will substantially raise the demand for
foreign military technicians and advisers.
Given the long leadtime normally associated with the
acquisition and integration of modern military sys-
tems, Third World military planners will feel pressure
Value b
(million
us $)
Units
Delivered
Units in
Pipeline c
Total
11,210
115
62
Asia
600
12
Unknown
Latin America
2,650
52
17
Middle East/North
Africa
7,560
44
45
a Includes guided missile surface combatants, minesweepers, frig-
ates, and larger surface warships. Data exclude US naval combatant
sales, which comprise only a small share of Third World orders.
b Values are minimum estimates and often do not reflect costs for
naval weapons and other expensive shipboard systems such as sonar
to quickly reassess military missions and equipment
priorities.' Suppliers of naval combatants may suffer
the most from the sea losses incurred by the British.
Over the last decade, billions of dollars of "blue-
water" ship orders were placed by developing coun-
tries (table 1). Since many of these combatants have
yet to be delivered, it is likely that some orders will be
Other buyers will undoubtedly add expensive air an
seaborne early warning packages to protect their
fleets
Some Third World countries may conclude, on the
basis of the recent conflicts, that the purchase of high-
technology weapons will quickly solve their defense
' Precedents for this reaction are seen in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war.
The success of the French-manufactured Mirage jet fighter against
the Soviet-supplied Egyptian and Syrian MIGs produced a dramat-
ic jump in orders for the Mirage. In subsequent years, the Mirage
family of jet aircraft represented the cutting edge of France's arms
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needs. Initial demand will be in four general areas: (1)
the so-called fire-and-forget ground- and air-launched
missiles and "smart" munitions, (2) fighter aircraft
with advanced avionics, (3) "black box" electronic
countermeasures, and (4) sophisticated communica-
tions links. Much of the desired equipment and
technology in these categories has been on the market
for five years or more and is available from a large
and growing array of producers and secondary sources
(see appendixes A and B).
In some instances, LDCs have been forced to pur-
chase downgraded or stripped export versions of ad-
vanced weapon systems, especially from the Soviet
Union. Because Soviet fighters, armor, and air de-
fense weapons have given poor showings recently,
Moscow presumably will be pressed harder for the
delivery of later generation hardware as well as for
improved training and technical support follow-on
programs. Western suppliers can also expect pressure
for more advanced systems.
Apart from Middle Eastern countries, the ability to
pay will remain an effective constraint on major arms
purchases by the developing countries. As many fi-
nancially hard-pressed LDCs have discovered, initial
acquisitions of modern arms soon require even larger
follow-on expenditures for additional hardware, sup-
port facilities, infrastructure, and technical training.
Costs will be less of a problem for certain Soviet
clients such as Cuba, India, and Ethiopia, where
Moscow's geopolitical interests outweigh its need for
hard currency.
Arms prices have increased rapidly in recent years
and high-technology equipment prices have risen even
faster. Western-produced, high-performance fighters,
for example, have more than doubled in price over the
past five years, as have prices for most guided mis-
siles. The Mirage F-1 now costs up to $13 million, and
the Mirage 2000 is selling at more than $20 million.
The manufacturer's price for an Exocet missile has
risen from $325,000 to $500,000. These prices ex-
clude support and training packages that can add
Thus, the surge of interest in technically advanced
weapons will not translate automatically into orders.
While such sales are expected to climb, Third World
enthusiasm will be tempered by other economic and
political factors. These include:
? Conflicting service requirements.
? The need to maintain a balanced force structure.
? Civilian demands on country budgets.
? Concern for becoming overly dependent on super-
power arms suppliers.
? Fear that rapid infusion of high-technology systems
will disproportionately increase the presence of for-
eign technicians in traditional societies.
In addition, the low technical base in many countries
will limit the type of equipment purchased and its
effectiveness in a country's inventor
Brazil, a relatively 25X1
sophisticated Third World country, was unable during
a military exercise in 1981 to successfully employ the
Exocet missile system or its new torpedoes.
Since the mid-1970s the availability of modern, high-
technology weapon systems has increased significant-
ly. For example, some 1,700 advanced fighters, more
than 250 other high-technology aircraft, 130 modern
naval vessels, and some 135,000 missiles of various
types were added to the inventories of LDCs, Cuba,
and Vietnam in 1976-81. Stepped-up purchases of
such equipment by Third World countries have result-
ed in a growing pool of weapons that could be
transferred, especially in crisis situations, if the price
or political motivation proved right.
Not only are the major producers expanding sales of
such equipment, but a number of other countries can
now, through licensing agreements, provide similar
equipment. For example, India just signed a purchase
agreement for the French Mirage 2000 and produces
under license a French antitank guided missile and
Soviet fighters and air-to-air and surface-to-air mis-
siles. South Korea is assembling the F-5 aircraft and
developing a surface-to-air missile (similar to the US
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Nike-Hercules) and a surface-to-surface missile. Oth-
er countries such as Taiwan, Egypt, Israel, Argentina,
and Brazil are active in similar endeavors.'
Current Supply Patterns and Policies
The primary suppliers of high-technology weapons are
the United States, USSR, France, Italy, West Ger-
many, and the United Kingdom (see appendix D).
Each offers a wide variety of sophisticated aircraft,
naval vessels, and missiles, as well as radars, elec-
tronic countermeasure devices, and other support
equipment.
Key producers of advanced weapon systems have
adopted varied export policies. The USSR and France
have been most willing to provide developing countries
with sophisticated arms and support equipment, al-
though their export versions generally possess lower
capabilities. Even though the United States, Britain,
and West Germany (for different reasons) generally
have been more restrained in introducing high-tech-
nology weapons, they have competed with the more
assertive suppliers. This proliferation of weapons sales
has been justified economically by the lower unit costs
of production that result from such sales, especially of
advanced fighter aircraft and missiles.
Regionally, nations in the Middle East and North
Africa possess the largest inventories of high-technol-
ogy weapons, mainly because of deep-seated Ameri-
can and Soviet security commitments to the individual
countries and, to a lesser extent, because of France's
aggressive sales effort which capitalizes on regional
tensions. Iraq, Libya, and Syria, Moscow's largest
clients, account for nearly 50 percent of the advanced
fighters and other aircraft, 20 percent of high-tech-
nology naval vessels, and 25 percent of the surface-to-
air and antitank missiles exported to LDC,; in the past
five years. Israel, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, reflecting
mainly US exports,. accounted for about 50 percent of
the antitank missiles delivered to LDCs, and Israel
and Saudi Arabia are the only foreign recipients of
the advanced F-15 fighter.
In addition, the smaller producers sell a limited amount of
hardware, including small arms, artillery, APCs, and ammunition,
Other countries with significant inventories of high-
technology weapons (mostly established clients) in-
clude India (Jaguar aircraft, Nanuchka guided missile
boats, and air-to-air and antitank missiles), South
Korea (F-5 aircraft and air-to-surface missiles), and
Algeria (surface-to-air and surface-to-surface mis-
siles). Most of the newer clients, by contrast, have
acquired smaller quanities of arms, many of which are
not classified as high technology. Ethiopia, which has
taken delivery of about 50 advanced aircraft and
several hundred missiles from the USSR, is an excep-
tion.
Missiles and supporting electronic hardware are the
most likely items to be traded, since they can be used
on outdated delivery platforms and can be easily
shipped. In crisis situations, however, fighter aircraft
might also be transferred, especially if recipient and
supplier inventories are compatible.
The introduction of high-technology weapons over the
past decade into some 50 LI)Cs has resulted in shifts
in the balance of power in some regions. Moscow's
support of Cuba has made that country a major
regional power, and the large-scale infusion of Soviet
weapons, including high-technology items, into Ethio-
pia was instrumental in making Addis Ababa the
leading power in the Horn of Africa. As demonstrated
in the Lebanon crisis, Israeli acquisition of advanced
US hardware broadened Tel. Aviv's existing superior-
ity over the Arabs. Advanced Soviet weapons such as
the MIG-25 have given India a further advantage
over Pakistan, although Islamabad's scheduled acqui-
sition of US F-16s will reduce New Delhi's superior-
ity.
As buyers attach greater importance to the acquisi-
tion of high-technology weapon systems, key suppliers
are likely to gain additional influence over recipients.
They may:
? Obtain favorable terms in barter deals involving oil
or other raw materials.
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? Ration or withhold key components to foster
dependence.
? Require that major repairs be done in the supplier
country.
Because it will take most developing nations years to
absorb sophisticated new systems into their inven-
tories, a continuing training and advisory presence by
major suppliers will be necessary, offering another
potential avenue for leverage.
The Private Arms Market
Recent events again have shown that in times of
critical need the private arms market promises much
but in nearly every case fails to deliver. Private
dealers and agents account for a small share of arms
transfers and for the most part provide only small
arms, ordnance, and key components for larger sys-
tems. While brokers claim to be able to provide
aircraft, helicopters, guided missiles, and other sophis-
ticated equipment, little, if any, ever materializes
unless the country manufacturing the equipment per-
mits the transfer. Much of the private arms business
reflects services rendered to governments, which uti-
lize the agents to launder arms deliveries to states and
groups they cannot openly support.
Future Supply Patterns
Although the technological sophistication of weapon
systems available to lesser powers will continue to
grow, we believe there will be few, if any, major
technological surprises among the systems available to
the Third World during the next five years.' High
technology weapons likely to be exported during the
next five-year period include:
? Systems already in some LDC inventories, like the
Exocet missile and F-16 jet fighter.
? More capable versions of these weapons, such as the
updated French SM-39 Exocet and the Italian
Otomat 2. On the aircraft side, the Mirage 2000
and 4000, currently under development, are now
being offered for sale.
' See appendix E for additional information on trends in high-
technology weapons. F_~
Totally new weapons incorporating advanced technol-
ogies and new designs are not likely to be for sale. The
technologies that will probably appear in systems on
the arms market are already well known to the
industrial nations. Even the specific technical charac-
teristics and capabilities of most of the weapons
themselves are relatively well known. With the possi-
ble exception of laser devices that could be available
for use against personnel or optical systems, these
systems do not represent major departures from cur-
rently existing types of weapons. Any radical changes
are likely to involve unexpected and innovative appli-
cations of existing technologies by major suppliers in
areas such as electronic countermeasures (ECM) and
electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM), which
are highly competitive, difficult to monitor, and which
can have a decisive effect on the outcome of a combat
situation.
Among the technological advances that have contrib-
uted most noticeably to the lethality of modern
weapons-and, hence, most likely to be in high de-
mand-are those associated with weapons-guidance
and homing systems. Relevant key technologies in-
clude microelectronics, computers, radar, signal proc-
essing, and electro-optics. Among the most sought-
after applications of these technologies will be a
growing variety of fire-and-forget weapons including
air-to-air, air-to-surface, and antitank missiles, anti-
radiation homing systems, and antiship missile-guid-
ance systems that are significantly more resistant to
countermeasures.
Other, less publicized but nonetheless significant
technologies that are likely to be in high demand
include those associated with advanced propulsion
systems for aircraft and missiles; lightweight, high-
strength materials; and advanced conventional muni-
tions.
It is unlikely that there will be any major shifts during
the next five years in the ability of the LDCs to
produce their own high-technology weapons. Al- 25X1
though many of the necessary technologies are widely
available, most LDCs will find it less risky to pur-
chase complete weapon systems or high-technology
components from traditional arms suppliers.
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Implications for the United States
Proliferation
The increased demand for advanced weapon systems
inspired by the conflicts in the Falklands and Lebanon
will almost certainly lead to further proliferation of
such systems and make control of conventional arms
trade more difficult. Foreign governments may en-
dorse the idea in principle but consistently bow to the
legal and political difficulties involved. Moreover,
major West European suppliers and the Soviet Union
have come to view arms sales as an indispensable
instrument in securing important political, economic,
and military goals.
Demand for US Arms
Fallout from these crises will boost foreign demand
for US military equipment and training still higher.
US military hardware and support are already highly
regarded among most Third World military planners,
and the demonstrated effectiveness of US systems in
the Falklands and Lebanon will increase their pres-
tige. Relaxations of US arms export restrictions and
the sale of high-technology items to Egypt, Israel,
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela have already
created the perception that Washington will be more
forthcoming than in the past. Although requests will
continue to be moderated by financial constraints and
diversification policies, foreign demands will grow for
firstline US equipment, particularly Harpoon mis-
siles, F-16 and F-18 jet fighter aircraft, a new genera-
tion of antitank missiles, and the Sidewinder (AIM-
9L) air-to-air missile, as well as for increased support
from US technical assistance teams.
As lesser powers reassess their needs for advanced
weapons over the coming months, US attempts to sell
scaled-down versions of state-of-the-art weapon sys-
tems will be strongly resisted by foreign recipients.
The inability of US manufacturers of the FX fight-
ers-the F-16/79 and F-5G, which are considered
inferior to the F-16s-to secure a single order to date
is a case in point.
probably increase.
Rising LDC defense budgets are likely to increase the
already high foreign debt accumulated by many US
arms recipients at a time when international demand
for their raw materials and manufactured exports has
declined. This, in turn, will lead arms clients to
pressure the United States to stretch out repayment
periods and lower interest rates on military assistance.
Requests for outright military grant aid or increased
economic assistance to offset military purchases from
some of the most seriously affected countries will
Longer Range Strategic Effects
While it is too early to assess the full effects of
growing deployment of advanced weapon systems-in
part because most nations have not yet decided on
order-of-battle changes-the increased availability of
modern weapons will clearly have some effect on the
deployment and potential use of conventional military
force by the United States and other major powers in
the Third World. Uncertainties about the ability of
potentially hostile developing nations to absorb high
technology make military assessments difficult, but
small-scale interventions in the Third World, particu-
larly by forces lacking strong air cover, will become
more risky. For example, surprise attacks on individ-
ual US surface combatants or even commercial ves-
sels could be mounted by nations with small arsenals
of Exocet-type missiles. Nations with high-perform-
ance aircraft and conventional munitions could inflict
significant losses on an intervention force of any
major power lacking adequate early warning capabili-
ty. The British experience in the Falklands suggests,
however, that well-led, well-trained professional
Western forces will still hold. a significant advantage
over most Third World military forces.
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The introduction of new weapon systems into a coun-
try's inventory is likely to further affect current
regional military balances. For example, upgrading
Soviet equipment in Syria, particularly air defense
systems, would require the Israelis, at a minimum, to
reevaluate their tactics. They probably would have to
develop new tactics and obtain new ECM systems.
The acquisition of a new generation of surface-to-
surface or air-to-surface missile by either India or
Pakistan could similarly affect the local military
balance and lead to an escalation of military pur-
chases.
The Soviet Role
Some Third World countries are likely to reconsider
their military supply relationships with the USSR in
light of the poor showing of Soviet military equipment
against US and West European equipment. Potential
clients, such as Iran or Argentina, may be reluctant to
buy substantial amounts of Soviet equipment. Jordan,
a traditional recipient of US arms, may limit follow-
on orders for the surface-to-air missile system it
ordered from the USSR last fall if suitable alterna-
tives can be acquired. Clients such as Iraq and
Algeria, who have been moving away from complete
dependence on the USSR, are likely to accelerate
diversification. Iraq, for example, has recently at-
tempted to obtain US military equipment, particular-
ly antitank missiles and helicopters, through third
parties.
At the same time that
they attempt to diversify, these traditional Soviet
clients are likely to increase pressure on the USSR to
provide more modern and sophisticated versions of
equipment, particularly in light of the failure of Soviet
equipment in the fighting in Lebanon.
Nonetheless, while the prestige of Soviet weapons has
been tarnished by the recent fighting, most Soviet
client states will probably remain dependent on the
USSR for most or all of their military supplies and
training. Some, such as Cuba and Vietnam, would
find it politically impossible to shift to Western
suppliers; others, like Ethiopia, Mozambique, and
South Yemen, will be too poor to afford the costlier
Western systems.
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Appendix A
Deliveries of High-Technology Equipment, 1976-81 a
(by Type and Region)
World
Total
Asia
Latin
America
MIG-25 (USSR)
138
8
Jaguar (United Kingdom-
France)
52
28
12
Mirage F-1 (France)
161
18
F-5 (United States, others)
343
191
18
F-4 (United States)
307
55
F- 14 (United States)
80
F-15 (United States)
30
F-16 (United States)
71
Helicopters
225
17
MI-24 (USSR)
213
17
Super Frelon (France)
12
Reconnaissance
29
1
RF-4 (United States)
28
RF-5 (United States)
1
Other
7
3
IL-38 ASW (USSR)
3
3
E-2C (United States)
4
Naval Vessels
Type 209 (West Germany)
9
2
5
Agosta-class (France)
6
2
Oberon-class (United
Kingdom)
6
6
GAL Type 500
(United Kingdom)
3
Unspecified (United States)
2
2
Other
104
11
8
Nanuchka patrol guided
missile boat (USSR)
6
3
Osa-II missile attack boat
(USSR)
63
8
Middle East/ Sub-Saharan Europe b Communist
North Africa Africa
143
110
24
218
34
80
30
71
174
18
16
162
18
16
12
20
8
20
8
4
3
50 12 5 18
34 4
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Deliveries of High-Technology Equipment, 1976-81 a Number of Items
(by Type and Region) (continued)
World Asia Latin Middle East/ Sub-Saharan Europe b Communist c
boat(France)
57-001 guided missile boat
(West Germany)
6
Reshef patrol guided missile
combatant (Israel)
2
Missiles
Air-to-surface
3,657
225
18
3,215
199
AS-7 (USSR)
76
NA
76
AS-9 (USSR)
70
18
52
AS-11 (France)
920
130
840
AS- 12 (France)
NA
NA
Shrike (United States)
141
141
Maverick (United States)
2,046
145
1,702
199
Standard (United States)
404
404
Air-to-air
10,026
3,636
379
5,117
135
709
AA-2 (USSR)
3,110
2,590
NA
500
20
AA-3 (USSR)
NA
NA
AA-6 (USSR)
263
263
Magic R550 (France)
1,256
1.56
NA
1,100
Shafrir (Israel)
244
244
Phoenix (United States)
509
509
Sidewinder (United States)
3,101
599
135
2,133
234
Sparrow (United States)
1,543
341
612
115
475
Surface-to-air
13,267
1,203
426
10,488
710
4
436
SA-2 (USSR)
1,044
22
864
100
58
SA-3 (USSR)
3,144
5.53
280
1,443
480
378
SA-6 (USSR)
2,014
134
1,700
130
NA
SA-9 (USSR)
493
493
NA
Roland (France)
342
82
260
Crotale (France)
250
250
Aspide (Italy)
NA
NA
RBS-70 (Sweden)
132
132
Seacat (United Kingdom)
194
130
64
NA
NA
Rapier (United Kingdom)
1,170
NA
1,170
Chaparral (United States)
2,897
2,897
Hawk (United States)
1,587
334
1,279
4
Too Secret 12
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Top Secret
Deliveries of High-Technology Equipment, 1976-81 a
(by Type and Region) (continued)
World Asia Latin Middle East/ Sub-Saharan Europe b Communist
Total America North Africa Africa
Antiship d
1,887
307
36
1,401
27
66
Styx (USSR, China)
880
168
658
4
Exocet e (France)
245
NA
30
176
19
20
Otomat (France)
208
4
200
4
Penguin (Norway)
5
Gabriel (Israel)
76
74
2
NA
Sea Killer (Italy)
63
63
Harpoon (United States)
410
65
304
41
Antitank guided
107,996
13,696
6,180
81,891
1,280
4,949
Sagger (USSR, others)
5,946
NA
1,000
4,826
120
Snapper (USSR)
15
15
HOT (France)
3,064
3,064
Milan (France, West
7,445
10
5,955
1,000
480
SS- 10 (France)
20
20
SS-11 (France)
9,900
3,500
400
5,700
300
SS-12 (France)
150
150
Dragon (United States)
39,251
589
38,662
TOW e (United States)
35,421
9,597
21,519
156
4,149
Cobra (West Germany)
780
780
Mamba (West Germany)
4,000
Swingfire (United Kingdom)
2,004
2,000
4
a This table shows deliveries of high-technology weapons, rather
than inventories. Losses due to combat, training, and retirement of
obsolete weapons are not reflected. Nonetheless, the data show
rough orders of magnitude of equipment available.
b Greece and Turkey.
Cuba and Vietnam.
d Includes antiship missiles.
e Includes air-to-surface variants.
50
50
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Appendix B
Deliveries of High-Technology Equipment to Asia, 1976-81 a
Equipment Afghanistan Brunei Indonesia India South Malaysia Pakistan Singapore Taiwan Thailand
Korea
MIG-25 (USSR) 8
MIG-23 (USSR) 44
Jaguar (United Kingdom/ 28
France)
F-5 (United States, 16 83 27 28 37
others)
RF-5 (United States)
Other
IL-38 ASW (USSR)
Naval vessels
Type 209 (West Germany)
Agosta-class (France)
Other
Nanuchka patrol guided
missile boat (USSR)
Osa-II missile attack boat
(USSR)
AS-11 (France) 80 NA
Maverick (United States) 145
Air-to-air
AA-2 (USSR)
Matra R550 (France)
Sidewinder (United States)
2,590
100
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Deliveries of High-Technology Equipment to Asia, 1976-81 a (continued)
Equipment Afghanistan Brunei Indonesia India South Malaysia Pakistan Singapore Taiwan Thailand
Korea
Missiles (continued)
Surface-to-air
SA-2 (USSR)
SA-3 (USSR) 125
SA-6 (USSR)
Seacat (United Kingdom)
Rapier (United Kingdom) NA
Hawk (United States)
Antiship b
Styx (USSR, China)
Exocet c (France)
Gabriel (Israel)
Harpoon (United States)
Antitank guided
Sagger (USSR, others)
Milan (France)
SS-11 (France)
Dragon (United States)
TOW c (United States)
9 This table shows deliveries of high-technology weapons, rather
than inventories. Losses due to combat, training, and retirement of
obsolete weapons are not reflected. Nonetheless, the data show
rough orders of magnitude of equipment available.
b Includes antiship missiles.
c Includes air-to-surface variant.
22
438
184
130
144
24
NA
NA
18
56
65
NA
10
3,500
589
15
4,913
4,430
239
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Top Secret
Deliveries of High-Technology Equipment to Latin America, 1976-81 a
Jaguar (United Kingdom/France) 12
Mirage F-1 (France) 18
F-5 (United States, others) 18
Naval Vessels
Type 209 (West Germany)
Oberon-class (United Kingdom) 2 2 2
Unspecified (United States)
Other
AA-2 (USSR)
SA-3 (USSR)
Roland (France) 12 70
Aspide (Italy) NA
Seacat (United Kingdom)
Antiship b
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Deliveries of High-Technology Equipment to Latin America, 1976-81 a (continued)
Equipment Argentina Brazil Chile Ecuador Honduras Peru Venezuela
Antitank guided
Sagger (USSR, others)
SS-11 (France)
Cobra (West Germany) 780
a This table shows deliveries of high-technology weapcns, rather
than inventories. Losses due to combat, training, and retirement of
obsolete weapons are not reflected. Nonetheless, the data show
rough orders of magnitude of equipment available.
b Includes antiship missiles.
c Includes air-to-surface variant.
Top Secret 18
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Deliveries of High-Technology Equipment to the Middle East and North Africa, 1976-81 a
Algeria Bahrain Egypt Iran Iraq Israel Jordan Lebanon Kuwait Libya Morocco Oman Saudi Syria UAE Tunisia North South
Arabia Yemen Yemen
44 61 33 12 12
12
Nanuchka patrol guided 2
missile boat (USSR)
Osa-II missile attack boat 9 2 12 6 5
(USSR)
AA-2 (USSR)
Magic R550 (France)
SA-6 (USSR)
SA-9 (USSR)
Roland (France)
400
750
550
8
178
57
260
Sea Killer (Italy) 63
Harpoon (United States) 167 100
Antitank guided
Dragon (United States) 20,937
TOW c (United States)
a This table shows deliveries of high-technology weapons, rather
than inventories. Losses due to combat, training, and retirement of
obsolete weapons are not reflected. Nonetheless, the data show
rough orders of magnitude of equipment available.
b Includes antiship missiles.
c Includes air-to-surface variant.
13,176 300
13,560
4,249
1,555 136 5,416
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Top Secret
Deliveries of High-Technology Weapons to Sub-Saharan Africa, 1976-81 a
Equipment Angola Ethiopia Ghana Ivory Kenya Mada- Mali Mozam- Nigeria Somalia Sudan Tan- Zambia
Coast gascar bique zania
AA-2 (USSR) 20
Sparrow (United 115
States)
Surface-to-air
SA-2 (USSR) NA NA 100
SA-3 (USSR) 36 150 NA 144 NA NA 150
SA-6 (USSR) 130
Seacat (United NA
Kingdom)
a This table shows deliveries of high-technology weapons, rather b Includes antiship missiles.
than inventories. Losses due to combat, training, and retirement of c Includes air-to-surface variant.
obsolete weapons are not reflected. Nonetheless, the data show
rough orders of magnitude of equipment available.
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Deliveries a of High-Technology Weapons
to Greece, Turkey, Cuba, and Vietnam, 1976-81
MIG-23 (USSR)
F-4 (United States) 12 22
Helicopters
Type 209 (West Germany)
Agosta-class (France)
Other
Osa-Il missile attack boat 9 8
(USSR)
Koni-class guided missile
frigate (USSR)
La Combattante patrol guided 4
missile boat (France)
57-001 guided missile boat
(West Germany)
Missiles
Air-to-surface
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Table B-5 (continued)
SA-2 (USSR)
SA-3 (USSR)
SA-6 (USSR)
SA-9 (USSR)
Hawk (United States)
Antiship b
2,345
than inventories. Losses due to combat, training, and retirement of
obsolete weapons are not reflected. Nonetheless, the data show
rough orders of magnitude of equipment available.
b Includes antiship missiles.
c Includes air-to-surface variant.
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Iq
Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied
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Top Secret
Appendix D
United France United West Italy Others USSR
States Kingdom Germany
Fighter F-15 Mirage Jaguar Tornado Tornado Kfir MIG-23/27
III/5/50
Trainer T-33 Alpha Jet Hawk Alpha Jet MB 326 Xavante EMB MIG-21UM
326 b
Strikemaster MB 339 Neiva Univer- U-MIG-23
sal
AMX-30 Challenger TAM T-72
AMX-32 Vickers
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Bulldog S.211 EMB 312
Other E-3 AWAC Atlantic ASW Nimrod C-160 G-222 Bandeirante IL-76
AWACS Transall EMB 110
E-2C AWAC Falcon Jetstream Embrar EMB AN-26
111
Helicopter Bell 204, 205 Alouette III Sea King b PAH-1 Bell Models b Ecureuil b MI-6
Bell AH-1 Super Frelon Gazelle Hughes Lama b MI-14
Models b
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Equipment in Production and for Sale a (continued)
United France United
States Kingdom
West
Germany
Italy
Others
USSR
Marder
Ml 13 b
Urutu
BTR-60
UR416
Fiat 6614
Jararacca
Armored M-1 13A1 AMX-10 APC Shorland
Personnel Panhard M d Saracen
Carriers VBX-170 AT- 150
AMX-13 'vTT
VAB-(6x6)
VBC 90
Armored
V-150
Panhard E:3R
Scorpion
Fiat 6616
Cascavel BMP
Cars
AML
Saladin
Ramta Ram VI
Surface-to-air
Chaparral
Crotale
Tigercat
Roland
Aspide
SA-2
Hawk
Roland
Seacat
Seasparrow b
SA-3
Seadart
SA-6
Rapier
SA-8
Air-to-air
Sidewinder
RF30
Sky Flash
Shafrir II
AA-2
Sparrow
Super R533
AA-3
Phoenix
Magic R5` 0
AA-6
Air-to-surface
Maverick
AS.30
AS-7
Bullpup
AS.11 / 12
AS-9
Shrike
Exocet
Standard
Antiship
Harpoon
Martel
Sea Skua
Kormoran
OTOMAT
I/II
Gabriel I/II
SS-N-2
OTOMAT
III1
Martel
LASSO
Antitank
Dragon
SS-10
Swingfire
Mamba
Cobra b
AT-1
SS-11
Milan
HOT
AT-3
SS-12
Milan
Harpon
HOT
Milan
Top Secret 28
25X1
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Equipment in Production and for Sale a (continued)
United France United West Italy Others USSR
States Kingdom Germany
Patrol combatants Asheville- PR 72 Province S 143-A CNR 6000
class
a Other equipment for sale, in the design and development stage,
includes P110 (UK), Mirage 4000 (France), AMX fighters and
Garibaldi CVN (Italy), and the EH-101 helicopter (UK & Italy).
Most suppliers also sell a wide variety of used military equipment
from their inventories.
b Produced under license; marketing restrictions vary.
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25X1
Appendix E
High-Technology Equipment:
Availability to Third World
Countries Within Five Years
Aircraft
Air-to-Air Missiles
Tactical Air-to-Surface Missiles
Precision-Guided Munitions
Antiship Cruise Missiles
Surface-to-Air Missiles
Antitank Guided Missiles
Munitions
Laser Devices
Submarines
T Secret
25X1
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 Model
Most capable
F-4
F-14
F-15
F-16
F-18
MIG-23
MIG-25
MIG-27
Jaguar
Tornado
Mirage 2000
4000
Mirage
E-3A
Less capable
F-5G
F-8
F-16/79
CF-101
F-104
MIG-21
TU-22
Nesher
KFir
Lavi
Mirage III
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Type a
Producing
Availability
Model
Type a
Producing
Availability
Less capable (continued)
MR
United States
Immediate
Mirage 5
MR
France
Immediate
MR
United States
Immediate
Mirage 50
MR
France
Immediate
MR
United States
Immediate
Mirage F1
MR
France
Immediate
MR
United States
Immediate
Super Entendard
A
France
Immediate
MR
United States
5 years
Viggen
MR
Sweden
Immediate
MR
USSR
Immediate
Lightning
MR
United Kingdom
Immediate
MR
USSR
Immediate
Buccaneer
B
United Kingdom
Immediate
A
USSR
Immediate
Piranha
MR
Switzerland
5 years
A
United King-
Immediate
E-2C
AEW
United States
Immediate
dom/France
P-3
ASW
United States
Immediate
MR
United King-
5 years
IL-38
ASW
USSR
Immediate
dom/ West
Germany/Italy
Least capable
MR
France
Immediate
MR
France
5 years
A-4
A
United States
Immediate
F -5
MR
United States
Immediate
AEW
United States
Immediate
SU-7/20/22
A
USSR
Immediate
TU-16
B
USSR
Immediate
MR
United States
5 years
Alpha Jet
A
France/West
Immediate
Germany
MR
United States
Immediate
Draken
MR
Sweden
Immediate
MR
United States
5 years
Marut
MR
India
Immediate
MR
United States
Immediate
Hawk
A
United Kingdom
Immediate
MR
United States
Immediate
Sea Harrier
MR
United Kingdom
Immediate
MR
USSR
Immediate
AM-X
A
Italy/Brazil
5 years
B
USSR
Immediate
Orao
A
Romania/
5 years
MR
Israel
Immediate
Yugoslavia
MR
Israel
Immediate
MR
Israel
5 years
MR
France
Immediate
a MR (multirole)-primary air-to-air mission with cons:.derable
ground attack capabilities.
A (attack)-primary ground attack mission with some air-to-air
capabilities.
AEW (airborne early warning)-designed for early warning of
hostile aircraft and control of friendly aircraft to intercept them.
B (Bomber)--designed for ground attack and/or antishipping
missions; no air-to-air capabilities.
ASW (antisubmarine warfare)-primary ASW and maritime recon-
naissance missions; may have some capabilities against surface
ships.
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Appendix E
High-Technology Equipment:
Availability to Third World
Countries Within Five Years
A large variety of relatively high-performance air-
craft is already available to Third World countries,
and still others may be produced by or sold to them in
the next five years.
A significant percentage of these aircraft types con-
sists of aircraft capable of combating the most mod-
ern aircraft in service in the United States or the
USSR. They include the US F-4, F-14, F-15, and
F-16; the Soviet MIG-23, MIG-25, and MIG-27; the
British/French Jaguar; and the French Mirage 2000.
The US F-18, the British/German/Italian Tornado,
and the French Mirage 4000 may also be for sale to or
operational in Third World countries within the next
five years. Most of these aircraft are multirole fight-
ers capable of air defense and ground attack missions
with little or no modification. In addition, the US
E-3A AWACS, currently in use by Saudi Arabia,
significantly enhances the effectiveness of air opera-
tions and would be a powerful force in the hands of
Third World countries.
Less capable but still potent aircraft available to
Third World purchasers include the US F-8, CF-101,
and F-104; the Soviet MIG-21 and TU-22; the Israeli
Nesher and Kfir; the French Mirage III, Mirage 5,
Mirage 50, Mirage Fl, and Super Entendard, the
Swedish Viggen; and the British Lightning and Buc-
caneer. The US F-5G and F-16/79, the Israeli Lavi,
and the Swiss Piranha could be in service in the Third
World within a few years. The US E-2C airborne
early warning (AEW) aircraft now used by Israel is
similar in function to the E-3A, but is less effective.
The US P-3 and the Soviet IL-38 antisubmarine
warfare aircraft, essentially identical to those in front-
line service in the United States and the Soviet Union,
are already operational in Third World countries and
constitute small but modern ASW forces.
The last group of high-performance aircraft is less
capable than those mentioned above. It includes the
US A-4 and F-5, the Soviet SU-7/20/22 and TU-16,
the French/German Alpha Jet, the Swedish Draken,
the Indian Marut, and the British Hawk and Sea
Harrier, which are currently in the inventories of
Third World countries. The French Atlantic ASW
aircraft is also in service outside of NATO countries.
The Italian/ Brazilian AM-X and the Romanian/Yu-
goslavian Orao may be in service in a few years. 25X1
A large number of relatively low-performance aircraft
are used by lesser powers and are easily obtainable by
any nation. Aircraft in this category would include
those such as the F-86, MIG-15, and MIG-17, which
are considered obsolete by the major powers and are
widely distributed to other countries. Others in this
category would be light ground attack aircraft and
armed trainers, such as the Strikemaster, Pucara,
A-37, and M.B. 326. These aircraft do have some air-
to-air and air-to-surface capabilities, but should not
be expected to present a sizable threat to a major
power under normal circumstances.
The key technologies involved in designing and pro-
ducing a high-performance combat aircraft include:
turbojet and avionics technology; structural design
and lightweight, high-strength materials; aerodynam-
ics, stability and control; and air-launched weapon
systems technology.
cooling, materials, and fabrication.
France and the United Kingdom, and of course the
United States and the USSR, are capable of design-
ing and producing high-performance engines for com-
bat aircraft. In addition, Australia, China, Israel,
India, Japan, Sweden, and most NATO countries
have produced engine components and in most cases
complete high-performance engines under license. For
other countries, major stumblingblocks to indigenous
high-performance engine production are turbine blade
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The greatest obstacle to production of stale-of-the-art
avionics is the large-scale manufacture of solid-state
technology devices. These devices are used. as building
blocks for microprocessors and infrared/electro-opti-
cal devices. The United States, the USSR, Japan,
Canada, Israel, the United Kingdom, France, East
and West Germany, Sweden, Italy, China, Taiwan,
Czechoslovakia, and perhaps Australia and Poland
possess this capability. Without advanced avionics, a
combat aircraft will be at a severe disadvantage in an
electronic countermeasure environment, during night
and adverse weather operations, and during engage-
ments beyond visual range.
The United States, Japan, West European countries,
and, to a lesser extent, the USSR, predominate in the
fields of structural design optimization and advanced
lightweight, high-strength materials. While these
technologies are very important in the design of a
high-performance combat aircraft, they are not as
critical as those mentioned above. The same state-
ments hold true for advanced aerodynamic concepts
and stability and control technology. Basic structural,
aerodynamic, and stability concepts are A ell known,
and conventional materials such as aluminum and
steel are easily available. The lack of the most
advanced structural or aerodynamic technology
should not, by itself, prevent the production of a high-
performance combat aircraft.
The final key area in the design of an effective combat
aircraft is perhaps the most important. The integra-
tion of various weapon systems-air-to-air missiles
(AAM), tactical air-to-surface missiles (TASM), and
other precision-guided munitions-with the aircraft
can often turn a mediocre platform into a highly
effective combat system. The ability to use these
weapons effectively is usually highly interrelated with
the avionics carried by the aircraft. This is the case
with most AAMs and TASMs that use some form of
semiactive or command guidance. However, with
weapons using active or passive guidance, the effec-
tiveness of the weapon depends more on the capabili-
ties of the weapon itself than on the avionics of the
launching aircraft. The Exocet antiship missile and
the AIM-9L AAM are examples of the latter. The
nations that lead the avionics field have the greatest
capabilities in designing and producing weapon sys-
tems and mating them to a suitable airframe.
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Phoenix A United States
Skyflash United Kingdom
Aspide Italy
Sidewinder L United States
Sidewinder M United States
Python 3 Israel
Air-to-air missiles (AAM) on the international arms
market fall into two categories, each characterized by
a different guidance type. The first class of AAM
guides to the target using radar energy reflected off
the target aircraft. These missiles can be fired from
almost any aspect to the target but are most effective
when launched in a head-on attack. The second type
of AAM relies on infrared (IR) energy radiated by the
target for guidance. The more advanced IR missiles
can also be launched from any aspect, but most are
restricted to launches from a tail-on aspect. Because
of the differing guidance techniques used, each class
of AAM has some unique advantages over the other.
For example, radar-guided AAMs generally have
greater launch ranges and can attack aircraft flying
over a wider range of altitudes than IR missiles.
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However, IR AAMs are cheaper, lighter, and typical-
ly require far less complex support avionics on the
launch aircraft. These advantages permit less devel-
oped countries with only moderately advanced air-
craft to purchase large numbers of highly advanced
IR AAMs, some with an all-aspect launch capability.
The table roughly ranks IR and radar-guided missiles
likely to be in growing demand on the international
arms market. Except for the Phoenix A, all of the
radar-guided missiles listed depend on the launch
aircraft for radar illumination of the target and are
collectively known as semiactive radar (SAR) guided
AAMs. For this type of missile to be effective, the
launch aircraft must maintain its direction of flight
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during the missile's flight, thus making the: aircraft
quite vulnerable to attack. Among the remaining
SAR missiles, those listed as "most capable" general-
ly have a greater launch range, a higher maximum
velocity, greater maneuver capability, better electron-
ic countermeasures resistance, and/or better look-
down/shootdown capability than those labeled as
"less capable."
Among the most significant trends in radar, AAM
technology is toward providing the missile with its
own radar illuminator (for example, active radar-
guided AAM). This capability, called laun .h-and-
leave or fire-and-forget, permits the launch aircraft to
take evasive action after firing. Only the Phoenix A,
which was exported to Iran, has an active :-adar
seeker, and it can only be fired from the F--14 fighter.
While the technology to develop active radar AAMs
probably exists in numerous countries outside the
United States and the USSR, only France is actively
exploring putting it to use. However, it will not
become operational until the late 1980s at the earliest.
translates directly into a highly accurate, fire-and-
forget missile with a greater launch range than the
remaining IR AAMs. The technology that made this
possible was the development: of cooled, highly sensi-
tive IR detectors used in the missile's seeker. This
technology is available in France, the United King-
dom, Italy, and others and most likely will be incorpo-
rated in any future IR AAM they may develop. The
use of this technology undoubtedly will be hastened
because of the results of air battles waged in the
Israel/Lebanon and UK/Argentina conflicts. The
apparent success the Israeli and British fighters have
had against their Syrian and Argentine counterparts
appears to be due in large part to their use of the
Sidewinder L. Because of this, the Sidewinder L and
other similarly capable IR AAMs will be much in
demand in the international arms market.
The most important factor which distinguishes the
Sidewinder L/M and Python 3 (which is under devel-
opment) AAMs from the less capable IR AAMs is
their ability to be fired in a head-on attack. This
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Matra France
a Walleye is judged superior to Paveway and Matra only because of
its greater range capability.
The sale of tactical air-to-surface missiles (TASM)
represents one of the biggest growth areas in arms
exports to the Third World. The attractiveness of
these weapons lies in their potential to substantially
upgrade a country's airborne firepower at relatively
low cost. Usually there is no need to invest in new
launch platforms or exotic avionics. As long as the
host country has aircraft capable of carrying a
TASM, usually only minor modifications to the air-
craft are necessary to produce a viable launch plat-
form. The major exporting countries of TASMs are
the United States, the USSR, and France. France
exports only electro-optically or command-guided
TASMs whereas the United States and the USSR
also sell antiradiation-homing missiles (ARM).
Antiradiation-homing missiles are designed to home
in on radar emissions from ground-based radars such
as those associated with surface-to-air missile (SAM)
systems. Optimal use of these missiles can effectively
neutralize an opposing country's early warning radar-
guided system and radar SAM batteries. The US
Shrike ARM has been exported only to Israel and
possibly a few other countries, but the Soviet AS-9
system is widely marketed and has appeared in South
America, the Middle East, and Afghanistan. Of the
two systems the AS-9, in general, is the most capable
because of its greater launch range (usually about 50
km). Typically, the greater an ARM launch range the
less likely it is that the launching aircraft will be
exposed to hostile SAMs. The most critical technol-
ogy in ARM design is in the missile guidance and 25X1
25X1
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control system, especially its receiver anc. tracking
subsystems. Expertise in these technologies probably
exists to varying degrees in numerous countries out-
side the United States and the USSR. HDwever,
indigenously produced ARMs are unlikely to appear
in the Third World in the next five years. Instead, the
availability of existing ARMs to the Third World,
particularly the Soviet AS-9, will probably increase
substantially.
Non-ARM TASMs, which include TV, laser, infra-
red, and command-guided TASMs can already be
found in large numbers throughout the Third World.
The major exporters are the French with their AS-12,
20, and 30 series, the United States with the Maver-
ick line, and the Soviets with their AS-7. The capabil-
ities of these TASMs vary widely, but as a general
rule their overall performance is severely degraded in
poor weather.
s with
ARMs, the most important technologies reside in the
guidance and control systems of the missiles, and the
expertise to produce similar systems exists in many
countries. In fact, Argentina has already produced a
command-guided TASM called the Pescador. Future
designs will focus on increasing the launch range,
enhancing poor weather capabilities, decreasing vul-
nerability to countermeasures, and concentrating
more on the development on fire-and-forget systems
to decrease the vulnerability of the launch aircraft.
25X4
25X4
25X4
25X4
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Top Secret
kilometers.
Two types of electro-optically guided munitions are or
soon will be available to Third World countries. The
first type is the laser-guided bomb, which is produced
by both the United States and France (known respec-
tively as the Paveway and Matra systems). Essentially
of similar design, operation, and capability, these
weapons home in on the reflected laser energy radiat-
ed from a target illuminated by either a ground-based
or aircraft-mounted laser designator. Both systems
are designed around a conventional bomb that is
modified, using a kit, to include aerodynamic surfaces
for increased lift and maneuverability, and a seeker
with its auxiliary electronics that locks on to the
reflected laser energy and guides the bomb to its
target. The key technologies on these systems involve
the design of the laser designator and the laser seeker.
While both of these subsystems use reasonably ad-
vanced technologies, duplication of their design and
production are judged to be within the capability of
numerous countries outside the United States and the
USSR, including the United Kingdom, France, Italy,
and Israel. Assuming that a lesser power has access to
ground-based illuminators, these laser-guided bombs
can be carried by almost any Third World aircraft
capable of delivering a conventional bomb and
launched to targets at ranges of less than about 15
The second type of guided munition on the arms
market is the US-built Walleye glide bomb. The
Walleye uses large wings to maximize its range and
glide to its target. Unlike the Paveway, however, it
utilizes a gyrostabilized TV camera in its nose to
acquire and lock on to the target. One version of the
Walleye uses a data link to send the TV image back to
the aircraft, thus permitting the pilot or weapons
officer to send steering commands to the Walleye
using a joy stick. The key technologies in the Walleye
involve the design of the TV seeker and the data link
subsystem, both of which are quite complex. It is thus
doubtful that many countries outside of Western
Europe and Japan can produce a weapon of similar
design and capability. (See table E-3.)
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Antiship Missiles, by Capability
System
Guidance
Category a
Producing Country
Availability
Ranges greater than 100 km
AS-5a
A
USSR
Immediate
AS-5b
A
USSR
Immediate
SS-N-9
A
USSR
5 years
Martel AS-37
Sea Eagle
A
United Kingdom
2 years
Otomat Mk 2
A
France/Italy
Immediate
Harpoon
A
United States
Immediate
SSC- l b
B
USSR
Immediate
Martel AJ-138
C
France
Immediate
Ranges 40 to 100 km
Exocet
A
France
Immediate
SS-N-2c
A
USSR
Immediate
Otomat Mk 1
A
France/Italy
Immediate
RBS- 15
A
Sweden
3 years
Penguin Mk 3
A
Norway
5 years
Ranges less than 40 km
SS-N-2a
A
USSR
Immediate
SS-N-2b
A
USSR
Immediate
Kormoran
A
West Germany
Immediate
Penguin Mk 1 and 2
A
Norway
Immediate
Gabriel Mk 3
B
Israel
Immediate
Gabriel Mk 1 and 2
C
Israel
Immediate
AS-15TT
C
France
Immediate
Sea Skua
C
United Kingdom
Immediate
Sea Killer Mk 1 and 2
C
Italy
Immediate
Top Secret 38
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Too Secret
Antiship cruise missiles on the international arms
market include air-launched, shore-launched, ship-
launched, and sub-launched cruise missiles. The mis-
siles vary considerably in terms of range and guidance
type. In ranking the missiles' capabilities, we divided
them into three flight-range categories: greater than
100 km, 40 to 100 km, and less than 40 km. Range is
an important category, because the greater the range
the greater the standoff capability of the launch
platform and hence the reduction in launch platform
vulnerability. Within each range category, we ranked
the missiles in three guidance categories: A, B, C:
? Category A is the most capable, representing mis-
siles with autonomous guidance such as active radar
or infrared homing. Autonomous missiles require no
interaction with the launch platform after launch
and therefore permit the launch platform to leave
the threat area immediately after launch.
? Category B includes missiles that have an interac-
tion with the launch platform in flight (such as
beam-rider or command-guided) but also have a
seeker for terminal homing.
? Category C, the least capable, includes missiles that
have an interaction with the launch platform but no
terminal homing. Without terminal homing these
missiles tend to be less accurate than those in
Category B. Antiship cruise missiles are included in
the table.
In selecting a cruise missile, a purchasing country
may make its decision based on a number of criteria.
It must select a missile whose capabilities match its
needs (for example, coastal defense or open-ocean
use). Another important aspect is the launch platform.
Some of the missiles listed can be launched from a
variety of launch platforms, whereas others are re-
stricted to a fewer number of potential launch plat-
forms. For example, the US Harpoon is designed to be
compatible with a number of launch platforms to
include aircraft, ships, and submarines. On the other
hand, the UK Sea Skua can be launched only from
the Lynx helicopter because the missile terminal
guidance requires the helicopter's radar. Thus, acqui-
sition of the missile may require purchase of a specific
launch platform as well, which may substantially
increase the cost of the total system depending on the
sophistication of the system.
The purchasing country would also have to consider
the cost of maintenance. Generally speaking the more
sophisticated the weapon the greater the maintenance
cost. A lack of technological capability for mainte-
nance by the purchasing country can in principle be
offset by a maintenance contract with the producing
country, of course, at a greater cost.
The amount of training required for use of the missile
is another major consideration. Personnel must be
trained not only in launching the missile but also in
targeting. Particularly for the longer range (over the
horizon) systems, targeting may require the greatest
degree of training.
cated weaponry.
A number of countries are now developing counter-
measures to antiship missiles because of the grave
threat posed by these weapons. Thus, future antiship
missiles will be developed to cope with these counter-
measures. We would expect to see more use of dual-
mode seekers (for example, active radar/IR and ac-
tive radar/millimeter wave) and more sophisticated
signal processing. Much of the technology is currently
available; the limitations are primarily cost and will-
ingness of the producing country to sell such sophisti-
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the developer's country in the next five years.
The short- and medium-range surface-to-air missile
systems are listed by their characteristics and ranked
in three categories:
? Category A-modern medium-range SAM.
? Category B-early generation medium-range SAM;
modern short-range SAM.
? Category C-early generation short-range SAM.
Even the Category C systems provide a great im-
provement in air defense over small arms fire and
antiaircraft artillery (AAA). Properly used by a well-
trained and disciplined crew that understands the
operational limitations of the weapons, Category C
SAMs are capable of shooting down the most modern
ground attack aircraft. The systems listed do not
include the latest US and Soviet systems (the US
Patriot and the Soviet SA-10, SA-11, and SA-X-12)
since it is unlikely that they will be deployed outside
Key Technologies
The major technological advances from early genera-
tion SAMs to today's systems have involved the use of
solid propellants and the application of solid-state
electronics technology, improved computer software,
and phased-array radar antennas to provide increased
capability in clutter, ECM, and weather-degraded
environments. While these technologies have greatly
improved SAM performance, the improvements have
occurred incrementally rather than in quantum
jumps. This incremental improvement is expected to
continue through the foreseeable future.
Prospects for Proliferation
The level of technology required for the independent
development of an effective SAM system is beyond
the capability of the nonindustrialized Third World.
Even the simplest shoulder-fired IR-homing SAM
requires sophisticated solid-state processing and elec-
tro-optical devices, which are far beyond the capabili-
ty of Third World manufacture. While some coun-
tries, particularly the oil-rich countries, may be able
to buy the requisite manufacturing technology, it is
unlikely that this procurement and the training of the
necessary skilled labor force could be accomplished
within the next five years. To date, these countries
have chosen to buy existing SAM systems from
outside sources.
countries currently produc-
ing SAMs are: the United States, the USSR, China,
the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Sweden, and
Japan. both Egypt 25X1
and India are currently attempting to develop SAMs
based on the Soviet SA-6. Within five years both of
these countries should succeed in this attempt, but
only with technical assistance from one of the present-
ly producing nations. It is possible that other nations
may attempt similar programs or may begin manufac-
ture under license from a producing country (as did
Japan, Italy, the NATO consortium, and China).
Such programs would require extensive assistance and
probably a supply of components by the licensing
country.
Other important factors influencing the effectiveness 25X1
of SAM use by Third World countries is the ability of
such countries to operate and maintain the weapons.
Many of the simple, short-range weapons are very
sensitive to gunner performance and, consequently,
very sensitive to gunner training. (For example, the
Soviets typically require one year of training for their
SA-7 gunners.) It is also important that the operator
fully understand the limitations of the system in order
to maximize its performance. System maintenance
encounters the same difficulty as indigenous manu-
facture of SAMs-lack of skilled technicians. With-
out the attention of well-trained maintenance techni-
cians (or external maintenance support) the complex
electronics associated with the computers and radars
of the advanced SAM systems will fail rapidly. I 25X1
We anticipate a continued proliferation of SAM
systems in Third World countries, principally through
the purchase of existing systems. The best defense
would be provided by a combination of modern,
medium-range systems (Category A), modern short-
range weapons (Category B), and radar-guided gun
systems. We expect, however, that most Third World
armies will concentrate on acquiring the less expen-
sive, short-ran a wea ons in combination with radar-
directed guns.
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Antitank guided missiles (ATGMs) currently avail-
able on the international arms market can be grouped
into two basic categories: first generation, or manual-
ly guided, and second generation, or semiautomatical-
ly guided. The technology associated with either
group is not overly sophisticated, as demonstrated by
the indigenous development of ATGMs in about 12
countries and the current production of one or more
ATGM systems by over 20 countries. Regardless of
sophistication, these missile systems pose a significant
threat to all Western armored vehicles.
Deployment of first-generation ATGMs began in the
late 1950s, and by the mid-1970s, 14 different
ATGM systems had been developed, one or more of
which were in service with the ground forces of more
than 60 countries. The most common of these were
the French SS-11 and the Soviet AT-3, both of which
were sold to more than 20 countries, and the West
German Cobra, which was sold to 18 countries and
was licensed for production in Italy, Turkey, Brazil,
and Pakistan.
The first-generation ATGM systems are very difficult
to control, require extensive gunner training, and have
low probability of hit under combat conditions. Devel-
opment of semiautomatically guided ATGMs greatly
alleviated these problems by relieving the gunner of
his missile guidance responsibility. With these sys-
tems, the gunner has only to track the target; the
missile is then automatically guided to that target.
The first systems of this type available for foreign
sale, the French Harpon and the Soviet AT-2C and
AT-3C, were developed in the late 1960s. All three of
these are variants of first-generation systems (SS-11,
AT-2, AT-3) with improved guidance systems. The
guidance improvements involved the addition of elec-
tro-optical equipment to the missile launchers and
little or no change to the missiles themselves. This
type of modification increases system effectiveness
with minimal development costs and little impact on
ongoing missile production, it should be very attrac-
tive to countries already producing a first-generation
ATGM system. The Yugoslavs, for example, had by
1977 developed their own semiautomatic variant of
the Soviet AT-3, which they were producing under
Antitank Guided Missiles
(by Producing Country)
SS-10 HOT
ss-11
SS-12
AT-1 AT-4 AT-2C
AT-2A AT-7 AT-3C
AT-2B AT-5
AT-3A AT-6
license, and have reportedly offered "modification
kits" for sale to other producers of first-generation
systems.
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The Soviet AT-2C and AT-3C are in production in
the Soviet Union and in some non-Soviet `Warsaw
Pact countries. They are deployed througl:.out the
Warsaw Pact and have been exported to a number of
Third World countries. The incorporation of semiau-
tomatic guidance and later improvements to the war-
heads of these missiles have greatly increased the
effectiveness of these systems, which were deployed in
their original configurations about 20 years ago.F_
By the mid-1970s, deployment of tube-launched, sec-
ond-generation ATGM systems had begun. These
missiles are packaged in sealed tubes that serve as
launchers and shipping containers and facilitate their
handling as "rounds of ammunition." In addition to
improved guidance, these systems typically have in-
creased lethality, higher velocities, and increased bat-
tlefield survivability. The most widely deployed of this
type are the US TOW, which is in service in 32
countries, and the French Milan, which has been sold
to 17 countries and has now been licensed for produc-
tion in India. The Indian license also allows third-
party sales by India, with French approval. Other
systems of this type that have been exported are the
US Dragon, the French HOT, and the Soviet AT-4.
The newer Soviet systems have not yet been widely
exported, but the AT-4 is in service in all Warsaw
Pact countries and has recently been offered for sale
to two non-Warsaw Pact countries. Increased export
of AT-4 is expected as is export of the AT-5 and
AT-7, which are currently deployed only with Soviet
forces.
Improved second-generation ATGMs are expected to
be available internationally within the next five years.
A version of the Milan with an improved warhead has
been offered for sale by the French, and an improved
warhead has been developed for the US TOW. Other
improvements likely to become available are night
sights and countermeasure-hardened guidance links.
More advanced ATGM systems are being developed
by the major powers, with primary development ef-
forts directed toward improved guidance and war-
heads. It is highly unlikely that any of these more
advanced systems will be available for foreign sales
within the next several years. It is equally unlikely
that many lesser powers would choose to deploy more
advanced systems in the near term, due to the costs of
the advanced missiles and to the quality and effective-
ness of systems already available.
The shaped-charge warheads of all currently fielded
ATGM systems (first- and second-generation) will
defeat most currently deployed armored vehicles (such
as M60, LEO I, Centurion, and T-62) and, depending
on the specific missile system and combat scenario,
pose some degree of threat to all armored vehicles
(including Ml, LEO II, Chieftain, T-64, and T-72).
Although the first-generation, manually guided sys-
tems are not as accurate as 'their semiautomatic
successors, they can be very effective when used in
large numbers by well-trained gunners, as evidenced
by Egyptian use of the Soviet AT-3 in the 1973
Middle East war. The more effective second-genera-
tion systems that are available are more expensive,
but an investment of about $2,500 to $15,000 per
round provides a high probability of kill at ranges up
to 4,000 meters against million dollar main battle
tanks.
Worldwide ATGM production is shown in the table,
with missile systems divided into medium and heavy
classes. Typically, medium ATGMs are man portable
or crew served and have a maximum range of 2,000
meters or less. Heavy ATGM systems have ranges
greater than 2,000 meters (typically 3,000 to 5,000
meters) and are mounted on ground vehicles and/or
helicopters.
25X1
25X1
t
25X1
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Belgium
SRC International
155-mm ERFB
PRB
75-mm HEAT
105-mm HEAT
155-mm ERFB
PRB
76-mm HEAT
90-mm HEAT
90-mm HESH
105-mm HEAT
105-mm HESH
Canada
Space Research
175-mm ERFB
China
70-mm HEAT
75-mm HEAT
105-mm APFSDS
France
Hotchkiss-Brandt
155-mm RAP
GIAT
90-mm HEAT
105-mm APFSDS
Luchaire
90-mm HEAT
IMI 105-mm HEAT
Israel
IMI
155-mm RAP
IMI
105-mm APFSDS
105-mm HEAT
Italy
SNIA-Viscosa
105-mm RAP
SNIA-Viscosa
90-mm HEAT
105-mm HEAT
Netherlands
Eurometaal NV
105-mm APDS
105-mm HESH
Spain
Barreiros-Hermanos
90-mm HEAT
105-mm HEAT
United States
20-mm AP (DU)
30-mm AP (DU)
155-mm RAP
155-mm ICM (AP
grenades)
76-mm HEAT
90-mm HEAT
105-mm APFSDS
105-mm APFSDS-P
105-mm HEAT
Improvements occurring in conventional munitions
provide a twofold benefit to the user: (1) the projectiles
are more lethal and (2) they allow an older gun to be
effectively upgraded on a par with newer gun systems
because the munitions are the killing end of artillery
and gun systems. The most prominent example of this
upgrading occurs with tanks. Many tanks considered
obsolete by our standards are in worldwide use and
United States 155-mm ICB (AT
(continued) mines)
155-mm Guided
(Copperhead)
203-mm RAP
203-mm ICM (AP
grenades)
203-mm ICM (dual-
purpose grenades)
United Kingdom Royal Ordnance
105-mm HESH
USSR 115-mm RAP
122-mm HEAT
122-mm RAP
152-mm RAP
122-mm Indirect
Flechette
152-mm Indirect
Flechette
Royal Ordnance
105-mm HESH
105-mm APFSDS
120-mm APFSDS
120-mm HESH
76-mm HESH
76-mm HEAT
85-mm HEAT
100-mm APFSDS
100-mm HEAT
115-mm APFSDS
115-mm HEAT
125-mm APFSDS
125-mm HEAT
Rheinmetall
120-mm APFSDS
120-mm APFSDS-P
120-mm HEAT
90-mm APFSDS
90-mm APFSDS-P
105-mm APFSDS
105-mm APFSDS-P
90-mm HEAT
105-mm HEAT
are armed with 105-mm guns. Most of these older
tanks could use the modern 105-mm ammunition
recently developed for the United States and/or
NATO, which would immediately give them the same
penetrating power found in firstline battletanks of
NATO countries and allow them to penetrate the
armor of very modern US and NATO tanks. The
major deficiency these tanks would then have is a lack
of armor protection comparable with newer tanks.
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The same improvements occur with artillery ammuni-
tion; older guns that fire modern ammunition would
have firepower comparable with new guns
Technology transfer, from a manufacturing sense, is
not an important issue in the munitions area. Most
Third World countries purchase rather than manufac-
ture ammunition. There are numerous ammunition
manufacturing countries willing to sell ammunition
on a worldwide basis.
The effectiveness of modern ammunition produced by
a wide variety of manufacturers is about equal, but
modern munitions as a class is much more effective
than older ones. As an example, the new 152-mm
Soviet flechette round has a lethal area 23 times
greater than the older Soviet 152-mm high-explosive
fragmentation round.
In artillery and tank ammunition, the modern rounds
are the ERFB (extended range full bore), ):.ZAP
(rocket-assisted projectiles), HESH (high-(:xplosive
squash head), APFSDS (armor-piercing fin-stabilized
discarding sabot), APFSDS-P (armor-piercing fin-
stabilized discarding sabot with depleted L.ranium
core), and the HEAT (high-explosive antitank). ERFB
and RAP are designed to extend artillery range by 20
to 30 percent; the other types are primarily used
against tanks. (The table lists some modern ammuni-
tion available for artillery and tanks.)
Laser-guided artillery projectiles such as the US
Copperhead will probably be in use by the United
States and NATO in the next five years. These
projectiles contain high-technology seekers designed
to withstand the tremendous accelerations that occur
when an artillery projectile is fired from a gun.
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25X1 I
25X1
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A wide variety of visible and near-infrared laser
rangefinders, illuminators, and designators are pro-
duced by US, UK, and French firms and are readily
available on the international arms market (see table).
Any country could obtain such laser devices and
might be able to deploy them on battlefield equipment
and use them in a limited role against personnel and
sensitive electro-optical devices.
(flashblinded) for about 10 to 15 seconds.
Such laser devices would present a serious threat to
military equipment and personnel. Low-energy lasers
can be used as optical jammers and countermeasures
against optical sensors and guidance systems; depend-
ing upon the wavelength and pulse energy, a low-
energy laser could be used to cause temporary or
permanent blindness of personnel viewing the laser
beam. The present threat of "off-the-shelf," labora-
tory-type lasers against personnel was dramatically
demonstrated in October of 1981: a low-power argon
laser, purchased from Spectra-Physics, was used by a
civilian to irradiate a Los Angeles police helicopter.
The pilot was immediately disabled and disoriented
Lasers capable of structural damage or out-of-band
damage to sensors (for example, frosting or crazing of
exterior optical surfaces) are in the R&D stage. These
lasers have cw-output powers greater than 20 kw or
pulse energies greater than 30 kJ. No country has yet
deployed such laser weapons, and these high-energy
laser weapons are not expected to be available to .
Third World countries within the next five years. F_
Firm
Wavelength Energy
(micrometer) (microjoule)
TK/60s laser
rangefinder
ILS (US)
1.06
15
NT-90 laser
ILS (US)
1.06/0.53
20-90
NT-60sO laser
transmitter
ILS (US)
0.53
150
LF6/7 designator/
rangefinder
Ferranti (UK) 1.06
100
Type 307 C02 laser
ranger
Ferranti (UK)
10.6
15
UV TEA laser
Marconi (UK) 10.6
60
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Almost all of the submarines sold in the export
market are diesel-electric-powered, attack-type sub-
marines displacing 1,000 to 2,000 metric tons while
submerged. These submarines generally can dive to
depths of about 200 to 300 meters, and typically carry
10 to 20 torpedoes for use against surface ships and
other submarines. A West German consortium,
HDW/IKL, sells the most popular submarines, vari-
ants of the Type 209. Over 35 Type 209s have been
Type 2000
West Germany
Immediate
Type 209
West Germany
Immediate
TR1700
West Germany
Within 5 years
TR1400
West Germany
Within 5 years
Agosta-class
France
Immediate
Type 2400
United Kingdom
Immediate
Type A45
Sweden
Immediate
Foxtrot-class
USSR
Immediate
Romeo
China
(See remarks)
sold, and more are under construction. None of the
submarines contain major technological innovations,
nor will they in the foreseeable future. In general,
however, IKL/HDW submarines are quieter and
contain more incremental-type innovations
Diesel-electric submarines are inherently quiet, and
would be difficult to detect by any means. Thus, they
probably represent a significant threat to an opponent.
Designed by HDW especially for export, it is a 2,500-ton submarine
with a range of 25,000 nm. It has six torpedo tubes capable of firing any
21-inch weapon such as the US Mark 48 torpedo or Harpoon. We know
of no sales of this design, however, Germany is attempting to sell system
to the United States.
Several versions are available for export. More than 35 have been sold
for export. The latest customer is India. The submarine displaces up to
1,500 tons, has a range of up to 8,000 nm. It has eight 533-mm torpedo
tubes and carries up to 14 torpedoes. Argentina has two T209s.
Designed and built by Thyssen Noordtseewerke, the competitor of
HDW/IKL. The TR1700 displaces 2,300 tons, has six 533-mm torpedo
tubes, and carries 22 torpedoes. Argentina has ordered four. The first
TR1700 should be ready for sea trials in 1983.
The baby brother of the TR1700, the TR1400 displaces only 1,700 tons.
It is intended for coastal defense. Argentina has ordered two.
The Agosta-class diesel-electric attack submarine has four 550-mm
torpedo tubes and can carry 20 torpedoes designed for the 550-mm
tubes. Spain has ordered four and Pakistan has ordered two.
The 2,400-ton Type 2400 submarine has six 533-mm torpedo tubes and
can carry up to 18 torpedoes. The only orders for this class are the Royal
Navy, however, Vickers is marketing this submarine in competition with
the TR1700, the T2000, and the T45.
This is an expert version of the Type A14 in service with the Swedish
Navy. There are no known customers for the A45, which is a rather
mundane boat.
The USSR has exported a number of Foxtrot-class diesel-electric attack
submarines to client states.
China has built several of these 1,400-ton diesel-electric attack
submarines for North Korea. Production is continuing for the Chinese
Navy. Thus, we cannot rule out possible exports in the future.
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 Too Secret
Top Secret
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