STATEMENT BY MR. JOSEPH J. LIEBLING DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (SECURITY POLICY) BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00823R000800120021-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 43
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 5, 2001
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: March 9, 1972
• Content Type: STATEMENT

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OSD 'Declassification/Release
Instructions on File
STATEMENT
BY
MR. JOSEPH J. LIEBLING
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(SECURITY POLICY)
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
MARCH 9, 1972
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Until released by the
Subcommittee on Intelligence
House Armed Services Committee
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Mr. Chairman and Distinguished Members of the Committee
INTRODUCTION
I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the Committee to
set forth in detail the policies and practices of the Department of
Defense dealing with the administration of the security program.
The President had ordered the National Security Council to
review classification procedures to-enlarge the people's right to
know more, not less. To this end, a committee was established by
the President on January 15, 1971. The President signed a new
Executive Order on the safeguarding of official information on
March 8, 1972. The provisions of the new Order were compared
to the old by Mr. Buzhardt. I will not cover that ground again.
However, I wish to point out here that we are well aware of our
responsibility to follow the provisions of the new Order. We are
also aware of their impact on Defense operations. Consequently,
as will be evidenced by this discussion today, the Department has
already initiated actions to gear up for effective implementation.
The fact of the matter is that over the past few years the Depart-
ment has been continuously refining its policies, practices and
procedures toward a more viable program.
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We share the concern of the President, the Congress and the public
over unnecessary security classification and overclassification, and we
intend to fully respond to the message, made abundantly clear in the
new Executive Order, to classify less, declassify more and afford
better protection to that which truly requires it.
My purpose here today is to describe to this Committee the current
major security policies and practices of the Department, the complexities
and problems encountered in carrying out particular security functions,
to clear up some misconceptions, to provide you with the actions
already taken by the Department in betterment of the security program
and to project future actions to meet the objectives of the new Order.
CLASSIFICATION
Classification is defined by us substantially as the determination
that certain official information requires in the interests of national
security a specific degree of protection against unauthorized disclosure.
It is overriding in importance because not until the moment something is
g
determined to be classified will the other security functions come into
play, consistent with the Executive Order.
Comparatively few officials in the Department of Defense are now
authorized to make original determinations that information should be
classified. For example, as of January 15, 1972, of the over three
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million people in Defense less than 1% or 29, 951 may exercise original
classification authority. This is about: 1, 000 less than reported in
September 1971. Of the 29, 951, 7, 277 have original Secret classifica-
tion authority and of these, only 799, representing only twenty-five one
thousandths of one percent of our people, have original Top Secret
classification authority. Considering the size and the geographic
dispersion of the Department and its activities, we consider that the
number authorized to exercise original. classification authority is
limited to those necessary and is reasonably consistent with the orderly
and expeditious transaction of Government business. Notwithstanding
the foregoing evaluation, we are currently reexamining the assignment
of original classification authority with a view to possible further decrease.
The Department's published policies with respect to classification
are clear. In substance, they are: (1) Information requiring protection
in the interests of national security shall be properly classified in the
first instance and unnecessary classification and over classification shall
be avoided; (2) classifications shall be imposed for the shortest possible
time consistent with the interests of national security; and (3) classification
may not be used for the purpose of concealing administrative error or
inefficiency, to prevent personal or departmental embarrassment, to
influence competition or independent initiative, or to prevent release
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of official information which does not require protection in the interests
of national security.
In addition, we have provided our classifiers with guidelines to
assist them in arriving at a judicious classification determination.
For example, the Secretary of Defense has issued instructions which
state in part that a determination to classify shall be made only when
one or more of the following considerations are present and the
unauthorized disclosure of the information could result in a degree of
harm to the national security:
1. The information provides the United States, in comparison
with other nations, with a scientific, engineering, technical,
operational, intelligence, strategic or tactical advantage
related to the national defense.
2. Disclosure of the information would weaken the international
position of the United States, create or increase international
tensions contrary to United States interests, result in a break
in diplomatic relations, or lead to hostile economic, political,
or military action against the United States or its allies,
thereby adversely affecting the national defense.
3. Disclosure of the information would weaken the ability of the
United States to wage war or defend itself successfully, limit
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the effectiveness of the armed forces, or make the United
States vulnerable to attack.
4. There is sound reason to believe that other nations do not
know that the United States has, or is capable of obtaining,
certain information or material which is important to the
international posture or national defense of the United States
vis-a-vis those nations.
5. There is sound reason to believe that the information involved
is unique, and is of singular importance or vital to the
national defense.
6. The information represents a significant breakthrough in basic
research which has an inherent military application potential
in a new field or radical change in an existing field.
7. There is sound reason to believe that knowledge of the inform-
ation would (a) provide a foreign nation with an insight into
the war potential or the war or defense plans or posture of
the United States; (b) allow a foreign nation to develop,
improve or refine a similar item of war potential; (c) provide
a foreign nation with a base upon which to develop effective
countermeasures; (d) weaken or nullify the effectiveness of
a defense or military plan, operation, project or activity
which is vital to the national defense.
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industry and the domestic community, and our allies through open
and effective technology dissemination.
Additionally, in December 1971, we reactivated the DoD
Classification Review and Advisory Board with the stated objective
of strengthening our Classification Management Program. The
Board will assist the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) in
the preparation of policy guidance and the development or review of
recommended changes in procedures or practices for achieving
Program objectives. In this connection, the Board will be called upon,
among other things, to monitor DoD Component actions, to review
complaints of a general policy nature, and to develop and recommend
action programs in furtherance of our goal, and that of the new
Executive Order, to classify less, declassify more, and afford better
protection to that which requires it. We probably will explore additional
ways and means of accomplishing the task as we carry out, within Defense,
the provisions of the new Order.
As I mentioned earlier, once official information lassified, we
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are interested in seeing to it that it remains classified for the shortest
possible time consistent with the interests of national security. This
brings us to the business of downgrading and declassification.
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These criteria will be reexamined in light of the new Executive Order.
Notwithstanding the foregoing policies and guidance, initial
security classification is a judgment call. Of course, judgments in
this complex area can and do differ. Thus, we encounter the problem of
unnecessary classification in the first instance, and overclassification.
We, in Defense, are aware of this particular problem. Over the past
five years we have made some perceptible progress in trying to reduce
its magnitude. Security classification guidances are required to be
issued for each Defense program, project or system in the technical
field. The numbers of people authorized to make original classification
determinations have been reduced. Top management in the Department
has taken a personal interest in reducing the amount of information
classified and has effectively expressed that interest throughout the
Department. All of these actions were taken with the aim of reducing
the problem of overclassification and unnecessary classification. We
continue to work toward the goal of total elimination of the problem
but recognize that so long as initial classification depends to a great
extent on the judgment of reasonable men after evaluations of the many
and complex factors involved, the best we can expect to accomplish
is to minimize it to the extent practicable.
I believe it appropriate to mention here that as far back as
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March 5, 1969, Secretary Laird issued to the heads of DoD Components
the following written instructions, and I quote in part:
Our first concern must be the security of the United States
and the safety of our Armed Forces. Therefore, information which
would adversely affect the security of our country or endanger our men
should not be disclosed.
"2. The provisions of the Freedom of Information Act (5 U. S. C.
552) will be supported in both letter and spirit.
No information will be classified solely because disclosure
might result in criticism of the Department of Defense. To avoid abuse
of classification procedures, we must adhere strictly to the criteria
set forth in Executive Order 10501.
"4. Our obligation to provide the public with accurate, timely
information on major Department of Defense programs will require, in
some instances, detailed public information planning and coordination
within the Department and with other Government agencies. However,
I want to emphasize that the sole purpose of such planning and coordin-
ation will be to expedite the flow of information to the public. Propa-
ganda has no place in the Department of Defense public information
program. "
In accordance with the Secretary's instruction, the heads of all
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DoD Components were instructed in August 1970 to establish security
classification guides for each development program over which they
have cognizance. Such guides are now required to be approved at
a higher level of command or supervision such as the Assistant
Secretary, Research and Development of the Military Departments
or equivalent in order to assure that only that information which truly
requires security protection is classified. This is intended to prevent
unnecessary classification at the start.
Secretary Laird also announced the establishment of a new
policy in October 1970 which prescribes that "all classification
decisions will be reached only after careful consideration of the
advantages of open circulation after public release approval of the
information against the advantages to a potential enemy. Even where
security classification is clearly required, it should be retained for
the minimum amount of time considering the degree of sensitivity,
cost, and robabilit of compromise. " This new policy means that a
security classification decision will be reached only after consideration
of competing advantages and disadvantages. In the past, major
emphasis for classification has generally been placed on the possible
benefits of the information to potential enemies without consideration
of the benefits which would accrue to the United States Government,
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DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION
Executive Order 10501 dealing with the security classification
system established the requirement for the continuous review and re-
evaluation for purposes of downgrading and declassification. From the
standpoint of manpower and related costs, the requirement for a
document-by-document review for downgrading and declassification, was
found difficult to implement. Consequently, the original Order was
amended in 1961 by establishing an automatic time-phased system. This
system excluded from automatic declassification all of the information
assigned to Groups 1, 2, and 3. Only Group 4 material qualified for auto-
matic declassification. However, the earliest a classified document in
Group 4 could be automatically downgraded was 3 years and the earliest
it could be automatically declassified was after 12 years. The new Order
reduces the automatic downgrading period from 3 to 2 years and the auto-
matic declassification period in the case of Top Secret from 12 to 10 years,
Secret from 12 to 8 years, and Confidential from 12 to 6 years.
I mentioned earlier the Department of Defense Classification
Management Program. This Program was established in January 1963
to insure proper classification of Defense information originated by or
under the jurisdiction of the Department. The Program was also
designed to assure that classifications were eliminated when no longer
required. With all candor I cannot state here that the Program has
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fully achieved its objectives. Let me assure you that new regulations
designed to implement the new Order will emphasize the following
points:
1. Information requiring protection in the interests of national
security shall be properly classified in the first instance and
unnecessary classification and overclassification shall be
avoided.
2. Classification shall be imposed for the shortest possible time
consistent with the interests of national security, and pro-
gressive downgrading and declassification will reduce and
ultimately eliminate classifications when they are no longer
necessary.
3. Uniformity shall be achieved, throughout the Department and
industry in the application and in the results of the applica-
tion of the rules governing classification, downgrading and
declassification.
4. Unnecessary expense incurred by the Department and its
activities in protecting information which no longer requires
security classification shall be eliminated.
The Department continues to stress review for downgrading and
declassification purposes. We realize, however, that such review
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must be currently performed by responsible officials who are in a
position to exercise judgment as to whether the information over which
they exercise classification responsibility may be downgraded or
declassified- -people whose full time is taken in accomplishing the
mission of their respective offices and activities. We expect improve-
ments under the new Order. I will address the problems and complexities
of document-by-document review later. It is sufficient to state here that
for full force and effect a document review would require additional
extensive resources in manpower funds. This is not to mean that we
have looked upon downgrading and declassification as an exercise in
futility. In spite of some reports to the contrary, we have taken positive
action to free official information from the wraps of secrecy.
In the latter part of 1969, we initiated a program requiring the
mandatory review of all security classification guidances for purposes
of downgrading and declassifying elements of information contained in
such guidances. Primarily involved were the security classification
guidances furnished to contractors. This program, conducted during
a six month period beginning in 1969 and ending in 1970 resulted in
significant downgrading and declassification actions in both Defense
and industry. Over 13, 500 security classification guides were reviewed
on a nationwide basis. To cite one example of the benefits derived
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from this mandatory review program, one Military Department
reported the total declassification of 12 contracts with a cost avoidance
of over half a million dollars. This program continues actively on an
annual basis.
On May 1, 1971, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed the
heads of Military Departments and agencies to institute an intensive
records cleanout campaign, to be completed by the end of FY 1972.
At the same time, the Secretary directed that special emphasis should
be placed on the elimination of classified material. by downgrading,
declassification, retirement, or destruction. He noted in his Directive
that this program should create a surplus of filing equipment which
could be used over the next three years to avoid purchasing new
equipment. Accordingly, he placed a moratorium on the purchase
of power filing equipment and security containers to continue until
December 31, 1973. The objectives of this program are being
actively pursued. Two of the smaller :DoD Components, the Office
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Defense Intelligence Agency, reported
in December 1971 that as of that time 158 security containers were
declared surplus. I might add that the average cost of the security
container is $460.
With respect to reducing classified inventories by destruction,
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special action programs are directed when, through our classifi-
cation management system, it is found that Defense activities hold
more classified information. in files than what is believed to be
reasonable. For example, a Defense contractor activity in
Pennsylvania was asked to reduce its classified holdings when it was
brought to our attention in the Office of the Secretary of Defense that
that particular activity had on hand over 400 security containers with
only two classified contracts. The contractor, acting under the
guidance of our Defense Contract Administration Services personnel
and the Military Department having cognizance of the contracts involved,
eliminated the requirement for fifty-five security containers within a
short period of time. Approximately 3 tons of classified material
were eliminated with a resulting reduction in administrative costs
involved in safeguarding. Subsequently;, we directed the Defense
Contract Administration Services organization to examine and purge
similar contractor holdings nationwide and the results to date are
significant. It was reported, for example, that of a total of 241
contractors and their associated consultants, 104 reduced their
classified document holdings an average of 38%.
During 1971, one contractor destroyed 90 tons of classified
material under our direction and guidance. A recent report shows
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that as of February 18, 1972, another contractor facility, within the
preceding ninety days, destroyed 53 tons of classified material as
the result of our conduct of an in-depth audit of the facility's entire
security program. As mentioned, we are following through on a
nationwide basis.
All of the foregoing actions, of course, reduce the risk of
compromise and the administrative costs associated with the safe-
guarding of the material involved. We continually strive for these
kinds of results. However, we believe that the benefits to be derived
from declassification are more important than destruction. For
example, early declassification could bring about these benefits:
. . . Greater flow of information to news media and the public
regarding current defense posture.
. . . Increase in the industrial base because of availability of
such information to small business.
. . . Facilitate international export and trade by American
industry.
? . . Permit wider exchange of know-how among the scientific,
technical and academic communities including colleges, universities
and historians, domestic and international.
. . . Provide for state-of-the-art technology available for
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commercial and civilian purposes.
. . . Reduction of costs associated with safeguarding classified
material.
It is quite apparent to us that the new Executive Order will go
a long way in accomplishing these things and, in its implementation,
the Department of Defense will make every effort to achieve fully its
objectives.
Thus far, I have cited just a few examples of efforts of the
Office of the Secretary of Defense to reduce the amount of classified
material by downgrading, declassification, or destruction. The
Defense Components are also highly motivated and are moving in a
direction to meet the intent of the new Order.
On December 20, 1971, the Department of the Army promulgated
a new Directive requiring the designation of a classification manager
at the departmental headquarters level and classification managers
at command echelons. That department also formed a special task
force in April 1971 to review World War II and prior records in the
National Archives for possible declassification. During the period
1 April 1971 to 1 December 1971, a total of 59 Mobilization Designee
Reserve Officers, some on a full time basis and others part time,
were assigned to the project. This specific effort was directed to
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intelligence records in various categories originated prior to January 1,
1946. The production total to date has resulted in a review of approxi-
mately 700 linear feet of records, 90% of which are scheduled for declassi-
fication. The remainder, identified as possibly requiring continued classi-
fication, are to be reexamined for declassification and downgrading. Of
course, under the provisions of the new Order, the Archivist is authorized
to review and declassify this kind of material unless specifically excepted.
On November 30, 1971, the Department of the Navy issued a
formal notice covering an accumulation of declassification actions taken
over a period of five years, 1966 - 1971. The value of this notice is
that every current holder of any of the involved documents or hardware
items could declassify them immediately upon identification. Because
many of the original documents and copies thereof would have been
destroyed during the intervening years, in terms of current holders
the notice is reported to cover over 1, 000, 000 documents and hardware
items still currently existing and on hand.
The Department of the Air Force reported that in the first
quarter of FY 71, one of its major commands directed a special,
intensified review of classified material throughout the command with
a view to reducing its classified holdings. In this three months review,
the following results were obtained: (1) Z58, 115 Secret documents were
destroyed; (2) 7, 790 Secret documents were downgraded to Confidential;
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(3) 1, 029 Secret documents were declassified; (4) 126, 397
Confidential documents were destroyed; (5) 2, 900 Confidential
documents were declassified. The total number of documents
destroyed, downgraded, or declassified in this effort was 396, 231.
Since May 1969, the Defense Contract Administration Services
under the Defense Supply Agency (DSA) have, as directed by the
Office of the Secretary of Defense, established a Classification Manage-
ment Program at Headquarters, DSA, and at each of the eleven Defense
Contract Administration Services Regions to insure that security classi-
fication guidance furnished to contractors is both timely and adequate.
In this connection, review of contract classification guidance is conducted
during each of the 27, 000 inspections performed annually of about 12, 900
industry facilities by more than 200 assigned Industrial Security repre-
sentative s.
The foregoing examples of actions already taken by the Department,
within available resources, are cited for this Committee and the public
to show that in spite of misconceptions and some critical reports to the
contrary, the Department of Defense has taken positive measures to
insure that the public and the Congress are informed of the Department's
activities to the maximum extent practicable consistent with the interests
of national security.
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Lest we be misunderstood, our responsibility in the Department
of Defense to safeguard sensitive information, lives and property must
be recognized. Espionage and sabotage and willful compromise will
occur. We must, therefore, also protect against such adversities.
In so doing, there is always a degree of risk involved. Total secrecy
in a democratic form of government is not possible nor is it desired.
COMPLEXITIES AND PRACTICAL PROBLEMS
Before moving to the safeguarding functions, I would like to
acquaint the Committee with some of the practical problems and
complexities associated with the whole arena of classification, down-
grading and declassification.
The sheer size of the Department of Defense, with over 3, 000, 000
people spread around the world, and separately involving about 12, 900
industrial facilities engaged in classified work, presents a difficulty
in obtaining reasonable estimates of how much classified material is
produced and how much is downgraded, declassified or destroyed over
any given period of time.
The Department cannot estimate how many classified documents
are held in active office files and records repositories. One Military
Department developed an estimate which indicated that approximately
17% of its total records holdings were classified. The estimate appears
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to be a reasonable one.
The Department is interested to know the estimated volume of
classified documents held in inventory in order to measure the effective-
ness of classification and records management actions taken which are
designed in part to reduce these inventories. More specifically, we
are concerned with how much classified material is being disposed of
by destruction, retirement and declassification and how much is being
generated. We are currently gathering this kind of data.
On February 10, 1972, we requested our Defense Contract
Administration Services people to obtain a sampling from Defense
contractors throughout the country of the numbers of classified documents
received, generated, destroyed, and declassified during Calendar Year
1971, and the number on hand at the end of that Calendar Year. It was
specifically directed that the information would only be solicited from
contractors who (1) had the information readily available; (2) would
cooperate on a voluntary basis in developing the information without
cost to the Government; and (3) are representative of those handling
a substantial volume of classified documents.
The report of this survey shows that 41 contractors held 4, 956, 109
classified documents at the end of Calendar Year 1971. Of this total,
4,467 were classified at the Top Secret level, 1, 470, 386 Secret, and
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3,481,256 Confidential. During Calendar Year 1971, these facilities
received and generated 1, 710, 787 classified documents. During the
same period, they destroyed, declassified or dispatched 1, 980, 012
classified documents. Thus, the beginning Calendar Year 1971 classified
inventory was reduced by 269, 225 classified documents.
It should be borne in mind that only 41 contractors were involved
in this survey. Altogether, there are 12, 900 contractors around the
country handling classified material. They vary in size. The 41
contractors also varied in size among themselves. Though the sampling
is relatively very small, the statistics resulting from the survey could
conceivably mean that all of the contractors country-wide are whittling
away at their classified holdings and reducing them, on an annual basis,
by the millions of documents. From the examples I cited earlier, it
is quite evident that such is the case.
A very great mass of classified :material is generated in DoD and
in industrial facilities in connection with research, development,
production, deployment and use of weapons and weapons systems.
At any one time, there are hundreds of classified efforts in progress
involving 150 or more scientific disciplines. Classification responsi-
bilities and judgments make heavy demand upon specialists--
specialists in public affairs and information, in intelligence,
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in science and technology, in military plans, requirements and
operations, in foreign relations, and in security.
The importance of accurate and adequate classification guidance
cannot be overemphasized. If badly prepared, it can be the source
of perpetuated unnecessary classifications and overclassifications.
It is essential that original classifiers understand and professionally
apply established classification principles.
Efforts are being made to train and assign classification managers
at headquarters offices where they can oversee and assist program and
project managers. Each such classification manager faces the extreme
difficulty of trying to remain abreast of significant developments in the
several fields of interest for which he has responsibility.
The application of classification guides at all operational levels
down through manufacturing processes in industry has presented
sizeable practical problems. Some monitorship is done from head-
quarters levels. Most, however, must be decentralized to the many
subordinate commands that have day-to-day contacts with operating
a ctivitie s.
Maintaining the currency of existing classification guidance can
result in real savings through reduction of costs in protective measures
and through facilitating operations. The problems incident to preparation
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of original guidance are present also in updating guidance. In this
connection, one must try to keep up with what is officially published
on a worldwide basis and with foreign developments and intentions.
Interest and activity of many parties outside the DoD-industry family,
the rapid pace of technological developments, the availability of
significant intelligence, all bear on both the original and updated
guidance. Monitorship is critical in assuring that changes in guidance
are actually made on a timely basis and then implemented all the way
down through operating levels.
The greatest apparent benefit of declassifying documentation
retained in files and storage is that then the files can be opened to all
parties. For a number of years, historical researchers have had
controlled access to classified files in the National Archives and
other records centers. However, because there is access to classified
information, their writings are subject to review before publication is
permitted. As I mentioned earlier, declassification not only removes
these restrictions, but also expands the base of persons who could
study the written record of events as they actually transpired.
Declassification of hardware and information creates opportunity
for private exploitation and for non-military use. It also materially
reduces military handling costs and facilitates military use.
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The new Order clearly expresses the policy that as soon as possible
consistent with maintaining necessary national security advantages
resulting from classification, declassifications are effected. In
some technology areas like imagery and infrared sensors we have
already declassified a great deal of material that may have great
benefit to the civilian community.
I have concentrated to a considerable extent on classification
and declassification of information pertaining to Research, Develop-
ment, Test and Evaluation, including weapons, weapon systems,
and other military equipment. We face different problems when
getting into military operations, contingency plans, and relations
with foreign governments. There, the factors governing classification
are not finite, like state-of-the-art. They are more intangible, less
measurable to analysis of sensitivity in a narrow sense of thinking,
because of dependence of shifting world affairs where defense efforts
must be flexible in support of ever changing national policy require-
ments.
In this politico-military area, information concerning a
particular foreign relations problem or a military operation may or
may not become subject to declassification when a single action or
event has been completed as may be the case in the RDT&E area.
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The process is not and probably cannot be an automatic one. The
planning, intelligence analyses, the various options considered,
evaluations of the possible or probable course of action by the other
party, all may remain sensitive as long as a particular government -74-
holds important public office, or our relations with a particular
country varies or remains the same bilaterally or multilaterally
related. Specific information given to the U. S. in confidence by a
foreign government, or joint efforts of political sensitivity to
another government may be involved.
The foregoing factors do not readily lend themselves to
automatic or blanket declassification action easily. What is involved
is the judgment and experience of persons who are specialists with
respect to particular areas of the world, or expert in political,
economic, intelligence, or military planning and operational affairs.
Persons with that type of broad background are rare, but are the ones
who can perform the necessary screening and evaluation to determine
what should remain classified. Although the sensitiveness of politico-
military affairs may diminish generally with the passage of time,
some items of information will remain sensitive for an incalculable
or unforeseen period. In this complex area, at the present time, a
careful document-by-document review and close collaboration between
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DoD, Department of State and other Government departments and
agencies, are required before declassification and open release can
occur. Guidance from the top needs constant refinement and com-
munication of such guidance bears heavily on the judgments to be
exercised with a reasonable degree of confidentiality to be respected
within tiers of Government.
In view of the foregoing, it can be readily ascertained that the
classification management problem has massive proportions.
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PROTECTIVE MEASURES
Up to this point in our discussion of Department of Defense
security we have been concerned with the nature, origin, and identifica-
tion of classified information, the length of time it remains at any level
of classification, and with its ultimate declassification. The balance
of this discussion will deal with the suitability and security qualifica-
tions for personnel and the safeguarding requirements which must be
observed.
PERSONNEL SECURITY PROGRAMS
The Personnel Security Programs, as the name suggests, are
involved with the reliability, trustworthiness, or suitability of
personnel as a means of achieving security. They have primary
significance for the simple reason that no amount of safes and alarm
systems, fences, guards or handling transmission, and other storage
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procedures can be solely depended 28
Upon to withstand the human element
or failing where wilful compromises will occur.
There are three personnel security programs Th
concerned first is
with the acceptance and retenti e
on of civilian personnel
second with the acceptance , the
and retention of military personnel, and
the third deals with clearance procedures for access
information by to classified
all departmental personnel and personnel in industr
I might add that there are also s y?
pecial applications of our
personnel programs such as those for individuals assigned
related to nuclear duties
weapons or other extremely sensitive information.
These special applications involve an extremely small personnel and are not typical of our general program and, in any
event, do not represent departures from the
general policy,
CIVILIAN APPLICANT AND EMPLOYEF; SECURIT
Y PROGRAM
I will first discuss our civilian program because it
serve as a background against which o will best
our other personnel security
programs may be most readily understood.
Under the Civilian Applicant and Employee Securit
all civilian y Program
positions are divided into three
classes according to the
degree of adverse effect the occupant of the Position
could bring about
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on the national security. These classes are critical-sensitive, non-
critical-sensitive, and non-sensitive.
A critical-sensitive position is one which has been designated
by the authority of the Head of a Department of Defense Component,
involving the following:
a. Access to Top Secret c~ information.
b. Development or approval of war plans, plans or particulars
of future or major or special operations of war, or
critical and extremely important items of war.
c. Development or approval of plans, policies, or programs
which affect the overall operations of a department or
agency, i. e. , policy-making or policy-determining positions.
d. Investigative duties, the issuance of personnel security
clearances, or duty on personnel security boards.
e. Fiduciary, public contact, or other duties demanding
the highest degree of public trust.
f. Any other position so designated! by authority of the Head
of a Department of Defense Component.
A noncritical-sensitive position is one which has been designated
by the authority of the Head of a Department of Defense Component,
involving the following:
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NMA~
a? Any position, the duties or
s0
responsibilities of which
require access to Secret or Confidential defense information,
b' Any position involving education
ment of Defense and orientation of Depart-
C. Any other position so designated by authority of the Head of
a Department of Defense Component.
A non-sensitive position is one which r
s
such by the a equires no desi
uthority of the Head of the gnation as
and is 2Department of Defense Com
one which involves no sensitive p?nent
the duties. All positions not
requirements of the above-described meeting
critical_ critical-sensitive or
sensitive positions non-
, therefore, fall into this group
For critical-sensitive positions we require
gation prior to quire a background i
appointment, This investigation is an extensive innvesti-
which normally covers the
inquiry
15 year period or extends to the 18th
of the subject. It also includes
birthday
a National Agency Check which
describe shortly.
I shall
For noncritical-sensitive positions a
Ag encY Check is pre-appointment -
required. This National
Federal records plus written inquiries to local law
officials, schools enforcement
employers, and other pertinent sources of information.
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31
For non-sensitive Positions National Agency Checks with written
inquiries may. be made subsequent to appointment.
The nature and scope of investigations used in determinin
g
eligibility for or retention in civilian employment are based upon
E. O. 10450 as amended, and the provisions of the Federal Personnel
Manual.
Upon receipt of the completed investigation, a security evaluation
is made by the major element of the Department of Defense Component.
cases in which significant adverse data. is developed, the ponent.
case is
referred to a central clearance group established in each Military
and each Department of Defense agency. y
A favorable evaluation may in some Department of Defense
Components be made by the major elements; in others it must be
by the central clearance made
group. In all Components, however, an
unfavorable final determination can be made only by the head of the
Component after a review by a central clearance group.
In all evaluations the security standard applied to Department
of Defense civilian personnel is that their acceptance or retention
must be clearly consistent with the interests of national security. Both
the standard and the implementing criteria stem from Executive Order
10450.
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The criteria are essentially guidelines for adJ'u
bility for or dlcating accepta-
retention in Government ennployment. They contain
examples of actions, situations, or conditions
hi
W
c
affect, but not necessarily h would adversely
preclude Government em l0
following is a general p Yment. The
summary of the
advocacy criteria: Commission. or
of wrongful acts or crimes, those affe
securit cting the national
y; concealment or refusal to furnish material facts o
mation; dishonest r infor-
infamous, or immoral conduct; Wilful disregard
of security regulations; g
any illness which may cause a significant
defect in judgment or security reliability Withou
factor t a rehabilitation
finally and most important, significant association with sub-
versive individuals or membership in or affiliation
organizations, with subversive
The Department of Defense Civilian Applicant a
Security Program is a si nd Employee
gnificant one. The Department of Defense
employed 1, 125, 481
civilians as of November 30, 1971, or 40. 1% of
total Executive Branch empto the
Yment of 2, 803, 872. To emphasize the
importance of the Department of Defense Civilian
that 75% an Program, it is
to 80% of all the sensitive positions
-service in the Executive civilian
Branch are in the Department of Defense.
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Our civilian applicant and employee program is to some extent,
shared with the Civil Service Commission. The Commission conducts
all National Agency Checks for Department of Defense civilians but
Background Investigations, when required, are conducted by the
Department of Defense.
In general, we have encountered only a limited number of
problems in our Civilian Applicant and Employee Security Program.
One past minor difficulty involves the Attorney General's list of sub-
versive organizations. It does not list organizations which have been
created since 1955 and which may deserve inclusion on the Attorney
General's list. It should be noted, however, that under Executive
Order 11605 the Attorney General is authorized to petition the Sub-
versive Activities Control Board to update this list. It is our under-
standing that the Department of Justice has already initiated action
concerning several organizations. At any rate, in individual cases,
the factors which would.be applied are the following: Membership in
an organization, knowledge of its illegal aims, and support of those
illegal aims.
MILITARY PERSONNEL SECURITY PROGRAM
The Department of Defense military personnel security program
is based on the Constitutional authority of the President and the general
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grant of authority to the Secretary of Defense in the National Security
Act of 1947. The national security program for civilians expressed
originally in Public Law 733, 81st Congress and Executive Order 10450,
as amended, has been adopted with certain modifications for its military
security program.
This program like its civilian counterpart is directed toward
assuring that the membership of any individual in the Armed Forces
is clearly consistent with the interests of national security.
The investigative and adjudicative procedures are essentially
similar to those followed in the civilian applicant and employee
program.
CLEARANCE :PROGRAM
The civilian and military personnel security programs that I
have just discussed are concerned with eligibility for civilian employ-
ment or military service from a security standpoint. Many members
of the Department of Defense require access to classified information
in. the course of their official duties. Executive Order 10501 required
that only persons determined to be trustworthy may be given access to
such information. This determination of trustworthiness, with respect
to access to classified information, is commonly called a clearance.
The Department of Defens e clearance program sets forth the scope of
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investigation on which a clearance must be based and rules for deter-
mining how such clearances are adjudicated. Within the Department
of Defense, this program applies to both military and civilian personnel.
Externally, it also applies to personnel in industry.
The following is a brief summary of the investigative require-
ments for access to the various levels of classified information.
For access to Top Secret information, an individual must be
the subject of a Background Investigation.. As an exception, military
personnel with 15 years of consecutive service may be granted a
Top Secret clearance on the basis of a National Agency Check and
a complete check of military service files.
For a Secret clearance, a National Agency Check is required
for both military and civilian personnel. For a Confidential clearance,
civilians require a National Agency Check and military personnel
require a check of all relevant personnel and medical records.
Requests for clearances are initiated by the commander or
supervisor of the individual and sent to the security office of the
appropriate major element in a Department of Defense Component.
The security office will usually have on record the scope, date, and
result of the most recent investigative action. If the scope is sufficient
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and there is no indication of significant derogatory information, the
clearance will be issued. Otherwise, the security office will request
that an investigation of sufficient scope be conducted for the level of
clearance requested. If the results of the requested investigation are
favorable, the clearance is issued. If, however, the investigation
discloses significant derogatory information, a review of the case
file is made by security specialists and sent to the commander or
director of the element for a determination. The decision to grant or
deny the clearance is made at this level.
After an individual has been cleared, and information is
subsequently discovered which adversely reflects on his trustworthiness
or reliability, the security office will request investigation to disclose
all relevant data. The procedures for retention or revocation of a
clearance are the same as those followed in connection with issuance
or denial.
If the clearance of a member of the Armed Forces is denied or
revoked he cannot be assigned to or remain in the position requiring
such a clearance. If a civilian employee holds a sensitive position,
his eligibility for access can be revoked only within the framework
of the Department of Defense Civilian Applicant and Employee Security
Programs.
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The Department of Defense applies, as far as is practicable,
the security principles it uses internally to Department of Defense
industrial personnel through its Industrial Security Program.
Contractors are authorized to grant Confidential clearances for
their employees, with some exceptions, under the guidelines
established in the Industrial Security Manual. Top Secret clear-
ances, Secret clearances, and certain Confidential clearances must
be granted by the Government and are is sued by the Defense Industrial
Security Clearance Office (DISCO) of the Defense Supply Agency at
Columbus, Ohio. Such clearances are based upon an appropriate
investigation. As of November 1, 1971, there were approximately
938, 763 Government-granted clearances on record at the Defense
Industrial Security Clearance Office. In addition, 327, 503 employees
held Company-granted Confidential clearances, making a total of
1, Z66,266 cleared industrial employees or approximately 23. 1% of
the total work force in facilities, where classified work is performed.
Of the 938, 763 industrial employees with Government-granted clear-
ances, 68, 439 were Top Secret clearances; 859, 922 were Secret;
and 10,402 were Confidential clearances.
In the event that the Defense Industrial Security Clearance
Office cannot make a favorable clearance determination, the case is
referred to the Industrial Security Clearance Review Division, Office
of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Security Policy).
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Tens of thousands of clearance applications are processed
annually without the development of any significantly unfavorable
information. Those applications are processed and clearances issued
by the Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office without the necessity
of referring them for review and determination. For example, during
the 12-month period ending December 31, 1971, the Defense Industrial
Security Clearance Office granted a total of 127, 544 clearances. During
this same period, it referred 439 cases to the Industrial Security
Clearance Review Division for determination under the established
procedures. The cases referred for review under those procedures
constituted only 3/10 of 1% of the total cases processed by the Defense
Industrial Security Clearance Office during Calendar Year 1971.
Two significant actions were taken during 1971 that are likely
to reduce the cost of investigations and clearances.
On June 30, 1971, all Federal Departments and Agencies were
directed by the White House to review all Top Secret clearances and
to discontinue all such clearances that were not essential. At the
end of the review in the Department of Defense, there were 464, 550
Government and industrial personnel retaining Top Secret clearances.
This was a reduction of 31. 2% in Top Secret clearances originally in
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effect. It is estimated that maintaining Top Secret clearances at the
lower level may result in a reduction in investigative costs of ap-
proximately $7. 3 million in future years assuming the same number
of people will be aboard who will require such clearances.
The second reduction in costs is expected to result from a
reduction in the scope of Bring-Up Investigations that relate only
to the updating of Standard Background Investigations in certain
sensitive positions. The new scope would require only a National
Agency Check in those cases in which both the subject's Statement
of Personal History and the National Agency Check reveal no adverse
or questionable information. In cases revealing adverse data, either
an Expanded National Agency Cheek or the usual Bring-Up Investigation
is required. It is estimated that this change in investigative scope
may result in cost avoidance of approximately $1.2 million without
devaluation of our security posture. Before concluding this portion
of our discussion dealing with personnel security programs I would
like to emphasize one dominant characteristic which runs through
all of them. In our discussion of the classification system I stressed
that one of its objectives was to strike a balance between the need
of the Government to protect certain information and the right of
the public to be informed. In the field of personnel security the
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Department makes every effort to achieve a similar balance between
the requirement on the part of the Government to insure that its
employees and those who have access to classified information are
reliable and trustworthy and at the same time to respect the
Constitutional rights of the individual. I submit that the history
of our personnel programs will demonstrate that the Department has
achieved this balance.
The magnitude of the Defense Investigative Program can be
illustrated by data on the number of various types of personnel security
investigations required during the last fiscal period (FY 1971) and
estimates of the cost of conducting those investigations. The following
data have been derived from quarterly reports submitted by the
investigative elements of the three Military Departments:
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furnished to us, we will review our current instructions concerning
these areas for consistency. These regulations, of course, also
apply to Defense industry through the Defense Industrial Security
Program which we operate for ourselves and twelve other agencies
of the Government in 12, 900 contractor facilities.
C ONC LUS ION
In conclusion, programs and systems supporting security
policy in both Defense and industry must be reasonable. A total
security condition would stifle the national defense effort. Operations,
manufacturing, progress, development and growth would be brought to
a standstill, if security requirements were one sided and did not take
into consideration the practical application thereof in Government
and industry. Security must remain in its role, with sound manage-
ment, initiatives and new incentives to assure that the attainable and
proper condition is established and that national objectives are attained
because it is appropriate and effective.
The Department is looking forward to implementing the provisions
of the new Order to classify less, declassify more, and better protect
that official information which truly requires protection.
I will now respond to any questions you may have.
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Vftw
Number Completed
Total Cost
Unit C
t
os
NAC
1,151,496
$ 6,264,139
$ 5.44-1
E NA C s "*
13, 787
789,603
57.27
BIs
94,204
24,801,231
263.28
SBIs=' qlll~
47,354
15, 347, 458
324. 10
28,809
6,412,607
222. 59
$53,615,038
"The estimate of the
DoD and FBI.
cost of NACs includes the costs
incurred by the
***An Expanded National Agency Check (ENAC) is conducted when the
subject's Statement of Personal History or the NAC, or both, reveal
adverse or questionable information that must be substantiated or
disproved. It is usually less extensive than a BI and is limited to
resolution of adverse or questionable information.
*"'The Special Background Investigation is one that is required by
the United States Intelligence Board as a basis for granting access to
compartmented intelligence information.
It may be of interest to point out that a NAC requires 15 to 20 days for
completion and a BI 60 days or less.
ADMINISTRATIVE AND PHYSICAL SECURITY
The Administrative and Physical Security Programs are concerned
with custody, safekeeping, accountability, dissemination, transmission,
disposal, and destruction of classified information. The new Executive
Order provides for the issuance of separate regulatinns by the National
A
Security Council covering these subjects. When these regulations are
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