JOURNAL OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL WEDNESDAY - 8 MARCH 1972 E-X-T-R-A-C-T

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00823R000800120016-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 14, 2005
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: March 8, 1972
• Content Type: NOTES

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JOURNAL
OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL
Wednesday - 8 March 1972
E-X-T-R-A-C-T
" 9' The Special Subcommittee on Intelligence
of the House Armed Services Committee, chaired by Representative Nedzi
(D., Mich.), began its hearings on H. R. 9853. The Bill would establish a
national commission on the classification and protection of information vital
to the national security. The first witness was Mr. Fred Buzhardt, General
Counsel, Department of Defense. Mr. Buzhardt furnished a statement on the
major changes in the Executive Order on classification issued on March 8, 1972, which superseded Executive O derr 10501. (See
Memorandum for the Record - 8 March 1972.) (See
Thursday - 9 March 1972
"2
a for starter, .as been asked to teest fy and that
beforre the
National Security and International Operations Subcommittee, Senate Govern-
ment Operations I I Committee on classification of information in open society.
would be available next Friday, 17 March, if the Affene.
had any thoughts on the subject that we would like put forth-
told him that he would relay the offer. F7 I O , has been adTT7-a
18. T
he Special Subcommittee on intelligence of
the House rme Services Committee, chaired by Representative Nedzi D,
Mich.), continued their hearings on H. R. 9853 concerning the classification
and protection of information vital to the national security. Witnesses were
Mr. Joseph Liebling, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Security Policy),
and Mr. Fred Buzhardt, General Counsel, Department of Defense. Mr. Lieblin
provided a statement on those actions taken by the DOD to better their securi g
program and to project future actions to meet the objectives of the new Executive
Order on classification and declassification which was issued yesterday, The
Subcommittee continued their detailed questions ~'
Department of Defense security of Mr. Buzhardt concerning
Mr. William Blair, Assistant Secretary of State, matters
schedulehis o testify t,
testify
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tomorrow. Mr. Ralph E. Erickson, Assistant Attorney General, Department
of justice, is scheduled to testify on Monday, 13 March. He will undoubtedly
be questioned in detail on the new Executive Order since the Department of
Justice is responsible for interpreting the Order. "
/s/
JOHN M. MAURY
Legislative Counsel
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
New Executive Order, "Classification
and Declassification of National Security
Information and Material. "
GENERAL
1. Q. Is the new Executive Order on classification of infor-
mation an improvement over Executive Order 10501?
A. I believe it is. It sets forth in greater detail those
items which require protection for an extended period of time; for
example, documents which, if compromised would reveal intelli-
gence sources and methods. It also establishes criteria covering
those items which can and should be declassified and thus made
available to the public after relatively short periods of time.
2.
Q.
A.
Does it meet your needs?
I believe it does.
3.
Q.
In your opinion does the Central Intelligence Agency
overclassify its information?
A. Many of the documents produced by the CIA involve
sensitive intelligence and/or intelligence sources and methods.
These documents I do not believe we tend to overclassify. However,
we may on occasion have overclassified documents of an adminis-
trative nature; such as, internal notices, or regulations. This
matter is under intensive study at this time and we intend to pro-
mulgate directives to correct any over classification.
4. Q. Please advise what action your department has taken
to insure that the delegation of authority to classify information has
been limited as severely as is consistant with the orderly and expe-
ditious transaction of Government business.
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A. Within this Agency the delegation of authority to classify
information is controlled by an establishment known as the "Classifi-
cation Control Network. rr This network, under the jurisdiction of the
Assistant Director for Central Reference, consists of (1) the CIA
Classification Control Officer; (2) Assistant Classification Control
Officers; and, (3) Authorized Classifiers.
The CIA Classification Control Officer, Assistant
Classification Control Officers, and Authorized Classifiers are the
only persons authorized to apply an original classification to infor-
mation or material. The reappointment of these officials will be
governed by the provisions of the new Order.
5. Q. Describe in brief the procedures established for imple-
menting declassification and downgrading as set forth in the Executive
Order.
A. The order calls for Presidential directives on this
matter. I, of course, will be guided by these directives.
6. Q. About how many documents do you declassify each year?
A. In some years the number is quite low. Upon occasion,
however, significant projects are undertaken such as the current
effort to declassify FBIS documents covering the years 1946 to 1966 entitled
"Trends in Communist Propaganda" and other titles in this series.
7. Q. How many people in your agency have authority to
classify Top Secret?
Executive Order only about
mation Top Secret.
0
however, under the new 25X1
will be authorized to classify infor-
8. Q. How many are authorized to declassify?
A. Approximately the sam.e number who have authority
to classify.
9. Q. About how many classified documents does the CIA
produce each year?
A. Insofar as intelligence is concerned, about 675, 000.
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10. Q. Could you declassify all or almost all of your intelli-
gence information after thirty years, twenty years, or ten years?
A. I believe we could declassify some of our intelligence
information after thirty years. It should be recognized that many
of our sources are productive for long periods of time. In addition,
we need to protect those who have assisted us in our mission even
after they are no longer productive. I think, therefore, that much
of our information would require protection for an indefinite period
of time.
Accountability and Destruction of Documents
1. Q. Describe the accountability procedures and records
maintained pursuant to the Executive Order?
A. Accountability procedures followed by the Agency are:
(1) TOP SECRET:
(a) Top Secret document control procedures are ad-
ministered by a CIA Top Secret Control Officer, a Central Top
Secret Control Office, Area Top Secret Control Officers, Alternate
Top Secret Control Officers serving major components, and Assis-
tant Top Secret Control Officers serving subordinate organizational
elements. The Central Top Secret Control Office and each Area Top
Secret Control Officer is required to maintain accountability records
of each Top Secret document received or originated by its respective
control points, showing the date of receipt or dispatch and the office
to which dispatched. A signed receipt is obtained for each document
delivered to an individual in the office or dispatched outside his area
of jurisdiction. Delivery of Top Secret documents is accomplished
by Security cleared couriers, except where transmitted personally
by Top Secret Control Officers.
(b) Each Top Secret document originated or received
by CIA is assigned a CIA Top Secret control number, and each Top
Secret document reproduced by CIA is assigned a copy number. A
control and cover sheet is attached to each copy, on which are re-
corded all transfers of the document while in the custody of CIA and
the signatures of all persons who see the document.
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I-aw
(2) SECRET AND CONFIDENTIAL:
(a) For transmission outside CIA, document receipts
are required for Secret material and are optional for Confidential
material; within the Agency, the use of document receipts is optional.
In all instances., courier receipts are obtained by Agency couriers
when packages containing classified. material are delivered between
CIA buildings or to another department or agency.
2. Q. What measures are taken to insure that the number of
copies of classified documents are kept to a minimum?
A. The following procedures are followed by the Agency
to keep classified documents to a minimum:
(1) TOP SECRET:
The number of copies of Top Secret documents pro-
duced by the Agency is predetermined on the basis of supported
requirements furnished by operating offices of CIA and intelligence
components of other Government agencies. Additional copies for
supplemental dissemination are produced in minimum number based
on previous experience with similar issues. Routing of a single
copy to successive offices is utilized where feasible.
(2) SECRET AND CONFIDENTIAL
The number of copies of documents received from
other agencies or originated by CIA is kept at the minimum neces-
sary to meet Agency dissemination requirements, and copies in
excess of dissemination needs are destroyed.
3. Q. Describe the means used, the procedures followed,
and the frequency of destruction of classified material, including
precautions followed to insure its complete incineration or destruction.
A. Nonrecord classified material which has been designated
and prepared for destruction is stored temporarily in vaults or secure
areas pending daily collection by a destruction team consisting of two
or more Agency employees. The material is transported to our destruc-
tion facility, which in case of water soluble material is a SOMAT
machine. Non-water soluble material is burned. Complete destruc-
tion is assured by inspection of the residue.
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Physical Security
1. Q. Please describe the types of storage facilities used
by your Agency for the storage of (a) Top Secret material, and
(b) Secret and Confidential material.
A. Within this Agency the physical security standards
for the storage of all classified material are as follows:
Where Agency-cleared. U. S. citizen guards are
available and access is controlled, all classified is stored in
approved locked safekeeping equipment.
Where U. S. citizen guards are not available, all
classified material is stored in approved locked safekeeping
equipment located in either a vault or secure area.
O'PA per
Vault and secure are specifications generally consist
of reinforced concrete or steel-lined construction and an approved
vault door.
Intrusion alarm systems are utilized in vault and
secure areas wherever a guard response is available.
Z. Q. Are the elaborate and expensive physical security
containers and devices really necessary in your Agency?
A. I believe they are.
3. Q. Have foreign agents ever penetrated the physical
security protective measures of your Agency to obtain classified
information?
A. Not to my knowledge.
CONGRESSIONAL, JUDICIAL, AND PUBLIC RELATIONS
I. Q. Should the Congress have access to any and all
classified information?
A. I believe that Congress should have access to clas-
sified information which would assist it in its performance of its
legislative duties. This has been our policy all along.
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2. Q. How do you clear the members of Congress before
you furnish classified intelligence information to them?
A. We do not investigate or clear members of Congress
before we furnish classified information to them. We do, however,
with the agreement of the various committee chairmen, clear staff
members of .Congressional Committees or arrange for a Department
of Defense clearance, which we honor.
3. Q. What is your policy on releasing classified informa-
tion to members of the Congress?
A. Our policy is to release classified information to the
Congress upon its request to assist it in the performance of its
legislative duties. We have agreements with the various com-
mittees to whom we release classified information covering methods
of protecting this information from unauthorized disclosure.
4. Q. Is the Freedom of Information Act causing you any
problems?
A. We have had very few requests under this act. They
have caused us no particular problem.
5. Q. Does the public have access to CIA Information?
A. They do under the Freedom of Information Act.
Requests may be submitted to the Agency in accordance with the
procedures set forth in our notice in the Federal Register.
6. Q. If the request is denied, what alternatives does the
requestor have?
A. The aggrieved person may appeal to the Executive
Director of the Agency for a review of the determination made.
The Executive Director reserves the right to require the person
to present additional information in support of his request for a
review. Each request is handled promptly.
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7. Q. How, do you handle the press, the inquiring publ c?for-
mation to the judicial branch, the A. We do not disclose classified arelf nests information
Pom ss
or the inquiring public. We handle requests m the ress or public in accordance withal the provisions on is releasedf tohthe Judic ary
p
of Information Act. Classified inform
on a strict "need to know'' basis. There are very few such releases.
OPINIONS
-ding for sanctions 1. Q. Do you need legislation prov,
information pert fining tonnt 1-
event of the unauthorized release of ireform
ligence sources and methods? alled Espionage
A. I personally would prefer
nal offense for any unauthorized
Acts be amended to make a criminal
that is, a person without a proper clearance and a demon-
strated need to know, to knowingly accept classified material.
2. Q. In your opinion how long: should cinformation pertaining
to intelligence sources and methods remain
A. This is difficult to answer as many of rasources
and methods are active for long periods of time. Certnly, we
would not declassify such information as long as our sources and
methods are productive and/or need prote.
3. Q. Should a commission be established to study the
problems of classification, downgrading, and declassification of
information?
A. As you are aware, the new Executive Order establishes
such a commission.
4. Q. Should the Congress have authority to declassify infor-
mation produced by the executive branch?
A. Insofar as sensitive intelligence and
Congrestslsho ldedeclassify
not
and methods are concerned I do
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information produced by the executive branch without permission of
the President or the Head of the agency that produced the information.
5. Q. Do you plan to keep the public advised on intelligence
estimates ?
A. In most cases, declassification of such documents would
not jeopardize sources and methods, since the sources of the facts
and assessments are usually not stated or are obscured so that they
are not apt to be disclosed by declassification of the document. The
documents may occasionally refer to the original source of material
contained therein, but such references could be edited out or gener-
alized so that the original source remains protected. This would
require of course careful review of any such material prior to de-
classification with this thought in mind.
6. Q. Can you declassify your portion of information involved
in the history of recent historical events--the Korean War, the
Lebanon Landings, the Bay of Pigs, or the Cuban Missile Crisis?
A. When we address the issue of declassifying the intel-
ligence contribution to major policy decisions or historical events,
we are talking about at least three separate types of documents.
(a) Finished Intelligence. This appears in the form of
National Intelligence Estimates or special memoranda, drawn from
all sources, recounting the facts and assessing a situation. In most
cases, declassification of such documents would not jeopardize sources
and methods, since the sources of the facts and assessments are
usually not stated or are obscured so that they are not apt to be
disclosed by declassification of the document. The documents may
occasionally refer to the original source of material contained
therein, but such references could be edited out or generalized so
that the original source remains protected. This would require of
course careful review of any such material prior to declassification
with this thought in mind.
(b) Disseminated Intelligence. Some disseminated
intelligence, such as technical or communications intelligence,
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reflects its origins in very specific terms so that declassification
would almost inevitably result in the disclosure of the source. In
other cases, such as clandestinely acquired intelligence, general-
ized source descriptions are used in the disseminations, so that the
exact identity of the source remains concealed. In all these cate-
gories, the passage of time may to some extent alleviate the damage
caused by a disclosure of the source, e. g. , the fact that we were
reading Japanese codes during World War II is hardly a sensitive
matter any more. On the other hand, with respect to some of
these sources, the passage of time may not relieve the sensitivity
of the matter, particularly on material provided to us by a friendly
foreign intelligence service which expects us to keep their relation-
ship with us a permanent secret. Thus in the category of disseminated
intelligence, a considerably greater job of editing might be necessary
to separate items which could be declassified from those which should
not be.
(c) Intelligence Operational Traffic. There is a great
deal of this material which in almost all cases should not and can not
be declassified without a highly inappropriate disclosure of intelligence
sources and methods. The material itself is frequently written with
special code names which may be valuable in the future. Also the
methodology revealed may show things about our service which could
be of advantage to an unfriendly power. The true names of our agents
and the precise techniques of our operations should in no event be
disclosed even after many years.
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