DIRECTOR'S TESTIMONY BEFORE THE NEDZI SUBCOMMITTEE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00823R000800120014-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 29, 2000
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: March 15, 1972
• Content Type: MF

*OGC Has Reviewed*
Approved For Release,%Wl/09/03 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000801 0014-2
15 March 1972
25X1A
MEMORANDUM FOR: Legislative Counsel
SUBJECT: Director's Testimony Before the
Nedzi Subcommittee
Attached are some ideas for coping with the possible
suggestions set forth in memorandum of
13 March 1972. I assume the Office of Security will cover the
Agency Classification Program and the Agency Personnel
Security Program. Some of the suggestions I have made
would cover the Director's termination authority under section
102(c) and other problems
LAWRENCE R. HOUSTON
General Counsel
cc: D/Security
Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000800120014-2
 Approved For Release 01/09/03: CIA-RDP83BOO823R000800 0014-2
New Executive Order on Classification
I. Q. Were there any provisions that the Agency desired
in the new Executive Order which the White House rejected?
A. There were a number of rather minor drafting
differences in which some wording that we proposed was not
accepted, but there were no substantive items we desired which
were rejected by the White House.
2. Q. Are you satisfied that the new Executive Order will
provide intelligence sources and methods adequate protection?
A. The Executive Order and the classifications therein
do not in themselves protect information. In essence, they provide
for notice to recipients of information that it requires protection, but
the protection itself must come from sanctions set forth in other
laws. The new Executive Order is quite adequate for coping in this
limited manner with the problems of intelligence sources and
methods.
3. Q. What problems will the Agency have in implementing
the automatic declassification provision of the new Executive Order?
A. We do not expect to have any major problem with
the automatic declassification provisions of the new Executive Order.
The great majority of our information will come under the 30-year
Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000800120014-2
 . Approved For Relea001/09/03: CIA-RDP83B00823R000120014-2
rule, and for some time we have been taking steps to improve
our capability to handle the declassification of intelligence material.
4. Q. Are there any other provisions of the Executive Order
that the Agency will have problems in implementing?
A. We do not expect to have any major problems in
implementing the Executive Order but will rued to redraft our
Agency regulations and delegations of authority. On the whole,
however, the problems are administrative ones of this nature.
Need for Additional Legislation
1. Q. Do you consider existing criminal laws adequate to
protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized
disclosure ?
A. The existing criminal laws are not adequate to
protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized dis-
closure. Over the years we have examined case after case and
have found that either the necessary proof does not exist under
existing laws, particularly in the areas of "intent" or "reason
to believe, " or else we face the problem of confirming officially
in open court the information we have been trying to protect.
Only two provisions come close to our particular problem in the
intelligence field. 18 U. S. C. 798 addresses itself specifically
Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000800120014-2
 Approved For Relea001/09/03 : CIA-RDP83B00823ROOOW120014-2
to the protection of communications intelligence and is a pretty
tightly drawn statute for that purpose. This is a very limited
field, however, and so far this section has not been tested in
the courts, so we are not even sure of its constitutionality.
The only case which arose under section 798 was back in the
1950's and ended with a guilty plea by the accused before trial.
The other section is the so-called Scarbeck act, 50 U. S. C. 783(b),
which makes it a crime to pass classified information to an agent
of a foreign power. This is probably the most useful approach
in the criminal statutes to our problem, but again it is very
limited in scope because of the fact that many of the leaks of
information relating to intelligence sources and methods are not
made to agents of a foreign power, or if there is indication that
they have, it may be impossible to prove.
2. Q. Do you feel that any additional legislation is necessary?
A. Obviously, from our point of view legislation which
would tend to close the gap described above would be desirable,
but we look to the Department of Justice to determine what sort of
legislation should be sought. Over the years we have discussed
this troublesome problem with the Department of Justice and have
from time to time made specific suggestions. We have previously
Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000800120014-2
 Approved For Relea 001/09/03 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000&Q 120014-2
submitted information in this regard to the staff of this Committee,
and, as it is a most intricate and technical subject, I would prefer
not to get involved in the details.
3. Q. Do you have any problems in carrying out your
responsibilities under the National Security Act of 1947 to protect
intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure?
A. Obviously, there is difficulty in carrying out my
statutory responsibilities in regard to intelligence sources and
methods. In certain instances we can point to specific situations
where release of classified information has cost us the ability to
acquire such information thereafter. In other cases we can only
speculate as to whether there is cause and effect. After many years
of study, we have .not found any really satisfactory resolution of this
problem in a free society. But, just as newspaper reporters feel
that their role in society would be impaired if they were forced to
reveal their sources, so is our work hampered if we are unable to
protect our sources.
4. Q. What is your position as to the proposed Commission
to be established under H. R. 9853 ? Wouldn't a Commission
comprised of representatives from the Executive, Legislative
and Judicial branches be the best way to resolve the difficult
problems faced?
Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000800120014-2
 Approved For Relea2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000120014-2
A. I have no objection to the Commission proposed
by H. R. 9853. Whether it is the best way to approach our problem
of protecting security I cannot say, although my personal view
is that a Commission tends to achieve a rigidity which impairs
its effectiveness. Whether the Judiciary would be willing to
participate I cannot say, and since the problems involved are
essentially legal, I would defer to the Department of Justice as
to the best way to proceed.
5. Q. Do you feel that the Congress can be of any assistance
and what would you propose ?
A. If legislation is the answer, obviously the Congress
is essential to the solution and should participate fully
in the process of developing the legislation. In other regards also,
we need the assistance of the Congress. As an example, our
security is only as good as the security and integrity of the people
in the Agency. On the whole, the record in this regard is.excel-'
lent, but this is due mainly to two things. The first is the careful
selection of our employees based on the most complete background
information as to truthfulness, suitability, loyalty, and emotional
stability, plus a continuing program of evaluating,personnel through
their careers. Secondly, to enforce our standards I have been
Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000800120014-2
 Approved For Release? O1/09/03: CIA-RDP83B00823R0008QQ 20014-2
given statutory authority to terminate any employee when I deem
it in the national interest. I believe both of these elements are
essential in the sensitive intelligence agencies of the Government.
I am fearful that the Congress, in not recognizing their importance,
may enact legislation which will erode our programs and my
authorities. I would, of course, appreciate any assistance which
can be given in this regard. I would be only too glad to give details
on this to your Committee, but again they are highly technical and
I believe may be better worked out in the first instance at the staff
level.
Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000800120014-2
 Ap roved
Ap
prO
BOTTOM
SI BO 14-2
UNCLASSIFIED C
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
TO
NAME AND ADDRESS
DATE
INITIALS
I
Director of Security
2
4E 0
3
4
5
6
ACTION
DIRECT REPLY
PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL
DISPATCH
RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT
FILE
RETURN
CONCURRENCE
INFORMATION
SIGNATURE
Remarks :
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.
TE
e eral Counsel
4/721
FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions
1-67 G I