LETTER TO MR. NORVILL JONES FROM LINWOOD BOLTON

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00823R000800030007-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 24, 2000
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: January 1, 1974
• Content Type: LETTER

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SECRET
Mr. Norvill Jones, Staff Member
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510
In ;4a !,a 'J reply to your letter of February 12, 1974,
any, requiring the State Department's clearance of requests
from the FBI for the initiation of electronic surveillance
of foreign diplomatic personnel or other foreigners in the
U.S.? Surveillance of Americans abroad by the FBI or other
this is so indicated.
1 = (a) What are the ;?~rittcn or unwritten regulations,
addressed to the Legal Adviser, the following are the
answers to the questions posed in the questionnaire you
enclosed. The answers are as complete as possible at
this date. Because of the contents, this letter is
classified. Where particular responses are unclassified,
security agencies?
1.(a) There are no regulations requiring State Depart-
ment clearance of, or liaison or consultation regarding,
FBI requests for initiation of electronic surveillance..
The FBI does not consult the Department of State on
surveillance of foreigners other than those on the
diplomatic list and those who are employees of
diplomatic establishments but do not have diplomatic
status.
.State Dept. d$
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We know of no regulations that require State
Department clearance for surveillance of Americans
abroad by the FBI or other security agencies.
1.(b) What procedures are in effect between the State
Department and the FBI relative to clearance of electronic
surveillances of foreigners who are not on the diplomatic
list?
1.(b) As indicated in (a), there are no procedures
in effect as to foreigners except those on the
diplomatic list and those who are employees of
diplomatic establishments but do not have
diplomatic status. The procedures for both are
the same and are described in 2 below.
1.(c) How many people are on the diplomatic list? What
is the estimate of the number of people who work in foreign
missions in the U.S. who are not on the diplomatic list?
1.(c)
Diplomats listed on November 1973
Diplomatic List
1,968
Embassy Staff employees in
Washington
3,700
International organizations
(includes all career and
staff employees)
9,581
2,000
17,249
END UNCLASSIFIED
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SECRET
3.
The FBI does not consult State regarding
the surveillance of foreigners who are not connected
with diplomatic offices.
SECRET
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A search of the State Department's records
for the period 1964-1974 has disclosed no instance
of electronic surveillance of American citizens
having been requested or conducted by the
Department of State.
In discharge of its special responsibilities
in Berlin, the United States Government has carried
on electronic surveillance there. Several Americans,
alleging that they were placed under surveillance,
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UNCLASSIFIED 9.
have filed suit against the Department of Defense.
Inasmuch as this litigation is pending, the
Department of State is unable to provide details
on participation by its constituent elements.
An element of the Defense Department employed
a telephone tap in an American Embassy at an overseas
location during the period 21-27 March 1973. This
telephone intercept was used in the office of an
American military member who was the subject of a
criminal investigation together with various local
national suspects. It was carried out under the
provisions of DoD Directive 5200.24 and reported to
the office of the Secretary of Defense as required
by that regulation. The action was taken with the
concurrence of the Chief of Mission based on probable
cause which was determined by,'the subject's military
commander. The investigation involved was jointly
conducted by U.S. military investigative personnel
and local national police authorities. The
investigation was of mutual concern to both
countries. In this instance, the approval and
conduct originated with the Department of Defense
under the provisions of a DoD regulation as cited
above. Since the concurrence of the Chief of Mission
was obtained, however, it is being included in our
reply.
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DOS 25X1A []Index SECRET 12.
BEGIN UNCLASSIFIED
11. For each of the 1 act tpn rc rc n1 AactN nrnvi r,ci ?h
number of:
(a) surveillances of Americans within the U.S. initiated,
approved, or conducted by the Department of State, broken
down between wiretaps, electronic eavesdropping ("bugs"),
physical surveillance, cover surveillance, and other
surveillance?
11.(a) None.
11. For each of the last ten years please provide the
number of:
(b) surveillances of Americans abroad which were
initiated, approved, or conducted by the Department
of State, broken down between wiretaps, electronic
eavesdropping ("bugs"), physical surveillance, cover
surveillance, and other surveillance (please indicate
any overlaps, e.g., if an American was the subject of
both a wiretap and a bug)?
11.(b) A search in the State Department records
for the period 1964-1974 has disclosed no instance
in which surveillance of Americans, either in the
United States or abroad, has been requested, approved,
or conducted by the Department of State, except for the
special cases im,Be` ;i mentioned in 7 above.
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12. With reference to electronic or personal surveillance
of Americans abroad:
(a) Are there any regulations governing the clearance
and conduct of such operations?
12.(a) Yes, the general regulations on special
investigative techniques previously furnished apply
to this kind of case as well as to others (see SY
433.10 attached).
12. With reference to electronic or personal surveillance
of Americans abroad:
(b) Does the FBI or CIA normally ask for the ambassador's
approval for such operations? If so, does the ambassador
seek the Department's advice or keep the Department
informed about such requests?
12.(b) State Department instructions require repre-
sentatives of the CIA and FBI abroad to review their
covert action and clandestine intelligence collection
programs with the Ambassador. The Ambassador is not
expected to be cognizant of operational details,,nor
is he required to seek the Department's advice or
to keep the Department informed of the details of
12. With reference to electronic or personal surveillance
of Americans abroad:
(c) Does the Department know how many Americans abroad
are currently under U.S.-initiated surveillance, either
being carried out by a U.S. agency or by cooperating
foreign officials?
12. (c) No.
12. With reference to electronic or personal surveillance
of Americans abroad:
(d) In what proportion of the cases is surveillance of
Americans abroad carried out without the approval or
knowledge of the ambassador?
12.(d) Not known.
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UNCLASSIFIED 14.
13. With reference to investigations for leaks, please
provide:
(a) the number of investigations for leaks in each of
the last ten years, including the specific leak
investigated.
13.(a) During the past ten years, the Department
has investigated 23 cases of unauthorized disclosure
of classified or privileged information. In many
cases, the Department's inquiries were but a part
of a broader investigation involving other Federal
agencies.
1964:
2
1969: 3
1965:
0
1970: 2
1966:
1
1971: 8
1967:
0
1972: 3
The incidence of cases, by year, was as follows:
19AR? d
SECRET
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SECRET 16.
BEGIN UNCLASSIFIED
14. With reference to the U.S. Intelligence Board, please
provide the following information insofar as it is known
from Departmental participation in the Board:
(a) Does the Board ever recommend the initiation of
electronic surveillance operations?
(b) Is the Board apprised of the existence of electronic
surveillances for national security purposes? If so, in
what manner?
(c) Describe the Board's role, if any, in investigations
for leaks.
(d) What was the Board's involvement, if any, in the
investigations for leaks of information regarding the
SALT negotiations, the Pentagon Papers, the Jack Anderson
documents and other leaks during the period 1969-1972?
UNCLASSIFIED
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UNCLASSIFIED 17.
(e) Does the Board ever consider inter-agency matters
relating to U.S. electronic surveillance activities?
1.4. While the Department of State has membership
on the United States Intelligence Board, its Chairman
is the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
and the Department believes that any questions con-
cerning the Board's activities or policies would more
properly be addressed to the Chairman.
15. How many electronic surveillances initiated, approved,
or carried out by State were terminated as a result of the
Supreme Court decision in the Keith case, United States v.
United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972)?
15. None, insofar as we are aware.
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SECRET
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17. To the best of the Department's knowledge, none
of its personnel has employed any "special investi-
gative techniques" in relation to any American
citizens at home or abroad in the past ten years.
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UNCLASSIFIED
.19.
18. How many reports have been received from posts
abroad for each of the last five years concerning
U.S. citizens traveling abroad who "indicate a dis-
affection toward the United States", as specified in
11 FAM 430.1?
18. There is no statistical breakdown possible on
this. A manual check of passport records would be
necessary.
19. How many reports have been made pursuant to the
telegram of November 2, 1972, concerning the reporting
by U.S. diplomatic posts on the activities of U.S.
military absentees in foreign countries?
19. The Department of State does not record these
reports, which are primarily of concern to the
Defense Department.
20. Please supply the following information for the
Department of State:
(a) Number of personnel on the Department's rolls
with the technical skills to conduct electronic
surveillance (either bugging or tapping).
20.(a). The Department assumes that virtually anyone
who can operate a home tape recorder could effect an
electronic surveillance. Anyone with any of a wide
variety of technical skills or experience would be
even more likely to be able to do so, using equipment
readily available in open commerce. Thus, it is a
virtual impossibility to determine the number of
personnel on the Department's rolls with adequate
technical knowledge to conduct electronic surveillance.
To be sure, any of the engineers or technicians of
the office of Security who are involved in the effort
to counter electronic and other forms of surveillance
of State premises and personnel presumably could
conduct positive surveillance but none do nor are there
any personnel on the rolls or on contract to the
Department of State whose duties are to engage in
such surveillance activities.
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20. Please supply the following information for the
Department of State:
(b) The number of pieces of equipment owned by or
in the control of the Department capable of being
used for:
(1) telephone surveillances
(2) microphone surveillances
(3) recording telephone calls without
knowledge of the caller.
20.(b). Again, assuming virtually any tape recorder
could be used to record telephone or other conversa-
tions surreptitiously, any effort to account for all
such pieces of equipment would require the review of
literally hundreds of inventory records and to
little practical purpose. In actual fact, the
Department does not engage in electronic surveillance
and, therefore, has no equipment intended for that
purpose.
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DOS ~gT1 d F
BEGIN UNCLASSIFIED
22.(a) Copies of Foreign Affairs Manual Circular
No. 102A and Department of State Instructions
CW-4099 (November 9, 1961) and Cad-4999 (December 19,
1961) were submitted previously in the informal
stage of this review. Executive Order 10450
(Section 8-d), of course, requires referral to
the FBI or any information developed during the
background investigation of an applicant or
employee which indicates the individual may
have been guilty of disloyalty or certain other
activities adversely affecting the national
security.
22. Please provide:
(b) copies of all existing statutes, executive orders,
and regulations concerning reporting on Americans
resident abroad.
22.(b). See 11 FAM 430 previously furnished.
23. Does the Department maintain files on individual
U.S. citizens who could be classified as potential
"trouble makers" for foreign policy or security reasons?
If so, please describe the extent of these files.
Describe the inter-agency procedures in effect for
sharing information of this nature.
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UNCLASSIFIED 22.
23. There is no category of files which fits into
this description. Under Department regulations
(22 C.F.R. 51.70(b)(4)) a passport may be refused
to a person when the Secretary determines that his
activities abroad are causing or are likely to
cause serious damage to the national security or the
foreign policy of the United States. Information
received by the Department bearing on the application
of this regulation to a particular individual would
be placed in the passport file of that individual.
Also under Department regulations (22 C.F.R. 51.33),
information in passport files is privileged and may
not be released except:
"(b) Pursuant to a subpoena or court order
directing the production of passport records.
"(c) At the request of another Government
agency.
if f .71 '.-,T' .,.n L a i.... .. t. Se via c~p.L .z .LX aUl.11Vr_L kA JU ~/ the cretary.
The ffice of `urity In indiv''ial employee files
or fz es on i estigatio is co d in dude inf oration
which igh result in cha~:a erizinc the i ividual
in thi c tegory. Howeve such informal on is
accessi e only thr ugh an al search O,f name or
incid tiles.
Finally, as indicated in the attachment (Tab E)
labeled "Protective Intelligence", the Office of-
Security maintains some files on what might be
called "trouble-makers."
24. Has the United States entered into international
agreements for commitments concerning electronic surveillance
operations involving foreign diplomatic missions in the U.S.?
If so, please provide the text of those agreements or
commitments?
24. There are no agreements of this kind. The
Department is not aware of any commitments of this
kind.
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 Linwood Holton
Assistant Secretary
for Congressional Relations
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 433.8 OFFICE OF 51:C'IJI.I"I'ti' I":STRUCT1ONS AND PROCEDURES
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DOS FOIAb3b1 & FOIAb2
CONFIDENTIAL
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446 Miscellaneous lnvesti ation
446. 1 Leak of information Cases
446.11 General
A leak of information case arises when classi-
fied or administratively controlled information
becomes available to a person or persons not
authorized to receive it. Obviously a person
unauthorized to receive classified information
is unlikely to reveal the source from which
he obtained it. Therefore, the Special Agent,
in all probability, will have to use an indirect
method of investil;ation. Cason of tl'ls Kind
! are extremely difficult to solve, since infor-
mation may be disseminated in a variety of
ways. However, certain inquiries may aid in
determining how the material was compromised,
or at least indicate some of the ways in which
compromise could have occurred.
CONFIDENTIAL
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The Department receives infoor", ition from
offices abroad, other guvernn' not>. other
United States agencies, and poi, 'tr individual
_.--in addition to information tt,tt or iinates in th.
_Department. The first sty p in i tr.tk of infor-
mation that has been compr.nni~,-,t. After
determining the origin and the date of its
arrival in the Department of thr ?pccial
Agent should look into the possibilities of
compromise outside the Department. In
this regard it may be necessary to request
that inquiry be made abroad or by some other
agency through Headquarters.
446. 13 Investigation of Possibility of Leak
in the Department
In following up possibilities of compromise
within the Department, the number of copies
of the basic document involved, together with
the distribution given the copies, should be
determined. If the basic document is (1) an
Operations Memorandum; (Z) a telegram; (3)
a WIROM; or (1) an airgram, this information
should be obtained from the Records Services
Division. If the document in question is an
Official -Informal letter or an office memo-
randum, the office of primary interest (action)
will have to be contacted. Following this,
inquiry must be made at each office receiving
copies to determine the names of the i.,dividuals
who received the document; the present location
of the copies; whether any copies have been
destroyed; and whether or not any person
having access to the compromised information
made the document available to others, dis-
cussed it with others, or discussed it in any
place where the information might be in-
advertently overheard by others. Inquiry
must also be made to establish if any copy
has been left exposed in an unoccupied office,
has been taken from the Department, or
otherwise handled in a way that might lend
Itself to compromise. In making these in-
vestigations, the Special Agent should coordi-
nate with the appropriate unit security officers.
The cooperation of the Special Assistant for
Press Relations has been valuable in such
cases, and he may be contacted. Representa-
tives of the Press are not to be interviewed
by Special Agents in connecting with these
cases without special permission from 11cad-
qurters.
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 D to Doc - I turned
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which have been commented on above, but rather to
observe other nrocedures as outlined in the attached
instructions.
PROTECTIVE INTELLIGENCE
In fulfilling its responsibilities for the protection
of the Secretary of State and certain other dignitaries,
the office of Security maintains files concerning per-
sons who have written threatening letters or otherwise
made themselves suspect as potential threats to the
safety of the Secretary or other persons protected. The
relevant portion of our Instructions and Procedures
is quoted below: ~-
"The Office of Security maintains a 'crank and threat'
file. The file is maintained in two parts: 1, alphabetical,
by name; 2, geographical.
The file consists of all 'crank and threat' letters
received by mail, summaries of all crank telephone
calls, summaries of statements made by and the physical
descriptions of all unauthorized visitors to the Secretary
of State and foreirin dignitaries visiting the United
States, and information zurnished by other intelligence
agencies of the U.S. Government.
ti-:hen the Secretary of State travels abroad or visiting
dignitaries travel in the United States, pertinent inf6r-
mation from this file is for,:arded to the Special Agents
and Security officers concerned."
When the Secretary or other persons being protected
travels to a different jurisdiction either home or abroad
and we have reason to believe any potential sorces of
threat are located in these jurisdictions, it is our
practice to provide a summary of information available
regarding these sources of threat to the local official
sharing the protective responsibilities. ;?/e also share
protective intelligence information with the United States
Secret Service an1 oth:r Federal agencies as appropri
when the nature of the information suggest that it falls
within the scope of the latter's lawful responsibilities.
i /FLOW
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SENDER WILL CHECK CLASS CATION TOP AND BOTTOM
UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
TO
NAME ND DDRESS
DATE
INITIALS
22
3
4
5
6
ACTION
DIRECT REPLY
PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL
DISPATCH
RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT
FILE
RETURN
CONCURRENCE
INFORMATION
SIGNATURE
Remarks :
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER
FROM: NAME. ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.
DATE
DD/P&M
9 974
/e
o ? 09/0 : IACR6P4BBOO8 3 00 A
ll
FORM No. 237 Use previous editions
1-67 L I
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0 UNCLASSIFIED' U U r,cF ANIY CON, ENTIAL ^9n ?.QRHV 4
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional)
FROM:
EXTENSION
NO.
Lgla7v. CouoilA !
6itr
DATE 14
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
DATE
OFFICER'S
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
INITIALS
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1.
D/Security 4E60
d Ms
Msi d to as by ft" Ir ow
2.
1>rsv cawas.. A copy
bas &I** bias hm war d.4 to the
I' UM to ho.
FBI
3.
.
yw
1 as It &I* loot
> 'y yi t3 May 1974.
4.
25X1A
5.
CANUMMI
6.
cc sent: IG and DDO
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
FORM 6~ 0 USEA NSv~ Fuse 2[7 -CU l~ de83E 8000300 o UNCLASSIFIED
3-62 EDITIITI NS u `RC 1 u USE ONLY