GUIDELINES FOR SANITIZING CERTAIN DOCUMENTS PROVIDED SELECT COMMITTEES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00823R000700040013-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 14, 2000
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: April 2, 1975
• Content Type: MF

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UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
SECURITY COMMITTEE
SECOM-D-56
2 April 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR: Security Committee Members
SUBJECT : Guidelines for Sanitizing Certain Documents
Provided Select Committees
1. The attached draft guidelines on sanitization were prepared
on an expedite basis for the Chairman, USIB,Ad Hoc Coordinating Group
on Congressional Reviews.
2. It was disseminated by the Chairman to Principals of the
Ad Hoc Group and at a meeting of the Group on 2 April 1975 it was
decided that the Principals would review the draft in coordination with
their Security Committee representatives and recommended changes
would be furnished to the members of the Security Committee.
Following this it was requested that the Security Committee meet
to consider the draft and suggested changes and prepare revised
guidelines for submission to the Ad Hoc Group at an early date.
3. It is requested that the Security Committee members
review the attached draft and be prepared to meet on the subject
matter early during the week of 7 April.
4. It would be helpful if members called to the attention of
the Chairman or the Executive Secretary of the Security Committee
any major changes desired in the draft.
Chairman
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 DRAFT
28 March 197-~
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GUIDELINES FOR SANITIZING CERTAIN DOCUMENTS
PROVIDED SELECT COMMITTEES
1. The Director of Central Intelligence has recently discussed
with Senator Church the need for special consideration and treatment
.by :the. Select Committee of certain sensitive aspects of intelligence.
activities' and the Senator has expressed his recognition of this need.
Included in such matters are the identities of sensitive sources, the
material provided to the United States by cooperating foreign
intelligence services, the details of technical devices and systems
and of operational methods, the identities of certain employees whose
safety could be jeopardized if revealed, the identities of American
citizens and organizations who have cooperated with US intelligence
and some additional materials the public disclosure of which would
create serious foreign policy or national security problems. Such
material should be protected not only from exposure but indeed the
risk of exposure. Further, recognition should be given to the need
to protect certain other information which, if improperly disclosed,
might impair the privacy rights of individuals.
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2. One form of this special consideration may include use
of sanitization procedures to avoid the risk of exposing such matters
and at the same time satisfy the Select Committee's need for a full.
understanding of the community's activities.
3. What May Be Sanitized
While it is not possible to anticipate all requirements which
may be levied by the Committees for documenting. material and not
possible to determine specifically what material should be excised
from these documents, the following illustrations are offered in
certain likely categories. The criteria in all cases should meet
the test` eentioned above.
4. Collection of intelligence
(a) The Committee will probably address the matter of how
intelligence activities or methods have or may impinge upon individual
rights. Documents supporting responses may be sanitized by removal
of identities of sensitive agents and informants,, covert personnel,
and contractual cover arrangements. A descriptive phrase may be
substituted, i. e. , a foreign journalist, a political official in the
opposition party. No sanitization should be used in connection with
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names of individuals whose employment or former employment by,
or association with a department or agency, does not remain secret
or for individuals whose present or future activities on behalf of the
department or agency do not require that previous cover arrangements
remain secret.
(b) Some information may be required with respect to
technical intelligence systems including cryptologic and communications
activities and reconnaissance capabilities. Almost all of such material
is currently handled in compartmentation control channels under
various codewords or nicknames. No security threat is perceived
by release of these codenames or nicknames in documents. Details
of the technical systems involved, contractual arrangements, funding
and/or names of companies or consultants whose participation was
obtained under agreement of continued secrecy may be excised from
documents. Any question on release of codeword material should be
referred to the Program Manager who in turn may consult with the
Director of Central Intelligence to ensure a consistent approach in
the community's sanitization procedure. While documentary samples
of intelligence obtained by technical means may be used in support of
verbal testimony, no raw product should be provided the Committees
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for retention. If absolutely required by the Committees, sanitization
of such raw product should be conducted to mask the degree of
technical capabilities.
5. Intelligence Estimates
Finished intelligence reports of departments and agencies and
estimates do not usually contain source identifications and will not
normally require sanitization. However, departments and agencies
should review such publications to ensure deletion of source identities.
6. Administration
Information concerning the internal administration arrangements
of intelligence agencies may be requested. This may include staffing
chartswith occupants identified.,
of personnel formerly not under cover and now functioning in a cover
assignment should be deleted as well as those who may in the future
The following categories of information or specific examples
may arise in any number of circumstances in documentation requested.
by the Select Committees. In all cases, serious consideration should
be given by the department or agency concerned to the necessity of
be considered for a covert assignment.
7. General
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deletion or sanitization of this type of information, prior to
providing the document.
(a) Agent or informant names or operational information
revealing them.
(b) Details which would reveal the effectiveness of sensitive
methods and techniques (l) employed overseas inhuman source
collection, (2) employed for the physical security protection of the
department's or agency's personnel or physical environment.
(c) The numbers, locations, times and other indications of
recruitment or emplacement of personnel within targetted foreign
organizations.
(d) The success or failure of recruitment attempts in any
given targetted foreign organization.
(e) Names of particular employees whose physical safety or
future career might be placed in jeopardy by exposure.
(f) Foreign or US sources, official or otherwise who agreed
to cooperate under terms of explicit or implied confidentiality, who
would be embarrassed or endangered by disclosure of their role.
(g) Identifying information on intelligence services in friendly
and neutral countries.
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(h) Identifying collaborative operations between the United
States intelligence agencies and other foreign intelligence liaison
services against targets within the country extending the collaborations
or within a jointly targetted third country.
signals intelligence collection, particularly for arrangements which,
if revealed, would be politically embarrassing in the countries
involved.
(j) Identification of.tecbnical intelligence operations of high
technical vulnerability and extremely high political sensitivity.
(i) Identifying collaboration with foreign governments in
(k) Specific identification of foreign technical collection
installations involving high political sensitivity in the host country.
(1) Details or disclosure of monetary arrangements with
US and foreign banks, investment houses, etc., in support of foreign
intelligence operations.
(m) Specific information on special relationships with private
firms established with the approval of top corporate officials. This
includes names of firms or industrial associations that collaborate
in a special manner such as providing cover for foreign intelligence
operations.
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(n) Names of firms collaborating with US intelligence
agencies in collection and assessment programs (especially
those having large foreign clienteles).
(o) Proprietary information relating to contractors
There are general categories of intelligence activities which
have already been placed in the public domain by the mass news media
or authors with background experience in intelligence departments
or agencies of the community. Names, places, dates and events
which have been so revealed should not be excised if contained in
requested documents.
There is an increasing body of information which has been
released under the Freedom of Information Act. No further sanitization
of this material should be conducted unless it relates to an individual's
rights to privacy.
9. Techniques of Sanitization
Sanitization of intelligence material is usually considered the
act of physical removal of the identity of a person, place or thing
from written communication with or without regard for the residual
or furnished in confidence.
8. What Should Not Be Sanitized
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content. Use of a substitution device, either pseudonym or ident
is an example of sanitization which permits intelligent continuity
of the material without revealing the true identity. Sanitization
does not extend to the use of false or misleading substitute material
The integrity of official records must be maintained. The
following sanitization techniques apply only to copies of records.
(a) Physical Sanitization - Names may be cut out and
the residual material xeroxed and submitted to Committees. Names
may be masked with correction tape and then xeroxed. The xerox
copy may be submitted to the Committees.
(b) Names may be deleted and replaced with "IDEN. "
The. deleted/ material is provided on a separate IDEN list which
contains names or descriptive phrases substituted for deletions.
(c) The material can be retyped or reprinted with
substitute phrases or substitute descriptions which do not reveal
the sensitive material.
(d) Entire pages can be removed from some documents'
and replaced with a blank page carrying only reference information
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as to the location of the sensitive material within the contributing
department or agency. This technique may be employed when
physical sanitization or excision of material results. in unintelligible
gibberish as residue.
(e) Within a category of inquiry, it may be desirable "to-
extract a complete document from requested material when the
request is broad and all inclusive within its field. The existence
of such a, document should be made known to the Committees but
retained by the agency or department for review under escort
of a representative of the department or agency.
10. Management of Sanitization
The original record and a copy of the sanitized version provided
should be readily available in all cases. Materials developed within an
agency or department in response to requests should be reviewed at an
appropriate level for completeness, responsiveness and accuracy. In
the case of documents or materials of a community nature, the release
should be done in coordination with the departments or agencies and/or
the Program Manager concerned and any sanitization should be agreed
upon during coordination.
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This proposed use of sanitization as a special arrangement
to protect selected issues contained in material provided to Select
Committees by one agency may prove to be a futile exercise if not
practiced in common by all participating departments and agencies.
to employ the same criteria for sanitization and coordinate as
required. This paper can serve only as general guidelines on
sanitization,
.._"-It is essential-to-the proposal-that-departments: and ag-encie-s.,attem
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