AGENCY PARTICIPATION IN NATIONAL MILITARY INFORMATION DISCLOSURE POLICY COMMITTEE (NDPC)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00823R000700020012-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 4, 2002
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: February 28, 1975
• Content Type: MF

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NAVY, ARMY and OSD review(s) completed.
9 8 FEB 1975
MEMORANDUM FOIR: Deputy Director of Security (P&M)
THROUGH Chief, Policy and Plans Group
SUBJECT Agency Participation in National Military
Information Disclosure Policy Committee (NDPC)
REFERENCE Memorandum from C/PPG, Same Subject; dated
16 December 1-974
1. The reference asks that I gather additional in-
formation on the subject and questions raised. by the refer,-
ence to be used as further guidance in. deciding whether this
activity should be retained in the Office of Security. I
have made an intensive review of the NDPC files. My th.o-j hts
on this matter are the result of this review.
2. A reading of the reference suggests that the fol-
lowing questions are being asked:
a. What is the National Disclosure Policy?
b. What is the National Disclosure Policy Comrmi.ttee?
c. What is the relationship of the NDPC to the
National Security Council (NSC)?
d.. What is the distinction between General and
Special membership on the NDPC?
e. What are the requirements of DCI membership
on NDPC?
f. 1FWI-hat does the DCI representative have to concern
himself with?
Whv does NDPC membership occur as a DCI re-
presentative rather than as a CIA representative?
hi . When would the Agency request an exception to
the National Disclosure Policy?
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i. When sloes the Agency participate in NDPC
security surveys?
j. Has Agency representation on. the NDPC been
passive and if so has this been the cumu-
lative product of inaction or a deliberate
choice?
k. Would Agency participation be more efficiently
drawn from the DDO?
3. The National Military Information Disclosure Policy
Committee (NDPC) is the central authority for the formulation,
promulgation, administration and monitoring of the national
policy and procedures for the disclosure of classified Military
information to foreign governments and international organi-
zations. The key to placing the NDPC in its proper context
is the word Military.
4. The NDPC is just one facet of the total U.S. Govern-
ment activity involving the disclosure of classified U.S. de-
fense information to foreign governments and international
organizations in order to a) facilitate the implementation
j tare a5C~ Tan(7 _P prograllls _ C) I i;0 :I1111.).I-UVe till Jt,Lt-uc::J_t.t1J~
capabilities of allied and friendly countries; c) to encourage
mutual and regional defense planning; d) to obtain reciprocal.
intelligence; and, e) to contribute to the attainment of broad
U.S. military and foreign policy objectives. The objective is
one of national self-interest. National security assets are
being shared with foreign entities where there is a clearly
defined net advantage to the U.S. government to do so,
5. The disclosure policy of the U.S. government is
currently based on two documents. The first is the Pres-
idential directive of 23 September 1958, "Basic Policy
Governing the Release of Classified Defense Information
to Foreign Gover.nmerlts." The second is the National Security
Decision Memorandum 119 dated 20 July 1971, "Disclosure of
Classified United States Military Information to Foreign
Governments and International -Organizations." NSDM .119
supersedes those provisions of the Presidential directive
of 23 September 1958 pertaining to the disclosure of clas-
sified military information to foreign recipients and assigns
implemen izi responsibility jointly to the Secretaries of
State and Defense. The 23 September 1958 directive remains
binding for classified non-military defense information, that
is information n:.,t under the control or jurisdiction of the
Department Of D ease, its departments or agencies, or of
primary interest to them. Both policy statements are binding
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on the heads of each department and agency of the Executive
branch. Both. policy statements require annual reports to the
National Security Council. The mechanism for a continuing
review of the implementation of the directive of 23 September
1958 is the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security.
A comparable mechanism for NSDM 119 is the NDPC.
6. The disclosure of classified defense information has
a long history. The first step in coordinating policy on dis-
closures took place in November 1934 when the Department of
State initiated action leading to an agreement reached by the
Secretaries of State, War and Navy under which the three depart-
ments would consult with each other on matters regarding the
export of war materiel relating to the national defense of the
U.S. It was essential that disclosures be in consonance with
the foreign policy and military and security objectives of the
U.S. This coordination was effected through an exchange of
letters to coordinate on shipments of war materiel enabling the
State Department to receive guidance in issuing export licenses
from the viewpoint of military security. No other formal inter-
departmental procedure existed.
7. in 1944, the Secretary of State felt the necessity
for a centralized, high level control to determine what future
?
..,i not he tvris piTted to Torei t 11aLivii3
A. i i ir_,.._., u; 1,t or gh t
~:.
to which the Secretaries of War and Navy and the Joint Chiefs of
Staff agreed. As a result, a Committee, the Technical Information
Security Control Committee (TISCC) was established in early 1945
composed of representatives from State, War and Navy. The TISCC
immediately recommended to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Com-
mittee (SWNCC) that it be constituted a subcommittee of the SWNCC.
In March 1945, the SWNCC agreed and established the subcommittee
for Technical. Information Security Control with responsibility
for controlling the release of classified. technical information
to foreign nations. This was later changed to the State-War-
Navy Coordinating Committee for Military Information Control
(SWNCC-MIC) and its responsibility was expanded beyond the
control of classified technical information to apply to all
military information released to foreign nations.
8. In 1946; in-response. to governmental requirements for.......
a post-war policy on the release of classified information to
foreign governments, the Secretaries of. State, War and Navy
developed for Presidential approval. a statement of "Basic Policy
Governing the Disclosure of Classified Military information to
Foreign Governments." In approving this policy on 27 February
1946, the President directed the Secretaries of State, War and
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Navy to exercise joint control. of the disclosure of classified
military information to foreign governments. Under the Re-
organization Act of 1947, .the Secretary of Defense assumed the
responsibilities of the Navy and War Secretaries. The SWNCC-
MIC carried out joint State-War-Navy control of the release of
classified information to foreign governments from 1946 to 1949.
9. On 30 June 1949, the State-Defense Military Information
Control Committee (S-DMICC) was established to function as the
agency of the Departments of State and Defense for developing,
recommending and promulgating policies and procedures concerning
the disclosure of classified mil_itar.y information to foreign
governments. Membership was composed of State (Chairman), Army,
Navy, Air Force and. the Research and Development Board. The
CIA was given an "observer" status on the Committee. On
I August 1-964, the S-DMICC was renamed the United States Military
Information Contrcl Committee (US-MICC). Effective 7 October
1966, the US--MICC became the National Military Information
Disclosure Policy Committee (NDPC).
10. In 1-ate 1968, the State Department felt that a change
in NDPC chairmanship was in order since in practice the work of
the Committee primarily involved the Department of Defense. An
s a ?-tab lishcd on 11 F''ebrucr lC1A0 ? dor
the chairmanship of DOD/International Security~Affairs but with
an Executive Director provided on an interim basis by State to
perform functions under NDPC, until. the Department of Defense
acquired sufficient manpower spaces for this function. The
respen.s ib i 1 4 _ty_ for the executive direct ion of the National
Disclosure Policy ,(NDP) was transferred from the Department of
State,~t, the ?)epartment of Defense effective 1 January 1.970.
As of this date, the Chairman, Executive Director as well as
the administrative and secretarial support to the Committee is
furni.s-hed by the 'Department of 'Defense. The basic National
Disclosure Policy (NDPC-1) was revised and reissued also
effective 1 January 1970 as National Disclosure Policy (NDP-1).
NDP-1/5 dated 25 November 1974 is the currently effective re-
vision of the National Disclosure Policy.
11-.. With the. passage of the National Security. Act in 1947,
a new element was introduced into foreign disclosure procedura.l.'
problems. Heretofore, the Secretary of State had assumed overall
responsibility for the implementation of foreign disclosure policy
since the raison d'etre for releasing classified defense information
to foreign governments was to further United States foreign policy.
As a practical matter, the military services had the responsibility
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for safeguarding- classified military information under, their
control and jurisdiction. They had -to assure that foreign
disclosures were consonant with approved. service plans and
programs, including the Military Assistance Program. The
National Security Act of 1947 created a Director of Central
Intelligence and gave him statutory responsibility for the
protection of intelligence sources and methods. As the
principal intelligence officer of the United States Govern-
ment, his responsibility extended beyond the intelligence
collected and produced by the Central Intelligence Agency.
Thus, classified military information now became."intelligence"
falling under the purview of the Director of Central Intelligence
when released to foreign governlrrents, whose substance, the
sources of its origination and the methods of its creation had
to be taken into account before being disclosed. The uniqueness
of the DCI is that he is the first and only Government official
specifically charged by statute to protect intelligence sources
and methods. Further, by virtue of his primary responsibility
for liaison with. foreign intelligence and security services and
for the release of United States intelligence to foreign
governments, the DCI became the source for the best available
information on the security situation in a foreign. country,
which information could be weighed in making the determination
to disclose classified military information to a particular
r reig^ unt Since the ('nmmittee fe t
it tCl hn jt7)cnj7pri r i
presume that significant developments abroad would reach all
levels of the Executive Branch through interagency or depart-
mental channels of itself, the DCI was given an "observer"
status on the S-DMICC in 194 - -- ~~~
12. Several problem areas came into existence as'a
result of the National Security Act of 1947. The first was a
potential area of conflict between the USIB (DCI's) responsibility
for the release of national or interdepartmental intelligence
(which often. contains military intelligence) and the S-DMICC's
responsibility for the release of classified military information,
including military intelligence. It was uniquely resolved in
1958. The initial step toward compromise at the time was the
approval by the Intelligence Advisory Committee (the predecessor of
the USIB) of a statement on the "Criteria and Conditions Governing
the:Release of :Intelligence-to Foreign Governments by the-IAC"
which was modeled on and consistent with the criteria set out in
the current Basic Policy Governing the Disclosure of Classified.
Military Information to Foreign Governments (MIC-206/29). This
was followed by memoranda from the Secretaries of State and
Defense to the DCI dated 11 and 17 June 1.958 respectively, in
which each stated, "Taking cognizance of NSCID-1 and the criteria
agreed to by the IAC . . . it is understood. that the authority
of the Secretaries of State and Defense to exercise control of
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the release of classified military information under the
Basic Policy Governing the Disclosure of Classified Mili-
tary Information to Foreign Governments will not (sic) be
applied to national intelligence and interdepartmental
intelligence produced. within the IAC structure which may
contain military intelligence." NSCID-l, paragraph 4.d.,
states "The Director of Central Intelligence. . .is further
authorized to disseminate national intelligence and inter-
departmental intelligence produced within the..." IAC (now
USIB) "...structure on a strictly controlled basis to foreign
governments and international bodies upon his deter~innationJ~
with the concurrence of the..." 'LAC (now USIB)
acticn would promote the security of the United States...
13. A second problem area was centered in the defi-
nition given in the Basic Policy Governing the Disclosure
of Classified Military Information to Foreign. Governments
(MIC 206/29) to "Military Information," namely, "information
under the control and jurisdiction of the Department of
Defense, its departments or agencies, or of primary inter-
est to them.... 11 CIA, as a service of common concern, col-
lects military intelligence information in response to
requirements of the Department of Defense. Although a basic
consistency exists between DCID 1/7 and MIC 206/29 governing
the release of this military information to foreign governments
iii t at the pr is pe s ii.is s ioii. of ~.he o r ig s cr j
be obtained before release, a conflict arises over the excep-
tions of a continuing nature to the basic release policy
exercised by the S-DMICC. While MIC 206/29 authorizes the
SD--MICC to grant exceptions of a continuing nature which
exceed the classification categories it has established or
are not included in the definitions of functional categories
it has defined, the CIA contended that the S-DMICC does not
have authority to grant continuing exceptions to the pro-
visions of. DCID 1/7, which can only be made by the DCI and
the 'AC (now USIB). This issue arose explicitly in December
1965, when COMUSMACV requested authorization to release
certain military intelligence information on a. continuing
basis to Free World Assistance Forces, Vietnam. CIA iegu-
lar.ly collected a considerable volume of the type of intel-
ligence which COMUSMACV wished to release. In this particular
instance, the -matter was resolved by parallel -action... The
US-MICC (formerly SD--MICC until 1964) .granted a "continuing
exception" to MIC 206/29 and. the DCI and USIB authorized an
exception to the provision of DCID 1/7.
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J
14. A third problem area was that of the relation-
ship of the CIA to the S-DMICC. The "observer" status of
the CIA was challenged in the recommendations attached to
a survey of the S-DMICC prepared in 1959 for the National
Security Council by the NSC Representative on Internal
Security, Mr. J. Patrick Coyne. He recommended that the
regular membership of the S-DMICC be limited to State,
Defense, Army, Navy, Air Force and the AEC. Participation
of other agencies, including CIA, at committee meetings
was to be limited to the relatively few instances when
matters involving their interest were considered by the
Committee. The NSC, however, by Action Number 2125, signed
by the President on 10 September-.1959, instructed that there
was to be "voting representation by the ..... Central intel-
ligence Agency. on items of direct concern to them (sic)
under consideration by the State-Defense Military Information
Control Committee or on unresolved issues of direct concern
to them (-sic) referred by the S-DMICC to higher authority..."
and that the Departments of State and Defense, consulting
as appropriate with other agencies, including AEC and CIA,
were to prepare a current, comprehensive, self-contained
statement of policy on the disclosure of classified military
information to foreign governments and international organi-
zations.
15. A fourth problem area has been the DCI's concern
that the existing system for releases was not closely linked.
to U. S. foreign policy and security objectives, that the
criteria governing releases were not adequate, and. that there
was _no effective means of keeping trace of what actually has
been released. As a result, in a time-frame extending from
March to June 1973, the DCI, as Chairman of the USIB, tasked
the Intelligence Community Staff (ICS) with surveying the
release of foreign intelligence to foreign governments and
international organizations for the purpose of assuring him
that he can know what is being released, that the system for
release is flexible enough to be responsive to current shifts
in U. S. policy, that exchanges are made on a quid pro quo
basis, and that no continuing obligations are assumed. The
survey indicated that: (1) existing arrangements for accom-
plishing releases .r.e. complex, and t:o. a considerable degree.
decentralized; (2) the DCI's authorities are quite limited
with respect to departmental collateral intelligence since
NSCID-1 limits him, with the advice of the USIB. to the
responsibility for the development of policies and procedures
for the protection of intelligence sources and methods from
unauthorized disclosure; (3) no system currently exists to
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provide a complete picture of the U. S. Intelligence that
is being released; and, (4) the degree to which disclosures
synchronize with U. S. policy. depends on the sensitivity with
which intelligence organizations and individual releasing
officers are able to discern unannounced changes in policy.
Existing.authorities to determine policy and. pro- I/
with respect to intelligence, including military intelligence,
derived from SIGINT is vested in the DCI (NSCID-6); and, (7)
collateral intelligence (classified non--military defense
-r ri +i.4 ) M.e~_eased by State en CIi o T?
1111 V A litU - vli J
s F? I"lq cI r. n'fi
Presidential Directive of 23 September 1958, "Basic Policy
Governing the Release of Classified Defense Information to
Foreign Governments" (NS.DM-119 supersedes only the provision
pertaining to classified military information).
1.7. The survey identified several problem areas in
connection with the release of U. S. intelligence to foreign
intelligence organizations and their governments. The first
is the quid pro quo issue. While the key criticism governing
the release of intelligence to foreign governments and inter-
national organizations is the net advantage to the United
States, there is no objective way in which such advantage can
be measured or assessed. Frequently, the release is only
indirectly related to an identifiable return. To have meaning,
net advanta.g. has to be broadly interpreted as applying to
the- spectrum - of .interests, of -the United States and not merely-
to a reciprocal- exchange of specific intelligence i_nformatioan,
This, however, puts a premium on the judgment of individual.
officers who arrange the release s. Hopefully, errors in
judgment in minor matters are corrected by the present system,
Wh._I_ch _ls__acqui_red by- CLA under NSCID- 4 or rySC_I.D_5__or__is produced-
by CIA under NSCID-3 is vest _ed_in. CIA;_ (5) authority with respect
to intelligence, derived from TKI-I material is vested in the
DCI (Presidential Directive and NSC Action 2454); (6) authority
for _d_partment_al intelligence. including military intelligence,
cedures for the release of intelligence to foreign govern-
ments and international organizations are widely divided;
(1) authority with respect to national intelligence and
interdepartmental intelligence is vested in the DCI, with
the advice of the USIB (NSCID-1); (2) authority with respect
to classified departmental military information (non-codeword
through Top Secret) is vested in-the Secretaries of State and
Defense (NSDM-119, 20 July 1971); (3) authority with respect
to departmental political, economic and sociological intel-
ligence is vested in the producing departments; (4) authority
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for senior level consideration of important matters and
the issuance of appropriate specific guidelines. Second,
is the role of formal, continuing intelligence exchange
agreements between the United States and. foreign. govern-
ments and their agencies. Through these agreements, the
United.-States has assumed something of a collateral obli-
gation whose ramifications go beyond purely intelligence
interests. Substituting a concept of no continuing obli-
gations would cause concern abroad that the United States
was making a basic shift in its relationships with other
parts of the world. Third, is the inter-organizational
differences in release criteria. While basic criteria for
the release of U. S. intelligence -are the same throughout
the Intelligence Community since they are based on the
President's Directive of 23 September 1958 and NSDM-119
of 20 July 1971 and the criteria for the release of TKH
and SIGINT are controlled by the DCI, practices of releasing
departments and agencies still. do vary. The Defense Depart-
ment under NDP-1/5 with its chart setting out the maximum
classification levels within each category of classified
military information which may be released to individual
foreign governments and international organizations tends
to be more restrictive in application than the CIA. In.
the CIA. net advantage to the U. S., as the driving criterion
guiding iii t of Stu i .i on in tlieir c ses, cnd" to'?:ard .,
more liberal release activity. Finally, there isVthe?problem
of interface with U. S. foreign policy and security inter-
ests. In theory, there should be no question concerning
the proper interface between U. S. intelligence disclosures
to foreign governments and current U. S. foreign policy
and security interests because the final release authorities
are vested in officials of sufficient stature to assess the
inter-relationships. For example, the DCI for SIGINT, TKH,
national intelligence and CIA produced departmental intel-
ligence, and the Secretary of Defense for military depart-
mental intelligence. In practice, however; the outgoing
flow of intelligence is in the hands of officials far below
policy levels and frequently geographically removed from
Washington. Senior levels normally become involved only
when a problem area is brought to the attention of the USIB
-or a request 'for an exception, to policy involving military
information is put before the NDPC. Problems can arise in
situations where the fine tuning of U. S. policy is hindered
by the inadvertant release or non-release of classified
defense information.
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18. The outgoing flora of classified military infor-
mation has been automated by the Department of Defense.
The Foreign Disclosure Automated Data (FORDAD) Sy was
formally implemented 1 April 1972. This system collects,
stores, and retrieves the disclosure decisions of the
various DOD disclosure elements throughout the world. This
ADP support, under the responsibility of the Department of
the Army, was converted to operate on its Worldwide Command
and. Control Computer located in the Pentagon on 10 September
1973. DOD instructions for the use of FORDAD places respon-
sibility for reporting on those who hold disclosure authority
in the various worldwide commands and offices of the DOD.
This reporting covers documentary disclosures, visits to
DOD facilities by foreign. representatives, the accreditation
of foreign representatives and. oral and visual disclosures.
19. As indicated above, disclosing classified United
States military information to foreign. governments and inter-
national organizations is based on National Security Decision
Memorandum 11-9 issued 20 July 1971. It defines classified
military information, in part, as information under the
control or jurisdiction of the Department of Defense, its
departments or agencies, or is of primary interest to them.
It sets out general policy objectives which are: (1) to treat
Vn ?1 ceC'1-f 1- 17 !i r-,
1 s ~~ a ^^ 1 it in or anon as ^ nate /
Ly? vlA ?ii11+
which must be conserved and protected and which mayabeGdis-
closed to foreign governments and international orb tons
hE,Uni.t d
only where theree is .a clearly defineda .vanta-e t o t
be consistent with United
State Such disclosures must
States foreign policy objectives and military security require-
ments, and limited to information necessary to the purpose of
the disclosure. (3) Disclosures will be contingent upon a
. ec 1nformatioh isi11_ afford
dete ~ rmit _th_a:t_ t a
it max f ial-ly. the sa.me_eree of security protection given
to it b the United fates This requirement may be set aside
in exceptional cases authorized jointly by the. Secretaries of
State and Defense, or by their representatives specifically
designated for this purpose, upon a finding that the advantage
resulting to the United States from the proposed disclosure
may be expected to outweigh the risk of the compromise of
U. IS. military secret-s. Instances' of. such -exceptions will..
be centrally recorded and included in annual reports to the
National Security Council concerning the implementation of
NSDM 11.9. The Secretaries of State and Defense, consulting
as appropriate with the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Com-
mission, the Director of Central Intelligence and the heads
1.0
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of other departments and agencies, are assigned the res-
ponsibility for controlling the release of U. S. classified
military information. Nothing in NSDM 11.9 is to be construed
as being contrary to, among other things, disclosure authority
vested in the United States Intelligence Board structure; nor
shall anything contained in NSDM 119 affect or modify authority
or responsibility vested in, among other persons, the Director
of Central Intelligence pursuant to Federal Law, National
Security Council Intelligence Directives, Executive Orders
or other Presidential authorizations, tomake specific deter-
minations concerning disclosures of classified U.. S. military
information to foreign recipients. NSDM 119 does not preclude
the continuation of the State-Defense agreement that a repre-
sentative of the Secretary of Defense provide executive direc-
tion and chairmanship of the NDPC.
20. NSDM 119 specifies that the responsibility assigned
to the Secretaries of State and Defense for controlling the
releases of classified U. S. classified military information
includes: (1) the establishment and management of such inter-
agency mechanism and procedures as are required for the effective
implementation of NSDM 119; (2) the promulgation of specific
disclosure criteria and limitations, definitions of terms,
release arrangements and other guidance required by U. S. depart-
meents ar,.\.L agerci?s having s ccc a:,icn to r
4
el.e se class 4 e,T IT Q
military information to foreign recipients; (3) the continuing
review of pertinent intelligence information, and the conduct
of periodic on-site surveys to determine the capability of
particular foreign governments to provide to classified U. S.
military information the requisite degree of security pro-
tection; and (4) the submission to the National Security
Council of an annual report covering the highlights of the
program. This annual report to the NSC is to include: (1)
an assessment of the effectiveness of the program in meeting
the general policy objectives and implementing responsibilities
as set forth in NSDM 119; (2) information concerning any
security compromises or other noteworthy-problems encountered,
and remedial action taken; and, (3) the circumstances of any
exceptional instances wherein disclosures of classified mili-
tary information were made to foreign recipients not known
to possess the capability. to . afford the information: protection.
substantially equal. to that provided it by the United States.
21. The current U. S. National Disclosure Policy was
issued by the Secretary of Defense after approval by the
Secretary of State and concurrences from the Chairman, AEC
11
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and the DCI. It became effective 1 January 1970. Entitled
"National Policy and Procedures for the Disclosure of Clas-
sified Military Information to Foreign Governments and Inter-
national Organizations," (Short title: National Disclosure
Policy, NDP- -1) , it has undergone five minor textual revisions
as the result of annual reviews by the Committee. The current
revision, NDP-1./5, was issued 25 November 1974.
22. The purpose of NDP-1./5 is to promulgate national
policy and procedures in the form of specific disclosure
criteria and limitations, definition of terms, release arrange-
ments and other guidance required by U. S. departments and
agencies having occasion to release classified U. S. military
information to foreign governments and international organi-
zations. It also establishes and provides for the management
of an interagency mechanism and procedures which are required
for the effective implementation of the policy. A11 de,)ar.t-
nment are
ments and a encies of the Executive Branch of over.
subect_to this policy. Classified military information is
f
i
on o
defined as ir.formation under the control or jurisdict
'the -D-epartnent of Deease, its departments or agencies or of
primary interest to them which re u.ires -rotection in trio
a_nterests o ~ security as described in Executive Order
._'-h .; r t , 'r f= c"- -(- i r g o ^ rn '-1 i h 11 ; 11 g ? (I ) t h r~ r e p o -n s l h
~_
vested in the DC 1 under the National Seczrity r.ct_o X947,
as amended, or-Section 6 of the CIA Act of 1949, as amended,
for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unautho-
rized disclosure; or (2) any authority vested in among others,
the DCI where permitted or required by law, Executive Order,
or other Presidential authorization to make specified deter--
minations concerning disclosures of classified military i-nfor-
matior, to foreign recipients. NDP-1/5 does not apply othe_
disclosure of National Intelligence or Lnter dearmerlrl=
F c = n -6 _e proouc .-d"W;Ithiir the I structui e. Such intel-
grit
_
Iigerlce t:arinot~b uisclosed t tliout t}ic aizt;io~ri-z'at.ion of the
DCI, concurred in by the USIB. NDP-1/5 also does not apply
to the disclosure of counterintelligence activity devoted to
destroying the effectiveness of inimical foreign 4ntel.l.igence
activities, which is governed by NSCID No. S.
23. NDP-1/5 guidelines to be applied to disclosure
programs cover both criteria and conditions. Al! of the
following criteria must be satisfied:
a. Disclosure is consistent with the foreign
policy of the U. S. toward the recipient
nation or international organization.
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b. The military security of the U. S.
permits disclosure.
c. The foreign recipient of the information
will afford it substantially the same
degree of security protection given to
it by the U. S.
d. Disclosure will result- in benefits to
the U. S. at least equivalent to the
value of the information disclosed.
e. The disclosure is--limited to information
necessary to the purpose for which dis-
closure is made.
f. If military intelligence is involved,
disclosures on activities. of certain
Communist governments should develop on
the part of the recipients an appreciation
of the capabilities, intentions or probable
courses of action of aggressors or potential
aggressors. Disclosures of military Intel-
ligence on activities of non-Communist gov-
ernmen.ts ~ccnri71P,rt i.Tith the ff. S. in i{}i-
ances or mutual defense agreements or certain
alliance organizations where a specific
determination has been made in each case
that such a disclosure will result in sig-
nificant benefit to U. S. objectives. Where
governments are not so associated with the
U. S. compelling circumstances must exist
and prior approval obtained via. NDPC exception
procedures before a disclosure is made.
In addition to the above criteria., the following conditions
must prevail:
a. All departments and agencies of the Executive
Branch will have issued detailed implementing
..:'dir.ectives and "instructions implementing the..,
N t
a
l
r a
_ on
the same degree of protection given. to it by
the U. S. will have been made.
Tona
Disclosure Policy.
Before_a proposed disclosure program involving
classified military information is initiated,
an on-site security survey of the recipient's
ability to afford the disclosed infornti
13
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C. Assurances should be received from the
recipient that the disclosed information
will not be reveal?d to a third party;
that it will be given the same degree
of security protection as given to it by
the U. S.; that it will be used only for
the purposes specified; that known or
suspected compromises will be promptly
reported to the U. S. Government; and,
that specified original recipients of
the disclosed information have received
appropriate security clearances from their
own government. These assurances are
covered in bilateral General Security
Information Agreements.
d. If the highest classification of the
disclosure program exceeds the maximum
permissable classification levels estab-
lished for each country by the NDPC, the
disclosure program will either be denied
or an. exception to disclosure policy will
be obtained from the NDPC.
e. All disclosure actions of classified
1 , :.t ate y of or :at ion, approvals -1.don .~...a y
will be reported to the NDPC.
24. When the National Disclosure Policy was being re-
drafted as NDP-1, one of the issues under consideration was
the Agency's membership on the Committee. As indicated above,
the DCI was given an observer status on the S-DMICC in 1949.
A Presidential Directive of 1.4 ,Sep_tmber,_1959 (NSC Action
?.5b, 10 September 1959) a ve the DCIsa .voterq,n,,matte rs of
direct concern to him without specifically addressing the
issue of membership. However, in MIC 206/29-644, the "United
States National. Disclosure Policy" issued by the Secretary of
State, 1 August 1.964 after his having received the written
approval of the Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency, among others, for the purpose of setting out "a single,
up-.to-date, comprehensive, selfcontained statement of policy
'on the' disclo5yare of classified 'military information to ~ foreign
governments and international- organizations in accordance with
the Presidential. Instruction of 10 September 1959 (NSC Action
2125 h) "it was stipulated that among the regular voting members
of the US - MICC was a representative of the Director of Central
Intelligence. This membership was carried forward into NDPC-1,
"National Policy and Procedures for the Disclosure of Classified
Military Information to Foreign Governments and International
Organizations," issued by the Secretary of State 7 October 1966
with the concurrence of the DCI under which the NDPC was
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J C.~ vW a .li'a
established. The first draft of a revised National Disclosure
Policy dated 30 January 1969 prepared by the State Department
intentionally dropped the DCI from NDPC membership in an effort
to cut down on bureaucracy since the bulk of the disclosures of
classified. military information pertained only to the DOD.
25. The DCI strongly demurred and opted for continued
general membership on the following grounds:
a. The high degree of responsibility and
authority of the DCI in the U.S. Intelligence
Community and on national security matters
(his responsibility to-the NSC and the
President) warrants his having a full status
to enable him to have a proper voice in dis-
closure policy without having to apply to
be heard nor having to explain just how a
disclosure matter is of direct interest to
him.
b. In a sense, even classified U.S. military
information is intelligence when released to
foreign governments falling under the DCI's
responsibility to protect it and. the sources
anc merhodl; by which a.r was developed from
unauthorized disclosure.
c. By virtue of his primary responsibility for
liaison with foreign intelligence and security
services and for the release of U.S. intelligence
to foreign governments, the DCI usually has the
best available information on the security
situation in foreign countries which should he
applied in the processing of U.S. military in-
formation for possible disclosure to foreign
governments. It cannot be presumed that
significant developments in the security
situation in a foreign country would reach
all NDPC members through other Agency or
departmental channels.
d. NSC Action No. 2125b, 10 September 1959
directed the Secretaries of State and Defense
to prepare National Disclosure Policy and
procedures in consultation with the DCI and
the Atomic Energy Commission. The DCI should
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have this status in the formulation of national
disclosure policy and any change in this status
should include advice to the NSC with a. request
for its views.
e. The DCI had full policy board voting status
since 1 August 1964, which did not impede or
inhibit normal S-DMICC or NDPC activity.
26. Since both. MIC 206/29-64 and NDPC-1 exceeded the
language of NSC Action No. 2125b in giving the DCI full member-
ship on the Committee where he was only given a vote on matters
of direct concern to him, the Categories of General and Special
Membership were established under NDP-l with General Members
having a broad interest in all aspects of Committee operations;
and Specie _me bers havino a signif i.c_azit- i_nt_ere. t some, but
not allas-pests of Commz.tteeoprations., Special Members may
~-
their direct concern on each matter
notify the Chairmanof
brought before the NDPC. Committee actions represent the
unanimous agreement among'General Members and Special Members
having a direct concern. When unanimity on a matter fails, the
Chairman can propose an NDPC position which can be appealed to
the Assistant Secretary of Defense/International Security Affairs
(ASD/ISA). Further appeal from the decision of the ASD/ISA can
bo mad_- to the Secretary o--'- llefPn e by the neap or 't:ie ut ~~at ~,uc ~Li',
or agency directly concerned. Under NDP-1/5 General Members are:
the Secretaries of State, Defense, Army, Navy, Air Force and the
Joint Chiefs of Staff; S ecial Members are_:Chairman AEC_;_BCI;
__Di_rector,,_,.D.ef-ense Researc an Ecng-neer.3_ng; Assistant Secretary
of Defense (Comptroller) Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
(Atomic Fner~an?d tli"e'irector, _Deiise Tnte S7gencgen.cy.
In a memorandum for the ASD/ISA dated 30 September 1969, the bCI
stated "I have accpeted Special Memb.ership rather than. full
membership on the basis that my representatives will be kept
informed on all matters brought before the NDPC and will receive
all issuances." The DCI's membership is in his capacity as
Chief, Intelligence Officer of the U.S. rather than as head of
the Central Intelligence Agency.
27. As a Special Member with. significant interest in
matters of- direct concern, the DCI has the fol.lowing role on...
the NDPC:
a. He concurred. in the formulation of NDP-1
and concurs in all of its subsequent changes.
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b. He is responsible for implementing NDP-1/5
within the Central Intelligence Agency.
c. He may disclose classified military informa-
tion under the terms of the NDP guidance if an
originator of classified military intelligence.
d. As a Special Member with significant interest
in some, but not all aspects of committee operations,
he will provide represenation at NDPC meetings as
required.
e. As a Special Member, he must notify the Chair-
man, NDPC when actions before the Committee are
of direct concern, since the Chairman must estab-
lish unanimous agreement among.Gcneral Members
and-those Special Members indicating direct con-
cern before Committee actions become final.
f. He responds to requests for consultation from
the ASD/ISA on appeals from the Chairman NDPC's
proposed position on matters before the Committee
lcl l.h111K U11 a.ni1lili i.iJ ia.~i.%GlltVll ~. u.,~iv a~ ,.. ,.,
if the action is of concern to him as a Special
Member.
g. He may appeal decisions of the ASD/ISA to the
Secretary of Defense on matters of direct concern
to him.
h. He is to issue detailed directives' and in-
structions which assure that disclosure decisions
are made promptly and disclosure activities are
carried out effectively.
i. The Annual Report to the NSC prepared by the
Executive Director, NDPC will include his con-
currence.
j. He will report to the NDPC all classified. .
military information disclosure actions (positive
or negative) undertaken by CIA under the provisions
of NDP-1/5 in line with the procedures established
for the Foreign Disclosure Automated Data (FORDAD)
System.
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k. He will provide qualified personnel to
serve on NDPC security survey teams when
requested by the Committee's Chairman.
1. He will, as requested. by the NDPC Chair-
man, provide appropriate briefings to the
NDPC security survey teams before their de-
parture on the countries and international
organizations of team concern.
28. In practice, the NDPC-under NDP-l conducts the greater
part of its business by correspondence or telephone. Detailed
operating procedures for the NDPC were established as a Record
of Action, currently RA-001.4/70 dated 17 October 1.974, a re-
vision of the original issuance. Proposals to the NDPC for
policy review and definition, exceptions to policy, or denial.
authority are to be submitted directly by General and Special
members to the Executive Director, NDPC, with simultaneous copies
to all. members. The Executive Director, with the concurrence cf
ers.
the Chairman, may also iQi~tiateStautl~orizedconsidered
encouraged~LbThe
Direct contact between members ;
routine business of the Committee may be handled without formal
meet ngs throug'f coordination w7.th_ al.) roorl.dL 1LelaueiS vuLuii,
the necessary concurrences with a written report issued to Com-
mittee members. Unresolved routine cases, policy q
other matters requiring formal NDPC consideration. may be resolved
by the Chairman or correspondence with members or may be held for
NDPC meetings routinely scheduled for 0930 hours, the third
Thursday of each month. Requests for an exception to NDP are
submitted in writing to members who can indicate their concurrence
o: no functional interest" in the case of Special members on a
preprinted form. Concurrences with comment or non-concurrences
are to be furnished by a separate memorandum. to the Chairman,
NDPC. A review of the Calendar Years 1970 through
a high frequency of meetings during the earl~h}eahes new rethen-
Department of Defense was feeling its way
sibility for running NDPC activities. In CY 19770Sthere we,ewith
only three cancelled meetings, June, August, arl
continuation meetings held. in. October and November.-.......:In. CY .1971 ..
regularly scheduled meetings were held in January, April, June
and September with a continuation meeting in September. Meetings
were held in January, March, August, September andrNovembernlith
a September continuation meeting April, September and December
four meetings in CY 1973, January, Awith a continuation meerCe tembepta.nde0ctoberawithla continuatione
were regular meetings in p
r .~ 1
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meeting in each of these months and a Special meeting in April.
In terms of exceptions to National Disclosure Policy, there
were 50 exceptions handled in CY 1970, 68 in CY 1971, 84 in
CY 1972, 93 in CY 1973, and 58 in CY 1974. These requests for
exception were initiated through correspondence and, for the
most part, disposed of in this manner. Of the 354 requests
for excentc o~r.xs i'ur-..Ga~o_-Ye.rs_,_ six weze_-related
tom military intelligence disclosures of direct concern to the
DCI imz ar y, 43 o t.Fiese requests were approvedby the
Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense with the NDPC being
informed of the action taken after the fact so it could make
these exceptions a matter of record. The Chairman requested
the DCI member to present an intelligence briefing on Chile,
which was accomplished 12 November 1970 by a briefing officer
of the DDI.
29. Other problems of the NDPC which have direct in-
terest to the DCI besides membership are the adequacy of
representation on the NDPC and the Committee's security in-
spection function. Two ~dies of Committee activi-
ties were made in the spring of 96 by the.Departme rL.t :sof
tateand_,I)efense The F e-tfnd-- R post dated l3 April by State
recommended that CIA and AEC appoint USMICC members and alter-
- ,+1 ~, thin i-,hA;-r car~~rity dJU1sions, a11d..wherever
possible iron a nigh enough poi iuy dC
`cl_s?on making. The Horowitz Report dated 11 May by Defense
was more philosophical in its comments on the quality of
Committee representation. It observed that since full-time
Committee participation is not required either for the review
of policy exception requests or for inspecting security systems
of foreign governments, the knowledge and capability of indi-
vidual Committee members is more important than the number of
of members on the Committee. The Horowitz Report further
argued 11gence orientedpersonnel should be selected
for Committee membership as opposed to operational or tech-
nically oriented persons, since foreign disclosure activities
are basically inherent to the field of intelligence. While
operationally or technically ori.e.tec'_ personnel are better to
assess the impact of releasing c.l=s::i: ied operational or
technical data. on the U. S., they a, e not as well qualified
to weigh the benefits to the U.' 5. 'ectuivalent to the informa
tion disclosed. For this reason, Committee members should
have broad background and experience, be sufficiently know-
ledgeable concerning foreign policy, military and security
objectives of the U. S. and be authorized within appropriate
limits, to act for their department heads in National Disclosure
Policy matters with easy direct access to the official respon-
sible for disclosure matters. The level of representation was
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again a matter of di.scussion,in the NDPC Executive Committee
established in January 1969 to revise NDPC-l. The crux of
the problem of adequate representation was to find the level
of officer for Committee membership to allow prompt policy
decisions and parent organization commitments on. the one hand
and active Committee participation on the other. The exper-
ience of the Committee was that high level officers were nom-
inal members who left participation in Committee activities
to alternates who performed all. the required routine functions.
It was thou5:tht desirable to have the Committee consist of
embers who were actually. involved in disclosure activities.
30. On 23 May 1966, shortly after the Freund Report
7 was circulated, Deputy Undersecretary of State, U. Alexis
Johnson, wrote to the DCI concerning his desire to "consult
a CIA policy official." regarding a National Disclosure Policy
working group. In his reply of 1 June 1966, the DCI, Admiral
W. F. Raborn, designated Thomas A. Parrott of my staff" as
the Agency policy official to deal with State. When he met
with Mr. Freund at State on 8 June 1966, it was suggested
to Mr. Parrott that future members and alternates of the
Committee should be provided from "policy" levels instead
of ~:: cu qty ? c'.-c1s Mr Parrott pnnrIer1 1-hnt the DCT
saw no cii?ficulty in meeting the Objectives of i.uls t
-mendation; namely, to make it possible to obtain decisions
Sp'eed'ily,'-by maintaining the DCI's representation from.the
Office of Security. Since the Office of Security is much more
closely related to the principal business of the Agency,
Mr. Parrott stated that this is where DCI representation
should properly come from. If there were future problems in
obtaining responses from the DCI, the DCI should be, advised.
and either channels would be unclogged or changing the locus
of representation would then be considered. The Deputy Chief,
Policy Division, Office of Security, was then designated by
Mr. Parrott to represent the DCI on the State-Defense Working
Group and to succeed to Committee membership. All actions of
the Working Group on reorganizing the USMICC in 1966 and in
reorganizing the NDPC-1 in 1969 were coordinated with Mr. Parrott
&n his.position a.s. Assistant to the DCI for National Intelligence
Program Evaluations (A/DCI/NIPS) Although the record does not
indicate the date of origin, it became the practice in mid-1966
to also coordinate Committee activities with focal noini: officers
in the Offices of the DDI and DDS?T and the C/FI of the
DDO. Prior to this time, coordination was effected with 25X1A
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interested components within each Directorate, a time-
consuming activity. Coordination with Directorate focal
officers is a current practice. The position of A/DCI/NIPE
disappeared with the creation of the Intelligence Community
Staff. Since problems have not arisen under NDP-1 requiring
coordination at the DCI policy level, a substitute avenue of
coordination has not been established.
31. The Freund and Horowitz Reports also revealed
problems needing solution. with the Committee's security in-
spection function. The Freund report recommended separating
the security survey function from normal responsibilities of
the USMICC. This would include establishing a "stable" of
security experts earmarked by DOD, AEC, and CIA. The Freund
report felt that security surveys needed to be better planned,
staffed, conducted and acted on promptly by the U. S., which
should inform both host governments and all interested U. S.
officials in Washington and the field of the results of the
survey. The Horowitz report queried whether the practice of
the Committee to appoint survey teams composed of Committee
members or alternate members did not in effect create a "judge
d.T?.Q. iY;i v. >i Uc1i 1uTi. ;i illCrc 411E
fu~ not
being kept separate from the policy function, there was no
assurance that fully objective inspections were being made.
32. NDP-1/5 is"worded in a way to allow latitude on
the matter of security surveys. In size and composition of
survey teams, they will be limited to the minimum number
essential to conduct a;~ effective security survey as is
determined by the NDPC on the basis of the requirement for
each survey. Qualified personnel will be provided, normally
by departments an.d agencies represented on the NDPC, to serve
on teams as required. Team members should be knowledgeable
of basic security practices involving clearance and investi-
gative aspects of personnel security; all aspects of document
and information control; and physical security in industrial,
military and civil organizations receiving U. S. classified
militar.y.informa.tion.. Team, members should also be knowledge-
able of the status of on-going programs with foreign govern-
ments or international. organizations being surveyed. All
members of the team and their respective departments and
agencies should participate actively in the planning process
to assure that the instructions issued to the team by the
Chairman fully cover all facets of the visit. When departments
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and agencies do not send representatives as team members, they
will. be afforded the opportunity to brief the team on their
on-going disclosure programs with foreign governments or
international organizations.
33. Under NDP-1/5, the Committee uses the following
criteria as a basis for determining which countries or inter-
national organizations are to be given on-site security surveys.
An initial NDPC security survey is normally required before
beginning a program or disclosing classified military infor-
mation. and equipment to a_foreign_gover.nment or international
organization. ~Tn~all._surveys_,_ the _U.. S.. Country Team on site
and the host government concur in the conduct of the survey.
Subse cent security surveys are made after the following
considerations are weighed: (a) a review of past security
surveys, Embassy security assessment reports and any bilateral
General Security of Information Agreements indicate that their
current applicability or validity as a basis for continued
NDPC disclosure or denial actions is in doubt; (b) a review
of classified military information and equipment disclosures
since the last security survey indicates an increase in the
volume of disclosures or the technological content of on-going
disclcsi.ii c Ni vgi...-... ; (c) .. .-rnt.. o f U 0
i tlt.e1 l l Bence. ?nd
Embassy reports indicates a weakening of the security ~,r~LedU es
or practices of a foreign country or international organization
in protecting U. S. classified military information and equip-
ment; (d) the current relationship between the U. S. and con-
cerned foreign country or international organizations has con-
siderably changed; and (e) the views of the American Embassy
regarding the appropriateness of an NDPC security survey of
its host country or international organization favor such action.
34. To Annex A, NDP-1/5 is appended a chart setting out
the maximum classification levels of classified military infor-
mation which may be released to individual foreign governments
and international organizations. The chart is a reflection of
U. S. National Disclosure Policy. Entries made in the chart
are comparable to a security clearance, coupled with a first
estimation .of the. foreign entitles "need-to-know." The factors
determining "nee-to-know" are primarily U. S: foreign and'
military policy. The chart, of itself, does not authorize
disclosures. The chart is reviewed annually by the Committee
and updated. The current chart lists four international or-
ganizations and 121 foreign governments (40 African, 22 Western
Europe/North Atlantic; 1.4 East Asia/Pacific; 24 Latin American/
Caribbean; 21 Near East/South. Asia). Since its inception as
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 25X1A
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date for the next report covering CY 1974 will be 30 April 1975
and will cover the report years 1975 and 1976. It was further
requested that this schedule indicate the countries and organi-
zations to be surveyed, the type of survey, tentative dates,
the last time a similar survey was conducted, and. the reasons
for conducting the survey.
36. The final question set out in paragraph 2 above
still.. remains to be con.si.dered, namely, could Agency partici-
pation be more efficiently drawn from elsewhere in the A7enc
25X1A say the DD O?
25X1A is the implementa-
tion instrument or t1e President's directive of 23 September
1958, Basic Policy Governing the Release of Classified Defense
Information to Foreign Governments. The relationship of the
25X1A NDPC to this directive is discussed in paragraph five above.
Under II the De u erations __1s irt~arily
responsible, on oeialf of theCI, for the conduct of liaison
with3`__o
i.n rote i ence services -,~zLnd wIHtherefore sup
g
P
vise the actua~~1as_e_ o interli- once aria intelligence infor-
maio The only exceptions are in fTiose instances where the
Dep Director (Intelligence) is releasing DD/I produce
Tyin-
1.C111k'Cil l.e aL .1- to co;;nt'': ^rj ?l whi rh ?he PD/I
maintains accredited liaison in IVashington, and overseas
through his representatives under the supervision of Chiefs
of Station. Prior to the initiation of a new CIA liaison in
which it is contemplated that classified defense information
will be released, it is the responsibility of the DDO to deter-
mine the security and the reliability of the proposed original
recipients. Before the security determination is made, the
Deputy Director (Administration) will conduct the required
security checks in. the U. S. The DDO will conduct such security
checks overseas. A copy of all security checks conducted by the
DDA shall be furnished to the DDO. In addition, the DD.A will
furnish the DDO any derogatory information that may be received
subsequent to the security determination. Since a security
determination is continuing in nature until revoked or amended,
the DDO is charged with the continuing review of any derogatory
information which maybe received after the security determina-
tion. Originally, the inspection function of the Inspection
and Security Office undoubtedly provided the rationale for
assigning responsibility for National Disclosure Policy matters
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25X1A ffice of Security. It would seem, however, that
last revised 1 April 1961, now provides stronger
justification for drawing DCI representation from the DDO.
As indicated above, membership on the NDPC does not require
participation in Committee security surveys. Should Agency
participation be requested on an NDPC security survey team,
it could still be drawn from the Office of Security. The
Agency, under NDP-1/5, will normally provide NDPC survey
teams appropriate country and international organization
briefings. In the past these have been drawn from DDI or DDO
resources. The area of direct Agency concern is the release
of military intelligence. In the past, the contributions of
the Agency have been supplied by DDO country desks who have
the most current access to significant information from overseas
stations. This coordination is currently being effected with
25X1A the DDO through the Chief, FI/0 The Office of Security
general business of the Committee, but go outside the DDA in
developing the agreed Agency position on any item of Committee
business.
37. To sum up therefore, it does not appear that any
!-.n c 71?a~~t~ fi
. :o..rard nassivi_ty in the Agency0s
relationship towara the NDPC. I t is i.1 ul LIIat L'h golf. 1.o
problem of the U. S. in 1967 led to an internal Agency decision
to play down participation in NDPC team security surveys. This
decision, however, has not. been tested by the NDPC,.since it has
-not requested Agenc parti.cipation since 1967. Internally, this
decision'may also be changed'oY reaffirmed by the new Director
of Security and DCI who have come on the scene since 1967.
Such a test may come soon as the NDPC implements the current
request of the NSC to plan security surveys two years in ad-
vance of each annual report. Then again, since the NDPC is
now chaired by the Department of Defense, the DOD may continue
to find an adequate stable of security specialists from among
its own departmental members to mann survey teams as it has
for the eleven surveys conducted since it took over the NDPC
chairmanship in 1.970. It would also appear that the continued
drawing of DCI representation from the Office of Security per-
petuates a longstanding' bureaucratic anachronism. Repres,en--
tation from this quarter cannot provide the inherent expo ise
necessary to carrying out the business of the Committee. it
has served mainly as a focal point for interface between the
NDPC and the DCI and internal Agency components. It would be
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 proved For Release 20021 X11IIA-RDP83B00823R000700020012-6
more realistic to draw the DCI's representation to the NDPC
from the DDO. The DLO already has the responsibility for
the Agency's implementation of the.disclosur.e of nonclassified
military defense information under the National Disclosure
25X1A Policy covered by the President's Directive of 23 September
1958 as referenced in 0 It would seem logical for him
to also represent the DCI on the NDPC on disclosure matters
of classified military information now covered by NSDM-119 of
20 July 1971. Moreover, the DDO has been furnishing the sub-
stantive expertise to the NDPC through the Office of Security.
Both the DDI and DDS&T have been nonproductive albeit essential
points of coordination. within the Agency. The DDO country
desks have been the more sensitive barometers of political
change. They can and have provided the NDPC timely indicators
of such change. To reassign the responsibility for pro-viding
DCI representation to the DDO would capstone the long and
tortuous functional evolution of the NDPC in its relationship
to the DCI.
Policy and Plans Group
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25X1A'