FUTURE COMPUTER REQUIREMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00823R000400140013-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 7, 2002
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: June 23, 1966
• Content Type: MEMO

OPTIONAL FORM N
MAY 882 EDITION/"~~?/ d pproved Fo&Ie?&se,2002 R)
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
0,Q86000400140013-5
Memorandum
Deputy Chief, Personnel Security Division
DATE: 23 June 1966
FROM Acting Chief, Clearance Support Branch
SUBJECT: Future Computer Requirements
1. Reference is made to the memorandum of 20 June 1966,
which requested "think pieces" in connection with computer re-
quirements for the future.
2. It is my opinion that the entire security records system
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has been geared to "names" and that there is always a problem
in recovering data when many facts on a situation are known, but
the specific identity is not recalled. The same thing applies when
we are attempting to determine names and other statistics on
categories of problem cases. We often get the question as to what
individuals are cleared at a particular institution, but there is no
reliable, efficient, or expeditious way of handling the inquiry.
3. As one example of the problem, I a few
months ago, conducted a survey on problem cases in which drink-
ing was a significant factor or the employee was known to be an
alcoholic. The only way to obtain this data was to cull the old pro-
blem reports and talk to those individuals who had been working on
problem cases. The same difficulty is encountered when we are
asked how many suicides there have been in the Agency.
4. In December 1965, there was a report that a person who
identified himself as an Agency employee, or an ex-Agency em-
ployee, had contacted an
phonically contacted in order to con irm their presence in the
United States. Again, the only method of developing a suspect list
was in trying to remember the more significant and recent problem
cases. All 701 cases and disgruntled ex-employees should be com-
puterized.
CONFIDENTIAL
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5. As yet another example of the problem, I was re-
cently interested in an applicant with a specific type of educational
background, and a particular knowledge of a foreign area. The
only method of exploring the lead was to have a number of employees
review several hundred files. The question can be raised as to how
many Agency employees have travelled to the USSR.. How many have
served in Iron Curtain posts ? How many have been recruited at a
particular college, possibly from a particular Personnel Lead
Source?
6. There have also been the cases of mysterious phone calls
to the Night Security Office, or to Senior Agency officials. This is
in addition to obscene phone calls to Agency female employees. I(
would appear to me that the computer system should be geared to
record significant information on these "Unknown Subjects".
7. At various times there has been a keen interest in leaks
to the news media, and a task force was created prior to the publi-
cation of "The Invisible Government". It would appear to be that
as one phase of such inquiries there should be a quick, efficient
means of determining those employees who have had press contacts.
This, of course, would tie in with the names of disgruntled employees,
close associates of prime suspects, degree of access, etc.
8. Some years ago, there was some general thought of prepar-
ing a "damage assessment" on all individuals who were leaving the
Agency. Although the idea was not considered feasible at that time,
I feel that with the development of computer methods, and the use
of the codeword system of clearances, something might be dnne in
the direction of preparing such assessments or studies on all em-
ployees. One of these days, there might be a defection. I don't
believe the security, medical, or personnel files give any clear idea
as to the sensitivity of information to which one has been exposed.
9. In the industrial security area, there is a 'current interest
in a company because of Fraud Against the Government investigation
by the FBI. This is a relatively small company, but a preliminary
check indicates that we have processed about fifteen (15) clearances
while there is a single contract for $39, 000. In retrospect, there
have been various "indicators" of a conflict of interest, but there
has been no real control by the Office of Logistics or the Office of
Security.
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10. On the topic of corporations, foundations, and educational
institutes, the question is often raised as to who is cleared, and
what is the level of their clearances. I can think of one organization
which has individuals who hold every conceivable type of clearance -
covert and overt, sensitive and non-sensitive. Tn nthar races +bor.e
11. In summary, there would appear to be benefit to recording
categories of significant data which, from a CI standpoint, will lead
us back to prime suspects.
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