ADP PROJECTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00823R000400140010-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 7, 2002
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: June 23, 1966
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2002/08/15 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000400140010-8
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 5010-107
MAY 1982 EDITION
GS 4GEN. REG. NO. 27
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
25X1 TO
CONFIDENTIAL
DATE: 23 June 1966
FROM : Chief /Security Research Staff
SUBJECT: ADP Projection
1. At your request, this Staff has projected some of
the possible uses of ADP beyond present facilities, and possibly,
feasibilities. Each of the items included in this memorandum is
submitted in the context of projection of ADP potential.
2. Perhaps the most feasible utilization, and most
valuable to the present and future needs of this Staff, is the security-
counterintelligence exploitation of Agency personnel-security-training
records by ADP. With proper input, the specific counterintelligence
needs of this Staff could be met in a highly successful manner. For
example, with appropriate input an--ADP search could ascertain those
employees, past and present, applicants, and persons of security
interest who have worked for a particular firm, studied at a partic-
ular educational institution, visited or resided in a certain area, etc.
This could be secured, with proper input, for desired time periods,
geographical locations, and other specific requirements. Similarly,
membership in certain organizations, by such persons, again equated
with time and location, could be assembled and afforded preliminary
analysis by ADP. An extension of this to include personnel assignments
and training by Agency personnel, for example, could provide identifi-
cation of personnel attending various training courses or having the same
specific geographic assignment as an individual under security-counter-
intelligence study. With proper input of operational data, agents, etc. ,
it might conceivably be possible to determine agents, operations, drops,
caches, etc. , to which an employee under security-counterintelligence
study was exposed, if not indeed knowledgeable. The value of such an
integrated system in the research work of this Staff is self-evident.
2. Another utilization which might be explored for ADP
exploitation is photograph storage. One such utilization would be the
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storage on magnetic tape of video signals of the photographs of
Agency employees, agents, etc. Video-interrogators could thus
reproduce, on command, the photo of any such person desired
by a using officer. The most basic utilization would be in visitor
control. A guard, for example, could have a video interrogator
at his control point, the video screen facing him, the inquiry keys
facing the visitor. The visitor could punch out his "secret" number
without it being noted by the guard. The storage tapes would be
interrogated, much as airline reservation records are interrogated
for space availability in commercial practice, and the photographic
image of the person holding that number shown on the screen for
a visual comparison by the guard with the visitor before him.
Similarly, in overseas areas, a walk-in at a station who claimed
to be an employee of another station or Headquarters could be com-
pared through a system interrogation. Of course, the true name or
pseudonym could also be used to interrogate the system, but a numer-
ical sequence would provide greater accuracy and provide for secure
integration of agent photographs, making it unnecessary for the guard
or inquiring station to learn the true identity or cryptonym. In time
of national emergency, with Agency staff, contract and agent personnel
"walking-in" at an Agency facility closest to them at the time of the
emergency, a visual comparison of the individual with an image obtained
from photographic storage would be a most valuable method of deter-
mining identity. (The stored image could also provide a short text, if
desired, relating further identification data, clearances, etc. )
3. The system related in paragraph two could also
be utilized for storage of photographs of hostile personalities, targets,
etc. , so that interrogation by name--or even description if properly
imputed, would provide out-stations with a method of immediate in-
terrogation of photographic holdings. In the event of description-only
interrogation, the video read-out could provide a series of photographs
one after the other, for the review of the person making the interrogation
of the system. Thus, for example, if the system is interrogated with the
Iphysicial -description-only of a suspected hostile agent, depending on
the details available for such system interrogation, the person making
the interrogation of the Headquarters holdings could review a series of
photographs of hostile agents to determine the specific identity of the
individual with whom he is concerned.
4. The foregoing suggestions, as indicated earlier, are a
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Cdr l E TIAL
projection of possible ADP utiliations. No time deadline for the
feasibility of such applications has been considered in making these
projections.
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