DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00823R000200050081-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 29, 2002
• Sequence Number: 81
• Content Type: LETTER

Approved For Release 2002/05/23 : CIA-RDP83BOO823ROO0200050081 9
it;v
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RE.13w, -to ~ r tS? tY
W ASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
Honorable James 0. Eastland, Chairman
Senate Judiciary Committee
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510
Dear Mr. Chairman:
1. Senator Bayh's bill S. 1841, "To protect the con-
stitutional rights of citizens of the United States
and to prevent unwarranted invasion of their privacy
by prohibiting the use of polygraph-type equipment for
certain purposes," has been referred to the Committee
on the Judiciary for consideration. The bill would
bar Federal agencies as well as private industry from
administering examinations to their employees with a
polygraph or other instrument which tests the veracity
of statements.
.2, The Central Intelligence Agency uses polygraph
testing, principally as a part of its security screening
process for applicants. After a tentative judgment has
been made that a given applicant seems to fit a man-
power need of the Agency, our Office of Security con-
ducts an investigation to determine whether the applicant
meets security criteria. One of the later phases of
this security investigation is an interview in which
the polygraph is employed. A medical examination is also
a part of the applicant screening procedure, and for the
well-being of the applicant this is always completed prior
to the polygraph interview on the possibility that a poly-
graph test might be contraindicated for medical reasons.
3 In his June 2 statement accompanying the introduction
of S. 1841, Senator Bayh expressed willingness to consider
the need for a limited use of the polygraph in the intel-
ligence field. I believe the need is clear in the case of
the Central Intelligence Agency. The polygraph program
is a highly productive element of our security program,
as some sample statistics may help to illustrate: In an
b~.'76.4916
Approved For Release 2002/05/23 : CIA-RDP83BOO823ROO0200050081-9
 Approved For Relea&e 2002/05/23: CIA-RDP83B00823R00N00050081-9
analysis we conducted of the period 1963 through mid-
1974, we found nearly 1800 applicants for staff or
staff-type positions were rejected on security grounds;
of this total, over 60% were rejected on the basis of
information developed principally or solely during
polygraph interviews. In a sampling of recent records,
we found that 52% of applicants who had been disapproved
on the basis of information developed during polygraph
interviews had already completed all other security
screening and been provisionally approved on this basis.
Without the polygraph program, the disqualifying infor-
mation on these cases would have remained unknown and
these unsuitable individuals would have gained access
to some of the U.S. Government's most sensitive infor-
mation. In addition, I believe it is reasonable to
presume that the program is a significant deterrent
to application for employment by unsuitable candidates,
and, more importantly, penetration attempts by foreign
intelligence services.
,A, The utility of CIA's polygraph program is not solely
a function of its part in contributing information lend-
ing to the rejection of'unsuitable candidates. The
preponderance of polygraph interview reports are favor-
able. Most of these favorable reports constitute useful,
and comforting, confirmation of other screening proce-
dures; the remainder represent favorable resolutions of
allegations or suspicions which otherwise could result
in injustices or in unnecessary defensive measures.
4: We at CIA are aware of the possibilities of abuse
of the polygraph program, and we have procedures in
effect to forestall abuses and to protect the rights
of those taking the examinations. These include:
--each applicant for employment is notified
at the time of the application of the intent to
use the polygraph. During applicant processing
the polygraph procedure and examination coverage
is fully reviewed, and then the examination is
conducted only after the applicant consents to
the interview;
Approved For Release 2002/05/23 : C19RDP83B00823R000200050081-9
 Approved For Relea'2002/05/23 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000Q,90050081-9
--advance interviews with the Office of
Personnel and the Office of Medical Services
determine if information has been developed as
a result of their screening procedures that
might preclude the advisability of conducting
a polygraph interview;
--the applicant is notified of the privilege
against self-incrimination if a question may per-
tain to a violation of the criminal law;
--the general content of all polygraph test
questions is reviewed before testing to assure
that all questions relate directly to security
considerations as outlined in Executive Order
10450;
--the applicant is told that the examination
may be monitored and possibly recorded to let
him know there are no hidden procedures;
--there is random monitoring by a specialized
supervisor to insure that no improper questions
are asked;
--polygraph records are maintained in sep-
arate files with very strict need-to-know rules
governing access;
--the polygraph examiner makes no recommenda-
tion as to the security suitability of the person
tested;
--the polygraph report is evaluated as but
one element in the total investigative report.
In addition to the above, in order to insure that
the polygraph examination program adheres rigidly to the
established standards, spot interviews and occasional
surveys have been conducted with applicants who have
completed their polygraph tests. In one such program,
several thousand female applicants were interviewed
after their polygraph examinations. Feedback from these
interviews was utilized to guide polygraph procedures,
but the program was finally dropped because the incidence
of adverse commentary was too low to justify its continu-
ance.
Approved For Release 2002/05/23 : C14-RDP83B00823R000200050081-9
 Approved For Rele 2002/05/23 : CIA-RDP83B00823R04Q200050081-9
6,Finally, the selection of polygraph officers is
extremely discriminating as to their qualifications,
intelligence, integrity, and high character. They are
given a rigorous training program which is a continuing
process to keep them abreast of developments in their
professional field. To support this program, CIA has
maintained a vigorous research effort inquiring into
new techniques and equipment to insure that highest
standards are maintained.
7, The National Security Agency also collects and
disseminates extremely sensitive foreign intelligence
information, and that Agency has also found it necessary
to use the polygraph as part of its security program.
I believe the use of the polygraph by NSA is also fully
justifiable, but I refer the Committee to NSA for the
details of their program. If S. 1841 is reported to
the Senate by the Judiciary Committee, I strongly urge
the Committee to add the following amendment to pro-
posed section 246 of Title 18:
"(d) This section shall not apply to the
Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security
Agency."
The Office of Management and Budget has advised
there is no objection to the submission of this report
from the standpoint of the Administration's program.
Sincerely,
W. B. Colby
Director
4
Approved For Release 2002/05/23 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000200050081-9