DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN:

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00823R000200050080-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 14, 2002
• Sequence Number: 80
• Content Type: LETTER

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Honorable James O. Eastland, Chairman
Senate Judiciary Committee
United States Senate
Washin ;ton, D.C. 20510
Senator Bayh's bill S. 1841, "To protect the constitutional rights of
citizens of the United States and to prevent unwarranted invasion of their
privacy by prohibiting the use of the polygraph-type equipment for certain
purposes," has been referred to the Committee on the Judiciary for consid-
eration. The bill would bar Federal agencies as well as private industry
from administering examinations with a polygraph or other instrument which
test the veracity of statements to employees or applicants.
The Central Intelligence Agency uses the polygraph as part of its
hiring process. After a decision to hire an applicant for a staff position
has been made (based on the needs of the Agency and the applicant's qualifica-
tions), our Office of Security conducts an investigation to determine if the
applicant is of excellent character and of unquestioned loyalty, integrity,
discretion, and trustworthiness. Upon completion of the investigation and
the accomplishment of medical examinations, a polygraph examination is
given as the final investigative aid in the hiring process.
In his June 2 statement accompanying the introduction of S. 1841,
Senator Bayh recognized that the intelligence profession has special
requirements, and expressed his willingness to consider the need for a
limited use of the polygraph in the intelligence field. I believe the need
is clear in the case of the Central Intelligence Agency: the polygraph is an
essential element of our security program. Statistics illustrate how important
the polygraph has proven. During the period 1963 through mid-1974, nearly
1800 applicants for staff or staff-type positions were rejected on security
grounds. Of this total, over 60 percent were rejected on information solely
or principally developed during polygraph interviews. In a sampling of our
recent records, 52 percent of applicants disapproved on the basis of polygraph
reports had been security approved until the polygraph examination. Without
the polygraph, the disqualifying information in these cases would have been
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unknown to the Agency, and many unsuitable individuals would have gained
access to some of the U.S. Government's most sensitive information. In
addition, I believe it reasonable to presume that the program is a significant
deterrent to application for employment by unsuitable candidates and, more
importantly, penetration attempts by foreign intelligence services.
We at CIA are cognizant of the danger of abuse inherent in the use
of any instrument used to distinguish truths from untruths. The Agency
has adopted strict procedures to forestall abuses and to protect the rights
of those taking the examination. These include:
--each applicant for employment is notified at the time
he is given an application of the intent to use a polygraph
examination and each must sign an advance consent statement;
--advance interviews with the Office of Personnel and
the Office of Medical Services determine if information has
been developed as a result of their screening procedures
that might preclude the advisability of conducting a polygraph
interview;
--notification of the privilege against self-incrimination
if a question may pertain to a violation of the criminal law;
--review of the general content of all questions that the
applicant will be asked is made before testing to assure that
all questions relate directly to security considerations (no
questions on religious thought or practices or political affilia-
tions of a non-subversive nature are permitted);
--the applicant is told that the examination may be
monitored and possibly recorded to let him know there are
no hidden procedures;
--random monitoring by a specialized supervisor to
insure that no improper questions are asked;
--maintenance of polygraph records in separate files
with very strict need-to-know rules governing access;
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--no polygraph-acquired information can be released
outside the Agency without the Director's approval or that of the
Deputy Director and only if such a release is necessary in the
interest of national security;
--the polygraph examiner makes no recommendation
as to the security suitability of the person tested;
--the polygraph report is evaluated as but one element
in the total investigative report.
In addition to the above, in order to insure that the polygraph
examination program maintains rigid adherence to established standards,
spot interviews have been conducted with applicants who have completed
polygraph tests. In one program, several thousand female applicants
were interviewed after their polygraph examinations and there were no
indications of abuses.
Finally, the selection of polygraph officers is extremely discriminating
as to their qualifications, intelligence, integrity, and high character. They
are given a rigorous training program which is a continuing process to
keep them abreast of developments in their professional field. In this respect,
CIA has maintained a vigorous research effort inquiring into new techniques
and equipment to insure that highest standards are maintained.
The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U . S . C . 403) charges the
Director of Central Intelligence with protecting Intelligence Sources and
Methods from unauthorized disclosure. However, this responsibility is
not accompanied by the sanctions I believe necessary to deter unauthorized
disclosure. As a result, past Directors and I have found it exceedingly
difficult to fulfill this responsibility. This lack of effective sanctions for
unauthorized disclosures makes it even more critical that this Agency possess
the tools necessary to identify unsuitable applicants.
The National Security Agency also collects and disseminates extremely
sensitive foreign intelligence information, and that Agency has also found
it necessary to use the polygraph as part of its security program. I believe
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the use of the polygraph by NSA is also fully justifiable, but I refer the
Committee to NSA for the details of their program. If S. 1841 is reported
to the Senate by the Judiciary Committee, I strongly urge the Committee to
add the following amendment to proposed section 246 of Title 18:
" (d) This section shall not apply to the Central Intelligence
Agency and the National Security Agency."
The Office of Management and Budget has advised there is no objection
to the submission of this report from the standpoint of the Administration's
program.
Sincerely,
W W. E. Colby
Director
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