ROLE OF POLYGRAPH IN THE REINVESTIGATION PROGRAM

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Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP83B00823R000200050046-8
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RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
8
Document Creation Date: 
December 12, 2016
Document Release Date: 
March 30, 2001
Sequence Number: 
46
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
April 12, 1974
Content Type: 
MF
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PDF icon CIA-RDP83B00823R000200050046-8.pdf333.92 KB
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Approved For Release 2001/07/12: CIA-RDP83B00823R000200050046-8 REEERENCE COPY RETUR11 TO US RE 'TRY .12 April 1974 MI3MOPANDW4 FOR: Director of Security SUBJECT : Role of Polygraph in the Reinvestigation Program 1, This memorandum responds to your request for a review of the role of the polygraph interview in the reinvestigation program initiated in 1961 and curtailed, for all practical application, in 1967. The memorandum also offers alternative plans for use of the polygraph should a reinvestigation program be reactivated. 2. Background a, On 30 November 1960, the Director of Security forwarded to the Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency a proposal to reinvestigate staff employees.. A polygraph interview. was pro- posed as part of the reinvestigation program. The DDCI approved the proposal on 2 February 1961. By June 1961 the reinvestigation program had been formally implemented in accordance with the fo1INTL ing proposed procedures: Approved STATINTL Approved For Release 2001/07/12 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000200050046-8 Approved For Release 2001/07/12 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000200050046-8 Approved For Release 2001/07/12 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000200050046-8 STATINTL d. The inclusion of the polygraph interview in the reinvestigation,program was a comparatively simple procedure because there was an on-going repolygraph program under DCI policy. This policy was set forth in a memorandum for the Director of Security, from C. P. Cabell,_Acting Director, subject Polygraph Operations, dated 8 August 1957. Paragraph 2, Persons to be Tested, states in part: "The following categories of personnel will be requested to participate in a voluntary poly- graph program for the benefit of the over-all STATINTL security of the Agency. Approved For Release 2001/07/12 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000200050046-8 Approved For Release 2001/07/12 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000200050046-8 4 . employees of any grade with five years of favorable service who were clear with SRS and who had'been polygraphed in the past five years. The exception to this authority were employees of sensitive pro- jects (not otherwise identified) and Communications employees, including code clerks. f. There is evidence in the records that by July 1959 there was concern among the Agency population over the fact that some individuals had to take the test and some did not. A memorandum to the Director of Security from C/ID, dated 20 May 1960, suggested that all overseas returnees be repolygraphed. This was turned down. h. Objections to repolygraphing of certain categories of personnel was raised by the Inspector General during the early discussions of the proposal to institute a formal reinvestigation program. In a 26 January 1961 memorandum for the DDCI from Mr. Lyman Kirkpatrick, he states in part: "...I would not make it mandatory that'a poly- graph be given in each case. In fact, I would suggest that the polygraphed be used only if there is evidence which needs to be clarified, by such examination. Furthermore, I believe that it should be policy in cost, if not all instances, senior employees, female employees and others on whom there is no new information developed by STATINTL name checks, etc., be excluded from the polygraph." Approved For Release 2001/07/12 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000200050046-8 Approved For Release 2001/07/12 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000WO050046-8 sTATr~TI NTL ated and repolygraphed to make one burl ntrc recirc uitg of the population. To keep the program current after 1966 would a year. Unfor- TATINTL investigations and xcalculated on a tunately, these figures-were la only projected stable population of II-OP employees with a fudge factor added for attrition STATINTL and an equal number of new employments. of ra rogram never i, As the records show, the reP yg per year. STATINTL approached the projected fi uin the period from it was never higher than reflect that the re- 1961 to 1966. The records re for a time in the spring investigation program was suspended of 1963 and again in 1964 because of the high demands for new employee processing and a high volume of covert cases from the special project areas of the DDS&T ?~.. Bannerman, j? In June 1964 the Director of Security, i the formed the Executive Director-C tptroller that- ted routine STATINTL in had comple ~nves of Security u approximately cases investigation program ogram in as of 30 May 1964. Since by the end of 1964, we tthee is a clear STATINTL had repolYgraphed only ~ indication that procedures had been modifiedhend that not all individuals had ram. There are as part of the reinvetrtin avroailable recordsBut no clear cut policy Papers rocedureshow the reason for this change in py clear. in But by May 1965 the records contain p did, not want cation that the Director oscuriy di mot waned .nc officials that automatic repolygraPh of pers. re his discussion Is pr posed one a selective basis. He furer indicated that runlesstagspec fic ygraasphsn further r should not be conducted appearso This shift in policy and procedures had a noticeable k. T effect on the polygraph interview portion of the re- invest gation program. From a ed high to of _n 196 rep?lY5, graphs in 1964, the number dropp years to 11 in 1966, to 8 in 1967 and in the six ynvesti- al of am isonow considered to since, there have been apx gr gation polygraphs. be non existent. STATINTL Approved For Release 2001/07/12 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000200050046-8 Approved For Release 2001/07/12 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000200050046-8 1. The files contain indication that there were personnel objections to the selective use of polygraph. People were adversely responsive to request to be polygraphed. They complained to their chiefs and supervisors and frequently ques- tioned the polygraph officer as to the reason they had been singled out for repolygraph. It was recognized that the largest number of repolygraph interviews took place with DDO personnel and the personnel of other directorates did not find them- selves called for repolygraph on any comparative percentage basis. 3. The concept that polygraph interviews play a significant role in any reinvestigation program must be evaluated in terms of results. As mentioned above, analysis fails to justify use of the polygraph in terms of uncovering penetration attempts or developing serious security information. Not one of the repolygraph cases surfaced a counterintelligence case or case with CI overtones. Based on such a criteria it would be diffi- cult to justify re-initiation of an across the board, all employee repolygraph program. STATINTL 4. There are intangible advantages to a potential repoly- graph interview. Among these are the effect that fear or apprehension of polygraph disclosure might have had over the years on personnel who abstained from undesirable conduct or actions, the weight fear of exposure might have had on opposi- tion elements tempted to recruit our personnel and the advantage of peace of mind available to employees who recognize that their peers have also gone through and face again the possibility of polygraph. S. Should these intangibles outweigh the lack of hard evidence and a repolygraph program again be initiated, there are factors of today's environment that require consideration in structuring such a program and in electing the coverage to be included. Among these are: a. the more widely held conviction that an element of privacy exists as a right of the individual; b. the changed morals and ethics of the day; c. the acceptance of civil;disobedience as a human right if not duty in some circumstances; d. the more open posture o# the Agency as a whole as declared by the Director. Approved For Release 2001/07/12 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000200050046-8 STATINTL Approved For Release 2001/07/12 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000200050046-8 Approved For Release 2001/07/12 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000200050046-8 Approved For Release 2001/07/12 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000200050046-8 S. The coverage in such, a program could include the follow- ing which seem to take into consideration the current environment: a. Release of classified information to unauthorized persons; b. Recruitment or employment by a foreign intelli- gence service; ' c. Use of narcotics; d. Participation in terrorists activities. 9. In summary, the original reinvestigation and repolygraph of the sixties did not develop'significant volumes of security related information. It faltered because of priority work. The selective repolygraphing created some morale problems. The policy and procedures changed in the mid-sixties and the program was essentially terminated by the end of the sixties. Reinstitu- tion of a polygraph program should be considered in light of today's environment and be laur4ched only with strong support of top management. Coverage should be limited and applicable to issues of direct relevance to security matters of high intensity. STATINTL Ch e Interrogation Branch Distribution: Orig E 1 - Adse STATINTL I - File 1 - Chrono OS/IB/-:tjs Approved For Release 2001/07/12 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000200050046-8