ROLE OF POLYGRAPH IN THE REINVESTIGATION PROGRAM
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP83B00823R000200050046-8
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
K
Document Page Count:
8
Document Creation Date:
December 12, 2016
Document Release Date:
March 30, 2001
Sequence Number:
46
Case Number:
Publication Date:
April 12, 1974
Content Type:
MF
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
CIA-RDP83B00823R000200050046-8.pdf | 333.92 KB |
Body:
Approved For Release 2001/07/12: CIA-RDP83B00823R000200050046-8 REEERENCE COPY
RETUR11 TO US RE 'TRY
.12 April 1974
MI3MOPANDW4 FOR: Director of Security
SUBJECT : Role of Polygraph in the
Reinvestigation Program
1, This memorandum responds to your request for a review
of the role of the polygraph interview in the reinvestigation
program initiated in 1961 and curtailed, for all practical
application, in 1967. The memorandum also offers alternative
plans for use of the polygraph should a reinvestigation program
be reactivated.
2. Background
a, On 30 November 1960, the Director of Security
forwarded to the Deputy Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency a proposal to reinvestigate
staff employees.. A polygraph interview. was pro-
posed as part of the reinvestigation program.
The DDCI approved the proposal on 2 February 1961.
By June 1961 the reinvestigation program had been
formally implemented in accordance with the fo1INTL
ing proposed procedures:
Approved
STATINTL
Approved For Release 2001/07/12 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000200050046-8
Approved For Release 2001/07/12 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000200050046-8
Approved For Release 2001/07/12 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000200050046-8
STATINTL
d. The inclusion of the polygraph interview in the
reinvestigation,program was a comparatively simple
procedure because there was an on-going repolygraph
program under DCI policy. This policy was set forth
in a memorandum for the Director of Security, from
C. P. Cabell,_Acting Director, subject Polygraph
Operations, dated 8 August 1957. Paragraph 2,
Persons to be Tested, states in part:
"The following categories of personnel will be
requested to participate in a voluntary poly-
graph program for the benefit of the over-all STATINTL
security of the Agency.
Approved For Release 2001/07/12 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000200050046-8
Approved For Release 2001/07/12 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000200050046-8
4 .
employees of any grade with five years of favorable
service who were clear with SRS and who had'been
polygraphed in the past five years. The exception
to this authority were employees of sensitive pro-
jects (not otherwise identified) and Communications
employees, including code clerks.
f. There is evidence in the records that by July 1959
there was concern among the Agency population over
the fact that some individuals had to take the test
and some did not. A memorandum to the Director of
Security from C/ID, dated 20 May 1960, suggested
that all overseas returnees be repolygraphed. This
was turned down.
h.
Objections to repolygraphing of certain categories
of personnel was raised by the Inspector General
during the early discussions of the proposal to
institute a formal reinvestigation program. In a
26 January 1961 memorandum for the DDCI from Mr.
Lyman Kirkpatrick, he states in part:
"...I would not make it mandatory that'a poly-
graph be given in each case. In fact, I would
suggest that the polygraphed be used only if
there is evidence which needs to be clarified, by
such examination. Furthermore, I believe that
it should be policy in cost, if not all instances,
senior employees, female employees and others on
whom there is no new information developed by STATINTL
name checks, etc., be excluded from the polygraph."
Approved For Release 2001/07/12 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000200050046-8
Approved For Release 2001/07/12 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000WO050046-8
sTATr~TI NTL
ated and repolygraphed to make one
burl ntrc recirc uitg of the population. To keep the program
current after 1966 would a year. Unfor- TATINTL
investigations and xcalculated on a
tunately, these figures-were la only
projected stable population of II-OP
employees with a fudge factor added for attrition STATINTL
and an equal number of new employments.
of ra rogram never
i, As the records show, the reP yg per year. STATINTL
approached the projected fi uin the period from
it was never higher than reflect that the re-
1961 to 1966. The records re for a time in
the spring investigation program was suspended of 1963 and again in 1964 because of the high demands for new employee processing and a high
volume of covert cases from the special project
areas of the DDS&T ?~.. Bannerman,
j? In June 1964 the Director of Security,
i the
formed the Executive Director-C tptroller that-
ted routine
STATINTL
in had comple
~nves of Security u approximately cases
investigation program ogram in as of 30 May 1964. Since by the end of 1964, we
tthee is a clear STATINTL
had repolYgraphed only ~
indication that procedures had been modifiedhend
that not all individuals had ram. There are
as part of the reinvetrtin avroailable recordsBut
no clear cut policy Papers rocedureshow the reason for this change in py clear. in But
by May 1965 the records contain p did, not want
cation that the Director oscuriy di mot waned
.nc officials that
automatic repolygraPh of pers.
re his discussion
Is pr posed one a selective basis. He
furer indicated that runlesstagspec fic ygraasphsn
further r
should not be conducted
appearso
This shift in policy and procedures had a noticeable
k. T
effect on the polygraph interview portion of the re-
invest gation program. From a ed high to of _n 196 rep?lY5,
graphs in 1964, the number dropp years
to 11 in 1966, to 8 in 1967 and in the six ynvesti-
al of am isonow considered to
since, there have been apx gr
gation polygraphs.
be non existent. STATINTL
Approved For Release 2001/07/12 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000200050046-8
Approved For Release 2001/07/12 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000200050046-8
1. The files contain indication that there were
personnel objections to the selective use of
polygraph. People were adversely responsive to
request to be polygraphed. They complained to
their chiefs and supervisors and frequently ques-
tioned the polygraph officer as to the reason they
had been singled out for repolygraph. It was
recognized that the largest number of repolygraph
interviews took place with DDO personnel and the
personnel of other directorates did not find them-
selves called for repolygraph on any comparative
percentage basis.
3. The concept that polygraph interviews play a significant
role in any reinvestigation program must be evaluated in terms of
results. As mentioned above, analysis fails to justify use of
the polygraph in terms of uncovering penetration attempts or
developing serious security information. Not one of the
repolygraph cases surfaced a counterintelligence case or case
with CI overtones. Based on such a criteria it would be diffi-
cult to justify re-initiation of an across the board, all employee
repolygraph program.
STATINTL
4. There are intangible advantages to a potential repoly-
graph interview. Among these are the effect that fear or
apprehension of polygraph disclosure might have had over the
years on personnel who abstained from undesirable conduct or
actions, the weight fear of exposure might have had on opposi-
tion elements tempted to recruit our personnel and the advantage
of peace of mind available to employees who recognize that their
peers have also gone through and face again the possibility of
polygraph.
S. Should these intangibles outweigh the lack of hard
evidence and a repolygraph program again be initiated, there
are factors of today's environment that require consideration
in structuring such a program and in electing the coverage to
be included. Among these are:
a. the more widely held conviction that an element
of privacy exists as a right of the individual;
b. the changed morals and ethics of the day;
c. the acceptance of civil;disobedience as a human
right if not duty in some circumstances;
d. the more open posture o# the Agency as a whole
as declared by the Director.
Approved For Release 2001/07/12 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000200050046-8
STATINTL
Approved For Release 2001/07/12 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000200050046-8
Approved For Release 2001/07/12 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000200050046-8
Approved For Release 2001/07/12 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000200050046-8
S. The coverage in such, a program could include the follow-
ing which seem to take into consideration the current environment:
a. Release of classified information to unauthorized
persons;
b. Recruitment or employment by a foreign intelli-
gence service; '
c. Use of narcotics;
d. Participation in terrorists activities.
9. In summary, the original reinvestigation and repolygraph
of the sixties did not develop'significant volumes of security
related information. It faltered because of priority work. The
selective repolygraphing created some morale problems. The
policy and procedures changed in the mid-sixties and the program
was essentially terminated by the end of the sixties. Reinstitu-
tion of a polygraph program should be considered in light of
today's environment and be laur4ched only with strong support
of top management. Coverage should be limited and applicable
to issues of direct relevance to security matters of high
intensity.
STATINTL
Ch e Interrogation Branch
Distribution:
Orig E 1 - Adse
STATINTL I - File
1 - Chrono
OS/IB/-:tjs
Approved For Release 2001/07/12 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000200050046-8