MEETING OF DD/A FREEDOM OF INFORMATION OFFICERS - 18 FEBRUARY 1975

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00823R000100080023-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 2, 2000
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: February 19, 1975
• Content Type: MFR

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19 February 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Meeting of DD/A Freedom of Information
Officers - 18 February 1975
1. Between 0915 and 1015 hours on 18 February 1975,
a meeting of Freedom of Information Officers representing
all DD/A Offices took place in the DD/A Conference Room.
25X1A The meeting was chaired by the Assistant for Coordination,
but Mr. Office of General Counsel, did most of
the talking.
25X1A 2. Mr. _ at the be innin of the meeting distrib-
25X1A uted advance copies of the "handbook" for the
implementation of Freedom of Information Act in the Agency.
3. The main purpose of the meeting was to present a
briefing on the OGC project, being handled by Mr.~ 25X1A
to develop a "listing" of Agency activities which can
properly be identified as relating to intelligence sources
25X1A and methods. Mr. - pointed out that the DCI has
always had the responsibility for the protection of intel-
ligence sources and methods, but that to date no definition
of what constitutes sources and methods has been formalized.
It has now been determined advantageous, in the light of
25X1A the case and the revision of the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act, to have the DCI designate as "sources and methods"
those intelligence activities needing protection with or with-
out security classification. Inherent in the concept is the
need to amend this "listing" from time to time. The idea
is that in the event of litigation of the variety 25X1A
or under FOIA, the predisposition of the DCI compared to a
specific piece of information would represent substantial
support of an Agency position.
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4. All Agency components are being solicited for a
draft listing of their "items" for such a listing. Although
in a paper distributed earlier on the subject a deadline
25X1A of 21 February is mentioned, it was recognized as unreal-
unreal-
istic. Mr. -emphasized, however, that the DD/A wishes
its portion of the first draft to be completed as soon as
possible.
25X1A
5. Since Mr. - expressed his willingness to dis-
cuss the project at an Office level, especially if Office
components were being tasked to compile an overall listing,
I requested him to address the Office of Security staff
meeting on Thursday, 20 February, for this purpose.
25X1A
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-1. Both the National Security Act of 1947 and the CIA Act of 1949
Protection of Agency Intelligence Sources and Methods
Neither Act specifies the method or methods by which this is to be
protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.
provide that the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for
.accomplished.
to deny access. We currently practice such a met~iod by locking: up docu-
they could supplement- the current. methods One method of protection is
are currently in. practice. while- others are. being reviewed to determine. z
There. are a number of methods that can. be used. to protect
intelligence sources and. methods from unauthorized disclosure..'.Some'-w
men.s cont'ainxng sources and methods information.. We also deny access
by our compartmentization techniques and need-to-know rules ..
3. Another method of protection is through the classification
.4. Other methods of protection are, criminal sanctions and contractual
authority. a authority for today's classification system is derived from
mation originally classified by the Agency, does not give the DCI the final-
tection and provides declassification.procedures, which, even for in?or-
specifies, in a general. sense, .what types of information qualifies for pro-
a series of Executive orders issued by the President pursuant to his own-.1.---
constitutional and statutory authorities. The current classification authority
authority as to what will be declassified..
determinations described in the latter paragraphs of this paper will probably
be required. Even if such criminal sanctions are not adopted, however, the
determinations as outlined below will be useful in pro tectin.g sources and
methods..
If such a proposal were adopted by Congress, the sources and methods
revelation of Agency sources and methods by an Agency employee a':crizne.
difficult. - There have been some proposals to make the unauthorized;
of the classified information. Proving intent to injure the United States is
restrictions. Both of these methods have been employed in connection.. with
the classification system... The Espionage Laws make it a criminal act to.
reveal certain classified information.. Unfortunately, these laws are not neces-
sarily directly applicable to an act of unauthorized disclosure of an Agency_
intelligence source or method. Further, these laws require the Government to
prove an intent to injure the United States was associated with the disclosure
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5. Many parts of the Government, including the Agency, require
with their initial employment. Under such agreements, Agency employees
agree not to reveal or publish classified material without authorization from
the Agency. Such agreements have been upheld by the courts as valid and
prospective employees to sign a secrecy agreement prior to or coincident
The Agency's most recent experience in enforcing such an
an injunction -prohibiting his doing that until ' after the Agency had' removed.'
ex-employee Marchetti intended to publish a book 'about the Agency, obtained
..agreement is the "Marchetti Case." There, the Agency, having learned that
the classified materials from the proposed manuscript. Pursuant to the
Disagreeing with that finding, Marchetti filed suit challenging the validity of
and the'Agency found a number of items that we maintained were: classified.
injunction,' Marchetti submitted the completed manuscript prior to publication
the previous finding was proper. Some items were relatively direct. A
the classification.-' The Government then had the burden of proving that
publication. In those cases in which such documented evidence could be
wanted to'publish and find justification for requiring it to be withheld froth
see the evidence of the prior determination, compare it to what Marchetti
The District Court, in examining each Hof the contested items, - could easily
such a manual might have contained the determination that the resolution of a
particular photographic reconnaissance system, is to be classified SECRET
that certain, information should be classified at a specific level; For example,.
manual could be produced which evidenced a previously made determination
introduced, the court upheld the Agency position. In a number of cases,
point is that the' most direct and comprehensible method of protection of
the court ruled against the Agency on'these items. While this ruling has been
just overruled by the Court of Appeals, an improtant point is evident That'
however, such documented prior determinations did not exist. -In generals
intelli gence so.~ces acid methods-will probablyget the wgde. t'support b
While for the moment; pending're-hearing iii the-4District Court,
and/or grant of certiorari by the Supreme Courts the Agency seems"to be =
Executive order." The third is for material specifically exempted from dis
closure by statute. While it has not been litigated, it is reasonable to assume
that the sources and methods provisions of the 1947 and 1949 Acts fall within
meats pursuant to the Act. The first is material classified pursuant to
exemptions which can be the basis for denying 'a request for Agency docu_
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) cases. Under that Act there are nine-'-'.
the scope of this third exemption.
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"on top" of the Marchetti-type situation. However, we face 'a:--m ultitude of
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8. When the Agency is involved in FOIA litigation, as it will most'
such cover arrangements. "
11. The objective of the current undertaking is to definitively list each
uauerzaice to adopt, pursuant to his statutory responsibility, :a defaili:s :Mtin
f
now the subject of the FOIA request is within the scope of his statutory.
to be in the position of showing that a prior determination had been made by
Acts. However, to be able to pursue this route, the Agency should be able
assuredly be, it will be convincing to be able to argue that a request should
be denied because it is for materials containing information which is exempted
from disclosure by the sources and methods provisions of our 1947 and 1949
responsibility.. In otherwords, the DCI should, at the earliest nossih1P data.
.-....~ 416Y1Q w uauerzaxe sucn an adoption, a list of these aspects
:intelligence met}iod$:tha require: protection fronzuxr.authorize!a--dtarinc, arm
o
the warsous~aspects oisatelligence'sourCes a~od the .various aspects- of-_
"the name of any Agency employee, who has served, is serving or may serve.
under cover, the revelation of which might damage the future effectivPr c t%f
a" Agency employees" would be too broad as the Agency openly acknowledges-
tine
as an aspect that requires protection. Similarly, an item such as "the names of
precludes the necessity of having to list the specific name of each Agency agent
. - -2 -1. aiavutu ue uescrioea as -the association of the name of any Agency
must be prepared.
-il
of intelligence sources and each individual aspect of intelligence method at
requires protection is the association of the name with the Aoencv- Ar- a;"_ti.,'
the Agency" as an aspect of intelligence sources that should-be protected would
probably be too broad as the name itself is not what requires protection What
a~.YW; V y+v~aa. a.~t~sa. ,,."a uluivlaual aspects ltopetully can be to some degree
general yet without being so general that they would include aspects that do
_not require proecHon. s an example, the listing of "all names of agents o
scope of the particular aspect. Each Agency office should list all those aspects
within their particular responsibility. Hopefully the first draft of such lists
aspect of intelligence sources and methods in enough detail so as not to include
non-protectable information, yet in enough generality that can protect the full,
can be forthcoming by no later than 21 February.
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10.. The list should consist of an itemization of each individual a ect