OFFICE OF SECURITY CONTRIBUTION TO SOURCES AND METHODS LISTING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00823R000100080020-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 2, 2000
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: March 7, 1975
• Content Type: MF

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional)
Office of Security Contribution
to Sources and Methods Listing
FROM.
25X1 A
EXTENSION
NO.
Policy and Plans Group
5311
DATE
7 March 1975
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
DATE
OFFICER'S
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
INITIALS
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1.
C/PPG
7
7~
2.
DD/P$M
3.
DD/Security
7 975
1 975
4.
5.
6.
7.
OS Registry
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
A Fill 4 1
111 11111
-R-QQ AA
FORM USE
3-62 610 EDITIONS T:T SECRET CONFIDENTIAL USE ONLY ^ UNCLASSIFIED
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Protection of Agency Intelligence Sources and Methods
1. Both the National Security Act of 1947 and the CIA Act of 1949
provide that "the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for
protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure."
Neither Act specifies the method or methods by which this is to be
accomplished.
2. There are a number of methods that can. be used to protect
intelligence sources and methods-from. unauthorized disclosure. Some
are currently in practice while others are being reviewed to determine if
they could supplement the current methods. One method of protection is
to deny access. We currently practice such a method by locking up docu.-
ments containing sources and methods information. We also deny access
by our compartmentization techniques and need-to-know rules.
3. Another method of protection is through the classification
authority. The authority for today's classification system is derived from
a series of Executive orders issued by the President pursuant to his own
constitutional and statutory authorities. The current classification authority
specifies, in a general sense, what types of information qualifies for pro-
tection and provides declassification procedures, which, even for infor-
mation originally classified by the Agency, does not give the DCI the .final
authority as to what will be declassified.
4. Other methods of protection are criminal sanctions and contractual
restrictions. Both of these methods have been employed. in connection. with
the classification system. The Espionage Laws make it a criminal act to
reveal certain classified information. Unfortunately, these laws are not neces-
sarily directly applicable to an act of unauthorized disclosure of an Agency
intelligence source or method. Further, these laws require the Government to
prove an intent to injure the United States was associated with the disclosure
of the classified information. Proving intent to injure the United States is
difficult. There have been some proposals to make the unauthorized .
revelation of Agency sources and methods by an Agency employee a crime
If such a proposal were adopted by Congress, the sources and methods
determinations described in the latter paragraphs of this paper will probably
be required. Even if such criminal sanctions are not adopted however, the
determinations as outlined below will be useful in protecting sources and
methods.
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5. Many parts of the Government, including the Agency, require
prospective employees to sign a secrecy agreement prior to or coincident
with their initial employment. Under such agreements, Agency employees
agree not to reveal or publish classified material without authorization from
the Agency. Such agreements have been upheld by the courts as valid and
enforceable.
6. The Agency's most recent experience in enforcing such an
agreement is the "Marchetti Case." There, the Agency, having learned that
ex-employee Marchetti intended to publish a book about the Agency, obtained
an injunction prohibiting his doing that until after the Agency had removed
the classified materials from the proposed manuscript. Furslaant to the
injunction, Marchetti submitted the completed manuscript prior to publication
and the Agency found a number of items that we maintained were classified.
Disagreeing with that finding, Marchetti filed suit challenging the validity of
the classification. The Government then had the burden of proving that
the previous finding was proper. Some items were relatively direct. A
manual could be produced which evidenced a previously made determination
that certain information should be classified at a specific level. For example,
such a manual might have contained the determination that the resolution of a
particular photographic reconnaissance system is to be classified SECRET.
The District Court, in examining each of the contested items, could easily
see the evidence of the prior determination, compare it to what. Marchetti
wanted to publish and find justification for requiring it to be withheld from
publication. In those cases in which such documented evidence could be
introduced, the court upheld the Agency position. In a number of cases,
however, such documented prior determinations did not exist. In general,
the court ruled against the Agency on these items. While this ruling has been
just overruled by the Court of Appeals, an improtant point is evident.. That
point is that the most direct and comprehensible method of protection of
intelligence sources and methods will probably get the widEst support by
thhe,courts.a
7. While for the moment, pending re-hearing in the District Court
and/or grant of certiorari by the Supreme Court, the Agency seems to be
"on top" of the Marchetti-type situation. However, we face a multitude of
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) cases. Under that Act there are nine
exemptions which can be the basis for denying a request for Agency docu-
ments pursuant to the Act. The first is material classified pursuant to
Executive order. The third is for material specifically exempted from dis-
closure by statute. While it has not been litigated, it is reasonable to assume
that the sources and methods provisions of the 1947 and 1949 Acts fall within
the scope of this third exemption.
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8. When the Agency is involved in FOIA litigation, as it will most
assuredly be, it will be convincing to be able to argue that a request should
be denied because it is for materials containing information which is exempted
from disclosure by the sources and methods provisions of our 1947 and 1949
Acts. However, to be able to pursue this route, the Agency should be able
to be in the position of showing that a prior determination had been made by
the Director that the particular aspect of either a source or method that is
now the subject of the FOIA request is within the scope of his statutory
responsibility.. In otherwords, the DCI should, at the earliest possible date,
undertake to adopt, pursuant to his statutory responsibility, .;a detailed'. list% ngr-
of the various. aspect ~f i tellig nce sources an d -':the various aspects o
intelligence, e4lzvd hat r qw. a protection fro .a unauthorized disclosure?-
s {
In order to be able to undertake such an adoption f. a list of these aspects
10. The list should consist of an itemization of each individual aspect
of intelligence sources and each individual aspect of intelligence methods that
require protection. The individual aspects hopefully can be to some degree
general yet without being so general that they would include aspects that do
not require protection. As an example, the listing of "all names of agents of
the Agency" as an aspect of intelligence sources that should be protected would
probably be too broad as the name itself is not what requires protection. What
requires protection is the association of the name with the Agency. Accordingly,.
the aspect should be described as "the association of the name of any Agency
agent with the Agency." This kind of general description, property limited,.
precludes the necessity of having to list the specific name of each Agency agent
as an aspect that requires protection. Similarly, an item such as "the names of
all Agency employees" would be too broad as the Agency openly acknowledges
the names of some of its employees. A more limited description might be
"the name of any Agency employee, who has served, is serving or may serve.
under cover, the revelation of which might damage the future effectiveness of
such cover arrangements. "
11. The objective of the current undertaking is to definitively list each
aspect of intelligence sources and methods in enough detail so as not to include
non-protectable information, yet in enough generality that can protect the full
scope of the particular aspect. Each Agency office should list all those aspects..
within their particular responsibility. Hopefully the first draft of such lists
can be forthcoming by no later than 21 February.
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26 February 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Security (P&M)
ATTENTION Chief, Policy and Plans Group
SUBJECT Protection of Agency Intelligence
Sources and Methods
REFERENCE Form 610 to DD/PTOS from DD/P&M,
dtd 18 Feb. 75, same subject
1. The PTOS Directorate, with its focus on
physical and technical security, has a composite
security methodology which must be considered, for
purposes of reference exercise, an intelligence metho-
dology requiring protection. In essence, the real
concern lies, of course, not in identifying the com-
ponent parts (left column below) of the composite
methodology, but rather with the specifics of these
component parts, i.e., the modus operandi, equipment
specifications, specific techniques, etc. (right
column below).
2. It is suggested the total PTOS methodology
be dissected as follows with the items in the right
column considered appropriate candidates for method
protection tactics:
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2. Please contact the undersigned for any elaboration
or discussion of the approach taken above.
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Deputy Director o'f Security (PTO
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Security (P&M)
ATTENTION Chief, Policy and Plans Group
SUBJECT Protection of Agency Intelligence
Sources and Methods
1. Reference is made to your request of 18 February
1975 that this Directorate submit a list of intelligence
sources and methods which require protection.
2. A review of the activities of this Directorate
has been conducted and the following intelligence sources
and methods items require protection from unauthorized
disclosure:
T
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3. Please advise if any additional data are desired.
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Deputy Director of Security (PSI)
n
ON Ft
C
E ,1AL
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