RESPONSE TO CINCPAC CABLE, "PREPARING FOR 1984 REVIEW OF THE MILITARY BASES AGREEMENT"

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00551R000100140007-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 22, 2007
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: December 21, 1981
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2007/03/03: CIA-RDP83B00551 R00010014000T-
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Assistant NIO for East Asia
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ie , Southeast Asia Division
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 Approved For Release 2007 Q3/9~. ;,CJA-RDP83B00551 R000100140007-7
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Assistant NIO for East Asia
SUBJECT Response to CINCPAC Cable,
"Preparing for 1984 Review
of the Military Bases Agreement"
1. The CINCPAC assessment regarding the 1984 Review
of the Military Bases Agreement might want to take note of
several political factors likely to influence the negotiations.
Compensation questions will probably dominate Philippine
negotiating strategy, while sovereignty questions will be
less important.
2. Compensation will be the major issue during the
bases negotiations largely because of the country's current
economic woes: high rates of un- and underemployment,
double-digit inflation, and a burgeoning foreign debt.
Imelda Marcos' Ministry of Human Settlements probably sees
ESF or similar funds as an easy source of financing for its
overambitious social development schemes. Money is likely
to be an issue for the military too, as the defense budget
has declined in real terms, while there has been a significant
increase in Communist insurgent activity.
3. The negotiations are likely to be held in an
atmosphere of rising nationalist sentiment, highlighted by
political debates during the scheduled 1984 parliamentary
elections. Left-wing opposition politicians use US-Philippine
relations as a convenient whipping boy for all of Manila's
problems. They claim the bases agreement can only drag the
Philippines into future nuclear conflicts between the super-
powers. The government may use increasing pressure from the
left, especially the Communist insurgency, as a pretext for
demanding more military assistance. Marcos would probably
avoid further exacerbating the domestic political situation
by refusing to extend the bases agreement beyond 1991.
4. Any inclusion of Defense Minister Enrile in security
discussions could result in raising hackles at Malacanang
Palace. His participation might better be broached informally
This entire memo is
classified SECRET
 Approved For Release 2007/03/03: CIA-RDP83B00551 R000100140007-7
with President Marcos before any action is taken. Enrile's
longstanding disagreements with the First Lady are well-known
and quite deep. An increase in his stature could alienate
Imelda and raise the financial demands of her Ministry of
Human Settlements.
Chief
South-east Asia Division
Office of East Asian Analysis
Approved For Release 2007/03/03: CIA-RDP83B00551 R000100140007-7