ANTIGOVERNMENT RESISTANCE IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00551R000100050007-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 11, 2007
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: November 24, 1981
• Content Type: REPORT

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ROOM /N O. BUILDING
FORM NO. 241 REPLACES FORM 36-8
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FES 55 WHICH MAY BE USED.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER
Vietnam is not exempt from the sort of armed, antigovern-
ment resistance activities that bedevil remote rural areas in
every Southeast Asian nation except the city-state of Singapore.
In Vietnam, sporadic acts of violence--assassinations of
official personnel, ambushes of vehicles on upcountry roads,
and bombings of government outposts--are concentrated in the
Central Highlands and the Mekong River Delta. Scattered and
uncoordinated, these resistance operations necessitate increased
security measures, but have little impact upon the stability of the
Communist regime. In fact, passive resistance is by far the
greater problem for Hanoi. 25X1
We lack reliable information on resistance craani7at-_ir
Important
questions concerning the scope of their activities, numbers
ns
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of partisans, and recruiting base remain unanswered. 25X1
Ethnic Animosity
Armed resistance is rooted primarily in the longstanding
racial animosity between Montagnard hilltribes and the dominant
lowland Vietnamese. The Montagnards, who constitute about
4.4 million of a nation of perhaps 54 million, want autonomy
from any government under ethnic Vietnamese control. Non-
Communist collaborators with US forces during the Indochina
war, the Montards remain politically naive and organizationally
fragmented. II 25X1
This rnemorandwn was prepare by the OJ`fie(~ of East Asian Analysis in
response to a request by Representative Donald Bailey. Comments and
queries may be addressed to Chien Southeast Asia Division, Office of
East Asian Analysis, on to
SECRET
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The best known of the Montagnard resistance groups is the
Front for the Liberation of the Central Highlands (DEGA), earlier
known as the United Front for the Liberation of Oppressed
Races (FULRO). Founded in 1958 in opposition to the Diem regime,
the organization was pacified by later Republic of Vietnam
policies, emerging again after 1975 to mount the most active
resistance to the Communist government. Today DEGA claims to
have several thousand personnel operating in small guerr
units in the highland provinces of Dac Lac and Lam Dong. 2X1
Other groups existing outside the mainstream of Vietnamese
society--such as the lioa Hao and Cao Dai religious sects--also
claim active resistance to the regime, as do some Catholics and
disgruntled anti-Communists from the previous government. In
addition, extensive emigre organizations proselytize among
expatriates and lobby foreign governments for political and
material support, but have no discernible impact upon events
inside Vietnam. 25X1
External Support
DEGA and other groups receive a small amount of Chinese
material aid--mostly small arms and ammunition--under Beijing's
policy of supporting any and all resistance to Hanoi. Chinese-
supplied weapons are hand-carried from depots inside Thailand
across northern Kampuchea by resistance representatives escorted
by Pol Pot's Democratic Kampuchean (DK) forces. The logistics
problems presented by this tortuous route are monumental, but
there is no other feasible way to reach the highlands. The
Chinese have tried to foster closer cooperation of DK and DEGA
forces, as well as other nascent resistance movements, but
anti-Vietnamese unity has proved elusive. In addition, China
may be trying to stir up resist it among hilltribes
i
solated in northern Vietnam.
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Passive Resistance
Passive resistance is of far greater concern to the govern-
ment. Noncooperation has thwarted programs aimed at creating
a socialist economy, and. rampant black market trading has had
a widespread corruptive influence among government and party
cadre. Desertions from military service--particularly among
southern draftees--have hampered operations in Kampuchea. 25 1
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Dissatisfaction with the regime's policies does not generally
translate into political action because there is no forum for
effective dissent. A large number of Vietnamese continue, how-
ever, to "vote with their feet" by leaving the country. This
refugee exodus not only is a source of embarrassment for the
government internationally, it deprives the regime of skilled
administrators, technicians, and craftsmen. Essential services
in northern Vietnam, for example, have suffered immeasurably
by the flight of ethnic Chinese who had dominated c ping
and worked the docks in Haiphong harbor. 25X1
Prospects for the Resistance
Armed resistance within Vietnam is unlikely to become more
than a thorn in Hanoi's side. The active resistance organizations
of the Montagnards are critically hampered by logistic problems,
geographic and cultural isolation from the bulk of the population,
and their own disunity. Other groups are small and have a
limited appeal. We see no immediate prospect of any force
galvanizing the resistance into a movement that could cause
serious problems for the government. 25X1
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