STRENGTH AND PROSPECTS OF POL POT S DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA FORCES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00551R000100020002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 27, 2007
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: February 1, 1981
• Content Type: REPORT

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 National Top Secret
Foreign
Assessment
Center
Strength and Prospects of Pol Pot's
Democratic Kampuchea Forces
Top Secret 25X1
e ruary 196 1
Copy 2 3
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National Too Secret
Foreign
Assessment
Center
Strength and Prospects of Pol Pot's
Democratic Kampuchea Forces
Information available as of 1 January 1981
was used in the preparation of this report.
Additional information was obtained, but the
conclusions of the report were not affected.
This assessment was prepared b
of the Eastern Forces Division of the ice of
Strategic Research. Questions and comments are
welcome and should be addressed to the Chief
Eastern Forces Division, OSR, telephon I
This assessment was coordinated with the National
Intelligence Officer for East Asia, the Office of
Political Analysis, and the Office of Geographic and
Societal Research.II
Top Secret
SR 81-10018CX
e ruary 1981
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Top Secret
Strength and Prospects of Pol Pot's
Democratic Kampuchea Forces
Key Judgments We estimate that Pol Pot's Democratic Kampuchea (DK) forces currently
consist of 13 "divisions" totaling from 30,000 to 35,000 troops. This is a
reduction of at least 25,000 from our estimate of the DK main forces at the
time of the Vietnamese invasion in December 1978 but a substantial
increase over our estimates of their strength in late 1979, when desertions, 25X1
casualties, malaria, and malnutrition had decimated their ranks. Our evi-
dence for all such estimates is limited.
Recognizing Vietnam's military superiority, the DK forces have chosen to
operate as guerrillas in units although they have 2
shown the ability to form into larger groups when operationally necessary.
Some guerrillas operate in the Kampuchean interior, but most DK forces are
confined to areas along the Thai-Kampuchean border. 25X1
Because the DK upper ranks-both army and party-are dominated by a
small clique intensely loyal to Pol Pot, the command and control system is
highly effectivel 25X2
5)1
The DK currently have sufficient small arms to conduct effective guerrilla
warfare in Kampuchea, but they lack the firepower needed for set-piece
battles that might challenge the Vietnamese for territorial control.II 25X1
We estimate the manpower base from which the DK might draw replace-
ment combat troops to be between 30,000 and 70,000 men, but because of
disease and injury not all of these would be fit for combat. A continuing
revulsion against Pol Pot has thwarted the DK leaders' efforts to broaden 25X1
their recruiting base within Kampuchea.
25X1
The DK forces are highly disciplined, well organized, amply supplied, and in
relatively good physical condition
Vietnamese militarily.
They have, however, no prospects of defeating the
Top I
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Top Secret
Strength and Prospects of Pol Pot's
Democratic Kampuchea Forces
For a few months the DK tried to maintain a conven-
tional resistance, despite the overwhelming military
superiority of the Vietnamese, but in May 1979 Pol
Pot, recognizing the danger and futility of this effort,
ordered his troops to resume the guerrilla tactics that
had brought their victory over Lon Nol in 1975. By
June the DK mainline units had dispersed into battal-
ion-size units, and by August the increasingly hard-
pressed troops had begun operating in platoon-size
units of 25 to 30 men. Later, the squad (10 to 12 men)
became the basic unit of the DK in its current guerrilla
organization-although in late 1980 some guerrillas
formed into larger groups for operations.
Current Military Situation
Organization . reporting
indicate that most of the DK
resistance forces are currently organized into at least
13 divisions.' These divisions appear-in Chinese
fashion-to have three regiments of three battalions
each, and we assume
that each battalion is in turn made up
of three companies. Manpower levels in all units differ
according to the local availability of soldiers.
' The term division is used in this paper as the DK themselves use it
and is not intended to reflect actual capability. The DK regulars are
a guerrilla force whose designated divisions have only a fraction of
the personnel and equipment usually associated with a conventional
division. In addition to those units included in our estimate
indicates that there are two other DK "divisions" active in
Kampuchea-the "1st" (different from 1st unit listed in table 1) and
the 9th-but neither of these organizations has a real combat
capability. These two divisions possibly have no more than 500 men
each and are involved mainly in intelligence operations and propa-
ganda work. F-1
25X1
DK military organization retains vestiges of the three-
tiered structure that shaped the DK forces before the
Vietnamese invasion. Between 1975 and 1979 the
DK military included: mainline units, constituting a
national force with an external defense role; territorial
or regional troops, providing security at the district
level; and village militia, functioning at the commune
and subdistrict levels. The current three-tiered struc-
ture consists of the 13 divisions, the transport corps, 25X1
and the village militia, whose primary role is to provide 2
security for the transport corps. These distinctions blur
in many cases, as when village militia units are inte-
grated into new battalions of guerrillas or are pressed
into service to carry food and ammunition supplies.
25X12
The DK leaders seem to be trying to rebuild a force 2
that is even more closely related to the preinvasion 2
structure. In August 1980 the DK claimed to have 25X1
formed two 800-man mobile strike units, using troops
drawn from the 13 divisions. Such strike units would
constitute a national force, whereas the divisions would
assume the role of regional troops.0 25X1
25X1
Strength and Disposition. Although our evidence is
limited, we currently estimate that DK regular forces
total between 30,000 and 35,000 full-time troops (see
table 1) dedicated to guerrilla resistance against the
Vietnamese occupiers. This is at least 25,000 less than
25X1
25X1
1 1 25X1
 920th
801st
912th
320th
519th
612th
616th
415th
405th
482nd
1st
2n
3rd
Total
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1,000
1,300
2,000
2,800
2,400
1,800
3,400
4,000
2,000
3,000
our estimate of the fighting strength of DK main forces
at the time of the Vietnamese invasion in December
1978 but is almost double our estimate of their
strength in late 1979, when they were decimated by
desertions, casualties, malaria, and malnutrition
The DK also have guerrillas who are active in the
Kampuchean interior and seem to be independent of
the 13 units listed in table 1. Although the total
number of such guerrillas is not known, we do not
believe their level of activity warrants an appreciable
increase in our estimate of overall DK strengtha
The majority of the DK forces are in areas along the
Thai-Kampuchean border. Neither the 13 divisions,
the other DK troops, nor the DK civilians are in what
could be considered secure or liberated zones, for there
are no sizable areas in Kampuchea that are safe from
Vietnamese operations. Nonetheless, the DK have
been able to establish bases, grow food, and produce
primitive weapons in several areas inside Kampuchea
25
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tubers, and rice-but too little for their needs. Since
early 1980 the DK have received a monthly average of
some 2,400 tons of rice, 125 tons of fish, 96 tons of oil,
and 55 tons of beans. UNICEF and Red Cross rep-
resentatives provide some of these supplies to DK
civilians concentrated near the Thai villages of Ban
Thap Phrik, Ban Nong Pru, and Phnom Chat. The
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within 50 kilometers of the border. Some units have
been forced to move b ive Vietnamese swee
operations, but others
have successfully resisted even the most intense
Vietnamese pressure.
Arms and Equipment. DK forces currently have suffi-
cient small arms to conduct an effective guerrilla war-
fare campaign against Vietnamese military forces in
Kampuchea almost indefinitely. Since January 1979
China has provided the DK with almost 6,000 tons of
military supplies, including small arms, rockets, anti-
tank and antipersonnel mines, mortars, and recoilless
rifles. Also included have been medicines and surgical
equipment, uniforms, radios, and bicycles. The PRC
has furnished a considerable amount of munitions, but
the DK stocks appear to be too scanty to support
operations for more than a few months without re-
supply
The DK have such crew-served weapons as 82-mm
mortars and 75-mm recoilless rifles, but because
they lost most of their heavier weaponry during the
initial Vietnamese invasion they lack the firepower
needed for set-piece battles that mi ht challenge the
Vietnamese for territorial control.
Pol Pot's forces have supplemented their limited-
range, small-caliber arms with various forms of primi-
tive weapons and have used tactics designed to
heighten their effectiveness. Punji stakes, snares, and
booby traps have served as deadly adjuncts to DK
mines, ambushes, and mortar attacks. These weapons
and tactics have played an important role in reducing
Vietnamese morale and willingness to fight.
Logistics Support. The DK-military and civilians
alike-currently depend almost completely on external
support. Arms and military supplies come from the
Chinese, but food-the factor most critical to the
survival of the resistance forces-comes primarily
from the stocks of the United Nations World Food
Program. The DK also grow some foodstuffs-maize,
25X1
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ret
25X1
2bX1
0
Command and Control. One of the most impressive
features of the DK resistance is the maintenance of an
effective command and control system. Even when the
DK had serious problems during the initial months of
the Vietnamese invasion, their organization retained
cohesion.
The DK have been successful at command and control
because their upper ranks are dominated by a small
clique intensely loyal to Pol Pot. The members of the
Standing Committee of the Central Committee of the
Kampuchean Communist Party also hold powerful
positions in the army (the one exception is leng Sary).
For example, Pol Pot, who had been premier, still
serves as secretary general of the Standing Committee
and as commander in chief of the army. Son Sen,
Kampuchea's Defense Minister during 1975-79 and
still the DK defense minister, concurrently commands
the DK Eastern Military Region 2 and is secretary
general of the Supreme Committee of the National
Army. Finally, Ta Mok,3 Son Sen's deputy com-
mander, reportedly is the DK chief of the general staff
and vice chairman of the Supreme Committee of the
National Army.
'The DK have divided their forces in Kampuchea into Eastern and
Western Military Regions. The Eastern Military Region consists of
all provinces north of the Tonle Sap and Mekong River, with the
exception of Battambang Province. The Western Militar Re ion,
commanded by Pol Pot, consists of all other rovincesi
' "Ta" is a term of respect meaning "elder.'
5X1
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2,
2,
5X1
25X1
Recruitment Base. Information on DK recruitment is
extremely limited, but our calculations indicate that
the manpower base from which the DK could reason-
ably expect to draw replacement combat troops num-
bers between 30,000 and 70,000. We developed this
range by applying likely high and low attrition rates
against those Khmer who probably have remained
loyal to the Pol Pot regime since the Vietnamese inva-
sion (see table 2, pages 8 and 9).F-1 25X1
Over the long term, continuing attrition is certain to
strain the DK recruitment base. We lack the informa-
tion to calculate DK losses accurately, but in Novem-
ber 1980 leng Sary revealed that the forces were losing
50 men per day. leng Sary did not indicate for what
length of time the DK had been sustaining these losses,
nor did he differentiate between killed and wounded or
between combat casualties and losses to disease. If the
DK had lost 50 men per day over the whole 20-week25X1
wet season in 1980, the ranks would have been depleted
by about 7,000 fighters. The DK were avoiding direct
combat during that period, and we therefore judge that
most of the losses to which leng Sary admitted prob-
ably represent the sick and wounded, rather than
killed. Increased combat would raise the number of
25X1
25X1
I 25X1
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let
DK casualties and deplete DK fighting strength more
seriously.^
It is also important to note that some of the men in our
statistically derived manpower base of 30,000 to
70,000 would be incapable of playing a combat role in
the DK. The serious consequences of malnutrition
throughout most of 1979, combined with the resur-
gence of infectious diseases-specifically malaria,
dysentery, and respiratory tuberculosis-have reduced
the number of physically fit Khmer males available for
combat. In addition, the lack of a medical support
structure for the DK units would prevent many injured
men from returning quickly to duty.II
Women theoretically could play an important role in
sustaining the DK resistance. As shown in table 2, the
number of potential combatants for the DK would
more than double if the DK were to mobilize women.
Khmer women, moreover, have a strong fighting
spirit
sumed the role of DK premier in place of party strong-
man Pot Pot-whose very name inspires hatred and 25X1
revulsion in the general Khmer populace. (The DK
have been trying especially hard to forge military ties
with Son Sann's anti-Communist Khmer Serai
resistance forces.) 25X1
More recently, Khieu Samphan and other DK leaders
have embarked on a pointed, though still largely un-
successful, public relations campaign to refurbish the
DK image. They now disavow Communism in their
efforts to unite Kampucheans in an anti-Vietnamese
crusade. They also claim that the mass killings of 25X1
1975-79 were actually the work of Hanoi's agents and,
although admitting that they made some errors before
being ousted, they contend that these were simply the
result of inexperience and will not be repeated.
Although the DK further claim that they have no
intention of bringing back the same regime that had
been in power, Pot Pot's power is undiminished. Con-
sequently, the DK are not achieving the wide popular
support for which they had hoped, either in
IT iormat a roe or
women is unlikely, However. Only a small number of
women have heretofore served as combatants, and
most have fulfilled more traditional roles-helping the
resistance by transporting food and ammunition and
cultivating crops to supplement rice supplies.
The DK probably will have little success in recruiting
non-Communist Khmer. Some Kampucheans who had
not been associated with the DK might have come
under DK control while fleeing before advancing
Vietnamese forces, but their numbers are probably not
significant. We also believe that, with the horrors of
the Pot Pot regime still fresh in the minds of those
who suffered under it, few of the surviving Khmer
would be attracted to the DK. The DK's limited
recruiting success has generally occurred in Khmer
Rouge concentrations.
Recognizing that their appeal was limited, the DK
have taken several cosmetic measures to improve their
image and broaden their base of support. In December
1979 they unveiled a "Patriotic and Democratic Front
of the Great National Union of Kampuchea," which
sought to unite all anti-Vietnamese Khmer behind a
banner of Khmer nationalism. That same month,
Khieu Samphan, the Khmer Rouge ideologue, as-
Kampuchea or abroad.
Strategy and Tactics. The statements of Pot Pot and
other DK leaders make it clear that they model their
25X12
actions on the blueprint for protracted war found in the
writings of Mao Zedong. To Mao there were three 25X1
stages in a successful resistance against an invading
force: a period of strategic offense and defense, a
period of strategic stalemate, and a counteroffensive.
The DK have adapted this framework to their own
long-term struggle against the Vietnamese and posit
the following three stages:
? Deep Vietnamese invasion that necessitates DK
defensive rear-guard actions supplemented by guer-
rilla warfare and static defense.
? A Vietnamese defensive posture in the cities and
along main lines of communication after the termi-
nal points in the offensive have been reached. The
DK engage Vietnamese troops along the farthest
points of the Vietnamese advance but switch a major
part of their force to the enemy's rear, where they
base themselves in areas not occupied by the enemy
and wage extensive guerrilla warfare.
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Secret
Estimated Recruiting Base for the DK Mainline Forces a
Date Event and Estimated
Demographic Impact
December 1978 Eve of Vietnamese invasion
January-June 1979 Vietnamese defeated DK and occupied main
towns and lines of communication in Kampuchea.
DK-controlled areas experienced general depriva-
tion and strict controls. Physical security for
civilians was poor as opposing forces skirmished.
Food shortages began.
DK resumed fighting. Meager harvest led to
widespread famine. Malaria, dysentery, and res-
piratory tuberculosis became epidemic.
Estimated Attrition
(Percent)
Provincial Troops
Low
High
Low
High
7,200 b
10,800 b
lo f
15 f
6,120
9,720
January-November 1980 International relief effort (begun in October 1979) 2 h 4 h 5,410 9,140
helped to alleviate conditions. DK avoided con-
frontation with Vietnamese to preserve forces.
Attrition due to disease and combat began to
decline.
a Most numbers are rounded to three significant figures. The
individuals may be in Kampuchea or in Thailand.
b In 1978 each of the approximately 120 districts in Kampuchea had
one militia company of 60 to 90 men. The 7,200 and 10,800 figures
are the result of simple multiplication.
By 1978 each commune and subdistrict had one or two 12-man
organized DK units. We postulate there were between 1,000 and
2,000 communes in Kampuchea at that time.
d For control and administration, the DK relied on five-man
committees, plus their staffs, at the region and sector levels and
e We have calculated the families of provincial troops, guerrillas, and
cadre members by using a factor of four, representing a wife and
three children. We have not calculated family members for the DK
mainline troops; most of them were in their teens or early twenties,
and therefore very few were heads of households.
f The 10- and 15-percent attrition rates represent our best estimate
of DK losses for the period.
s The 4-percent attrition rate was used in a recent CIA research
three- to five-man committees at the district and commune levels. tion. he 8-percent rate is based on our judgment that the DK
We estimate that DK cadre members nationwide numbered at least
5,000 in December 1978.
? A counteroffensive, the success of which depends on
the accumulated strength of the DK, on international
support, and on changes within Vietnam that would
reduce the Vietnamese war-waging capability.
According to Mao, a change in the relative strength of
the belligerents should occur during each of the above
stages. Thus, the DK see the Vietnamese as initially
strong but becoming weakened by casualties, material
attrition, deteriorating troop morale, economic strains
and discontent at home, and continued world con-
demnation. The DK see themselves overmatched at
first, but gaining strength as they mobilize the Khmer
people, score successes in guerrilla warfare, and ac-
quire increased international support.
Tot) ecret
Much of the DK strategy-adopting united-front
tactics, avoiding major confrontation with the Viet-
namese, and striving for international backing to retain
their United Nations seat-has been designed to bring
about this change in strength. Its flaws lie in the
antipathy of the Khmer people to the DK movement
and in the fact that, despite the effect of the predicted
strains of war and occupation, the Vietnamese show no
signs of weakening in their resolve to maintain their
hold on Kampuchea
Tactically, the DK continue to wage a classic guerrilla
war, employing what they call their "three basic com-
bat tactics":
25XI5
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military and civilians and other DK-controlled Khmer probably
lived under much harsher conditions than the bulk of the Khmer
population.
h These attrition rates have been devised to reflect continued DK
casualties and losses from disease, especially malaria.
We estimate that children constitute approximately 20 percent of
the total population under DK control.
i Field reporting suggests that women constitute as much as 75
percent of the current adult Kampuchean population. We have used
this factor in deriving the 83,400 figure.
? To interdict communication and transportation lines.
? To expand the production and use of all types of
primitive weapons.
? To stage guerrilla raids that result in continuing
Vietnamese casualties.
By these means the DK hoped to inflict some 50,000
casualties on the Vietnamese during the 1980 rainy
season. Although information on Vietnamese battle
casualties is sparse, it is clear that the DK failed to
inflict such high losses
reports suggest that the Vietnamese suffered as many
as 200 combat deaths per week, for a total of 4,000
during the 20-week wet season. Even if a number of
wounded are added, the DK probably fell well short of
their 50,000 goal
Top
et
28,000
35,000 Less children under age of 10 i
111,000
138,000
83,400i
69,000k Less women
k This figure is based on the possibility that women make up onl 25X1
about 50 percent of the surviving recruitment base population
This percentage is not likely to apply
Prospects
At present, the DK-military and civilians-remain a
sizable, highly disciplined organization that, if pro-
vided with continued military assistance from the Chi-
25X1
nes Ican continue to
oppose the Vietnamese in Kampuchea. Pol Pot and his
troops have no prospect, however, for defeating the
Vietnamese militarily. Moreover, over the long term,
unless the DK can expand their recruitment base, they
will face a growing problem of maintaining their mili-
tary strength as attrition from combat casualties and 25X1
disease erodes their numbers.II 25X1
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