PAKISTAN: THE SUCCESSION PROBLEM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00232R000100070006-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 14, 2007
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: April 1, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
Directorate of
_ _
Intelligence
Pakistan: The
Succession Problem
MASTER Fill COPY
C~ ~~T GIVE OUT
0~ MARK QN
Secret
NESA 82-10124
Aprff 19&S L
COPY ~ ~ V
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This paper was coordinated with the Directorate of
Operations and with the National Intelligence
Council.
Secret
NESA 82-10124
April 1982
Directorate of
Intelligence
Pakistan: The
Succession Problem
Information available as ol1 S March 1982
has been used in the preparation o1'this report.
This assessment was prepared by~
of the Office of Near East-South Asia
na ysis. omments and queries are welcome and
may be directed to the Chief, South Asia Division,
NESA,
2.
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Pakistan: The
Succession Problem
0
Key Judgments President Zia-ul-Haq faces no immediate threat to his rule, but his sudden
death or assassination would be followed in most foreseeable circumstances
by the Army's choice of his successor. An acting president-probably the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court-would be appointed quickly, while
senior officers in the General Headquarters, martial law secretariat, the
corps commands, and provincial martial law administrations decide on a
person to take over the posts that are Zia's real bases of power: Chief of the
Army Staff and Chief Martial Law Administrator.
A military successor to Zia probably would maintain the present relation-
ship with the United States and, unless Islamabad believed Washington's
commitment to Pakistan was transitory, would be unlikely to adopt a more
flexible position toward the Soviets in Afghanistan.
In time the new government might deemphasize Islamization, seek a
rapprochement with the opposition parties, and agree to general elections
on terms the Army could accept. The Army would ensure, however, that
the foreign policies adopted by a civilian government would be consistent
with the Army's needs.
In the event of massive and sustained popular unrest, the Army probably
would replace Zia fairly quickly with a general who could negotiate a
political settlement with moderate leaders. Such a government would be
likely to continue the present relationship with the United States but would
be reluctant to improve ties further.
It is also possible-although less likely-that a "populist general" would
emerge and seek to co-opt the broad constituency of the Pakistan People's
Party by promoting a program of radical reform. In such an event the new
regime probably would weaken Pakistan's ties with the United States.
iii Secret
NESA 82-10124
April 1982
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A revolutionary regime-either of the left or Islamic right-is unlikely in
the near future. The radical, Bhutto-led wing of the Pakistan People's
Party would have the best-albeit tenuous-opportunity to form a leftist
government. Such a regime would deemphasize ties with the United States
in favor of closer relations with both Moscow and New Delhi. A rightist,
Islamic fundamentalist regime would turn inward and attempt to eliminate
Western cultural influences, but it probably would not halt the US-
Pakistan arms relationship.
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Pakistan: The
Succession Problem
0
The Setting
President Zia-ul-Haq faces no immediate threats to
his rule. Although he does not dominate the political
landscape as did Bhutto or Ayub and lacks a political
base outside the Army, he is the key figure in
Pakistan. Zia's extensive authority stems from the
consolidation of his power in three roles-as Chief of
the Army Staff, Chief Martial Law Administrator,
and President. He rules through a negative consen-
sus-most Pakistanis dislike him but see no better
alternative-which is bolstered by his ability to keep
domestic opponents off balance, the economy in good
condition, and the Soviet presence in Afghanistan
highlighted as a constant threat to the country's
security.)
Like any leader, however, President Zia could sud-
denly disappear from the political scene through
assassination or illness or be forced to resign if the
Army believed he was incapable of governing the
country. The Army might remove him if student riots,
sectarian disturbances, or the emergence of a mass
opposition movement threatened a widespread break-
down of law and order. In his nearly five years in
power, Zia has neither built a strong personal con-
stituency nor overcome the widespread sense in Paki-
stan that his opponents, given the right combination
of issues and leadership, would rapidly threaten his
regime and force a transition to civilian rule
Zia attempted in December 1981 to bridge the gap
between the martial law regime and the people by
creating the Federal Advisory Council, an appointed
body of middle-level politicians with no formal pow-
ers. Fear of the consequences of relaxing political
restrictions probably will restrain Zia from giving the
Council genuine power voluntarily, but if the Army
continues to press him to return the country to civilian
rule, the Council could provide the basis for that
transition.
President, Chief Martial Law Administrator, Army
Chief of Staff Zia, S8, was born in what is now
Indian Punjab. f(fter some enlisted service, he was
commissioned in the armored corps in 1945. He has
served in Jordan and attended two military courses in
the United States. He was promoted to lieutenant
general in 1975 and to full general and Chief of the
Army Staff a year later. He became Chief Martial
Law Administrator when he deposed Prime Minister
Zu~kar Ali Bhutto in July 1977. Zia appointed
himself'President when his predecessor resigned vol-
untarily in 1978. Some have attributed his attempts
to institute Islamic reforms to the strong religious
inl7uence of his father, a minor government oJ~cial
during the British Raj. Zia's military service has not
been outstanding, but he has played Army politics
shrewdly. He holds the loyalty of the Army simply
because he is its "Chief, "and he has gained respect
for his adroit handling of threats to the country s
integrity. Recently, however, Zia has come under
increasing pressure from within the Army to end
martial law and return the country to civilian rule.
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The Army as the Key Interest Group
The Army holds the key to succession. Its institutional
integrity and discipline will guarantee a fairly smooth
transition, barring massive civil disturbances.
The most important power center within the Army
Zia's relaxation of press
censorship in January led to a flurry of political
activity that culminated in mass arrests in early
March. Zia postponed the second meeting of the
Federal Advisory Council and told the nation that it
was not ready for elections.
Zia can now claim that major changes are inadvisable
while the country is unstable, but pressure from the
Army to accommodate to olitical reality probably
will continue.
will be the General Headquarters, which is headed in
Zia's absence by Gen. Sawar Khan, Army Vice Chief
of Staff, and the seven corps commanders, all lieuten-
ant generals. The corps commanders near the cap-
ital-X Corps at Rawalpindi and I Corps at
Mangla-might have a relatively larger role in influ-
encing the succession. The IV Corps commander at
Lahore-astride the main battle front on the Indian
border and guardian of the country's premier political
and cultural center-also will have an influential
voice.)
After the General Headquarters in importance will be
the martial law secretariat, a secondary power center
that controls the day-to-day operations of the govern-
ment. Its military staff, under the direction of Lt.
Gen. K. M. Arif, oversees the vast machinery of civil
government. Arif probably would use his influence
either to improve his own prospects or provide what
could be decisive support to another candidate.C
The provincial governors may have an important,
though indirect, role in determining the succession.
The governors, who also serve as martial law adminis-
trators, probably would have a modest role if Zia
replaces them with civilians. With the exception of
Rahimuddin in Baluchistan, however, each is now a
lieutenant general of considerably more experience
and seniority than any of the more recently appointed
corps commanders-partly a deliberate move by Zia
to keep potential rivals from directly commanding
troops. Respect for the governors' military seniority
and for their newly demonstrated grasp of regional
issues and the workings of government means they
will be active in brokering the selection of Zia's
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Governor of Punjab. Jilani, 58, is the senior serving
lieutenant general in the Army. A Punjabi, Jilani was
commissioned in the infantry in 1945. He has held
several top command and staff assignments and
served as Director General of the Interservices Intelli-
gence Directorate from 1971 to 1977. Governor of
Pakistan's most populous province, Jilani is an ex-
tremely able and sophisticated power broker who is
unafraid to put his strong views to Zia. Although he
could gain a cabinet appointment ij'Zia decides to
reshuffle his government, the recent arrest of the
Governor's military secretary for smuggling could-
if the scandal touches Jilani personally finish his
career.
successor. Further, each of them-Jilani in Punjab,
Abbasi in Sind, and Fazle Haq in the North-West
Frontier-is a potential alternative to a successor
from General Headquarters, particularly if backed by
one or more cor s commanders or the martial law
secretariat.
Governor of Sind. Abbasi is son of the Nawab of
Bahawalpur, ruler of the most important princely
state incorporated into Pakistan. Abbasi graduated
first in his class at the Pakistan Military Academy
and is regarded as a brilliant officer. He was commis-
sioned as an artillery officer, has served as Chief of
the General Stafj; and was Commander of V Corps.
Abbasi has administered the restless Sind Province
with admirable political skill. He aspires to be Chief
of the Army Staff but is not seen as afront-runner for
the job.
Other Interest Groups
Although the Army is likely to be the principal arbiter
of power, it will be difficult for anyone to govern the
country without the cooperation of the civil servants
who run the country on a day-to-day basis. Zia's
successor will inherit the extensive civilian bureaucra-
cy that has been the bedrock of government in
Pakistan since long before independence. The federal
system, though battered, has survived successive mar-
tial law regimes.
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the elite will exercise influence behind the scenes
through linkages based on money, land, old school
ties, clan, tribe, and family. Retired generals now in
business or public corporations will m
Governor of the North-West Frontier Province. Haq,
53, was commissioned in the Pakistan Army in 1948
and is a native of the province he governs. He spent
much ojhis career in the armored corps but com-
manded an irEfantry brigade during the Baluchistan
insurgency of 1974-77. He graduated Irom the ad-
vanced armor course at Fort Knox, Kentucky, in
1956 and is proud of having competed well against
Americans during war games there. Haq is an able
mix of soldier, administrator, and politician and is
regarded as one of the best governors the NWFP has
had. He is alorceful and colorful personality and
would have little di1~culty developing a strong politi-
cal following in his home province, t/'not in Pakistan
as a whole.
Other interest groups are peripheral, and their roles
are less easily identifiable, although both the Navy
and Air Force high commands would be publicly
associated with any succession decision reached by the
Army. A relatively small elite, comprising the mili-
tary, the civil bureaucracy, the police, judiciary,
landed gentry, and urban industrial interests, domi-
nates Pakistani society. We expect that members of
heard as they have in past successions.
It is unlikely that any political figure or member of
the intelligentsia will be directly involved while the
Army controls the succession. Still, the Army would
consult representatives of the Islamic right-the
Jama'at-i-Islami party in particular-to ensure that
the religious parties and their volatile student support-
ers are not offended by the result.
The Succession
Whether Zia dies suddenly or is overthrown by a mass
uprising, an Army general probably will succeed him.
The process of selecting Zia's successor, however,
depends on how he departs the scene. Were he to die
unexpectedly, the succession probably would be close-
ly held within the Army establishment. An uprising
would force his successor to negotiate a political
settlement with opposition leaders.
Zia so far has kept the question of succession vague
by dividing his authority among several officials when
he leaves the country. The succession issue gained
some prominence a year ago when Zia promulgated
the Provisional Constitutional Order, which provided
for two vice presidents-the senior being designated
the successor to the president. Zia has filled neither
position, although he may be considering such ap-
pointments as part of his plan to move eventually
toward a civilian regime.
Zia will approach civilianization and the succession
warily because both involve delicate issues of promo-
tion and retirement. As Chief of the Army Staff, Zia
has played Army politics shrewdly, retiring or side-
tracking several senior officers who opposed his poli-
cies and filling their positions with supporters. None-
theless, Zia has never dominated the Army as
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President-and Field Marshal-Ayub Khan did in
the 1960s. Zia depends on senior officers in the
General Headquarters, the corps commands, the mar-
tial law secretariat, and the provincial governorships
to undergird his regime.)
These groups, together with influential cabinet mem-
bers like the Finance Minister and the Foreign Minis-
ter, meet monthly in Rawalpindi and constitute the
real policymaking council of the regime. Although
Foreign Minister Agha Shahi resigned in February
1982, his successor Yaqub Khan-a retired general
with 10 years' ambassadorial experience-probably
will command at least as much influence on policy.
The military will view Yaqub more favorably than the
wily civil servant Shahi, whom many generals dis-
trusted.
Zia's extended term as Chief of the Army Staff was
supposed to expire in March, but the recent domestic
unrest may have given him the leverage to reappoint
himself quietly or at least to continue in office until
the agitation eases. An extension of his term almost
certainly will meet opposition from the Army, which
has complained before of the disruption in the normal
promotion cycle-a frequent occurrence since Zia
took power.
Governor of Baluchistan and Commander of II
Corps. Rahimuddin, 56, is a member of one of the
most prominent Muslim families that moved from
India to Pakistan in 1947. An uncle who remained
behind became President of India. Commissioned in
the infantry in 1948, he received training in the
United States in the mid-1960s. Before his promotion
to lieutenant general in 1978, he was Chiejof the
General Stc~1j He is loyal to Zia, who is a personal
friend and a relative by marriage, and is Zia's
personal choice to be the next Chief ojthe Army
Staff. He is regarded as a capable oJ~cer by his
colleagues, but an attempt to make him Chief of the
Army Staff could run into charges of nepotism.
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Vice Chief of the Army Stctf,1: Sawar, 57, is a Punjabi
and longtime associate of Zia. He served as Governor
of Punjab and Commander of IV Corps at Lahore
from 1978 until he replaced Iqbal as Deputy Army
Chief in April 1980. As Deputy Chiej; Sawar is the
second most powerful figure in the Army but is
regarded as politically unambitious and loyal to Zia.
Though not an unusually gifted officer, Sawar has a
reputation as a thoroughly capable soldier. He has
largely stayed out of the limelight and concentrates
on the day-to-day running of the Army. Recently,
however, rumors have circulated of his involvement
in corrupt activities.
Zia's second choice probably would be Gen. Sawar
Khan, an apolitical officer and Zia supporter. A corps
commander such as Lt. Gen. S. F. S. Khan Lodhi,
Commander of IV Corps at Lahore, is also
plausible-this position has been the traditional
springboard to the position of Army Chief of Staff. A
darkhorse candidate is Lt. Gen. K. M. Arif, who runs
the federal bureaucracy through the martial law
secretariat, where he serves as chief of staff to Zia in
the Tatter's role as Chief Martial Law Administrator.
Arif is regarded as the most skilled bureaucratic
player in Islamabad. He wants a corps command, and
he recently tried unsuccessfully to resign as Zia's
chief of staff. He has also supported negotiations
between the martial law administration and the oppo-
sition political parties.
If the vice presidency remains vacant, the succession
process will be uncertain. In the wake of Zia's sudden
removal, a collegium of senior Army officers probably
would quickly appoint an acting president in order to
maintain constitutional continuity. A likely candidate
would be the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.
Following such an appointment, the succession to
Zia's other two positions-Army Chief of Staff and
Chief Martial Law Administrator-would be worked
out within the Army and probably would go to the
same general
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Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee.
Igbal, a SS-year-old Punjabi, is the son of a noncom-
missioned officer and has spent his entire life in the
military. He was commissioned in 1946, has been
director of Army intelligence, and served in the
Army s senior staff post. He was promoted to lieuten-
ant general in 1976 and given command of IV Corps
at Lahore. In 1977 his reluctance to use force against
anti-Bhutto demonstrators in this politically crucial
city was an important factor in bringing down the
Bhutto regime. Iqbal was made Vice Chief of the
Army Staff in 1978, but disagreements with Zia on a
number of issues led the President to transfer him in
1980 to the more prestigious but less powerful post as
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee.
Iqbal is widely admired in the Army.
In either scenario there might be an initial period of
power sharing. Only General Iqbal has enough sup-
port in the Army to consolidate his power and emer e
rapidly as more than an interim successor.
A Radical Alternative
Politics in Pakistan will continue to be characterized
by long periods of relative stability, broken by short
periods of mass protest which, as in the past, probably
will result in abrupt changes of government. President
Ayub Khan in 1969 and Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali
Bhutto in 1977 were both removed by the Army after
intense political movements of four to five months'
duration. The sudden emergence of a mass movement
against Zia or of a conservative military successor is
always a possibility, although for now external threats
and periodic crackdowns have preserved Zia's posi-
tion.
The ideological left in Pakistan is small and sharply
fragmented and by itself has no chance of gaining
power. It could acquire influence only by attaching
itself to a more populist movement like the radical
wing of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP). Most
Pakistanis are conservative, respect authority, and
accept basic social change only if they believe it is
consistent with Islam
The radical wing of the PPP, led by Bhutto's widow
and daughter, is the group most capable of mounting
a mass opposition movement from the left, but its
problems of poor organization, public apathy, and
ineffective leadership show little prospect for change.
The PPP has also been damaged by the activities of
the Bhutto sons; the eldest, Murtaza, leads the Kabul-
based Al Zulfikar terrorist group. Nevertheless, the
Bhutto wing of the party retains the support of many
poor Pakistanis and could reemerge as a contender for
power if there is an economic downturn that brings 25
people into the streets or if Zia otherwise blunders
badly.)
The Islamic right in Pakistan is a growing force but,
like the left, is weakened by its inability to coalesce
around a single leader. The religious parties' effective 25
student organization could mount strong opposition to 25
a government it opposed, but theological splits and
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rivalries frustrate unity efforts. Most Pakistanis are
Sunni Muslims and, as such, are less susceptible to
the inflammatory rhetoric characteristic of Shia Is-
lam. Nonetheless, the Islamic right played a major
role in destabilizing the Bhutto regime, particularly in
the urban areas. The combination of social discontent
and clerical agitation occasionally has been explosive
in Pakistan. Some influential elements of the clergy
are becoming disillusioned with the slow pace of Zia's
Islamization program and could offer the President
growing opposition.
Implications for the United States
Pakistan's present foreign policy has broad support in
the Army and the elite and probably would not be
abruptly changed by a military successor to Zia. Over
time Islamabad might modify its policies toward the
United States and toward the Soviets in Afghanistan,
but such shifts may occur even if Zia remains in
control.
relationship against its view that, historically, the
United States has been unreliable. Pakistan's willing-
ness to further improve relations with Washington
will depend on its judgment .of the durability of the
US commitment to assist Pakistan in resisting Soviet
pressures. If the Army becomes dissatisfied with the
United States, the ouster of a leader committed to
improving ties with Washington would allow his
successor to reevaluate and ossibly downgrade the
relationship.
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Although less likely, the emergence of a "populist
general" should not be ruled out, particularly if mass
protest topples the present regime. Such afigure-
provided he had charismatic qualities-might succeed
in attracting the PPP rank and file by a program of
radical social reform and a neutralist or leftist foreign
policy. These policies would find support among a
section of the intelligentsia and among some junior
Army officers
Pakistan is reserving its long-term policy options, but
any changes toward the United States in the event of
a military succession probably would follow a percep-
tion that Washington had failed to support Islama-
bad. Pakistan will continue to cautiously evaluate the
A radical regime in Pakistan-right or left-would
attempt to alter significantly Zia's foreign policy.
Statements of PPP leaders indicate that at least the
party's radical wing would move to downgrade rela-
tions with the United States, accept the reality of
Indian hegemony in South Asia, and attempt to
weaken Pakistan's Army. The PPP itself probably
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would recognize the Soviet-backed regime in Kabul,
look to Moscow for substantial economic and military
aid, and put pressure on the Afghan refugees to return
home-an extremely delicate and probably impracti-
cal task.
A regime of the Islamic right would remain commit-
ted to opposing the Soviets in Afghanistan and to
resisting New Delhi's regional ambitions. It would
assume an even stronger identity with the Muslim
world-particularly Saudi Arabia and the Gulf-and
probably would deemphasize relations with the Unit-
ed States, though not to the point of forfeiting US
arms and economic aid. There is a significant strain of
anti-Westernism among Pakistani clerics, who see
Western society as materialistic and morally bank-
rupt. They would seek to limit Western cultural
influences, but they are pragmatic enough to realize
that only the United States has sufficient economic
and military power to counter Soviet ambitions in the
area.
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