IRAQ: THE USES OF TERROR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00232R000100040005-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 30, 2011
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: February 1, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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Intelligence
Iraq:
The Uses of Terror
STAT
TOp S cret-
February 1982
Copy 228
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Directorate of Top Secret
Intelligence
Iraq:
The Uses of Terro~
Information available as of 31 January 1982
has been used in the preparation of this report.
STAT
Office of Near East-South Asia Analysis.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Persian Gulf Division,
This assessment was prepared byl
NESA
the National Intelligence Officer for Near East
and South Asia, and the Directorate of Operations
Top Secret
NESA 82-10057C
STAT
STAT
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The Uses of Terror I 25X1
Iraq:
Key Judgments Iraq continues to use terrorism as an instrument of national policy.' It has,
however, altered its targets to reflect changing national priorities and
goals, and it relies more than earlier on its own nationals to conduct
terrorist operations. Its principal targets now are Iranians and domestic
opponents who are frequently attacked abroad. Nonetheless, links to anti-
Israeli Palestinian factions and other groups have not been severed. We
believe Iraq will sponsor their activities when the goals are mutual and the
risk to its present national policy needs are minimal.
Iraq's more cooperative attitude toward Arab leaders and especially toward
those in the Persian Gulf is born of a coincidence of President Saddam
Hussein's desire to increase Iraq's regional power and international
influence and Iraq's need for friends and financial aid because of its war
with Iran. Iraq's aspirations were encouraged principally by three major
events. Egypt and Syria, Iraq's traditional rivals for Arab leadership, were
isolated and weak; Iran, its rival in the Gulf, was in the throes of
revolution; and oil wealth offered the prospect of economic development
and freedom of maneuver between the superpowers.
essary instruments of national policy.
These prospects have been clouded over the past 17 months by several
developments that could again alter Iraq's choice of targets and its means
of terrorism. Syria and Saudi Arabia are making new initiatives aimed at
Arab leadership. Iraq's bid to defeat Iran and establish its own hegemony
in the Gulf is failing and there is no end in sight to the war, which has
weakened Iraq's economic base. Superpower military presence in the
region is growing, unchecked by regional consensus, and Israel-regardless
of the Baghdad-orchestrated summits-can strike at Iraq with impunity.
Whatever new tacks Iraqi policy might take, we believe Baghdad will
continue to use the tactics of terror and regard them as legitimate and nec-
? Terrorism: the threat or use of violence for political purposes by individuals or groups,
whether acting for, or in opposition to, established governmental authority, when such
actions are intended to shock, stun, or intimidate a target group wider than the immediate
? International terrorism: terrorism conducted with the support of a foreign government or
organization and/or directed against foreign nationals, institutions, or governments.
iii Top Secret
NESA 82-10057C
February 1982
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Iraq:
The Uses of Terror
The Iraqi Record
Baghdad earned a reputation in the 1970s as a backer
of international terrorists. Eager to broaden its repu-
tation as a foe of Zionism and imperialism, Iraq gave
money, arms, training, and safehaven to a variety of
Arab and non-Arab groups,
went primarily to Palestinian factions for operations
against Israel. Baghdad also used the Palestinian
factions to wage undeclared war on Syria and the
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).
The focus of Iraq's support in the mid-1970s, accord-
ing to Iraqi leadership
statements, was anti-Syrian Palestinian groups fight-
ing in Lebanon. These groups included the Arab
Liberation Front, the pro-Soviet Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) led by George Hab-
bash,, the PFLP faction led by Wadi Haddad, the
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine
(DFLP), the Front for the Liberation of Palestine led
by Abu al-Abbas, and the Palestine Popular Struggle
Front. Iraq created the Black June Organization in
1976 to counter growing Syrian influence in Lebanon.
Its leader, Sabri al-Banna (Abu Nidhal), was a former
member of Fatah who had been condemned by Fatah
after he tried to assassinate Yasir Arafat in 1974.
Black June acted as Iraq's surrogate in wide-ranging
acts of sabotage in Lebanon and Syria against the
Assad government and in Baghdad's occasional wars
with Arafat and the PLO.
Aid was not limited to the Palestinians. The Italian
Red Brigades, the West German Baader-Meinhof
gang, and the Japanese Red Army trained in Iraq in
the mid-1970s. Iranian, Bahraini, Omani, and Poli-
sario Front guerrillas reportedly also used Iraqi train-
ing camps. The Popular Front for the Liberation of
Oman-a Marxist-oriented dissident group based in
Aden-had an office in Baghdad, as did the Popular
Front for the Liberation of Bahrain and the National
training West European, Japanese, and Arab terror-
ists at present. It is aiding Iranian dissidents.
Support for national liberation movements, especially
those in black Africa, also was a popular Baath Party
cause in the 1970s. Baghdad aided guerrilla groups
from Afghanistan, South Yemen, Zimbabwe, Nami-
bia, Chad, and Eritrea.
Iraq's willingness to offer shelter, training, money,
and arms involved it in a number of terrorist oper-
ations in the 1970s,
roups receiving training and sa a aven in Iraq
were responsible for the hijacking in July 1973 of a
Japanese airliner in Dubai by the PFLP and the
Japanese Red Army, the hijacking in July 1976 of a
French airliner to Entebbe by the PFLP, attacks on
the Semiramis Hotel in Damascus and the Intercon-
tinental Hotel in Amman in 1976, and an assassina-
tion attempt in October 1977 on Syrian Foreign
Minister Khaddam in which the Minister of State for
Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Emirates was
killed. The last three attacks were all Black June
operations. In 1978 Black June and Iraqi intelligence
fought a series of battles with the PLO. They staged
terrorist attacks on PLO offices in the United King-
dom, France, Kuwait, and Pakistan, killing the PLO
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representatives in London, Paris, and Kuwait as well
as a French policeman. Black June also assassinated
Yusuf al-Sibai, editor of the influential Egyptian
newspaper al-Ahram and a close friend of President
Sadat.
Iraq routinely is blamed for terrorist operations in
Syria because of the longstanding emnity of the two
Baath regimes, but the extent of its involvement is
unknown. Iraq, however, has had contacts with the
Syrian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood and with
other anti-Assad factions over the years.
The Changes
Iraq's foreign policy goals were changing by the late
1970s as it attempted to play a more influential
international role. President Saddam Hussein, bol-
stered by rapidly rising oil revenues and confident of
his control over the Baath Party and the government,
wanted to end his country's diplomatic isolation and
build its economic and military power. He wanted to
be included in regional decisionmaking and to partici-
pate more fully in the Arab League, the Islamic
community, and the nonaligned movement.
The first signs of a possible shift came as early as
1975, when Saddam-then the second most powerful
figure in Iraq-signed the Algiers Accord with the
Shah of Iran.. This effectively ended the latest round
of Kurdish rebellion and put relations with Tehran on
an even keel. He also started talks with the Saudis
aimed at reducing tensions and settling border dis-
putes.
Jordan and the conservative Arab monarchs in the
Gulf paid little heed to Baghdad's overtures until late
1978, when two developments made Iraqi offers of
cooperation more acceptable. These were Egyptian
President Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in November and
the revolution in Iran.
Egypt's rapprochement with Israel gave Iraq the
opportunity to compete for Cairo's position of Arab
leadership. Baghdad was host to two anti-Sadat sum-
mits in 1978 and 1979 and improved relations with
Syria and the PLO. As further proof of its intentions,
Baghdad,
closed training facilities and offices and in
some cases withdrew financial aid to Black June, the
PFLP, and the DFLP. It also reduced its support for
radical organizations targeted against its conservative
Arab neighbors.
The war with Iran gave impetus to Iraq's policy of
seeking better relations with fellow Arabs. Concerned
with PLO support for Iran and eager to enlist Sunni
Arab support against the Khomeini government in
Tehran, Iraq further reduced its aid to terrorist
groups and closed the Baghdad offices of the PFLP
and DFLP. Baghdad drew closer to the Gulf Arab
states and Jordan, relying on them for financial aid
and logistical support against Iran.
At the same time, decreasing evidence of Iraq's
support for European terrorist groups may have re-
flected Baghdad's concern that its continued involve-
ment with such groups would retard its improving
relations with the West and damage its access to
Western military technology. Iraq began in the mid-
1970s to broaden its access to European military
suppliers, in particular French, West German, Italian,
and British companies which manufactured advanced
fighter aircraft, artillery, surface-to-air missiles, ra-
dars, and electronic equipment. Baghdad has more
recently become interested in purchasing US military
equipment as well.
The Constants
Iraq's changing foreign policy ambitions produced a
shift in targets for terrorism but not a shift away from
terrorism as an instrument of policy. Baghdad now
relies more on its own agents than on outside groups,
and its targeting has shifted toward Iranian and pro-
Iranian groups, with less emphasis on Israel and the
conservative Gulf Arab regimes. It continues to rely
on terrorist tactics against antiregime Iraqis-espe-
cially Kurds, Shias, and Communists-both in Iraq
and abroad.
Iraq began its pursuit of Iranian targets not long after
Khomeini came to power. Orders for attacks on
Iranian diplomats and facilities were routinely issued
by the summer of 1980, especially to Iraqi agents in
the Gulf and Lebanon, where local conditions could
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Nationalities of Victims of Iraqi Terrorist Attacks
1970-78
Iraqi
Israeli
Saudi Arabian
Egyptian
Palestinian
Syrian
This chart only includes incidents directly instigated by Iraq. It does not
include incidents by surrogate groups receiving Iraqi aid, such as Black June
and the Arab Liberation Front. These groups have been excluded because
mask Iraqi activities. In Lebanon Iraqi intelligence
used the Arab Liberation Front and the Baath Party
of Lebanon as well as its own operatives to assassinate
Iranian officials and Iranian sympathizers in the
PLO; to bomb embassy, airline, and newspaper of-
fices; and to attack pro-Iranian Lebanese Shia ele-
ments hostile to Baghdad. Iraqi agents tried to assas-
sinate Iranian Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh in
Kuwait in April 1980. One month later five Arabs
recruited and trained by Iraq seized the Iranian
Embassy in London, holding it and hostages for
several days
Baghdad also has increased its contacts with exiled
Egyptian dissidents over the past year, including
former aides to President Nasir-Muhammad Hay-
kal and Ashraf Marwan-and former Chief of Staff
not all of their acts are sponsored by Baghdad and because Iraq now relies
more on its own agents than on outside groups.
Prime domestic targets are Kurdish dissidents, Iraqi
Communists, pro-Iranian Shias, and anyone suspected
of opposing the regime or slandering its leaders. Iraqi
intelligence has made repeated attempts to assassinate
Kurdish Democratic Party head Masud Barzani and
to disrupt antiregime Kurdish groups in Europe. In
July 1980 West Berlin police arrested two Iraqi
diplomats carrying explosives to a Kurdish student
conference. Iraqi intelligence routinely reports on
journalists, scholars, and politicians in exile who
"defame" Iraqi leaders and thereby can become
"candidates for liquidation." A prominent Iraqi jour-
nalist in Beirut was killed in June 1979. His crimes
included criticizing Saddam Hussein and working for
a PLO newspaper. In 1978 Iraqi intelligence agents
killed Abd al-Razzaq al-Naif in London. The target
of earlier attempts, Naif had been Iraq's Prime
Minister briefly in 1968
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Iraqi intelligence is particularly zealous in tracking
down Shia dissidents.
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Abu Nidhal transferred his offices
and allegiance from Baghdad to Damascus last year
because of Iraqi attempts to restrict his operations.
the Iraqis closed down
Nor have the Iraqis totally forsworn links to the
Palestinian radicals. The Israeli raid on the nuclear
facility at Tuwaitha in early June 1981 rekindled
Iraqi interest in Palestinian terrorism directed against
Israel. Following the attack Baghdad was in touch
with Fatah, with a PFLP splinter group known for
anti-Israeli and anti-Jewish bombings in Europe, and
with renegade Palestinian activist Abu Daud (Daud
was responsible for planning the massacre of Israeli
athletes at the Munich Olympics in 1972). Some
Fatah officials claim Baghdad provided the explosive
devices used in bombing a synagogue in Vienna in
August 1981.
Baghdad is sheltering remnants of the PFLP group
led by Wadi Haddad, who died in 1978. One of the
splinter groups is the Fifteen May Organization for
the Liberation of Palestine, headed by Abu Ibrahim.
Fifteen May claims responsibility for a grenade at-
tack on Jewish school children in Belgium in July
1980 and for attacks on Israeli airline offices and
embassies in Rome, Istanbul, Athens, and Vienna
following the attack on Tuwaitha. The group has its
headquarters in Baghdad, but Fifteen May also has
received aid from Libya and Syria.
Saddam Hussein has admitted sheltering members of
the PFLP-SC (Special Command) led by Salim Abu
Salim, another offshoot of the Haddad PFLP organi-
zation. This group's only known activities so far have
been in Kuwait, but Saddam denies Iraqi sponsorship
of their operations.
facilities that had been used by Black June, and Abu
Nidhal was looking for patrons in Syria, Libya, and
Eastern Europe. indicate Black June is
still conducting its activities from Baghdad. The
Iraqis, however, are not on good terms with Abu
Nidhal and are not likely to sponsor Black June
efforts at this time against Assad or Arafat. Abu
Nidhal remains a potential asset to use for operations
against Israel or other targets when the goals are
mutual and the risks acceptable.
Outlook
Iraq's targets of terrorism could change again based
on new directions in foreign policy and national policy
needs. Nonetheless, Saddam Hussein expects Iraq's
more cooperative attitude toward its Arab neighbors
to gain him an expanded role in regional affairs. He
also expects Iraq's apparent lack of support for Euro-
pean-based terrorists to bolster its international image
and help remove barriers to acquiring more advanced
technology from the West. But Iraq's current policy of
emphasizing support for some terrorist groups and
deemphasizing others rests on a fragile base. For
example, if.
? The war with Iran ends. This probably would mean
a reduction in Baghdad's assistance to anti-Kho-
meini terrorist groups, although Iraq will continue
to feel threatened by Tehran whether it is ruled by
mullahs or leftists.
provide support to anti-Assad groups,
agh-
dad will avoid direct confrontations with Damascus
as long as its war with Iran continues. The two
countries are longstanding rivals, however, and Sad-
dam could redirect his energies to Syria when the
war ends.
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? Saddam's "moderation "fails to win new friends or
gain him entry into regional councils. The war with
Iran forces Saddam to maintain good relations with
his neighbors; he needs their transportation facili-
ties, their money, and their political support. If the
war ended and Saddam believed that his moderate
policies toward the Gulf Arabs were not producing
results-for example, eventual membership in the
Gulf Cooperation Council-he might revert to his
more familiar pattern of threat and intimidation.
Baghdad has not broken completely with the PFLO,
although its offices are closed, and support for it and
other antiregime dissidents in Bahrain, Kuwait, and
the UAE could easily be upgraded.
? The Palestinians modify their demands and choose
settlement with Israel. Historically Iraq rejects an
Arab settlement with Israel, although Baghdad
currently is minimizing its rejectionist views. Its
newfound moderation, however, must be suspect,
and Iraqi cooperation with radical Palestinians to
undermine a settlement is a real possibility.
? Saddam comes under ideological pressure from the
party or the military. Important elements within the
Baath Party probably are uncomfortable with Sad-
dam's close relations with the kings of Jordan, Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait, and Oman-all once targets of
Baathist subversion.
? Superpower pressure affects Iraqi attitudes toward
the use of terrorism. Baghdad's willingness to back
away from terrorism when more important Iraqi
interests are at stake was demonstrated by its review
of aid given to Salvadoran rebels following a US
demarche last March and its assurance to the
United States that the aid was "a one-time action
that would not be repeated." The demarche came at
a time when the sale of Boeing aircraft to Iraq was
being considered.
Baghdad will continue to aid groups that are pro-
Soviet, but it is unlikely to do so strictly at Moscow's
behest. In some cases, as with its assistance to Nicara-
guan and Salvadoran rebels, Iraqi and Soviet objec-
tives will coincide and raise suspicions of collusion.
But Iraq also will continue to give support to groups in
direct conflict with the USSR, as it did in Afghani-
stan, South Yemen, and Eritrea. Baghdad will en-
courage countries and organizations to maintain their
independence of both superpowers, but at the same
time recognize that conditions can make necessary
relationships with the Soviets, the United States, or
both.
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