USSR: 1982 GRAIN CROP IN TROUBLE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00231R000200210003-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 14, 2007
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: June 1, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
Directorate of
Intelligence
1 #7
An Intelligence Memorandum
AsTEa R1E COPY
g0 !~T qYE Oyi
Secret
GI 82-10133
June 1982
Copy4 7 0
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USSR: 1982 Grain
Crop in Trouble
Directorate of Secret
Information available as of 28 June 1982
has been used in the preparation of this report.
This memorandum was prepared by the Agricultural
Assessment Branch and the Agricultural Trade Branch
of the Resources Division, Office of Global Issues,
with a contribution from the Office of Soviet Analysis.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
addressed to the Chief Agricultural Assessment Branch,
OGI, F77 I
Secret
GI 82-10133
June 1982
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I 25
Summary
Crop in Trouble
0
Poor weather during the past few weeks has greatly reduced potential
Soviet grain production this year. We now believe that the best grain crop
Moscow can harvest is about 185 million tons, 53 million tons short of this
year's target. The outcome could be much worse. Hot, dry winds-known
as a sukhovey-currently threaten crops in the main spring grain belt from
the Volga valley eastward. If the sukhovey persists or is followed by
drought, total Soviet grain output will be markedly lower, perhaps even as
low as last year's disastrous harvest of 158 million tons. Maximum
potential yields will be determined largely by weather conditions during the
next several weeks, and by mid-July we will be able to make a more precise
estimate of this year's crop.
The current crop is suffering from more than just bad weather. In addition
to normal managerial problems, the Soviets are experiencing shortages of
high-quality seed and chemical fertilizer. Furthermore, a poor crop this
year could have negative carryover effects next year. Specifically, a
continued shortage of high-quality seed would limit next year's yields.
Regardless of what happens later this summer, the USSR will need to
import as much grain as possible. Port capacity now approaches 50 million
tons per year. Moscow imported a record 45 million tons of grain during
marketing year (MY) 1982 (1 July 1981 through 30 June 1982) and may
already have lined up more than 17 million tons of grain from non-US
suppliers for delivery in MY 1983. Non-US sources could provide another
15 million tons, more if the Soviets are willing to pay a premium or
substitute wheat for feedgrains. For purchases much above 32 million tons
in the mix of feedgrains most suitable for its needs, Moscow would
probably buy US grain.
Secret
GI 82-10133
June 1982
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Major Grain Growing Regions
F inI n
MOSCOW* Votga
t3elorussia'. Vyatka
Central
t and Spri, Gains
Central
Black Vo?
Ea,
Mediterranean Sea
Lebano,
North '-,
3IZTasus
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative. -
egiort `ti. r`
1?e) t ULn o cb n
Trans \/ Cas an )
Caucasus sea
Kazakhstan
Lake
Ba!khash
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Crop in Trouble
0
An abrupt shift in the weather has all but eliminated any chances the
Soviets might have had for a good grain crop this year. In early June, an
extensive low pressure system dominated most of the European USSR. The
high winds, rain, and occasional snow that resulted severely hampered the
sowing of spring grains. Official Soviet data indicate that the total area
sown to grain this year will fall several million hectares short of target.
Moreover, in much of the northern European USSR, cooler-than-normal
temperatures retarded the development of both winter and spring grains. In
some parts of the grain region these conditions were replaced in mid-June
by hot, dry winds, referred to by the Soviets as a sukhovey. Before the
weather system responsible for the sukhovey broke on 21 June, winter
grain yields were reduced markedly. Development of a similar weather
system east of the Urals now threatens the spring grains as well.
The 1982 Crop hollowing three consecutive poor grain harvests, the 1982 crop season
Season Thus Fair opened on an optimistic note. Indeed, the outlook for fall-sown winter
grains appeared good last fall just prior to dormancy:
Total planted area was up slightly from the previous year.
Above-average precipitation brought relief to much of the European
USSR which had been suffering from drought.
Soil moisture was adequate for germination.
Conditions were also favorable during the winter, and we judge that
winterkill was somewhat less than the normal 15 to 20 percent. Neverthe-
less, soil moisture levels remained about 25 percent below normal in several
key winter grain areas, particularly in parts of the eastern Ukraine and
northern Caucasus.
In late spring the production outlook turned sharply downward. Cooler-
and wetter-than-normal weather in April and May eliminated any linger-
ing effects of last year's drought, but the continuation of these conditions
into June created serious new problems. The wet weather sharply curtailed
sowing operations in the central and northern regions of the Russian
Republic. In addition, cool temperatures retarded crop development,
probably lowering the yields of both winter and spring grains in those
areas. In a normal or good year, these central and northern areas might be
expected to produce about 25 million tons of grain. By our esti
most these areas will produce this year is about 15 million tons 2
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Recent precipitation has improved soil moisture in parts of the eastern
Ukraine and northern Caucasus, but some winter
crops have been severely damaged, causing us to lower our production
estimates in these areas as well. The sparse and uneven stands of these
crops may result from shortages of high-quality seed that prevented
extensive reseeding operations earlier this spring. Local agricultural offi-
cials have referred to such shortages in the Soviet press. Moreover, in some
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1976-78 1979 1980 1981 1982 a
Average
other parts of this area, winter grains did not receive normal topdressing or
adequate applications of mineral fertilizer. One official in the USSR
Ministry of Agriculture admitted that the chemical industry had fallen
considerably behind in its deliveries of nitrogen fertilizer. By the beginning
of April, the shortfall was reportedly equal to the amount needed to
fertilize about 2 million hectares, some 7 percent of the current winter
grain area. Subsequent deliveries of fertilizer, even if they can be made
will arrive too late for this year's crop. 25
In the large spring grain area east of the Volga valley, weather conditions
have been mostly hot and dry this spring. Soil moisture reserves were down
to about one-fifth of normal during the main planting period from mid-to-
late May. In early June, widespread rainshowers probably provided at least
adequate moisture for germination, but most of the region-particularly
northern Kazakhstan-needs considerably more rain for yields to be
average or better. From 13-21 June, a sukhovey centered in the Volga and
Urals regions resulted in temperatures as high as 34?C (94?F) in some
areas, relative humidity less than 20 percent, and high winds. These
conditions severely reduced the potential for winter grain yields. A similar
system now threatens spring grains in northern Kazakhstan and western
Siberia.
Outlook for the With normal weather for the rest of the year, we believe the best grain crop
1982 Grain Crop Moscow can harvest is about 185 million tons-well short of its needs for
food, seed, livestock feed, and industrial use:
? As a result of the poor weather in recent weeks, we now expect the winter
grain harvest to be no greater than 55 million tons, much below our May
estimate of 60 to 70 million tons.
? We expect spring grain output will be no more than 130 million tons, the
result of a sharp reduction in the area sown and a soil moisture deficiency
in many parts of the spring grain growing region.
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Winter grains
Spring grains
Total
a Estimate.
b Upward limit.
1976-78
Average
1979
1980
1981
1982
70.1
49.6
63.1
53 a
55 b
148.9
129.6
126.0
105-
130 b
219.0
179.2
189.1
158-
185 b
214.0
227.0
235.0
236
238
The outcome could be much worse. If the sukhovey that now threatens
much of the spring grain growing area persists or is followed by drought,
yields will be lower than those currently forecast. Indeed, we can not now
rule out the possibility of a repeat of last year's crop failure-158 million
tons.' For this to occur, however, damage from the sukhovey would have to
be severe, and weather through the remainder of the growing season and
harvest period would have to be abnormal. We will be better able to
estimate the likely size of this year's harvest by mid-July, when the spring
grains reach the critical flowering stage. Drought conditions during this
stage of plant growth could sharply reduce maximum potential yields of
spring grains as they did last year. Similarly, extremely wet conditions
during the fall harvest period or an early onset of winter would force grain
fields to be cut prematurely or to be abandoned entirely.
A poor grain harvest will also affect prospects for the 1983 crop. The lack
of reseeding operations this spring and remarks in the Soviet press suggest
that the Soviets ran short of high-quality seed this year. With their seed
stocks already depleted, Soviet farmers may be faced with a serious
shortage again next year, thus limiting potential yields at the onset of the
crop season.
' Moscow has made no official release of 1981 Soviet grain production. Soviet economic lec-
turers who have announced production results in the past have indicated that the harvest
was about 158 million tons.
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Soviet Grain Imports With another poor harvest likely, the USSR will import as much grain as
possible in the marketing year (MY) that ends June 1983 (MY 1983)-
limited by the amount its ports and rail system can handle, currently
estimated at about 50 million tons. Moscow's purchase of 45 million tons of
grain during MY 1982 now stands as a record. Long-term agreements and
new purchases may already assure delivery of more than 17 million tons in
MY 1983:
epen ing on the size of this year's crops, non-US grain exporters could
provide an additional 15 million tons of grain to the USSR. For purchases
much above 32 million tons in the mix of feedgrains most suitable for its
domestic requirements, Moscow would probably buy US grain. To import
as much as port capacity will allow, purchases of US grain in MY 1983
could well exceed the 16-million-ton level expected to be sold in the current
marketing year.
Under extreme conditions, say if US grain were unavailable, Moscow could
meet much of its import requirements from non-US sources. To do so, the
Soviets would have to aggressively tap small suppliers, be willing to pay
some premium to divert grain from traditional customers, and substitute
wheat for feedgrains.
Paying for such purchases will be a problem. Although grain prices have
-fallen somewhat recently, Moscow will need at least some $6 billion to
$6.5 billion to import all the grain it needs. Prices for oil and gold-two
major hard currency earners-will probably remain weak throughout
1982. Consequently, Moscow probably will continue to rely on short-term
credits to finance a substantial portion of its grain purchases, rather than
curb imports to any great extent.
IIn addition,
Moscow will bay again feel the need to reduce imports of nonagricul-
tural commodities, which fell last year by about 10 percent.
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