UN SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT: A PREVIEW

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GI 82-10117
June 1982
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Directorate of Secret
UN Special Session
on Disarmament:
A Preview
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 A Preview
Information available as of 5 May 1982
has been used in the preparation of this report.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Weapons Proliferation Branch,
rity Issues Division, OGI, on
Secret
GI 82-10117
June 1982
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A Intelligence
UN Special Session
on Disarmament:
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UN Special Session
On Disarmament:
A Preview
Key Judgments The UN Second Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD II) will open on
7 June in New York. The most likely outcome of the five-week session will
be a cosmetic declaration reaffirming the principles and goals established
by the First Special Session (1978) and calling for additional work on a
Comprehensive Program of Disarmament. The Final Document of the
conference is likely to:
? Call for the conclusion of a Nuclear Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB).
? Urge a reduction of strategic nuclear weapons.
? Endorse expansion of the Committee on Disarmament.
? Recommend convening of a Third Special Session on Disarmament.
25X1
This outcome should satisfy many nonaligned leaders who fear that a
conference ending in confrontation or stalemate would call into question
the utility of such multilateral forums and jeopardize the gains they have
made in acquiring a greater voice in disarmament negotiations. The
nonaligned have not organized behind specific substantive objectives or
negotiating tactics. Moderate nonaligned nations share the Western belief
that lessened international tensions and some renewal of trust is necessary
before progress can be made on arms control. This may provide some
opportunity for the United States to garner support for its positions, but
these nations are also likely to support the demands of more radical
nonaligned nations that the suer rs commit themselves to progress on
nuclear disarmament. ow 25X1
The Soviet Union does not as yet appear to have any new initiatives to
bring forward, although it could offer sweeping disarmament proposals.
Moscow will undoubtedly use this meeting as a propaganda event to vie
with Washington for Third World favor, yet try to avoid poisoning the
atmosphere for upcoming superpower bilateral negotiations. The industrial
democracies are generally in line with the United States but are more
willing to meet the rhetorical demands of the neutral and nonaligned
states. Many Western leaders, under domestic political pressure, will take
advantage of extensive media co age to propose largely symbolic disar-
mament initiatives v r 25X1
Nonaligned nations will focus conference proceedings on nuclear weapons,
because they assert that the arsenals of the great powers present the
greatest danger to world peace. The nuclear focus also offers the best
opportunity for maintaining the negotiating unity of the nonaligned and
iii Secret
GI82-10117
June 1982
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allows them to sidestep blame that their own military behavior and refusal
to accept limits on acquisition of arms stymie serious progress toward
multilateral arms control.
The nonaligned view the Special Session on Disarmament as a dialogue
between the developed and developing nations. If the conference is
dominated by East-West exchanges and fails to address the concerns of the
nonaligned, they will judge it to be a failure. Because Soviet disarmament
proposals generally are closer to those of the nonaligned in language and
approach, the United States would be held responsible for a conference
that ends in confrontation. Many already suspect that the United
views the SSOD II primarily as a damage limitation exercise.
An unsuccessful session would cause West European and Japanese leaders
to take stands on issues like the Comprehensive Test Ban and outer space
arms control that are highly divergent from those of the United States to
preserve their image with the nonaligned. This would enable radical and
pro-Soviet nonaligned states to become more influential in multilateral
disarmament forums. The Soviet Union would undoubtedly take advantage
of these developments by increasing its efforts to isolate the United States
at future meetings of the UN Committee on Disarmament and by
pressuring Washington to make concessions in bilateral arms control
negotiations.
Secret iv
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Contents
Key Judgments iii
The Difficult Conference Setting 1
Growing Public Pressures for Disarmament 4
Disarray Among Neutral and Nonaligned Nations 4
The Major Issues 5
Implications for the United States 14
C. A Comparison of Proposals for the First Stage of a
Comprehensive Program of Disarmament
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UN Special Session
on Disarmament:
A Previe
The Second United Nations Special Session on Disar-
mament (SSOD II)' opens in New York on 7 June.
The meeting will be the largest international confer-
ence on disarmament in history and could produce
five weeks of acrimonious discussion on virtually
every aspect of arms control. Nearly all of the 157
UN-member states will attend, and many will be
represented at the opening by heads of state, prime
ministers, or other high-ranking officials.
Like the First Special Session (SSOD I) in 1978,
SSOD II is a deliberative meeting and will not
negotiate treaties or other binding agreements on
arms control. Its success will largely depend on the
ability of the United States, the Soviet Union, and the
nonaligned states to find some common ground on the
major disarmament issues. The provisional agenda of
the SSOD II, constructed over four sessions of the
Preparatory Committee, includes the following items:
? A general debate on disarmament, including
speeches by several heads of government, which
addresses the present risks of war and the effects of
the arms race on international security and econom-
ic development.
? A review of the recommendations of the First
Special Session, focusing on the current status of
negotiations on strategic nuclear weapons reduction,
nuclear Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB), and com-
pliance with existing limitations on chemical and
biological weapons.
? Work on a Comprehensive Program of Disarma-
ment (CPD), including its phased implementation,
legal nature, and verification procedures.
? New initiatives, including a ban on attacks on
peaceful nuclear reactors.
? A review of multilateral disarmament institutions,
including the Committee on Disarmament.
? Consideration of a Third Special Session and the
convening of a World Disarmament Conference.
? Adoption of a final document.) I 25X1
A declaration, or Final Document, embodying confer-
ence decisions adopted by consensus, is the desired
formal outcome of the Special Session. Any agree-
ments reached will become significant milestones in
the multilateral disarmament process. The expected
presence in New York of thousands of individuals
from peace movements throughout the non-Commu-
nist world and dozens of nongovernmental organiza-
tions concerned with disarmament will focus the
attention of world media on the conference.
The Difficult Conference Setting
The Second Special Session comes at a particularly
delicate time. A number of developments since
SSOD I appear to cast doubt on the possibility that
new arms control or disarmament agreements can be
reached any time soon. The United States, in particu-
lar, is perceived by many neutral and nonaligned
states and, to a lesser degree, by some allies to have
become less interested in arms control progress since
1978. Suspicions of Soviet intentions have also risen
as a result of the use of lethal chemical and biological
weapons by the Soviet Union and its allies and the
invasion of Afghanistan. FI 25X1
Lack of Progress in Arms Control
Perhaps the most significant factor clouding the at-
mosphere for SSOD II is the frustration felt by the
Group of 77 (G-77), the caucus of neutral and nona-
ligned states at the UN.' In the four years since
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Events Leading to SSOD II
1965
1971
1976
1978
First UN resolution adopted urging consideration of a Special Session on Disarmament or a General Dis-
armament Conference.
First Summit of Nonaligned States adopted resolution proposed by President Tito of Yugoslavia urging
the convening of a Special Session on Disarmament or a World Disarmament Conference. Proposal re-
mains a standard theme at subsequent Nonaligned meetings.
UN resolution passed urging the convening of World Disarmament Conference.
Soviet Union proposed a World Disarmament conference and UN adopted resolution to explore this goal.
UN adopted resolution concerning a Special Session.
First Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to Disarmament met from 23
May to 1 July. 144 of 149 Member States attended with 16 prime ministers or presidents, four vice presi-
dents or deputy prime ministers, and 49 foreign ministers representing their nations. A Final Document
adopted by consensus and called for the convening of a Second Special Session on Disarmament at some
later date.
UN General Assembly adopted resolution calling for a Second Special Session in 1982.
Three meetings of the Preparatory Committee on a Second Special Session held; agenda for the meeting
outlined.
Final meeting of the Preparatory Committee held between 26 April and 14 May to prepare draft lan-
guage for a Final Document.
SSOD I, only two arms control agreements have been
produced:
? A 1979 draft convention between the United States
and the USSR prohibiting the development, produc-
tion, stockpiling, and use of radiological weapons.
? A 1980 multilateral treaty prohibiting or restricting
the use of certain conventional weapons deemed
25X1 inhumane.
Other more important arms control negotiations have
not been concluded:
? US-USSR treaties on a Threshold Test Ban (TTBT)
and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNE), signed in
1974 and 1976, respectively, remain unratified.
? The Second Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty
(SALT II) between the United States and the
USSR, signed in 1979, remains unratified.
? The US-UK-USSR negotiations on a Comprehen-
sive Test Ban have been adjourned since 1980.
? The US-USSR negotiations on a treaty prohibiting
chemical weapons (CW) have been adjourned since
1980, and only slow progress has been made in the
CW Working Group of the Committee on
Disarmament.
? In Europe, the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduc-
tion Talks (MBFR) have gone nowhere despite
almost 10 years of effort, the Second Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) pro-
duced no agreement on a follow-on Conference on
Disarmament in Europe (CDE), and talks on inter-
mediate-range nuclear forces (INF) have just begun.
Multilateral arms control initiatives encouraged by
SSOD I but not yet arranged address an Indian
Ocean Zone of Peace (IOZP), guarantees by nuclear
weapons states against the use or threatened use of
nuclear weapons (NSA, or Negative Security Assur-
ances), and restraints on the international transfer of
arms. In these areas, difficulties have occurred as
much because of rivalries among developing nations
and their general insistence on national sovereignty as
because of any great power disagreements. Develop-
ing countries generally seek to avoid any blame for
the increasing threats to peace posed by their own
arms races and regional conflicts. As a consequence,
the nonaligned draft review of the implementation of
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SSOD II: World Leaders Expected To Attend
Sweden
Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics
Anthony A. Street, Foreign Minister
Bruno Kreisky, Chancellor
Wilfried Martens, Prime Minister
Pierre Trudeau, Prime Minister (Mark MacGuigan, Secretary of State for External Affairs)
Huang Hua, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Carlos Rafael Rodriguez Rodriguez, Vice President
Anker Jorgensen, Prime Minister
Helmut Schmidt, Chancellor
Kalevi Sorsa, Prime Minister
Claude Cheysson, Minister of External Relations
Menachem Begin, Prime Minister
Giovanni Spadolini, Prime Minister (Emilio Colombo, Minister of Foreign Affairs)
Zenko Suzuki, Prime Minister
Max van der Stoel, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Svenn Stray, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Thornbjorn Falldin, Prime Minister (Ola Ullsten, Deputy Prime Minister)
Andrey A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs
the Final Document of SSOD I contains criticism
only of the United States, the USSR, and their allies.'
Increasing superpower tensions, the outbreak of sever-
al regional armed conflicts, and the nearly universal
sense of growing insecurity since 1978 add to the
uncertainties facing the conference because of the
bleak arms control record. Western and nonaligned
delegates to the last preparatory conference urged
that a review of arms control progress since 1978
include an assessment of the international situation.
Heightened tensions in every region, and particularly
for debate in and of themselves.
While the First Special Session was not entirely free
of East-West debate, the United States and the
USSR did cooperate to defend the superpower record
on arms control and prevent excessive interference by
other nations in determining the pace and organiza-
tional venue of bilateral negotiations. They also
shared an interest in strengthening support in the
developing world for the nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT). These common interests are still large-
ly valid from Moscow's point of view, with the
probable exception of the nonratification of SALT II.
Soviet press commentary indicates, however, that
Moscow is ready to use SSOD II purely as a propa-
ganda event, and to vie with Washington for favorable
treatment at the hands of the Third World.
25X1
International conflicts between other nations also may
become issues and further dim the possibility for
agreement. Recent sessions of the UN General As-
sembly have witnessed an increase in the number of
proposals to condemn the actions of states by name. In
SSOD I, Israel and South Africa were targets of the
now standard G-77 attack for being "racist" states
and seeking a nuclear weapons capability. These
states along with Iraq, Iran, and the United Kingdom
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will likely be the targets of criticism and resolutions
by some nonaligned states. Western criticism of na-
tions like Libya, Cuba, Argentina, or Nicaragua
probably will encoura a others to attempt to politicize
the Special Session. 25X1
Growing Public Pressures for Disarmament
The recent lack of arms control progress and height-
ened international tension have created a third devel-
opment that may make the work of the Special
SSOD II: Selected NonGovernmental Organizations
Expected To Attend
Canada United Nations Association (Canada)
Denmark No to Nuclear Weapons
Federal Republic of Action Reconciliation
Germany
Session even more difficult from the US perspective. Italy
Throughout the industrialized world, peace and disar- Japan
mament groups have grown in strength, and some now
receive support from members of parliaments in their
calls for unilateral steps toward disarmament. Many
of these groups, particularly from Japan, West Ger-
many, the United Kingdom, and Canada, plan to
demonstrate in New York at the time of SSOD II.
Some of their leaders will achieve high visibility
because, as at SSOD I, they will be allowed to address
the Special Session during the first two weeks of the
meeting 25X1
The resurgence of the peace movement encourages
the Soviet-aligned and the neutral and nonaligned
nations to press harder for concessions from Western
states. At the very least, Moscow may "play to the
galleries" and eschew meaningful negotiations to lend
credence to the perception of some groups that the
West must show its good faith by accepting Soviet
offers or taking unilateral actions. Although events in
Poland and Afghanistan have made many Western
activists suspicious of Moscow's motives, some West-
ern leaders may feel compelled to take stands or make
Netherlands
Sweden
United Kingdom
Europe/Greece
Europe wide
Global
League of Rights of People
Japanese Socialist Party
Japanese Democratic Socialist Party
Clean Government Party
New Liberal Club
United Socialist Democratic Party
General Council of Trade Unions
(SOHYO)
Confederation of Labor (DOMEI)
Japanese Congress Against Atomic and
Hydrogen Bombs (GENSUIKIN)
Dutch Interchurch Council
People's Parliament on Disarmament
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament
British Labor Study Group
Pax Christi
World Disarmament Campaign
American Friends Service Committee
Clergy and Laity Concerned
AFL-CIO
United Nations Association (USA)
World Council of Churches
Torch from Olympia to New York
European Nuclear Disarmament
Ad Hoc Liaison Group of the NGO
Committee on Disarmament (official
UN observer status, umbrella
organization)
World Federation of UN Associations
World Peace Council a
gestures that lean toward Soviet positions to appeal to
domestic political audiences. 25X1
Disarray Among Neutral and Nonaligned Nations
A final problem that complicates prospects for the
Special Session is the confusion and lack of unity
among neutral and nonaligned nations. Despite the
significance of SSOD II as an opportunity for Third
World nations to influence the atmosphere and course
of international disarmament, neither the Nonaligned
Movement (NAM-the international caucus of devel-
oping states on East-West and colonial issues) nor the
G-77 has yet organized their members behind specific
substantive objectives or negotiating tactics. This
means that no deliberately confrontational approach
a Note: Except for the World Peace Council, the above organizations
are not Communist front organizations although Communists may
participate in some as a minority. 25X1
by the NAM has been devised as was the case prior to
the 1980 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review
Conference!
The NAM could yet do so at a Havana meeting just prior to
SSOD II. Before the 1980 meeting, the NAM and the G-77
established a coordinated pogition and negotiatin strategy which
ut the nuclear weapons states on the defensive.
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This may provide some opportunity for the United
States to garner support for its positions from the
more moderate nations. The potential benefits of
nonaligned fragmentation are likely to be outweighed
by the difficulties in dealing with contending neutral
and nonaligned spokesmen when consensus is desired.
Most developing nations are not actively involved in
multilateral disarmament activities and usually follow
the lead of the activist nation or nations that appear to
have organized the greatest following in the develop-
25X1 ing world.
The current "moderates" on disarmament issues-
Brazil, Yugoslavia, Sri Lanka, Sweden, and other
European neutrals-usually draw the greatest follow-
ing in the G-77. These nations accept in varying
degrees the Western belief that lessened international
tensions and some renewal of trust are necessary
before real progress in arms control can be made.
While placing priority on nuclear disarmament, most
of the moderates acknowledge the need to consider
simultaneously arms control measures that limit the
arsenals of the nonnuclear nations. Their efforts in the
latest Preparatory Committee Session indicate that
they hope to avoid major confrontations at SSOD II
that would:
? Create conflicts between nonaligned states.
? Further impede arms control progress.
? Question the right or ability of nonaligned states to
participate directly in future disarmament
negotiations.
? Diminish chances of holding a third special session.
More radical activist nations are likely to succeed in
gaining support among the nonaligned by persuading
the moderates to accept their views. States like Paki-
stan, India, Mexico, and possibly Nigeria are ada-
mant in their intent to focus on, as a fundamental
principle, the responsibility of the superpowers to
engage in the first concrete steps toward disarmament
before developing nations assume new obligations.
Specifically, they will seek promises of progress in
nuclear disarmament and may argue that growing
international tensions require a display of political
good will on the part of major powers. The United
States almost certainly will receive more public criti-
cism from these states than the USSR. Should both
superpowers prove unwilling to endorse most of their
disarmament proposals, the radical activists appear
willing to hold out for their principles rather than
make major concessions. 25X1
Finally, Marxist and pro-Soviet nations like Cuba will
attempt to focus the ire of the moderates and the rest
of the G-77 on the United States and away from the
USSR. These states will not be as successful as the
radicals in obtaining the support of the moderates
because of Moscow's weakened international image.
Cuba undoubtedly will try to stiffen Mexico and
others against compromise with the West and will
suggest, with less likelihood of success, that the Soviet
Union and nonaligned countries have common
concerns.
Moscow's own diplomacy at SSOD II will have an
important effect on the extent to which less involved
developing nations fall into line behind an anti-
Western confrontational posture. Support among the
nonaligned for Soviet proposals in the past has been
substantial because these proposals are similar in
language and approach to sweeping nonaligned initia-
tives. Neither require the nonaligned to make sacri-
fices in the disarmament field and both avoid issues
that would expose differences in security interests
among developing states. Moscow's support for na-
tional liberation movements and US ties to former
colonial powers have been used in the past by the
Soviet Union and its Third World allies to drum up
support for Soviet proposals. We believe that US
support for the United Kingdom in the Falkland
Islands crisis will be to this end at the
conference. 25X1
The Major Issues
Comprehensive Program of Disarmament
Proposals for a Comprehensive Program of Disarma-
ment will receive considerable attention at SSOD II.
The nonaligned have long viewed the CPD as the
centerpiece of their disarmament efforts. Frustrated
with the agonizingly slow pace of arms control talks
between the nuclear weapon states, these nations view
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Saga of the Comprehensive Program of Disarmament
1964-65
1969
1978
1979
1980
1981
New Committee on Disarmament examined proposals for general disarmament as well as specific arms
limitation.
Joint US-USSR Statement of Principles for General and Complete Disarmament; separate US and
USSR draft treaties.
Nonaligned states called for a World Disarmament Conference endorsed by UN General Assembly.
The UN General Assembly recommended that the Committee on Disarmament address "a
comprehensive program dealing with all aspects of the problem of the cessation of the arms race and gen-
eral and complete disarmament under effective international control." The Committee adopted the
suggestion but gave scant attention to this recommendation for more than a decade.
SSOD I endorsed the nonaligned concept of a Comprehensive Program of Disarmament.
The UN Disarmament Commission agreed to a skeletal text which was referred to the Committee on
Disarmament for negotiation.
The CD established a CPD working group and quickly adopted an outline for a CPD.
CD received separate CPD draft from Nonaligned States and Western States, but discussions bogged
down.
The CD submitted to the SSOD II a heavily bracketed, nearly 50-page CPD draft that reflected dis-
agreement on basic concepts.
the CPD as a vehicle for increasing their leverage in
disarmament negotiations and as a set of proposals for
reducing the levels of armaments throughout the
world. The nonaligned have linked the CPD to their
call for a new international economic order by assert-
ing that global disarmament would free funds to aid
their economic development. 25X1
On 21 April 1982, the Committee on Disarmament
(CD), after two years of nearly complete frustration,
submitted a CPD draft to the SSOD II.S Only parts of
the declaratory sections of the draft-the Preamble,
Objectives, Principles, and Priorities-are clearly
worded and probably reflect international consensus.
The more important and complex sections on Meas-
ures, Stages of Implementation, Machinery, and Pro-
cedures remain heavily bracketed compilations of
national and regional views 25X1
The Measures section, for example, is so inclusive that
it constitutes a menu of all disarmament proposals
made since 1945, from decades-old proposals for the
'See appendix C for a Comparison of Western and Nonaligned
Proposals. 25X1
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTB) to the French
proposal for an International Satellite Monitoring
Agency. The proposals have been organized into three
categories: measures required to address the present
situation, intermediate measures, and measures re-
quired for general and complete disarmament. States
have made numerous reservations on both the appro-
priateness of specific measures and their placement in
particular time frames. After some cosmetic blending
of these disparate suggestions, the CD accepted the
Measures section solely for the purpose of continuing
negotiations at SSOD II.F__~ 25X1
More significant disagreements continue over the
legal nature of the program, the timing of its phases,
and the emphasis on nuclear weapons. The nonaligned
have argued in the CD that the CPD should be a
legally binding document with three or four well-
defined stages, each to be completed within a specific
time period. In particular, they maintain that the
threat posed by nuclear and other weapons of mass
destruction, covered in the first phase, make a dead-
line imperative-possibly 1990, the end of the Second
Disarmament Decade. 25X1
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Given its casual treatment of the CPD issue, Moscow
probably does not expect any real progress to be made
and probably hopes that the exercise will create
additional divisions between the West and the nona-
ligned. It hopes to place itself in an advantageous
position by giving tacit support to the nonaligned
position. Moscow will actively enter the debate only if
a document is about to be concluded that would
significantly circumscribe its ability to maneuver on
arms control negotiations with the West.
Most Western states are reluctant to agree to a
program that commits them to meet arbitrary dead-
lines even with adequate verification mechanisms,
security guarantees, and workable alternative meth-
ods for resolving international conflicts. The West
also desires a link between nuclear and conventional
disarmament. Many states feel that negotiations
limiting conventional arms should parallel discussions
of nuclear disarmament to prevent destablizing the
East-West military balance and giving the nonaligned
a free ride in the early stages of a CPD.
A West German proposal, for example, calls for an
undetermined number of open-ended disarmament
phases. In each phase, nations would undertake nego-
tiations on a specific set of interrelated measures
while determining an agenda for the next phase.
Periodic UN reviews of the CPD process would
replace the time limits set forth under the nonaligned
proposal.
Both the nonaligned and the West continue to develop
new positions, and it is possible that progress on the
CPD issue could be made at SSOD II. Within the last
several months, some nonaligned nations have indicat-
ed that they might accept a statement of agreed
principles as an alternative to adoption of a complete
CPD as part of the final documents of SSOD II.
Pakistan has stated that it would support a nonbind-
ing CPD, signed later by heads of state of the great
powers and approved by a UN Security Council vote.
Sri Lanka and others believe that such a genuine
political commitment to a CPD by the United States,
the Soviet Union, and their allies is an acceptable
substitute to adopting a CPD at SSOD II. They have
indicated in the CD that they are willing to compro-
mise on this issue because the alternative they face is
continued stalemate, which could undermine support
for future multilateral negotiations and give credence
to those nonalign d tates who fay closer ties with
the Soviet Union. 25X1
Nuclear Disarmament
The lack of progress on nuclear weapons issues en-
sures that they will be at least as important and
controversial as the CPD issue. Strategic arms control
between the superpowers and the CTB issue will be
the focus of this discussion. The nonaligned in pre-
vious multilateral disarmament discussions have
pointed to the nuclear arsenals of the great powers as
the most significant threat to world peace. Nuclear
issues are also of immediate interest to most nona-
ligned countries because they offer the greatest oppor-
tunity for maintaining nonaligned negotiating unity in
SSOD II. Further, the focus on nuclear weapons
allows the nonaligned to sidestep any efforts to i)lace
limits on their own conventional arsenals.
25X1
Strategic Arms Control Negotiations. The majority
of neutral and nonaligned nations are unknowledgea-
ble about, and unsympathetic to, detailed arguments
concerning the strategic nuclear balance. Some na-
tions, like Mexico, specifically reject nuclear deter-
rence as a stabilizing factor in the world. Peru and
Yugoslavia link continued adherence to the NPT by
nonnuclear weapons states to real progress toward
nuclear disarmament. These states may try to insert
such thoughts in a Final Document and almost cer-
tainly will want SSOD II to declare strongly its
disappointment over the failure of the superpowers to
fulfill their promises for a second strategic arms
agreement.F____1 25X1
Most of the nonaligned will blame the United States
for the absence of a strategic arms control agreement
since October 1977. Washington deferred ratification
of the SALT II treaty in January 1980, following the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the current ad-
ministration has opposed resurrecting it. Most US
allies and some neutral and nonaligned states recog-
nize that Moscow's global behavior accounts for
present US attitudes, but all wish that Washington
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had ratified the agreement to set the stage for addi-
tional negotiations. More specifically, many nations
are impatient over the 18-month review of policy by
the new US administration prior to any resumption of
negotiations. 25X1
President Reagan's call for the elimination of all
intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe and the
announcement of United States readiness to initiate
Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) beginning
this summer should prevent foreign critics from focus-
ing exclusively on the United States. US allies wel-
come these initiatives and will work to make any
discussion of strategic arms control evenhanded in its
treatment of the two superpowers.
25X1
We believe Moscow will maneuver cautiously to
deflect neutral and nonaligned criticism away from
itself and toward the United States while trying to
avoid souring the atmosphere for the resumption of
bilateral strategic arms control negotiations. The
USSR will probably call attention to public discus-
sions in the United States of "nuclear war fighting
strategy" and Washington's rejection of the Soviet
proposal to freeze intermediate-range nuclear forces
in Europe at current levels. It will also try to associate
itself with the idea of a declaration of no first use of
nuclear weapons by pointing to Brezhnev's proposed
multilateral no first use declaration in 1978 and to a
1981 Indian UN resolution calling for a prohibition
on the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.
25X1
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban. The lack of US-
UK-USSR agreement after five years of negotiations
on a treaty prohibiting all nuclear testing will be
another major point of contention at SSOD II. The
three negotiating parties noted significant progress
toward a treaty and expressed their desire to achieve
early agreement in a report to the Committee on
Disarmament in July 1980. Negotiations have been in
abeyance since November 1980. As in the past,
neutral and nonaligned states will argue that only a
lack of political will blocks a final CTB agreement
and probably will insist that the Special Session call
for a speedy resumption of the trilateral negotiations.
25X1
Nearly all US allies favor a nuclear test ban, and
while some may stand with the United States against
nonaligned attempts to insert sharply critical com-
ments on the CTB delay in any conference statement,
most will likely endorse a call for completion of a
treaty. Japan, the Netherlands, and Australia appear
most willing to diverge from the US desire to avoid
explicit declarations calling for a test ban treaty any
time soon.
The Soviet Union has more room for maneuvering on
the CTB issue than on strategic arms talks. It is less
concerned than the United States and the United
Kingdom about the need for strong verification meas-
ures to monitor an absolute ban. Moreover, on the
political level, the Soviets undoubtedly realize that
French and Chinese refusal to accept such a treaty
would provide a convenient excuse for setting a fixed
date for the expiration of any treaty. They will argue,
as they have for two years in the CD, that the United
States and the United Kingdom have delayed the
talks and will stress, as the nonaligned have, the view
that only a lack of political will on the part of the
West blocks a treaty. Moscow could extend its criti-
cism to France and China as parties unwilling to
engage in nuclear arms control, but these states will
argue that significant reductions in the nuclear arse-
nals of the superpowers must occur prior to a univer-
sal test ban that otherwise would freeze in place the
current nuclear preponderance of the United States
and the Soviet Union
The Soviet position has been weakened to some degree
by US success on the issue of a CTB working group at
this year's CD meeting. The United States achieved a
tactical victory in March when it proposed establish-
ment of a working group with a mandate limited to
verification and compliance issues. Despite hasty So-
viet efforts to get nonaligned nations to hold out for
more, agreement was reached between Western and
nonaligned nations. On the last day of the CD
meeting, Moscow reluctantly endorsed the idea rather
than become the only nation opposing procedural
progress.
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Moscow could encourage nonaligned nations to seek
an endorsement by SSOD II of an expansion in the
mandate of the new working group in an attempt to
isolate Washington once again. We doubt that moder-
ate activists-Brazil, Yugoslavia, Sweden, and Sri
Lanka-among the nonaligned will press this proposal
at the conference, however, because they probably
realize the new working group must be given some
chance to hold discussions before any attempt is made
to broaden its focus.
Institutional Reform
The First Special Session made a number of signifi-
cant changes in disarmament institutions:
? The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament
was changed to Committee on Disarmament and
was expanded from 30 to 40 members.
? The moribund UN Disarmament Commission was
revived as a deliberative body to give additional
states representation on arms control matters.
? The importance of the UN Center on Disarmament
was increased by enlarging its staff and expanding
its research and public information programs.
Most states are generally satisfied with these institu-
tions and believe that the lack of arms control prog-
ress reflects a failure of political trust and will, and
not a failure of institutions. Only a few states will
present initiatives for institutional change. If agree-
ment cannot be reached on the major substantive
issues, tinkering with the disarmament institutions
and procedures may become the last resort for those
states wishing the meeting to show some concrete
results.
It is highly likely that the conference will recommend
convening a Third Special Session. This would pro-
vide the international community with a regularly
scheduled forum for assessing progress on disarma-
ment. Although some states probably view such ses-
sions as a waste of time and money, few are likely to
object publicly to holding additional disarmament
sessions. Most of the nonaligned will view a third
session as an institutionalization of the gains they
have made in acquiring a greater voice in the disar-
mament field.
Proposals for enlarging the CD have an even chance
for success. Sweden intends to propose a small expan-
sion of the committee and several other nations-
Norway, Turkey, Finland, and Austria-are seeking
a seat on it. Membership on the CD is now carefully
balanced between 21 neutral and nonaligned, 10
Western, eight Eastern states, and China. To preserve
this balance, additions to any one bloc would necessi-
tate additions to the others, resulting in the addition
of 10 to 20 members. This would make substantive
negotiations in committee sessions all but impossible
unless agreement was reached on rotating seats
among selected group members or on establishing
special forms of limited membership.
The previous expansion of the CD reduced the will-
ingness of the major powers to conduct negotiations in
this forum and generally made proceedings slower
and more unwieldy. Most Western states have joined
the United States in opposing further enlargement of
the committee. Portugal, Denmark, Canada, France,
the Netherlands, and West Germany, however, may
be willing to acquiesce if significant support for
expansion comes from the nonaligned. The Soviet
Union may also be willing to reverse its position if it
believes that an enlarged committee would include
more nonaligned states sympathetic to its concerns.
25X1
Organizational changes designed to improve UN abil-
ity to verify existing arms control agreements are less
likely to be adopted. France has proposed the estab-
lishment of an International Satellite Monitoring
Agency, and a handful of others have supported the
creation of an International Disarmament Organiza-
tion devoted to ensuring compliance with arms control
agreements. Some national leaders believe such insti-
tutions could play a major role in monitoring adher-
ence to a variety of confidence-building measures-
(CBM), which many states will propose as the next
prudent step in the disarmament process. Neverthe-
less, significant disagreement exists over the legal and
practical aspects of extending UN verification author-
ity at the expense of national sovereignty.
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Vyacheslav Aleksandrovich
Ustinov (USSR), UN Under Sec-
retary General for Political and
The Soviet Union has long called for a World Disar-
mament Conference that would serve as a propaganda
platform for attacking Western governments and
lending support to Western peace and disarmament
groups. SSOD I called for the convening of such a
conference, at some appropriate time, but the issue
has received little attention. It is unlikely that
SSOD II will do more than endorse the idea of a
World Disarmament Conference because Special Ses-
sions of the UN General Assembly are viewed by
(July 1981 -
Ustinov, a 30-year veteran of the Soviet foreign service, has had
extensive experience in Third World affairs. He has consistently
interfered with the UN investigation of the use of chemical weapons
by the Soviet Union and its allies. Ustinov is very cautious in
discussing Soviet policy and does not go beyond the official linen
A group of Western and nonaligned states may
attempt to improve UN verification capabilities by
removing the UN Disarmament Center from the
control of UN Undersecretary General Ustinov of the
Soviet Union and giving its Swedish Director Marten-
sen more autonomy. They resent Ustinov's consistent
interference with UN investigations into Soviet use of
chemical weapons in Afghanistan and Soviet-spon-
sored use of chemical weapons and toxins in Southeast
Asia. Ustinov's performance has led most Western
states to oppose the creation or enlargment of any
functional UN disarmament agency which might be
controlled by a Soviet or pro-Soviet international civil
servant
Among the proposals least likely to be adopted is the
Canadian proposal to abolish all present UN disarma-
ment institutions and replace them with a Disarma-
ment Conference. Such a conference would hold
general debate for only three weeks each year to limit
the now perennial polemical debates on disarmament
in UN institutions. Serious negotiations would be
limited to small groups with permanent or rotating
membership, which would meet throughout the year.
The Canadians believe that this arrangement would
end demands for expanding the CD and institutional-
izing the Special Sessions on Disarmament. The
conference could also monitor implementation of a
CPD and other disarmament treaties.
most participants as more workable forums.
Any institutional changes agreed to at SSOD II will
have little immediate impact on progress in the
disarmament field. Organizational reforms could,
however, play an important role in demonstrating
national commitment to the process of disarmament.
Moreover, once institutions are created and negotia-
tions begun, eligible states feel obliged to participate
and may even be compelled by international or do-
mestic public pressure to demonstrate success. By
their very existence, new forums could affect national
positions on arms control.
The conference will consider a number of other issues
contained in the Final Document of SSOD I or raised
by national initiatives. Marginal growth in the level of
economic aid provided by the developed countries to
LDCs in the past few years and the debilitating
effects of the current global economic slowdown will
probably generate considerable interest in the rela-
tionship between disarmament and economic develop-
ment. We believe less developed countries may seek
conference endorsement of a disarmament-develop-
ment fund as a concrete step that could be taken at
SSOD II. Neither of the superpower blocs are likely
to endorse this idea. An SSOD I-mandated study,
completed in 1981 under the chairmanship of Swedish
Undersecretary of State for Disarmament Inga
Thorsson, will undoubtedly be the basis for discussion.
The study concluded that:
? The arms race and underdevelopment are not two
problems but one and, accordingly, must be solved
together.
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Belgium Verification mechanism for 1925 Geneva Protocol
Canada Standing UN Conference on Disarmament
Denmark Nuclear Proliferation; Disarmament and Development
France International Satellite Verification Agency
Federal Republic of Germany Principles for a Comprehensive Program of Disarmament; Ban on Chemical Weapons
India Nonuse of Force Convention
Italy International Verification Agency; Limitations on Conventional Weapons Transfers
Japan Ban on Attacks on Safeguarded Nuclear Reactors
Norway International Arms Control Impact Statements
International Exchange of Data on Seismic Events
Sweden International Conference on Verification and Compliance With the Biological Weapons
Convention
Call for the Resumption of US-USSR Bilateral Negotiations on Outer Space Arms Control
International Discussion of Antiballistic Missile Developments and Their Implications for
Outer Space
Protocol to the Radiological Weapons Treaty Prohibiting Attacks on Peaceful Nuclear
Facilities
US-USSR Radiological Weapons Treaty (draft)
USSR Outer Space Treaty
Nonfirst Use of Nuclear Weapons Agreement
Moratorium on Nuclear Weapons Deployment
World Disarmament Conference
? Growing East-West tension threatens to spill into
the entire field of international economic relations.
? Military outlays work to the detriment of less
developed economies.
economic and social costs attributable to military
spending.
? The UN should consider establishing an interna-
tional development fund financed by savings that
ures.
Many Western states-Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Ja-
pan, Norway, and West Germany-motivated by
domestic pressures and fears of increased superpower
confrontation, will advocate a number of discrete
steps which could be implemented to consolidate
previous arms control agreements and to restore
momentum to the disarmament process. Following the
lead of the United States, they will highlight verifica-
tion issues. Swedish diplomats have indicated to US
officials that Sweden will call for an international
conference to establish a verification mechanism for
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the 1974 Treaty on Biological Weapons, and Belgium
may make a similar initiative on verification of the
1925 Geneva Protocol on chemical warfare. China
has expressed tacit support for these initiatives by
noting that it will not agree to any new limitations on
these weapons unless compliance wiih_existing agree-
ments can be adequately verified.
Other Western countries will draw attention to meas-
ures which could easily be agreed to or implemented
through voluntary compliance. Norway, for example,
has informed the West it will propose that national
arms control impact statements be submitted to the
UN on new major weapons systems and military
programs. Many Western states hope that such infor-
mation exchanges and other Confidence-Building
Measures will help to restore credibility to the arms
control process and ease international tensions. They
acknowledge that the present international climate
does not favor complex and dramatic initiatives but
believe that symbolic and incremental steps might
prepare the way for more meaningful agreements in
the future.
In contrast to these limited measures, the Soviet
Union and its allies will restate their ambitious disar-
mament proposals in a variety of areas: outer space,
new weapons of mass destruction, and nonuse of force
agreements. It is also possible that the Soviets will
table new sweeping proposals at SSOD II. They could
characterize Western insistence on detailed verifica-
tion and information exchanges as obstructionism and
may note that Soviet proposals in 1981 for establish-
ing CBMs in the Far East were rejected by Japan and
China. Further, Moscow will lobby for the creation of
additional international public education programs,
which could be used as propaganda, platforms to
attack the West for the lack of progress on disarma-
ment
Individually and collectively, these issues could play
an important role at SSOD II. Given a widespread
desire to make the conference at least a nominal
success, one or more national initiatives could be
seized upon as a vehicle for tangible progress. This
possibility will become more likely if progress cannot
be made on the CPD, nuclear disarmament, or insti-
tutional reform. On many issues, particularly ques-
tions of verification and information exchange, West-
ern interests parallel those of influential LDCs,
placing Soviet-aligned nations in the minority. While
voting on specific measures remains unlikely, Moscow
and its allies may be pressured into making minor
tactical concessions or breaking the valued goal of
consensus.
The number and complexity of issues and the diversi-
ty of national positions almost guarantee difficulty in
achieving meaningful agreements at the SSOD II.
The addition of East-West tensions to fundamental
disagreements between the major powers and the
neutral and nonaligned nations creates an atmosphere
conducive to sharp exchanges and acrimonious discus-
sion.
On balance, the most likely outcome is a short
cosmetic declaration reaffirming the principles and
goals established by SSOD I and calling for addition-
al work on a CPD in continuing multilateral forums.
This would be widely perceived as disappointing, but
not as a complete failure. Several less likely outcomes
are possible, however:
? A declaration that sidesteps disagreement on a CPD
by endorsing specific principles or proposals on
nuclear issues, expansion of the CD, and possibly on
new initiatives made at SSOD II.
? A longer, compromise Final Document that en-
dorses a nonbinding CPD and calls for further
intensive negotiations.
? A stalemated conference that adjourns in confronta-
tion with consensus only on the need for general
progress toward disarmament and on the desirabil-
ity of holding a subsequent SSOD III.
? A conference that breaks consensus and votes on
individual issues, forcing some nations, including
the United States, to vote in opposition
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Alfonso Garcia Robles
(Mexico), Chairman of the CD
Working Grou
(1981-82)
25X1
Garcia Robles often serves as a spokesman for the nonaligned on
disarmament issues. His nearly obsessive commitment to a Compre-
hensive Program of Disarmament-and his relative autonomy from
Foreign Ministry control-may prevent him from compromising on
a CPD formula. He is likely to hold out for a legally binding program
The actual outcome of the meeting is likely to depend
on the flexibility and diplomatic skill of the leaders of
SSOD II working groups, as well as those individuals
who negotiate informally on behalf of the various
groups of states. Mexican Ambassador Garcia Robles
is attempting to play a major role at the conference by
becoming chairman of the Session's CPD Working
Group. He has become almost fanatically attached to
his own concept of a CPD and is not very sensitive to
Western concerns. He was ineffective in working out
agreement on this issue as chairman of the CPD
Working Group in the Committee on Disarmament
and, according to diplomatic sources, probably plans
to marshal support in the G-77 for his own CPD draft
to be tabled at the Special Session. Garcia Robles was
instrumental in creating a confrontation between the
United States and nonaligned nations over the CTB
issue at the 1980 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
Review Conference and, we suspect, may prefer a
similar outcome this year if the alternative is a weak
25X1 CPD.
Others, such as the Nigerian Ambassador Adeniji, the
Swedish representative Lidvard, and the Brazilian
Ambassador Sousa y Silva, are committed to the goal
of forcing concessions from major powers, but are
more willing to innovate and compromise. These
leaders have indicated in preparatory meetings that
Oluyemi Adeniji (Nigeria),
Chairman of the Preparatory
Committeefor SSOD II (1980-
Adeniji, noted for his negotiating ability and forcefulness, has nearly
two decades of experience in UN-related affairs. Generally pro-
West in political outlook, he is, nonetheless, a staunch advocate of
nonalignment. He has sought compromise with the West at the CD,
where in 1980 he served as the first chairman of the Workin GrouD
on a Comprehensive Program of Disarmament. 25X1
they are not as concerned about achieving a CPD at
this time and privately share the Western view that
the comprehensive approach is a confusing and unre-
alistic morass. They may attempt to sidestep the
problem by seeking specific declarations on nuclear
disarmament, measures to prevent nuclear war and
build international confidence, and on other second-
ary issues that reaffirm and embody the objectives of
the Final Document of SSOD I. Finally, nonaligned
leaders in the General Assembly not normally in-
volved in disarmament negotiations will play an im-
portant role at the Special Session, as they do in all
General Assembly sessions. Former Iraqi Ambassador
Kittani, President of the General Assembly, will wield
considerable authority on procedural issues at the
conference. Algerian Ambassador Bedjaoui, Chair-
man of the G-77, will be able to exert influence when
the G-77 caucus to consider important substantive
questions. 25X1
We believe the responsiveness of Western delegations
to the concern of these neutral and nonaligned leaders
will be critical in determining how the outcome of
SSOD II is perceived. West European and Japanese
leaders will try to display flexibility and are prepared
to sign nonbinding declarations on most issues to
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mollify both the nonaligned and Western disarma-
ment groups. In contrast, the USSR and its allies
showed surprising clumsiness in handling the array of
multilateral issues on the agenda at the CD. Moscow
may find itself at a disadvantage at SSOD II because
of its inability to do more than restate longstanding
views in the face of a confusing, fast-moving, and
poorly prepared meeting. It also may be on the
defensive now that Washington has announced its
START proposals. President Reagan's "zero option"
speech before the opening of the INF talks last year
had such an effect.
25X1
Implications for the United States
The announcement that President Reagan will ad-
dress the session already has produced a positive
foreign response which should continue through the
conference itself. Many participants will view the
Presidential speech to the General Assembly and the
announcement of US willingness to begin strategic
arms negotiations with the Soviet Union as si ns of
25X1 Washington's commitment to arms control
Many nations will also be attentive to US positions
and behavior during the general debate and work of
the conference's various subgroups. Delegates from
many nonaligned nations indicated that they were
extremely disappointed in what they saw as the
polemical attitude of the United States at the last
session of the General Assembly. The US delegation
was perceived as being needlessly provocative in its
attacks on the Soviet Union. The nonaligned view the
Special Session as a dialogue between the developed
and developing nations-a dialogue in which they
expect the superpowers to take all the first steps in
reducing arms and controlling means of destruction
despite the role their own pursuit of weapons and
armed conflicts play in preventing multilateral arms
control. If the conference takes on the character of an
East-West debate and does not address the nona-
ligned concern for arms reduction between the super-
powers, they will view SSOD II as a failure. Because
sweeping and unverifiable Soviet disarmament pro-
posals generally are closer to those of the nonaligned,
the United States would be held responsibly
conference that ends in confrontation.
25X1
The outcome of the session could also have some
impact on US foreign and arms control policies. The
most likely scenario for SSOD II, an acrimonious
session ending in cosmetic agreement, probably would
not further undermine Western unity in multilateral
disarmament negotiations. It probably would pre-
serve, though not advance, ties which Washington has
cultivated with moderate nonaligned states. Impor-
tant nongovernmental organizations will be disap-
pointed with such a conference result, but Moscow
would not be able to exploit this dissatisfaction to
effect a decrease in allied support for US negotiating 25X1
positions in the START and INF talks.
A less satisfactory outcome, one which ends in stale-
mate, might cause West European and Japanese
leaders to take stands divergent from those of the
United States to preserve their image with the nona-
ligned and at home. This would enable radical and
pro-Soviet nonaligned states to become increasingly
influential in multilateral disarmament forums, and
nonaligned activists in arms control would become
more difficult to deal with. The Soviet Union would
undoubtedly take advantage of these developments in
an attempt to isolate the United States at future
meetings of the CD and the UN General Assembly.
Moreover, Moscow might try to benefit from such a
climate by pressuring Washington for cessions in
bilateral negotiations on nuclear weapons.
Regardless of its individual successes and failures,
SSOD II will be seen by the leading neutral and
nonaligned states as an indicator of not only the status
of the disarmament process but also the condition of
East-West and North-South relations. In particular,
the Second Special Session on Disarmament will color
perceptions of US, West European, and Japanese
willingness to address nonaligned concerns in other
issue areas, notably negotiations for a new interna-
economic order
tional
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Appendix A
Glossary of Terms
ABM
BW
CBM
CD
CDE
CPD
CSCE
CTB
CW
G-77
INF
IOZP
LDC
MBFR
NAM
NATO
NGO
NPT
NSA
PNE
RW
SALT
SSOD
START
TTBT
UNDC
Antiballistic missile
Biological weapons
Confidence-building measures
Committee on Disarmament
Conference on Disarmament in Europe
Comprehensive Program of Disarmament
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
Comprehensive test ban
Chemical weapons
Group of 77 Nonaligned States
Intermediate-range nuclear forces
Indian Ocean Zone of Peace
Less developed country
Mutual and balanced force reductions
Nonaligned movement
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Nongovernmental Organization
Non-Proliferation Treaty
Negative Security Assurances
Peaceful nuclear explosions
Radiological weapons
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
Special Session on Disarmament
(UN General Assembly)
Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
Threshold Test Ban
United Nations Disarmament Commission
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Appendix B
Excerpts From the SSOD I Final Document
11. Mankind today is confronted with an unprece-
dented threat of self-extinction arising from the
massive and competitive accumulation of the most
destructive weapons ever produced.
12. The arms race, particularly in its nuclear aspect,
runs counter to efforts to achieve further relaxation
of international tension, to establish international
relations based on peaceful coexistence and trust
between all States, and to develop broad internation-
al co-operation and understanding. The arms race
impedes the realization of the purposes, and is incom-
patible with the principles, of the Charter of the
United Nations.... It also adversely affects the right
of peoples freely to determine their systems of social
and economic development, and hinders the struggle
for self-determination and the elimination of colonial
rule, racial or foreign domination or occupation....
13. Enduring international peace and security cannot
be built on the accumulation of weaponry by military
alliances nor be sustained by a precarious balance of
deterrence or doctrines of strategic superiority.
16. In a world offinite resources there is a close
relationship between expenditure on armaments and
economic and social development.... The economic
and social consequences of the arms race are so
detrimental that its continuation is obviously incom-
patible with the implementation of the new interna-
tional economic order based on justice, equity and co-
operation.
17. No real progress has been made so far in the
crucial field of reduction of armaments. Agreements
have been reached that have been important in limit-
ing certain weapons or eliminating them altogeth-
er.... These partial measures have done little to
bring the world closer to the goal of general and
complete disarmament....
43. The present Programme of Action contains prior-
ities and measures in the field of disarmament that
States should undertake as a matter of urgency.
45. Priorities in disarmament negotiations shall be:
nuclear weapons; other weapons of mass destruction,
including chemical weapons; conventional weapons,
including any which may be deemed to be excessively
injurious or to have indiscriminate effects; and reduc-
tion of armed forces.
51. The cessation of nuclear-weapon testing by all
States within the framework of an effective nuclear
disarmament process would be in the interest of
mankind.
52. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the
United States of America should conclude at the
earliest possible date the agreement they have been
pursuing for several years in the second series of the
strategic arms limitation talks. It should be followed
promptly by further strategic arms limitation negoti-
ations ... leading to agreed significant reductions of
and qualitative limitations on, strategic arms.
59. In the same context, the nuclear-weapon States
are called upon to take steps to assure the non-
nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of
use of nuclear weapons.
60. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones
on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among
the States of the region concerned constitutes an
important disarmament measure.
64. The establishment of zones of peace in various
regions of the world under appropriate conditions....
can contribute to strengthening the security of States
within such zones and to international peace and
security as a whole.
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65. It is imperative, as an integral part of the effort
to halt and reverse the arms race, to prevent the
proliferation of nuclear weapons. The goal of nuclear
non-proliferation is on the one hand to prevent the
emergence of any additional nuclear-weapon States
besides the existing five nuclear-weapon States, and
on the other progressively to reduce and eventually
eliminate nuclear weapons altogether. This involves
obligations and responsibilities on the part of both
nuclear-weapons States and non-nuclear-weapon
States....
66. Effective measures can and should be taken at
the national level and through international agree-
ments to minimize the danger of the proliferation of
nuclear weapons without jeopardizing energy supplies
or the development of nuclear energy for peaceful
purposes.
67. Full implementation of all the provisions of
existing instruments on non-proliferation ... by
States parties to those instruments will be an impor-
tant contribution to this end. Adherence to such
instruments has increased in recent years and the
hope has been expressed by the parties that this trend
might continue.
68. Non-proliferation measures should not jeopard-
ize the full exercise of the inalienable rights of all
States to apply and develop their programmes for the
peaceful uses of nuclear energy for economic and
social development in conformity with their priorities,
interests and needs. All States should also have
access to and be free to acquire technology, equip-
ment and materials for peaceful uses of nuclear
energy, taking into account the particular needs of
the developing countries....
72. All States should adhere to the Protocol for the
Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating,
Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological
Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June
1925.
73. All States which have not yet done so should
consider adhering to the Convention of the Prohibi-
tion of the Development, Production and Stockpiling
of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons
and on Their Destruction.
75. The complete and effective prohibition of the
development, production and stockpiling of all chemi-
cal weapons and their destruction represents one of
the most urgent measures of disarmament.
76. A convention should be concluded prohibiting the
development, production, stockpiling and use of ra-
diological weapons.
77. In order to help prevent a qualitative arms race
and so that scientific and technological achievements
may ultimately be used solely for peaceful purposes,
effective measures should be taken to avoid the
danger and prevent the emergence of new types of
weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific
principles and achievements.
80. In order to prevent an arms race in outer space,
further measures should be taken and appropriate
international negotiations held in accordance with the
spirit of the Treaty on Principles Governing the
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies.
81. Together with negotiations on nuclear disarma-
ment measures, the limitation and gradual reduction
of armed forces and conventional weapons should be
resolutely pursued within the framework of progress
towards general and complete disarmament. States
with the largest military arsenals have a special
responsibility in pursuing the process of conventional
armaments reductions.
82. In particular the achievement of a more stable
situation in Europe at a lower level of military
potential... would contribute to the strengthening of
security in Europe and constitute a significant step
towards enhancing international peace and
security....
85. Consultations should be carried out among ma-
jor arms supplier and recipient countries on the
limitation of all types of international transfer of
conventional weapons, based in particular on the
principle of undiminished security of the parties with
a view to promoting or enhancing stability at a lower
military level, taking into account the need of all
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States to protect their security as well as the inalien-
able right to self-determination and independence of
peoples under colonial or foreign domination and the
obligations of States to respect that right.
89. Gradual reduction of military budgets on a mu-
tually agreed basis, for example, in absolute figures
or in terms of percentage points, particularly by
nuclear-weapon States and other militarily signifi-
cant States, would be a measure that would contrib-
ute to the curbing of the arms race and would
increase the possibilities of reallocation of resources
now being used for military purposes to economic and
social development, particularly for the benefit of the
developing countries.
91. In order to facilitate the conclusion and effective
implementation of disarmament agreements and to
create confidence, States should accept appropriate
provisions for verification in such agreements.
92. In the context of international disarmament ne-
gotiations, the problem of verification should be
further examined and adequate methods and proce-
dures in this field be considered. Every effort should
be made to develop appropriate methods and proce-
dures which are nondiscriminatory and which do not
unduly interfere with the internal affairs of other
States or jeopardize their economic and social
development.
93. In order to facilitate the process of disarmament,
it is necessary to take measures and pursue policies
to strengthen international peace and security and to
build confidence among States. Negotiations on gen-
eral and complete disarmament shall be conducted
concurrently with negotiations on partial measures of
disarmament. With this purpose in mind, the Com-
mittee on Disarmament will undertake the elabora-
tion of a comprehensive programme of disarmament
encompassing all measures thought to be advisable in
order to ensure that the goal of general and complete
disarmament under effective international control
becomes a reality in a world in which international
peace and security prevail and in which the new
international economic order is strengthened and
consolidated.
103. To encourage study and research on disarma-
ment, the United Nations Centre for Disarmament
should intensify its activities in the presentation of
information concerning the armaments race and
disarmament.
113. In addition to the need to exercise political will,
the international machinery should be utilized more
effectively and also improved to enable implementa-
tion of the Programme of Action and help the United
Nations to fulfill its role in the field of disarmament.
In spite of the best efforts of the international com-
munity, adequate results have not been produced
with the existing machinery. There is, therefore, an
urgent need that existing disarmament machinery be
revitalized and forums appropriately constituted for
disarmament deliberations and negotiations with a
better representative character. For maximum effec-
tiveness, two kinds of bodies are required in the field
of disarmament-deliberative and negotiating. All
Member States should be represented on the former,
whereas the latter, for the sake of convenience,
should have a relatively small membership.
115. The General Assembly has been and should
remain the main deliberative organ of the United
Nations in the field of disarmament....
117. The First Committee of the General Assembly
should deal in the future only with questions of
disarmament and ,elated international security
questions.
118. The General Assembly establishes ... a Disar-
mament Commission, composed of all States Mem-
bers of the United Nations, and decides that.
(a) The Disarmament Commission shall be a de-
liberative body, a subsidiary organ of the General
Assembly, the function of which shall be to consid-
er and make recommendations on various prob-
lems in the field of disarmament and to follow up
the relevant decisions and recommendations of the
special session devoted to disarmament.
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119. A second special session of the General Assem-
bly devoted to disarmament should be held on a date
to be decided by the Assembly at its thirty-third
session.
120. The Assembly welcomes the agreement reached
following appropriate consultations among the Mem-
ber States during the special session of the General
Assembly devoted to disarmament that the Commit-
tee on Disarmament will be open to the nuclear-
weapon States, and thirty-two to thirty-five other
States to be chosen in consultation with the President
of the thirty-second session of the Assembly; that the
membership of the Committee on Disarmament will
be reviewed at regular intervals.
122. At the earliest appropriate time, a world-disar-
mament conference should be convened with univer-
sal participation and with adequate preparation.
123. In order to enable the United Nations to contin-
ue tofulfill its role in the field of disarmament and to
carry out the additional tasks assigned to it by this
special session, the United Nations Centre for Disar-
mament should be adequately strengthened and its
research and information functions accordingly ex-
tended. The Centre should also increase contacts with
non-governmental organizations and research institu-
tions in view of the valuable role they play in the field
of disarmament.
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A Comparison of Proposals for the First Stage of a
Comprehensive Program of Disarmament a
21 Neutral and Nonaligned States
Five Western States
A legally binding treaty. First stage should be
completed in 3 to 10 years. Three or four stages should
lead to general and complete disarmament within 10
to 30 years.
An indicative declaration. First phase is of indetermi-
nate time with a review at the end of Second
Disarmament Decade (1990), leading to further
phases when appropriate with an ultimate goal of
general and complete disarmament.
Strategic
Ratification of SALT II; reduction of US and USSR
warheads and vehicles by 20.
Continue negotiations; conclude agreements where
possible.
Reduce.
Continue negotiations; conclude agreements where
possible.
Comprehensive
Test Ban
Agreement.
Continue. negotiations;
possible. conclude agreements where
Ban on production
and improvements
Agreement.
Nonuse
Unconditional guarantees for nonnuclear weapons
states; agreements for nonuse.
Begin efforts to negotiate.
Nonproliferation
Strengthen treaty in particular guarantee of access for
all states to modern technology.
Strengthen all aspects of treaty and assure universal
adherence.
Regional
Emphasize nuclear-free-zones measures.
Nuclear-free zones part of collateral measures; more
emphasis in Phase 2.
Other weapons of
mass destruction
Chemical
Conclude agreement.
Continue negotiations.
Biological
Universal adherence.
Strengthen compliance and verification.
Conventional Weapons
US-USSR
25 percent overall reduction.
C
ti
i
i
f
Other European
states
Reduction of forces.
on
nue negot
at
ons o
mutual and balanced force
reductions; more in Phase 2.
Other militarily
significant states
Reduction.
Arms race
Reductions by major producers.
Study relation of producers and recipients; more in
Phase 2.
Expenditures
Immediate freeze by US and USSR. Budget reduc-
tions by militarily significant states.
Study uniform reporting system; reductions in
Phase 2.
An important precondition for each arms limitation or
disarmament element.
Peaceful settlement
of disputes
Strengthen institutions.
Reallocation of resources to developing countries.
No provision.
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