THE SOVIET PACIFIC FISHING FLEET: AFTER MORE THAN FISH

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00231R000100140001-8
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• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 27, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 1, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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The Soviet Pacific
Fishing Fleet:
After More Than Fish
NAVY review
completed.
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Directorate of Secret
The Soviet Pacific
Fishing Fleet:
After More Than Fish
An Intelligence Assessment
Information available as of 23 March 1982
has been used in the preparation of this report.
Secret
GI 82-10065
March 1982
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The Soviet Pacific
Fishing Fleet:
After More Than Fish
Key Judgments The Pacific Ocean is now the USSR's premier fishing ground. Soviet
fishing vessels regularly operate around its rim, off the coasts of New
Zealand, Peru, and Chile, over scattered points in midocean, and just
outside foreign coastal zones. With coastal fisheries increasingly denied,
Moscow will probably next expand fleet operations to the Pacific regions of
the Antarctic. Such operations-including transit to and from the fishing
grounds-would extend the Soviet presence over a still broader area of the
Pacific.
The Pacific now provides one-half of the USSR's total annual ocean catch.
During the 1970s fish provided about 15 percent of the animal protein in
the Soviet diet. Of late this food source has assumed increasing impor-
tance, since the catch is obtained without the massive hard currency
expenditures associated with grain imports. The fishing grounds off the
north Asian coast remain the most important for the Soviets, currently
producing some four-fifths of the annual Pacific Ocean catch. Fishing
grounds lying just outside the Chilean and Peruvian 200-mile coastal zones
rank second, with those off North America and New Zealand ranking
third and fourth, respectively. To facilitate its fishing operations, the
USSR has concluded a number of bilateral agreements with Pacific
countries. These include licensing arrangements that allow Soviet vessels to
fish in foreign coastal zones, joint fishing ventures with local private
companies, and port use agreements that provide repair, supply, and crew
transfer facilities. Some countries suspended these agreements after the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, but Moscow continues efforts to establish
more, especially with the newly independent island countries in the tropical
Pacific
Secret
GI 82-10065
March 1982
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Whatever its secondary objectives, the extended activities of the Soviet
fishing fleet increasingly impact on US interests. Soviet vessels will appear
more frequently in shipping lanes vital to the United States and Japan and
in areas of ANZUS naval maneuvers. ANZUS navies will therefore find it
more difficult to operate unobserved in the Pacific.
Moscow is also pushing to
sign fishing agreements with as many South Pacific :island nations as
possible. Such agreements would institutionalize the Soviet presence and
provide increased opportunity to influence the policies of the nations there.
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The Soviet Pacific
Fishing Fleet:
After More Than Fish
The Soviet fishing fleet is the largest in the world.
With some 4,500 vessels of 100 gross registered tons
or :pore, it accounts for more than half of the world's
fishing tonnage. The fleet consists of a variety of
trawlers and seiners as well as factory ships that
perform a full range of processing operations. Fishing
fleet operations are routinely supported by tankers,
supply ships, rescue tugs, and research ships. Fleet
eqLipment is constantly updated, and Soviet fishing
vessel technology is second to none in sophistication.
Prcductivity is another matter. Japan, with a fleet
two-thirds the size, consistently out produces the
USSR, in large part through more efficient use of
labor.
almost all parts of the Pacific. Nearly 1,700 Soviet
ships operated in the Pacific area last year, making
the Soviet fleet the largest in the region. Fishing and
port-call agreements reached with a number of coun-
Focus on the Pacific
Soviet activity in the Pacific has increased markedly
during the past decade. The Soviet Navy now operates
throughout the Pacific, although the Far Eastern
region remains the main area of activity. With the
pro:iferation of 200-mile fishing and economic zones
in the mid-1970s, the Soviet fishing fleet was forced
from many time-proven coastal fishing grounds, espe-
cially in the Atlantic. With the resulting emphasis on
open-seas operations, the Pacific fisheries have as-
sumed greater importance to the Soviet Union. Conse-
quently, Soviet fishing vessels can now be found in
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tries in the basin heightens the Soviet presence, as 25X1
does the relatively large number of sophisticated
research vessels that the Soviets operate in the
Pacific
Fishing Activities
The Soviets now take about 4 million tons annually
from the Pacific Ocean, half their global catch and
double what was taken a decade ago. In all, some 12
percent of the total Pacific catch accrues to the
USSR, compared with the US share of less than 3
percent. Almost 8 percent of the total animal protein
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supplies available to Soviet consumers in recent years
has come from the Pacific. Of late this source has
assumed increasing importance, since the catch is
obtained without the massive hard currency expendi-
tures associated with grain imports
Although the Pacific accounts for a growing share of
the Soviet fish catch, the number of fishing ships used
in the Pacific has remained steady. The largest ship
concentration is in the northern Pacific along the
Asian coast, where for some time the Soviets have
operated about 1,200 fishing vessels. This is the single
most important fishing ground for the Soviets, and the
size of the catch there has increased yearly. Neverthe-
less, because of gains elsewhere, the Asian waters
have yielded a smaller share of the total Pacific catch
in recent years-declining from a high of 90 percent
in 1977 to 79 percent in 1979
Soviet fishing vessels have worked the North Ameri-
can grounds-which extend from the Bering Sea to
California-since the mid-1950s. By the early 1970s
as many as 900 ships produced one-third of the
USSR's Pacific catch from these fisheries. Establish-
ment of the Canadian and US 200-mile coastal zones
reduced the Soviet catch in the region to only 5
percent of the Pacific total in 1979; the number of
vessels sighted dropped to about 700. Since then the
Soviet catch has been further reduced, the result of
denied access to the Canadian and US coastal zones
in the aftermath of the Afghanistan invasion.
Accordingly, the Soviets have turned to the fishing
areas off the South American coast, particularly those
off Chile and Peru. In 1978 the Soviets operated less
than 20 ships on the South American fishery, but last
year they deployed at least 260 ships there. The South
American coastal fishery is now the second most
important Pacific fishing ground for the USSR, ac-
counting for 13 percent of its Pacific catch in 1979
USSR
1,591
2,216
3,368
3,381
4,106
Japan
6,361
8,303
9,384
9,709
9,488
United States
550
72.9
786
881
964
Other
15,301
23,432
17,014
20,031
20,698
Total
23,803
34,680
30,552
34,002
35,256
Total Soviet
Ocean Catch
4,274
6,391
9,031
8,197
8,308
the total Pacific catch. New Zealand fish stocks never
proved as massive as the Soviets originally estimated.
Additionally, Soviet vessels are restricted, by terms of
the agreement with New Zealand, to deep water and
less popular species. Although constrained by New
Zealand's economic zone, the Soviets benefit from
several joint ventures with New Zealand firms.
Pacific Basin Agreements
The USSR has negotiated maritime agreements with
a number of Pacific Basin countries-and offered to
negotiate with others. Such agreements may allow the
Soviets access to coastal fishing grounds otherwise
denied to them by the creation of 200-mile economic
zones, grant Soviet ships the right to make calls in
specific ports in order to service vessels, or establish
joint maritime research projects. Although these
agreements are in large part necessary to support
Soviet fishing activities, they also serve to institution-
alize the Soviet presence in the area.
Fishing Agreements. Moscow currently has access to
200-mile coastal fishing zones in the Pacific only off
Japan, New Zealand, and Nicaragua:
The USSR has also greatly increased its presence in
the fishery over New Zealand's vast continental shelf.
Last year some 300 Soviet fishing vessels were sighted
in the area, compared with about 200 in 1980 and an
average of only 40 annually in 1975-78. Nevertheless,
in recent years the Soviet catch there has averaged
less than 60,000 tons annually-roughly 2 percent of
? The agreement with Japan is reciprocal and allows
Soviet fishermen to take 650,000 tons of fish in
Japan's zone and Japanese fishermen to take
750,000 tons of fish in the USSR zone.
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The New Zealand arrangement allows Soviet ves-
sels to fish New Zealand waters independently upon
purchase of a license and payment of fees based on
the size of the catch. There are also three joint
ventures set up in part to train local fishermen who
are to eventually take over the entire operation.
In 1981 Nicaragua accepted a Soviet offer of
fisheries aid, and Soviet ships are now surveying the
resources in the Nicaraguan 200-mile zone. The
agreement probably parallels those offered other
countries, which provide for formation of a joint
venture company (51-percent locally owned), build-
ing or upgrading of port and onshore processing
facilities, training of local personnel, a division of
the catch, and the contribution of Soviet equipment.
The Soviets enjoyed greater access to the coastal
regions until their invasion of Afghanistan. At that
time New Zealand halved the catch quota of inde-
pendently licensed vessels and imposed port and per-
sonnel restrictions. Agreements negotiated with Aus-
tralia, Canada, and the United States were suspended
when those countries expelled Soviet trawlers, also to
protest the invasion. Soviet factory ships may still
enter the US zone, however, to take on fish caught by
US fishermen under a joint venture agreement with a
private company set up in 1978.
Por Privileges. Operating far from its home ports,
the Soviet fishing fleet requires port facilities near its
fishing grounds for vessel repair and maintenance,
refueling and resupply, transshipment of catch, crew
changes, and R&R. While Soviet ships would have
access to any port in an emergency, Moscow has
negotiated specific rights in certain Pacific ports.
Singapore is the major such port in the western
Pacific. Fuel, supplies, and complete port facilities are
available there including drydocks for major repairs.
Fresh crews are flown in from home and board ships
in Singapore, enabling the fleet to remain on the
fishing grounds almost indefinitely. A joint-venture
company set up there in 1975 processes a portion of
the Soviet catch.
The Soviet fishing agreement with Wellington allows
Soviet fishing vessels repair, fueling, and supply privi-
leges in Auckland, Wellington, Dunedin, Lyttleton,
Although Soviet fishing vessels no longer operate in
the US zone, Soviet factory ships and fishery research
ships do. The factory ships operate in a joint venture
with US companies; the research ships in a coopera-
tive arrangement with the US National Marine Fish-
eries Service, the Department of Commerce agency
that manages fishing in the US 200-mile zone. Under
terms of the joint venture, established in 1978, US
fishermen deliver fish caught under their own favor-
able quotas in the US zone to Soviet factory ships,
making the transfer at sea. A varying number of US
vessels and 30 to 40 factory ships are involved,
processing pollack and some flounder in the
Aleutians and hake off Washington, Oregon, and
California. The joint venture production increased
from 9,209 tons offish worth $1.02 million in 1979 to
81,124 tons worth $10.9 million in 1981. The fishery
research program began as part of the licensing
agreement that permitted Soviet fishing in the US
zone. It has been continued, despite the ban on Soviet
fishing.
and Nelson. Nevertheless, following the Afghanistan
invasion, New Zealand withdrew certain services in
Auckland and restricted the movement of Soviet
fishermen while in port. Fishing vessels traveling
between the Soviet Far East and the South Pacific
also stop in Suva, Fiji, where Moscow has arranged
for fueling and supply.
Portcalls by Soviet fishing vessels in South America
occur mainly in Equador, Peru, and Chile. In Peru the
Soviets regularly use Callao, where their fishing ships
are serviced at the naval facility, and Paita, where
they provided aid to construct port facilities; crew
rotations in Peruvian ports alone involve 3,000 seamen
annually. Soviet fishing vessels also call at Valpariso,
Chile; Quayaquil, Equador; Vancouver, Canada; and
at US ports including Portland, Seattle, and Honolu-
lu. Although Soviet trawlers no longer operate in the
US zone, Soviet factory ships do-some with nearly
300 crewmen. With four days' advance notice, they
can enter US ports for supplies, mail, and R&R.F_
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Figure 2
Pacific Ocean: Sightings of Soviet Fishing Ships
1. Northwest Pacific
2. North Central Pacific
Seamounts
Note: Ships may operate
in more than one region
during the course of a year.
14
0 2000 Kilometers
0 2000 Nautical miles
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authontative
12. Eltanin Fracture Zone
13. New Zealand
14. Antarctic
1978 1981
0 0
O 0
Ships
100-499
4. Eastern Aleutians
5. Eastern Bering-Sea
6. Gulf of Alaska
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Unaccepted Offers. Moscow has attempted to estab-
lish fishing, port-use, or marine resource survey agree-
ments with Papua-New Guinea, Tonga, Western Sa-
moa, and the Cook Islands in the South Pacific as
well as with the Philippines and a host of Latin
American countries. Many countries are reluctant to
ente- into joint ventures, although they would have a
controlling interest, because of reports from other
LDCs that training programs are ineffective and
Soviet fishermen keep the best fish for shipment to the
USSR while providing local processing facilities-
often built by the Soviets-with inferior fish. They
may also be influenced by reports of Soviet overfish-
ing in poorly policed areas. Such overfishing occurred
off the US and Canadian coasts where, before the
200-mile zones were in effect, fishing took place under
unenforceable international regulations
Offers to Chile, Colombia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Fiji,
Mexico, Panama, and the Philippines are still out-
standing. Papua-New Guinea, the Cook Islands, Ton-
ga, and Western Samoa, which delayed negotiations
on resource survey ventures at the urging of Australia
and New Zealand, suspended negotiations in the
afte:math of the Afghanistan invasion. Late in 1981,
Western Samoa broke ranks and agreed to allow the
Soviet research vessel Kallisto to operate out of Apia.
Soviet fishermen may make headway elsewhere as the
memory of Afghanistan fades or as nations become
confident that they can effectively patrol their zones.
Experience in several fisheries has shown that the
Soviets abide by the rules where coastal countries
exercise their rights to board fishing boats and inspect
their catches.
Research Activities
The Soviets operate the largest fleet of research
vessels in the Pacific, with about 50 fishing research
vessels and at least as many oceanographic research
ships. Equipped with sophisticated oceanographic in-
strumentation, nets, and occasionally with submersi-
bles, the fishing research ships collect a variety of
hydrographic, biologic, and meteorologic data that
are ;useful in finding new fishing grounds and moni-
toring the status of existing fishing grounds. Histori-
cally, they have focused their attentions mainly on the
North Asian continental shelf, the Bering Sea, the
Aleutians, the US West coast, and the waters off New
Zealand. Research ships operating in the US zone
carry some instruments and nets provided by the
United States under terms of the Fisheries Research
Agreement
The Soviets may be using some of these vessels to
study the geology of the Pacific seabed. They are
believed to be interested in testing sound propagation
through the rock as well as through the water and in
evaluating the mineral resources there. Fishery re-
search ships carrying submersibles have operated off
the US coast and along the Chile Rise. Study of these
regions, as well as other areas located in fracture
zones associated with areas of seafloor spreading
(tectonic plate movement), would be especially fruitful
for both types of research. Large cross sections of
subsurface geology are exposed on the walls of the
fractures and can be studied with the use of submersi-
bles.
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The Seamounts Issue. The activities of Soviet fishing
fleets above underwater seamounts in the Pacific are
especially questionable.' Except for two seamount
areas lying off South America, seamount fisheries add
little to the Soviet Pacific catch. Because of their
restricted surface area, the nutritive base of sea-
mounts is limited and their fish stocks are easily
depleted. Indeed, Soviet fishermen have already over-
fished the Emperor seamounts that lie northwest of
Midway Island, the chain of seamounts that lie just
outside the US 200-mile fishing zone off Washington,
Oregon, and California, and the seamounts that lie
along the Eltanin Fracture Zone east of New Zea-
land. Totals from the Eltanin area fell from some 70
tons per day to less than half that in 1972, the first
year of production, and by 1980 had fallen below 2
tons per day. In 1980 Soviet fishermen took just 1,200
tons from the Cobb Seamount, the northernmost of
the seamounts off the US Pacific coast.
Despite the sharp decline in the catch, Soviet ships
return to these depleted areas annually. Undoubtedly,
the five seamount regions are attractive to the Soviets
because they lie beyond national coastal zones and,
consequently, are not subject to quota regulations.
But the small catches from the Emperor, US, and
Eltanin seamounts make them of questionable eco-
nomic value to the Soviets. This continued activity
may simply result from pressure on the Soviet fleet to
' Seamounts, submarine elevations that rise hundreds or thousands
of meters above the abyssal seafloor, are broadly scattered over the
Pacific seabed. They are the products of seafloor volcanism and
fracturing. Some support exploitable quantities of fish, although
such fisheries must be managed with extreme care. Seamount fish
species are similar to continental shelf species and, therefore, are
Looking Ahead
The USSR will continue to expand its presence in the
Pacific. Soviet fishing operations there will become
more intense as the fleet attempts to maintain the size
of its catch in the face of resource depletion and
tightened control of the 200-mile zone by coastal
nations. Most countries in the area are becoming
more protective of coastal fish stocks and are especial-
ly wary of dealing with the Soviet fleet because of its
reputation for overfishing in poorly policed regions.
Consequently, the Soviet fleet will have to focus more
on areas outside national coastal boundaries, particu-
larly untapped seamount regions.
Soviet fishermen probably will also increase explora-
tory operations in the Pacific sector of the Southern
Ocean off Antarctica. We expect an all-out fishing
effort there in the next few years as the Soviets
attempt to establish as large a base-period catch as
possible before ratification of the Antarctic Living
Resources Treaty. The treaty would subject these
resources to an international management plan. The
Soviet harvest there in 1979 was only 800 tons,
compared with 451,000 tons from the Atlantic sector.
More than two-thirds of the Atlantic sector catch
consisted of the small, shrimp-like krill, which many
fishery experts consider the world's largest single
source of animal protein.
Such pursuits will heighten the visibility of the Soviet
fishing fleet. While Soviet fishing beyond the North
Asian continental shelf will take place largely outside
national coastal zones, the number of vessels transit-
ing these fishing grounds will almost certainly in-
crease. (Generally, as long as they are not fishing,
25X1
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such vessels are permitted free transit of foreign
coastal fishing and economic zones.) The volume of
oceanographic and fishing research activity is also
expected to intensify, adding to Soviet regional access.
Impact on US Interests
Moscow's expanding Pacific operations will have
some effect on ANZUS naval activities. F_
the Soviet presence among the island nations of the
central and western tropical Pacific will tend to
spread along with the fishing fleet activity. These
island nations bestride sea lines of communication
between the United States, Australia, New Zealand,
New Caledonia, and Papua-New Guinea. Moscow
still wants to establish joint fishing or research ar-
rangements in the area; at a minimum the number of
routine port calls by Soviet fishin vessels will in-
crease.
Increased Soviet activity in the Pacific will not affect
US fishing in the near term. In the Pacific waters
beyond the US fishing zone, US fishermen concen-
trate on tuna, which the Soviets have not yet learned
to catch and process effectively. US tuna fishing areas
lie off Central and South America-largely within
200-mile coastal zones-and increasingly in Microne-
sian and New Zealand waters. Although Soviet fish-
ermen will attempt to carve a niche for themselves in
the tuna fishery, the more experienced US, Japanese,
and Korean fishermen-backed by well-developed
processing infrastructures-will have a strong com-
petitive edge.
Soviet exploration for seabed minerals could eventual-
ly affect the timetable of US seabed mining programs.
Until recently, the USSR showed little interest in
mining the seabed, although Western firms have
invested millions of dollars in research and develop-
ment and the UN Law of the Sea Conference has
spent nine years hotly debating how seabed mining
should be carried out. This posture began to change in
1979 when Moscow proposed to several newly inde- 25X1
pendent South Pacific countries a joint scientific
research cruise that would include a survey of seabed
mining resources. In December 1981 and January
1982 the Soviets tried to acquire certain items of
Western seabed mining technology. How serious the
Soviets are about seabed mining is not known. It
would seem more appropriate for them to concentrate
on developing their huge land-based mineral re-
sources. Conceivably, however, by the time Western
seabed mining consortiums begin their operations,
they may find in the USSR a healthy and well-
prepared competitor.
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Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative
Figure 3
Pacific Ocean: Soviet Fishing Grounds
25X1 25X1
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