THE PCI AND THE ITALIAN POLITICAL GAME: THE IMPACT OF POLAND

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00228R000100150004-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 13, 2007
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: April 1, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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The P~CI and y the
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The Impact of Poland
An Intelligence Memorandum
Secret
EUR 82-10041
ADri11982
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~'"~^~~ Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
U
The PCI and the
Italian Political Game:
The Impact of Poland
Irt/ormation available as of 1 S April 1982
has been used in the preparation of this report.
This memorandum was prepared by
Office of European Analysis. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be addressed to the Chief Western
Europe Division, EURA
The paper was coordinated with the National
Intelligence Council and the Directorate of
Operations
Secret
EUR 82-/0041
Apri11982
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The PCI and the
Italian Political Game:
The Impact of Poland
0
Summary The Italian Communist Party's (PCPs) harsh criticism of Moscow in the
wake of the imposition of martial law in Poland has:
? Driven the party's relations with the Soviets to an all-time low.
? Highlighted longtime strains between the PCPs leaders and its rank and
file, many of whom are sympathetic to Moscow.
? Underscored differences at upper levels of the PCI over tactics and
strategy.
? Reopened the question, not seriously considered since 1978, of PCI
participation in the national government.
Senior PCI officials may have anticipated each of these developments. It is
less clear that they thought much about the short- or long-term implica-
tions of dealing in some coherent way with all of them at once. The
inclination of all but a few of the party's senior leaders has been to go on
trying to make the party all things to all people-loyal to the "best" of the
Marxist-Leninist tradition but- clearly enough divorced from Moscow to
qualify as afull-fledged participant in national-level politics. Thus, these
leaders have arrayed themselves in a more or less orderly fashion behind
Party Secretary Berlinguer's "third way to socialism" banner. This is at
best an uncertain gamble, for it is not at all clear that the strains and ten-
sions now exposed can be neatly hidden away. Nor is it certain that
Berlinguer and his associates will have time to consolidate their position
before they find themselves overtaken by the forces that seem to be moving
Italy toward early parliamentary elections. The best they can probably
hope for is that their political opponents-impressed by the uncertainties
inherent in the party's disagreement with Moscow, as well as by the
opportunities-will be unable to capitalize on the Communists'
vulnerability.
Secret
EUR 81-10041
April 1982
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The PCI and the
Italian Political Game:
The Impact of Poland
The CPSU-PCI The Italian Communist Party (PCI) has long occupied a special place in the
Axis on Ice firmament of international Communism because of its size, the prestige of
its leaders, and its proximity to power. The past 10 years or so have seen a
growing willingness by Italian Communist leaders to stand apart from the
Soviets, as demonstrated by their stance on Czechoslovakia in 1968 and on
Afghanistan in 1979. Many PCI officials believe that their party has been
on a collision course with the Soviet Party (CPSU) for some time. Some
would even argue that the current dispute is long overdue. The PCI
statement on Poland issued last December falls short of laying responsibil-
ity for the imposition of martial law directly at Moscow's door, but by link-
ing events in Poland to criticism of the Soviet model, Italian Communist
leaders have left few doubts about where they think the blame ultimately
lies
The continuing polemics between the Italian Communists and Moscow
have brought relations between the two parties to a new low; PCI criticism
of the Soviet model in fact almost certainly amounts to an ideological
break with Moscow. Both sides hope to avoid a formal rupture of relations,
however.
there are signs that party leader Enrico Berlinguer believes the time has
come to let the dispute cool. He has reiterated his view that the PCI
statement should not be construed as anti-Soviet
t the
same time, a is anxious to avoi t e appearance o rawing too c ose to the
Soviets
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A Party in Search These gestures have not obscured the fact that the crisis in Poland and the
of an Identity dispute with Moscow have reverberated through the Italian Communist
Party like few other events. This is in large part because the recent
developments have laid bare more than a decade of internal tension about
what the party is to become. Since the mid-1970s the PCI has been
compelled by events both at home and abroad to seek a new identity. More
recently it has faced the need to recapture the momentum it lost in the
1979 parliamentary elections. Berlinguer and his colleagues now face a
new version of an old dilemma: how to pull the party out of its doldrums
without alienating traditional supporters.
Before the recent developments in Poland, party leaders had generally tried
to be circumspect in their criticisms of Moscow. Each time they moved
away from the Soviets on an issue, they hastened to reassure the rank and
file that nothing had really changed. Both the reality and the perception of
change were there, however, and for many party members-especially
remaining members of the old guard with strong emotional attachments to
Moscow-the slow shift by the leadership has been wrenching.
Still, as long as the PCI was advancing at the polls, as was the case during
the early and mid-1970s, the party base was willing to set its suspicions
aside and accept the explanations it received from above. PCI leaders had
the reputation during that period for being better able than their counter-
parts in other parties to recognize and respond to constituent concerns.
Once signs began to appear that the party was on an electoral plateau or
was even on the decline, the more skeptical of its supporters became less
tolerant although criticism of the leadership remained diffuse. The Polish
situation, however, leaves little room for smokescreens and, in effect, has
exposed both the leadership's intentions and the party's critical weak point.
The PCI leadership knows it would be hard pressed to retain its credibility
with non-Communist voters if it failed to condemn Warsaw and distance
itself from Moscow. But moving in this direction has revealed a serious gap
between the ideas and goals of party intellectuals-many of them close to .
Berlinguer-and the PCPs more parochial elements. Having steadfastly
refused to open a serious intraparty debate that would cover the entire
range of differences with the Soviets, the leadership is now finding it
difficult to explain its stand persuasively.
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The PCI, like other parties and governments in the West, was unprepared
for the imposition of martial law by the Poles themselves. Lacking aclear-
cu"t case of Soviet interference as a starting point the art leadershi
quickly found itself divided about how to react.
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The existence of such divisions about policy, or even about what a policy
means once established, is not noteworthy in itself. What set Poland apart
from a dozen other issues in the past several years is Cossutta's decision to
go public with his position after the Central Committee voted to adopt a
statement that split most of the differences of the extremes on both sides.
Press reports suggest that Cossutta's repeated acts of public dissent-
especially his attack on the party leadership during aPCI-or anized rall
in Perugia-have seriously shaken the party's inner circle.
Cossutta's decision to oppose the party statement in public and the reaction
of party hierarchy and the rank and file provide a measure of how far the
party has evolved over the past 20 years. The Cossutta episode, regardless
of how it ultimately plays out, is both a triumph and a setback for
"democratic centralism," the theory of unchallenged decisionmaking at the
top that has guided the PCI since its founding. Dissent has long been
tolerated within the inner corridors of PCI head uarters but Cossutta's
decision to carr his ob'ections to the public
is without precedent. The agreement
among party ea ers to a ow ossutta to express his views in the party
newspaper L'Unita, albeit with enough delay to prepare a tough rejoinder
for the same page, is equally noteworthy.
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How the Cossutta phenomenon ultimately will affect the party's decision-
making process is open to various lines of conjecture. The hint of greater
openness might prove so popular with the party base that the leadership
would find itself unable to turn it off without raising unanswerable
questions within the political class at large about the party's democratic
character. It seems likely, however, that the party hierarchy would
conclude that it is not yet ready to have quite so much light shed on its in-
ternal affairs.
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Stirring the It is still unclear how the electorate will respond to the PCI-Moscow
Domestic Political Pot polemics, but press commentary and statements by leading non-Commu-
nist politicians suggest that a sizable part of the national political elite sees
the dispute as a milestone in Italian political development. A broad
consensus seems to be developing that the PCI has enhanced its legitimacy
and taken an important step toward becoming an acceptable coalition
partner.
Since the late 1940s, Italy's non-Communist parties have pointed to the
PCPs ties with Moscow as a major obstacle to its acceptability as a
governing partner. While the leaders of these parties are still unsure
whether the current dispute will qualify as a definitive break, each is now
hard at work reassessing attitudes toward the PCI and seeking clues about
how these developments will affect the broader political game. At the top
of everyone's list is the need to rethink the future of the current
Republican-led, five-party coalition. This is especially true for Socialist
leader Craxi, who is anxious to do what he can to ensure that developments
arising from the dispute do not undermine either his ongoing attempt to se-
cure the prime-ministership or his longer term efforts to increase his
party's leverage.
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Craxi: Since mid-December the Socialists and their Social Democrat allies, with
Weighing a Crisis? occasional support from the Liberals, have directed a steady drumbeat of
criticism and threats against Prime Minister Spadolini. Several times since
January, Craxi has stopped just short of pushing the government out of
power. Craxi would like both a crisis that allows him to succeed Spadolini
and a national election to strengthen his hand in Parliament. He has,
however, been unable to find an issue that would allow him to set a crisis in
motion and still escape retribution at the polls. Italian voters have a long
history of punishing a party that initiates a period of instability.
The PCI-Moscow polemics pose what may be Craxi's most difficult choice
to date. He believes that current tensions within the PCI represent an
electoral opportunity for his party that will not be seen again for some
time. He is convinced that a sizable number of PCI supporters will rally to
the Socialist banner if national elections are held. But it is difficult to
discern the right moment to act. He might argue that he should move
immediately because it is only a matter of time before Berlinguer has the
situation within his party back in hand. Furthermore, once Berlinguer has
succeeded, the PCI may regain its momentum, position itself to become the
principal interlocutor of the Christian Democrats (DC), and exile the
Socialists to the margins of the political game. But Craxi might also
calculate that things will get worse for the PCI before they get better and
that he, in turn, should continue to bide his time.
At the same time, Craxi must consider the potential impact on internal So-
cialist party politics of the PCI-Moscow polemics, which have encouraged
those members of the Socialist Party left who remain committed to the
concept of a "leftist alternative" government. For traditional leaders of the
party left like Francesco DeMartino, the PCI statement removed an
important barrier to closer cooperation with the Communists. Craxi, who
vanquished his leftwing opponents at the January 1980 Party Congress,
remains wary of a deal with the Communists. At the same time, he needs
to make some gesture in the direction of leftist unity to avoid reopening
rifts within the Socialist ranks. Although he has for now rejected long-
standing calls from the Communists for comprehensive cooperation, he has
agreed to the establishment of a number of joint study groups. He is almost
certainly convinced that given the relative size and organizational strength
of the two parties, closer involvement would offer the PCI too many
opportunities to undermine the Socialists. In addition, Craxi believes that
part of his party's new appeal can be traced to its image as a substitute for
the Communists on the left. Thus, moving closer to the Communists might
not only leave him weaker, but it could also strengthen the Christian
Democrats, Republicans, and Social Democrats.)
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The DC:
Settling on a
Party Line
himself.
For now, Craxi is probably counting on the joint study groups and
occasional hints about more extensive cooperation at a later date to disarm
potential critics within his party, while keeping his Christian Democrat
opponents off balance. The Christian Democrats know that despite his
suspicions of the Communists, Craxi is perfectly capable of reversing
that would be only too happy to see him replaced.
If, following the Andreatta incident, Craxi has definitely decided to bide
his time until after the DC congress in early May, he will have only six
days in which to set plans both for a crisis and a spring election in motion.
By law, there must be a 45-day campaign period between a dissolution of
Parliament and new elections. To schedule an election for the last weekend
in June-presumably the parties would not favor an electoral test during
the summer-the President must dissolve parliament by 12 May. An
unsuccessful bid for elections in June would not only end his enviable string
of tactical victories and tarnish the Socialists' image as an up-and-coming
party; it could also serve to rally disparate elements of the Socialist Party
The PCI-Moscow dispute has also complicated matters for Craxi's Chris-
tian Democratic counterpart, Flaminio Piccoli. By rendering the Commu-
nists even slightly more "respectable," the dispute has somewhat strength-
ened the DC's position vis-a-vis the Socialists. Even though the DC
remains cool toward cooperation with the Communists, DC leaders can
now remind Craxi with considerably more impact than before that his is
not the only game in town. Working against the DC's ability to trade on
this, however, is the impact of the polemics on relations among the warring
DC factions. Perceived signs of PCI "moderation" appear to have contrib-
uted to a revival of the DC left-long an advocate of cooperation with the
PCI but seriously weakened in recent years. This substantially raises the
odds against agreement at the congress on an effective and rejuvenating
course of action for the party as a whole.
left of the party.
In choosing their next secretary, the Christian Democrats will be signaling
whether they will continue their current line of cooperation with the
Socialists or work toward some form of accommodation with the Commu-
nists. Piccoli, already preoccupied with articulating a program of renewal
for his ailing party and fending off Craxi, now finds himself at the center of
that debate, subject to precongress challenges from both the right and the
 Piccoli's strongest challenge comes from former Prime Minister Arnaldo
Forlani. Forlani, whose broad-based support includes elements from the
DC right, as well as the party's Catholic left, believes that the DC's
relationship with the Socialists must be made to work but that this cannot
happen unless the party hierarchy is firmly behind it. He has accused
Piccoli of weakening the coalition by playing upon the hostility of some DC
factions toward the Socialists. Forlani acknowledges that much of the DC
wants to eliminate the Socialists as a contender, and he himself agrees they
must be kept on a tight rein. But he seems prepared to cede them their turn
at the premiership if the survival of the governing formula can thereby be
assured.
Like Forlani, Piccoli has affirmed his support for the current governing
formula, but his recent tough line against the Socialists, while boosting his
stock in some quarters of the DC, betrays a lack of enthusiasm for it. At
the same time Piccoli has made a determined public effort to underscore
the DC's right to reassume the premiershi . He ho es to weaken Forlani b
portrayina him as soft on the Socialists,
Piccoli's struggle to retain his office has been dealt a setback by the
decision of Ciriaco de Mita, a powerful party vice secretary from the DC
left, to launch his own bid. While there is some support for Forlani on the
left of the party, most left-leaning DC members worry that strengthening
the relationship that involves the DC, the Socialists, and the smaller
partners will push the DC toward conservative positions that could be
dangerous in an election. De Mita's candidacy is especially appealing to
those party members who continue to see advantages in some kind of
arrangement with the Communists and are encouraged by the PCPs stand
on Poland. Piccoli sorely needs the support of these members to retain his
post, and it was undoubtedly with this in mind that he made his widely re-
ported January statement acknowledging that the PCPs position on Poland
had significant implications for domestic policies.
If Piccoli is reelected, the position he takes on the question of ties with the
Socialists and the Communists will depend heavily upon what factions
support him at the congress. A successful De Mita candidacy remains an
improbable long shot, but by throwing his weight behind Piccoli at the
right moment, De Mita and the left might find themselves well placed over
time to draw the party toward a closer working relationship with the
Communists.
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Gambling Once the DC congress is out of the way, the Christian Democrats and
on the "Third Way" Socialists will be ready to make their next moves. The dispute between the
PCI and Moscow will figure prominently in the calculations of both
parties, but neither camp is prepared to make a precipitate move toward
the Communists.
figures at regular intervals.
Berlinguer's recent meetings in Rome and Paris with President Mitterrand
have almost certainly boosted spirits at PCI headquarters. Berlinguer's
attempts to arrange a meeting on previous occasions since Mitterrand
entered the Elysee were undermined by Craxi, who insisted that the PCI
would be strengthened at his party's expense. Mitterrand has expressed
some sympathy for the PCI in the past, however, and sees in the Italian
Communists' dispute with Moscow a new opportunity to further weaken
the Communists in France. Mitterrand hopes that his gesture toward
Berlinguer will rally to his own banner those French Communists who are
dissatisfied with their party's subservience to the Soviets. The French
President also sees similarities between the PCPs "third way" and his own
desire to make France into a model from which other socialist governments
and parties can learn. Berlinguer shares this assessment, and having spoken
at length with Mitterrand, he is almost certain to try to arrange a meeting
with West German leader Willy Brandt in the weeks ahead. The goal
apparently is to have discussions with leading West European Socialist
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Hard Realities Berlinguer's enthusiasm for the "third way" notwithstanding, caution is
likely to govern PCI actions in the months ahead. The polemics with
Moscow and the reemphasis on the "third way" will raise many more
questions than they resolve, and it is simply too soon to tell whether these
developments will result in a net gain or loss for the party in terms of do-
mestic support. Over the short term-at least the next 12 months-this
probably suggests that Berlinguer will be chary of undertaking any serious
new moves toward either the Christian Democrats or the Socialists.
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The PCI under Berlinguer's tutelage seems to have arrived at a point in its
political developments where simple answers are no longer available. The
Polish crisis has demonstrated the existence of philosophical and tactical
gaps not only between the leadership and the rank and file, but within the
leadership as well. For each new step the PCI takes toward internal
democracy and each new step it takes away from Moscow, the party is like-
ly to pay a steep price in terms of internal strain. The PCI is not in danger
of losing its position as one of the preeminent players in Italian politics. If
anything, Poland has underscored the Communists' importance. But
Poland also suggests that the old PCI-the well-oiled, steadfastly disci-
plined machine-has become a thing of the past.
The PCI will almost certainly continue to evolve toward a philosophy and
an image more in keeping with Western tradition, albeit by fits and starts,
as the Poland situation is demonstrating. Party Leaders have no choice but
to continue their search for formulas that serve conflicting needs. The
party's evolution has been slow and tortuous to date and the future seems
to hold nothing simpler in store.
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