THE ITALIAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS: AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Document Page Count: 201
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 17, 2007
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: March 1, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Confidential
Intelligence
The Italian Christian
Democrats:
An Uncertain Future
A Research Paper
Confidential
EUR 82-10020
March 1982
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Directorate of Confidential
Intelligence
The Italian Christian
Democrats:
An Uncertain Future
A Research Paper
Information available as of 1 September 1981
has been used in the preparation of this report.
The author of this paper is
European Issues Division, Office of European
Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and
may be directed to the Chief, European Issues
Division,
This report was coordinated with the National
Intelligence Officer for Western Europe.
Confidential
EUR 82-10020
March 1982
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Overview
The Italian Christian
Democrats:
An Uncertain Future
In June 1981, the 35-year grip of the Christian Democrats (DC) on the
Italian Prime Ministry ended when the office was assumed by the leader of
a small coalition party, the Republicans. Although the DC remains strong,
the loss of this key position was but the latest in a series of defeats and
checks beginning in 1974 that have clouded the DC's future. Calls for
party renewal have a hollow ring after eight years without evidence of
effective action. Over the same period, the DC's main rival, the Commu-
nist Party (PCI), has enjoyed a steady rise in electoral strength, but in 1979
it slumped for the first time in parliamentary elections.
Conventional wisdom holds that Italy's Government is unstable, but
detailed analysis shows three decades of stagnation and immobility while
the DC became virtually inseparable from the Italian state. Also, since at
least 1953, all major Italian parties?except the PCI? have retained an
almost identical share of the electorate. The average lifespan of govern-
ments since World War II is 11 months, but only one party, the DC, and a
relatively small number of its leaders have managed the government.
Except in politics, Italian life has undergone a metamorphosis since 1945,
and profound change has occurred in the Catholic Church. The result is a
governing "confessional" political party which has changed little while the
nation has leapt into the postindustrial world. Now a major industrial
power with a high standard of living, Italy is still ruled by a DC-dominated
government
Assessment of various facets of political activity permits identification of
changes in progress. The crisis of DC party organization, leadership, and
support groups, for example, shows an increasing divergence from the basic
trends in national life. Study of regional, provincial, and communal levels
of government and election results also suggests that traditional assess-
ments of parties' strengths, particularly of the DC, based solely on national
election results are inaccurate.
The evidence is insufficient to indicate whether the DC will achieve true
renewal or suffer imminent and dramatic decline. One thing is clear: the
nature of the party's power and role in government is changing. Even
though its traditional interclass appeal is disappearing and its ability to
deliver spoils is declining, the DC may retain at least 28 to 30 percent of
111
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the electorate for the near future and is assured of a major share of
national life for some years to come. Fut the DC's longstanding inability to
govern except in coalition will become progressively more subject to
increased demands from potential partners.
Coalitions of opposites in Italy are sanctioned by more than a century of
practice. Hence a modus vivendi between the DC and PCI is not without
precedent. Should that occur, however, the DC would suffer some shrink-
age of its electorate, and conservative factional elements might bolt the
party. Thus, should current trends continue, there will be a reduction of
DC power in the next few years.
Crisis is endemic in the DC's history, yet it has continued to survive against
all predictions. Nevertheless, in the 1980s, continued juxtaposition of
postindustrial society to a DC-dominated government described as a
"35-year Watergate" is ultimately a volatile mixture.
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Contents
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Page
Overview
111
The Church versus State Antecedent
7
Party Structure
10
The Formal Organization
10
The Factions
13
Party Finances
17
Party Membership
18
Auxiliary Support Organizations 26
Church-Related Support Groups 26
Sottogoverno and Clientelismo 31
Other Support Elements 34
The DC's Electoral Record 36
National Legislative Elections 38
Administrative Elections: The Regions 72
Administrative Elections: Provinces and Communes 81
DC Policy, the Other Parties, and Prognosis 98
Has the DC Lost the Way? 98
Leadership Vacuum? 101
Implications for US Policy 105
Appendix
National Referendums and Elections for the European Parliament 107
DC Parliamentary Delegations and the Party's Hold on Power 114
The DC and the Italian Electorate 125
Tables
1.
Parliamentary Members of the Christian Democratic National 13
Council, by Faction, February 1980
2. Central Directorate of Christian Democracy (As of 5 March 14
1980 Election)
3. Christian Democratic Party Membership by Region, 1968-78 21
4. Party Membership, by Sector (DC Records)
23
5. Party Membership, by Sector (DOXA Poll Organization)
23
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6.
Social Background of Electorate by Party
24
7.
Union Membership, 1976-80
35
8.
Election for the Constituent Assembly, 2 June 1946
39
9.
National Institutional Referendum, 2 June 1946
39
10.
Italy's Eight Postwar National Elections (Voting for the
Chamber of Deputies), 1948 and 1953
41
11.
Italy's Eight Postwar National Elections (Voting for the
Chamber of Deputies), 1958 and 1963
42
12.
Italy's Eight Postwar National Elections (Voting for the
Chamber of Deputies), 1968 and 1972
43
13.
Italy's Eight Postwar National Elections (Voting for the
Chamber of Deputies), 1976 and 1979
44
14.
Italy's Eight Postwar National Elections (Voting for the
Senate), 1948 and 1953
45
15.
Italy's Eight Postwar National Elections (Voting for the
Senate), 1958 and 1963
46
16.
Italy's Eight Postwar National Elections (Voting for the Senate),
1968 and 1972
47
17.
Italy's Eight Postwar National Elections (Voting for the Senate),
1976 and 1979
48
18.
Population by Geographical Region, 1951 and 1979
52
19.
Population and Voting by Sex, 1948 and 1979
52
20.
Eligible Voters by District, 1948 and 1979
61
21.
Population by Administrative Region, Voting for the Chamber of
Deputies, 1951 and 1979
63
22.
Chamber of Deputies: Percentage of Eligible Voter Turnout in
Eight National Parliamentary Elections
66
23.
Senate: Percentage of Eligible Voter Turnout in Eight National
Parliamentary Elections
67
24.
Ranking of Chamber of Deputies Districts by Eligible Voters, 1979
70
25.
Ranking of Senate Districts by Eligible Voters, 1979 Elections
71
26.
Party Composition of Regular Statute Region Governments
75
27.
Regional Council Election Results in 15 Regular Statute
Regions, 1970-80
76
28.
Regional Council Election Results by Geographical Region,
1970-80
78
29.
Regional Election Results in Five Special Statute Regions, 1968-81
80
30.
Regional Election Returns, 1968-81
82
31.
Provincial Council Results by Party in 91 Provinces
84
32.
Provincial Council Election Returns by Party in 86 Provinces,
1975 and 1980
86
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33.
City Council Election Results Shown With and Without Eight
Major Cities, 1975 and 1980
91
34.
Comparative Communal Election Returns, 1975 and 1981:
A Composite of 98 Communes With More Than 5,000 Inhabitants
96
35.
Comparative Communal Election Returns, 1976 and 1981,
in Five Provincial Capitals
97
A-1.
Results of May 1974 Divorce Referendum in Provincial Capitals
Ranked in Order of Vote Favoring Retention of Divorce Bill
109
A-2.
Returns of Election in Italy for the European Parliament, June 1979
110
A-3.
European Parliamentary Election Vote Restructured by Chamber
of Deputies Districts
112
A-4.
Returns of Elections for the European Parliament, June 1979 if
Presented as a Senate Election
113
A-5.
Seniority of Christian Democratic Deputies, VIII Legislature
115
A-6.
Women in Parliament
116
A-7.
Preference Votes for Leading Christian Democratic Deputies
118
A-8.
DC Chamber of Deputies Delegation by Preference Vote, 1979
118
A-9.
Preference Votes for Selected DC Deputies, 1968-79
119
A-10.
Leading Christian Democratic Senators by Numerical Vote
120
A-11.
Leading Christian Democratic Senators by Personal
Preference Vote
121
A-12.
DC Senate Delegation by Preference Vote, 1979
122
A-13.
Chamber of Deputies: Percentage of Valid Ballots Cast in
Eight National Parliamentary Elections
124
A-14.
Ranking of Chamber Districts, by Percentage of Valid Ballots
in Eight Parliamentary Elections
125
A-15.
Senate: Percentage of Valid Ballots Cast by Eligible Voters
in Eight National Parliamentary Elections
126
A-16.
Ranking of Senate Districts by Average Valid Ballots, 1948-79
127
A-17.
Regular Statute Group, Tables A-17 Through A-24
129
A-25.
Special Statute Group, Tables A-25 Through A-31
137
A-32.
Provincial Council Election Results by Party in Geographical
Regions, 1975 and 1980
144
A-33.
Chamber of Deputies, Tables A-33 Through A-64
149
A-65.
Senate, Tables A-65 through A-84
181
Figures
1.
Italy: Administrative Regions 2
2. Structure of Government, 1981
3
3. The Governments of the Republic of Italy
5
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4.
Structure of the Christian Democratic Party
11
5.
Comparatative Growth of DC and PCI Membership, 1946-77
19
6.
Christian emocratic Party Membership by Region, 1968-78
22
7.
Major Parties' Share of Vote, 1946-79
40
8.
Composition of Constituent Assembly, 1946
40
9.
Composition of Chamber of Deputies, 1948-79
49
10.
Composition of Senate, 1948-79
50
11.
Labor Force by Economic Sector, 1951-80
51
12.
Urbanization and Support for the Christian Democrats, 1953-79
51
13.
Population Change (1951-79) in Relation to DC Representation
Change (1948-79) in the Chamber of Deputies; Shown by
Political Region
53
14.
Christian Democratic Share of Electoral District Delegations,
1948-79
55
15.
Distribution of Seats by Electoral District (Region)
59
16.
Change in DC Delegation Size by Geographic Region,
1948-79
65
17.
Provincial Council Election Results by Party in 91 Provinces,
1960-80
85
18.
Christian Democratic, Communist, and Socialist Parties Showing
in Provincial Elections of 1975
87
19.
Christian Democratic, Communist, and Socialist Parties Showing
in Provincial Elections of 1980
89
20.
City Council Election Results by City and Geographical
Region-1975
93
21.
City Council Election Resutls by City and Geographical
Region-1980
95
A-1.
Results of Divorce Referendum by Province, 1974
108
A-2.
Results of Abortion Referendum by Province, 1981
110
A-3.
Election Results for the Italian National Delegation to the
European Parliament by Political Region-1979
111
A-4.
Relative Ages of Parliamentary Delegations: DC, PCI, PSI,
1948-79
117
A-5.
Tenure of Office for Christian Democratic Ministers and Under
Secretaries, 1945-81
Back
Pocket
A-6.
Showing of DC, PCI, and PSI in Regional Council Elections
146
A-7.
Chamber of Deputies Districts
147
A-8.
Senate Districts
148
NOTE: Throughout the text of this paper, in cases
where place names differ in Italian and English the
English name is used. In the figures, the Italian name
is used in most instances.
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The Italian Christian
Democrats:
An Uncertain Future
Christian Democracy's emergence as a major political
force is one of the most significant events in Western
Europe since World War II. Five of the 10 member
nations of the European Community have large par-
ties of this bent, the dominant one being in Italy. The
rather dramatic rise of Christian Democracy after the
war stems from its appeal as a moderate center
movement at a time when the right was discredited by
nazism and fascism and the left was associated with
Stalinism and the Soviet Union. Also the Christian
Democratic appeal was broadly based because of the
movement's adherence to Christian principles on hu-
man rights, particularly those of the individual, as
well as to democracy, class reconciliation, and trans-
national cooperation and integration. While Christian
Democracy's strength is its nonideological, wide-rang-
ing approach to politics, its weakness is the lack of any
firm and articulated creed of specific goals. Still, its
mild conservatism attracts many adherents because of
its defense of private property, aversion to Marxism,
and general rejection of excessive state intervention.
In essence, Christian Democracy has drawn together
pragmatists of all classes who desire the resolution of
problems through conciliation and compromise. In the
Italian case, it has had the added appeal of providing
a broad opening to Catholics who were long excluded
from national politics in the wake of Church-state
hostilities during and after Italian unification.
Christian Democracy has varied considerably in each
of the countries where it has developed. The very
vagueness of its programs plus the diversity of par-
ticular country experience fostered the growth of
somewhat divergent groups under the same label. This
is particularly true of the Italian Christian Democrats
(DC) because of the Holy See's presence in Italy.
Much more so than elsewhere, century-old conflicts
between Church and state in Italy still influence an
Italian's perception of the role of the Vatican and of
Catholics in public affairs. It is thus the prime
example of the cliche that Italy has a long historic
memory.
1
From 10 December 1945 to 28 June 1981, in unbro-
ken sequence, governments headed by Christian
Democratic premiers governed Italy (see figure 3).
Either alone or in coalition with smaller parties, the
DC's record of 39 consecutive governments is un-
equaled in the West. Only in Asia with the Liberal
Democrats of Japan can a comparably long tenure be
found. Unlike Japan, though, Italy has become virtu-
ally synonymous with instability.
Whereas many observers believe that Italy's frequent
changes of government are indicative of weakness or
fragility, the DC's persistent and pervasive presence
suggests something quite different. Indeed, continuity
of political administration in democracies is normally
regarded as evidence of a sound body politic. And
when compared with some of the lurches and wrench-
ings of postwar France, Italy appears rather stolid.
Admittedly, however, the number of government cri-
ses in Italy is the stuff of which instability is made.
Also, a decade of recurrent Red Brigade terrorist
activity has given Italy high international visibility
with overtones implying governmental impotence, no-
tably in the 1978 abduction and murder of former
Premier Aldo Moro. There are also the electoral gains
made by the Communist Party in the 1970s as well as
the returns on various issues submitted to referendum
since that on divorce in 1974, all connoting growing
challenge to DC rule. Furthermore, an average life-
span of 11 months for cabinets is hardly characteristic
of stable government.
Examined in detail, however, Italy's political condi-
tion seems to suggest stagnation or atrophy rather
than instability. Government crises rarely have result-
ed from fundamental political differences. Instead
they have been more an exercise in political ritual?
jockeying by rival DC factions?wherein the game is
perpetually influenced by the DC and its involvement
in all segments of national life. Governments have
changed, but men and policies have remained monoto-
nously similar. When a major shift has occurred, such
as the Socialists' entry into the government in 1963,
the change was contemplated well in advance and was
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Figure 1
Italy: Administrative Regions
i
Sondrie
rentino-
Bolzan .?2/
Alto Adige
Trento
? Political region boundary
Province boundary
Political region capital
Province capital
?.11Friult-
j, Vehozia
Giclia
Udine
Aosta Varase -Bono t Pordenon ? ...-,..--Gorizi.
a. ..
-4.,.--- - Como Perham i Treviso.
losta
/.----?
Novara Lorribardia Brescia Vicenza. ifeneiG rTile, csie,-,
. Milan .
Vercelli ,,4.- . ice
PiemOnte. ,, '''.(Milno) Veikrie? Padua.
a
Pavia' C,15011qa Mantua '1;u , .i(Venezia)
(Trourriingor ? -----A-,-.? ? -
Pia enza Parma'
- -11,k.sti ;Alessa '.
,_ Re gio? ?Modena- -Ferrara
.Cuneo (7,li---,',. BeinZ4 C Emg Bologn
ilia ? 4rniiia- . . Ravenna
iN-r.) ,-.h. a ' .
J? -..."--?,` Savona Romago
France Forli _ /
..---Imperia Carrara\ ' ucca ?Pistoia _
n Marino42, .
ma
--4Monaco 1.13 8r0
Pi Flares
?
' r.0 En-(Firenze)
0 100 Kilometers
100 Miles
Names and boundary r presentat
are not necessarily authoritative.
Yugoslavia
Q,Corsica '
-?--/.111uoro)
Sardinia,'
Oristanir
Sardinia
(
Algeria
r
Tunisia
)
Leghorn
oscana ?
Arezzo
(Livorno
Siena?
'E
*Tunis
Marche
acerata?
Astoli
o
ncona
'Perugia
-ymbria
Terni. ?
Viterbo? Rich
'Grosseto
Latio
*Rome
tina
iota c'' Usbeq,
Fr
?,"Pescara
'?Chiek,_
AbraP.zi
Is rnia
Molise
Cam
amino
sso
.Fogg'a
\ Caserta .BeRev to eOglia qui
Nries Avellino
Cer:pahisa
otenza
(Matera
Bastlicata
0 Isola I. fon
VII1,134
Trapan. Palermo in a
?Enna ,
'Callinissena
? -
Agrihe C 1 ys-
Catania
Ta
Cosenza
Calabfia
Cau,aio
(.R,aligtri. di Calabria
Syracuse
Siracusa)
Brindisi
?
Le
rdi

628851 3-82
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Figure 2
Structure of Government, 1981
Parliament
Senate 315 7
Chamber of Deputies 630
President
Prime Minister
Council of
Ministers
Regional AssemblyRegional Commissioner
Provincial Council
Communal Council
Electorate
Executive Council
President
?????......................... Prefect
Executive Council
President
Communal Secretary
Executive Council
Mayor
Election
Appointment
- Supervision
Approval
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Figure 3
The Governments of the Republic of Italy
Legend
DC-Christian Democratic Party
PSDI-Social Democratic Party
PSLI-Workers' Socialist Party
(later became PSDI)
PSI-Socialist Party
PLI-Liberal Party
PRI-Republican Party
PdA-Action Party
PSU-Unified Socialist Party (temporary name of PSI and PSDI)
PCI-Communist Party
MSI-Italian Social Movement (Neo-Fascist party)
DL-Democratic Labor Party
Party Affiliation (Coalition)
Months in Office=
0 6 12
18
24
30
36
Dates in Office
Crisis Lengtha (days)! I
Parentheses indicate party giving external support
Alcide De Gasperi I-DC (DC, PCI, PSI, PRI, PLI, PdA, DL)
--ri
10 Dec 1945- 1 Jul
1946
12
Constituent Assembly Alcide De Gasperi II-DC (DC, PCI, PSI, PRI)
-I
13 Jul 1946-20 Jan
1947
13
Elected 2 June 1946 Alcide De Gasperi III-DC (DC, PCI, PSI)
Ll
2 Feb 1947-13 May
1947
18
Alcide De Gasperi IV-DC (DC, PSLI, PRI, PLI)
II
31 May 1947-12 May
1948
11
Legislature I Alcide De Gasperi V-DC (DC, PSLI, PLI, PRI)
q
23 May 1948-12 Jan
1950
15
Elected 18 April 1948 Alcide De Gasperi VI-DC (DC, PSLI, PRI)
L
27 Jan 1950-16 Jul
1951
10
Alcide De Gasperi VII-DC (DC and PRI)
I
26 Jul 1951-29 Jun
1953
17
Legislature II Alcide De Gasperi VIII-DC (DC)
_Li
16 Jul 1953-28 Jul
1953
20
Elected 7 June 1953 Giuseppe Pella-DC (DC)
11
17 Aug 1953- 5 Jan
1954
13
Amintore Fanfani 1-DC (DC)
II
18 Jan 1954-30 Jan
1954
11
Mario Scelba-DC (DC, PSDI, PLI)
1
10 Feb 1954-22 Jun
1955
14
Antonio Segni I-DC (DC)
II
6 Jul 1955- 6 May
1957
13
Adone Zoli-DC (DC)
U
19 May 1957-19 Jun
1958
12
Legislature III Amintore Fanfani II-DC (DC)
1 Jul 1958-26 Jan
1959
20
Elected 25 May 1958 Antonio Segni II-DC (DC)
LI
15 Feb 1959-24 Feb
1960
30
Fernando Tambroni-DC (DC)
A
25 Mar 1960-19 Jul
1960
7
Amintore Fanfani III-DC (DC, PSDI, PLI, PRI (PSI))
1
26 Jul 1960- 2 Feb
1962
19
Amintore Fanfani IV-DC (DC, PSDI, PRI, PLI (PSI))
1 I
21 Feb 1962-15 May
21 Jun 1963- 5 Nov
1963
1963
37
29
I I
Legislature IV Giovanni Leone I-DC (DC)
Elected 28 April 1963 Aldo Moro I-DC (DC, PSI, PSDI, PRI)
I
4 Dec 1963-26 Jun
1964
26
Aldo Moro II-DC (DC, PSI, PSDI, PRI)
22 Jul 1964-21 Jan
1966
33
Aldo Moro III-DC (DC, PSI, PSDI, PRI)
ii
23 Feb 1966- 5 Jun.
1968
19
Legislature V Giovanni Leone II-DC (DC)
I I
24 Jun 1968-19 Nov
1968
23
Elected 19 May 1968 Mariano Rumor I-DC (DC, PSU, PRI)
I
12 Dec 1968- 5 Jul
1969
26
Mariano Rumor II-DC (DC (PSI and PSU))
1 I
5 Aug 1969- 7 Feb
1970
48
Mariano Rumor III-DC (DC, PSU, PRI)
11
27 Mar 1970- 6 Jul
1970
31
Emilio Colombo-DC (DC, PSI, PSU, PRI)
1
6 Aug 1970-15 Jan
1972
33
Giulio Andreotti I-DC (DC(PL1))
I
I
17 Feb 1972-26 Feb
1972
121
Legislature VI Giulio Andreotti II-DC (DC, PSDI, PLI(PRI))
I
26 Jun 1972-12 Jun
1973
25
Elected 7 May 1972 Mariano Rumor IV-DC (DC, PSI, PSDI, PRI)
Il
7 Jul 1973- 2 Mar
1974
12
Mariano Rumor V-DC (DC, PSI, PSDI)
I I
14 Mar 1974- 3 Oct
1974
51
Aldo Moro IV-DC (DC, PRI(PSI and PSDI)
I
23 Nov 1974- 7 Jan
1976
36
Aldo Moro V-DC (DC)
I
I
12 Feb 1976-30 Apr
1976
90
Legislature VII Giulio Andreotti III-DC (DC(PSI and PCI))
I
I
29 Jul 1976-16 Jan
1978
54
Elected 20 June 1976 Giulio Andreotti IV-DC (DC(PSI, PSDI, PI, PRI, PLI))
1
11 Mar 1978-31 Jan
1979
48
Giulio Andreotti V-DC (DC, PSDI, PRI)
I
I
20 Mar 1979-31 Mar
1979
126
Legislature VIII Francesco Cossiga I-DC (DC, PSI, PRI)
4 Aug 1979-13 Mar
1980
22
Elected 3 June 1979 Francesco Cossiga II-DC (DC, PSI, PRI)
I
4 Apr 1980-29 Sep
1980
19
Arnaldo Forlani-DC (DC, PSI, PSDI, PRI)
I I
18 Oct 1980-26 May
1981
33
Giovanni Spadolini-PRI (DC, PSI, PSDI, PRI, PLI)
28 Jun 1981-
aGovernments are said to be "in crisis" from the time an incumbent
cabinet resigns until its successor takes office. In the crisis period, the
outgoing government serves in caretaker capacity.
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accepted virtually as a necessity even by those origi-
nally opposed to it. Viewed in broad perspective, this
and other shifts are examples of how Italian politics
tend to move more in the context of geologic time
than in conventional political frames.
The characteristic torpor of Italian politics may,
however, be coming to an end, albeit in slow motion.
Analysis of regional and national elections as well as
returns on referendums demonstrates that something
is changing. In the midst of such protracted change,
what might ultimately emerge is more difficult to
ascertain than elements in the transition process.
Terrorism and the Italian public's response to it, for
example, are symptomatic of exasperated impatignce
and frustration. The years of dramatic terrorist acts
would seem to imply an eventual and unavoidable
backlash or public outburst. Yet the passage of so
many years of flamboyant incidents without decisive
public outcry has become a particularly Italianate
phenomenon. Terrorism in this instance must be
regarded with caution, however, for it is a symptom of
something more profoundly alarming in Italian life.
Whether or not the Red Brigades and other terrorists,
left or right, are aided from abroad is not the critical
aspect of the situation. Instead, these assaults on the
system are violent warnings of a profound dislocation
which continues to feed lawlessness and which in turn
can be exploited from outside.
The Christian Democrats, and to varying extents their
occasional coalition allies, carry great responsibility
for the immobilism and unfulfilled promises that have
frustrated the Italian people, driving some to the point
of murder and mayhem. The roots of this violence and
the seedbed in which it flourishes are widely viewed
by Italians as deriving from years of failure by the
government to resolve persistent problems and provide
an effective response to national -expectations. Blam-
ing the Christian Democrats alone for this state of
affairs is simplistic, but as the only constant stewards
of national affairs for 35 years they become a facile
scapegoat. No objective analysis of contemporary ,
Italian affairs can thus avoid careful assessment of
DC leadership and the party's role in guiding the
nation, as well as a look at what can be expected of
Italian Christian Democracy in the future.
7
The Church versus State Antecedent
The image of the DC in Italian minds can be fully
comprehended only through an awareness of the role
of Catholics in the last century of national life.
Unusual as the longevity of this phenomenon may
seem to outsiders, Catholics and Catholicism?the
question of Church and state?is the oldest continu-
ing theme in Italian politics. Christian Democracy's
rule is but the central manifestation of the phenom-
enon since 1945. In addition, one must remember that
if political conduct in Italy is Byzantine, it derives
from centuries of foreign domination when duplicity,
subterfuge, corruption, and myriad devious devices
were justified as necessary for survival until they
became a way of life.
Italy's unification process was shot through with
conflict between the papacy and the secular forces
seeking to create a nation state. Church opposition to
national unification hardened in 1870 when the King-
dom of Italy seized the city of Rome, ending papal
temporal authority. Pius IX then forbade Catholics
under pain of excommunication to participate in the
affairs of what he regarded as a usurper state. Only in
1904, and then in limited and oblique fashion, was
that prohibition lifted to permit Catholics to throw
their weight into any electoral district where leftist or
anticlerical elements might otherwise win a seat in
Parliament. Again in the national election of 1913
restrictions were further relaxed to allow Catholic
candidates for the first time to run against leftists.
Finally, with Benedict XV's grudging acquiscence in
1919, all constraints on Catholic involvement in Ital-
ian politics were lifted. A Sicilian priest, Don Luigi
Sturzo, then founded the Italian Popular Party (PPI),
Italy's first confessional party and the forerunner of
today's DC. As in previous Catholic political initia-
tives the PPI was directed largely against Marxist
elements in national politics. Until January 1921,
when the Communist Party (PCI) was founded, the
principal vehicle of Marxism in Italy was the Socialist
Party (PSI). Whether in opposition initially to the
Socialists or subsequently also to the Communists,
anti-Marxism was as important in the founding of the
PPI as it was in the establishment of the DC in the fi-
nal years of World War II.
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If the hostility of the Vatican toward the Italian state
is comprehensible, the Church's opposition to later
Catholic initiatives in politics is harder to grasp. The
first man to be elected to the Italian Parliament as a
Catholic, the priest Romolo Murri in 1909, was
defrocked and excommunicated. That incident and
others illustrate ongoing tensions within the Catholic
community itself. Catholic political activity in Italy
developed and still continues to work either in spite of
the Vatican or as a weapon used by the Church to
oppose certain initiatives within the Italian political
arena. Thus, one cannot assume that the DC is always
and automatically subservient to the Vatican's wishes.
On occasion each has done the other's bidding, but
instances of divergence are not at all uncommon.
Anti-Marxism remains the fundamental tenet not
only of the Church but also for the DC, and it cannot
be overemphasized as a central force in 20th century
Italian Catholic political organizations. To a large
segment of the Italian public, however, this appears as
a negative initiative when directed against social and
economic reform. Of equal significance in many
Italian minds is the onus of Church accommodation
with Mussolini in the Lateran Pacts of 1929. In short,
a whole fabric of opposition to Italy or of complicity
with the fascist dictatorship remains even today in the
minds of many Italians when they think of Church
involvement in national life?that of an occasional
and unwelcome intruder whose interests are not fun-
damentally Italian. This is the record which the DC,
as a party of Catholics, has had to contend with since
its founding. Not even the active and well-known
participation in the resistance to fascism by some
members of the DC sufficed to remove the wariness
Italians feel for the Church in politics.
If the DC has achieved a relatively favorable record in
light of such obstacles, explanations are not hard to
find. First, Italy is a nation of Catholics (as opposed to
a Catholic nation) where reconciliation of State and
Church opened the door to political activity for a
massive group of previously alienated citizens, the
largest single political bloc in the country. Second, in
the aftermath of World War II and the simultaneous
civil conflict which swept the country, the DC offered
a healing alternative, an outlet for Catholic social
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aspirations favoring interclass cooperation, free enter-
prise, and personal rights. While Stalin's Russia cast
an ominous shadow over Europe, the DC stood for
alliance with the West. In addition, with the removal
of the monarchy by referendum in 1946, the DC, as
representative of the Church, the other principal
traditional institution in Italy, stood in an extremely
favorable position to fill the resultant power vacuum.
Still, as these factors recede in importance, the DC's
lack of a well-defined political credo inevitably leaves
it without the appeal of some of the other parties.
Today's Christian Democratic Party was born in the
summer of 1943 in semiclandestine circumstances
after the fall of Mussolini but before the country was
freed by Allied armies. The party dates its origins
from several statements of principles and aspirations
published by Alcide De Gasperi writing under the
pseudonym of Demofilo. The first of these, Recon-
structive Ideas of Christian Democracy, called for a
party that was more a mutation than a continuation of
the old PPI which Mussolini had suppressed. The two
parties had in common the goal of promoting Chris-
tian principles in the political world plus a direct
political link to the Vatican. De Gasperi's program,
however, was an odd blend of corporativism with a
call for social reforms, individual freedom, the sancti-
ty of private property, and the fostering of moral
values, notably of the family. His first program merits
mention primarily to underscore the degree to which
the DC varies its aims, seemingly for advantages of
the moment, a mode of conduct which opens the party
to charges of opportunism. To call for any corporativ-
ism in the aftermath of fascism and to speak of
phasing out the proletariat?two major points in the
early program?struck many at the time as odd. The
first program has long since been abandoned and now
seems even antithetical to programs the DC has
fostered since. Nevertheless, the implied paternalism
of the early program is in linear descent from the PPI
and, before it, from the landmark encyclicals of Leo
XIII, Rerum novarum (1891) and Graves de' corn-
muni re (1901), which mark papal endorsement of
Christian Democracy and the Catholic labor
movement.
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uonlinential
Despite the views it expressed, Christian Democracy
attracted an unusually heterogeneous following in the
wasteland of immediate postwar politics. Laymen and
clerics, as well as progressives and conservatives, fell
in behind De Gasperi. The disparate groups and
individuals which joined at the outset were precursors
of internal factions whose constant struggles are the
hallmark of the party today. Individuals who stand
out in the early DC represent a broad spectrum of
political experience, some even tainted by association
with the fascist regime, as in the case of Amintore
Fanfani.
The DC benefited from several organizations whose
existence Mussolini tolerated even though he and the
fascists did not wholly control them. Hence the early
DC profited from having in place some Catholic
groups made up of individuals who had not been in
hiding or in exile. The Vatican itself, of course,
provided a haven of sorts for future DC leaders to
escape Mussolini and still remain physically in Italy,
significant among them being De Gasperi himself.
Catholic Action, the lay group promoting Church
interests, as well as the Federation of Catholic Uni-
versity Students,' out of which Guilio Andreotti and
others came, provided the first organizational spring-
boards for the DC. If such men and organizations
proved useful for the party's launching, the legal and
institutional carryovers from the fascist regime that
they sanctioned are another matter. The DC not
infrequently has been faulted for this, and it has
proved a source of embarrassment as well as an
obstacle to realization of various democratic reforms.
Some aspects of the immediate postwar years have
special relevance to the contemporary scene. Specifi-
cally, the DC's occasional staunch stand against
Marxist parties is not a phenomenon of the years
immediately after 1945. The makeup of the Constitu-
ent Assembly, as well as the constitution it produced,
demonstrate the strength of both the PCI and the PSI
(see figure 8). As a consequence, despite its opposition
to Marxism, the DC was not initially strong enough to
practice ideological purity. Its collaboration with both
Socialists and Communists was a matter of necessity
until in 1947 in his fourth ministry De Gasperi was
able to exclude them from government. Also the DC
'See below, page 28
9
did not consolidate its power in 1948 merely because
of its accomplishments or US backing. Heavyhanded
actions of the Soviet Union, particularly in Czechoslo-
vakia, were as great an assist to the DC as any
tactical error or shortcoming on the part of the PCI or
PSI. Thus, the habit of DC predominance dates from
April 1948, with the first election for a Parliament
under the new Constitution.
The essence of the Italian Christian Democrats, to say
the least, is not easily understood abroad. No other
Italian or European party is analogous, and the
nearest valid comparison?that of an American
party?is misleading. Further complicating matters,
the DC has become nearly indistinguishable from the
Italian Government itself, an unusual situation in a
parliamentary democracy. As a movement appealing
to a vast number of interests, it is more an umbrella
over a series of differing political viewpoints, a coali-
tion of factions, some of which seem diametrically
opposed. Its continued existence and dominance are as
easily explained by historical circumstances as by its
record of achievements. And its longevity of power is
as easily explained by the unifying link of the Church
as it is by any recognition of mutual self-interest and
enjoyment of power shared by its component groups
and leaders. Not the least of the vital elements in its
survival is Italy's so-called imperfect two-party sys-
tem, an allusion to the lack of a loyal opposition
because of continuing doubts about the PCI's true
allegiance. While Italy ranks in the top 10 of the
world's powers by many criteria, the country still has
one foot in the Third World in terms of political
development, further clouding an already confusing
impression. If Italian politics seem almost frozen in
the past, the country's social and economic develop-
ment have nevertheless progressed dramatically since
World War II.
As a result of these factors, an assessment of the
Christian Democrats virtually approximates a review
of contemporary Italy. This paper seeks to ascertain
the status of Christian Democracy?its strengths,
leadership, and relations with other parties and orga-
nizations?as well as some indications of what the
future may hold for the party and, unavoidably, for
Italy. The central theme of this analysis is that a
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fundamental change is slowly taking shape in Italy, a
shift that appears to pivot on the returns of national
consultations at the polls between 1974 and 1976 and
which implies the erosion of Christian Democratic
strength. Although nothing currently suggests that
the party might disappear, many factors imply that its
nature and success will be affected and doubtless
altered in the relatively near future. The nature of the
Italian electorate for some years is such that the DC,
or a near likeness of it, will long remain among the
nation's top three political parties.
Party Structure
For a party of such long-lived electoral success, the
DC is surprisingly short on functioning organization
and discipline in the conventional sense. Also, its
membership fluctuates dramatically, with occasional
temporary declines in some areas of as much as 50
percent (see following section on party membership).
In all these aspects, the DC contrasts strikingly with
its major rival, the PCI. Occasionally there have been
serious attempts to correct this problem, the first and
most effective being when Amintore Fanfani was
party secretary in the 1950s. But today it remains
only erratically well organized despite efforts in the
mid- and late 1970s to achieve a rinnovamento (re-
newal) following its electoral shocks of the middle of
that decade.
The DC's organization and daily functioning are best
understood if viewed on two distinct levels: the formal
structure and the actual working elements. In theory
the party has a precise and elaborate organization
ranging from thousands of local sections nationwide
through the National Council, Central Directorate,
Party Secretary, and President (see figure 4). How-
ever, this system functions rather sporadically, usually
in weeks prior to either a national party congress or
elections. In practice, the DC is an amalgam of
factions?something the Italians call correnti (cur-
rents)?and a vast network of support organizations
(on the latter, see the following section).
The Formal Organization
Today's DC organization is based on the new party
statute drafted over a four-year period and published
in 1979. The document purports to be the foundation
of the party's renewal process. Despite the time spent
on its preparation, careful reading shows that even
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when it took effect such important sectors as the
youth and women's movements still remained to be
completed. DC setbacks and losses from 1974 through
1976 forced many of the changes. For example, such
innovations as direct election of the party secretary by
the national congress rather than by the National
Council sought to create "a wide open party." Al-
though the changes attempted to make the party more
genuinely democratic, the effort is a typically DC
approach to problem solving: a reaction to conditions
rather than a spontaneous initiative for revitalization.
Many of the changes in party organization, it was
said, were necessary because of fundamental innova-
tions in the structure of the nation such as the
enactment of the administrative regions. However,
five regions had been in existence for years and the
remaining 15 were put in place in 1970, nine years
before the DC got around to adopting a statute
reflecting this most important of Italian postwar
administrative reforms.
The 128 articles of the DC statute consider, in great
detail, all aspects of party operation from individual
membership requirements through the duties and
functions of the top hierarchical organs and officials.
Nevertheless the ongoing activity of the party sug-
gests that the statute serves more as a statement of
ideals or aspirations than as a binding constitution. As
an example, it lays down specific requirements of
moral and political conduct which in practice are
made a mockery by the party's continuing production
of scandals.
What is new in party organization is the more precise
outline for its structure as well as the election of
functionaries in a manner parallel to the various levels
of government where the party competes for office:
communes, provinces, regions, and the nation as a
whole. Provision is also made to favor those adminis-
trative areas where DC election successes most fre-
quently occur, presumably giving an incentive to the
ambitious rank and file to work more actively for
party candidates. On the other hand, although the
regions are now second only to the nation in impor-
tance, DC regional officials have yet to gain the
influence still enjoyed by provincial leaders, notably
the provincial political secretary who remains a lead-
ing power broker for those seeking to launch political
careers.
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Figure 4
Structure of the Christian Democratic Party
?Line of election
?Line of appointment or coordination
National Congress
Regional
Pre-Congress
DC Parliamentary
Delegations
585804 2-82
President
Political Nat'onal Council Central Directorate
(80 DC parliamentarians; 80 Executive Administrative
noriparliamentarians; chairman Board Secretary
Secretary
Consultative
Assembly of
Body of Regions Regional
Councillors
of DC parliamentary delegations;
DC regional secretaries; other
members.)
Regional Congress Regional Committee
Regional Directorate
Executive Board
Regional Secretariat
Provincial Congress --Provincial Committee..... Community Committee -x-N
3 ...--.....?............., 1
Provincial Directorate Community Directorate
3 3
Secretariat Executive Board Community Council
3
Secretary
...--"------
Sectional Directorate ?.-Secretary District Committee
I 1
Sectional Assembly District Council
1 3
Secretary
Local Section
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National Congresses of the Christian Democratic
Party
1. Rome, 24-28 April 1946 8.
2. Naples, 16-20 November 9.
1947
3. Venice, 2-5 June 1949 10.
4. Rome, 21-26 November
1952 11.
5. Naples, 26-29 June 1954 12.
6. Trento, 14-18 October 1956 13.
14.
15.
7. Florence, 23-28 October
1959
Naples, 27-30 June 1962
Rome, 12-16 September
1964
Milan, 23-28 November
1967
Rome, 27-30 June 1969
Rome, 6-10 June 1973
Rome, 18-24 March 1976
Rome, 15-21 February 1980
Tentatively scheduled for
late April 1982
At the top of the party pyramid is the national
congress, an assembly of delegates elected by local
sections and regional congresses and including the DC
members of Parliament. The Congress?in theory?
meets every two years unless summoned into special
session by the political secretary or a two-thirds
majority of the National Council. It deliberates on
general party policy and elects the national political
secretary by secret ballot from a field of at least 30
candidates from 10 or more regions.
The political secretary is, in effect, the party's chief
executive officer with responsibility for coordinating
and promoting the DC's activities according to the
wishes of the National Council and Central Director-
ate (see tables 1 and 2). As a matter of practical
politics, the political secretary is normally a figure
acceptable to the party's major factions.
The party president is elected by the National Coun-
cil, and the job tends to go to the head of the, most in-
fluential faction. In practice the presidency has be-
come as powerful as an incumbent can make it. While
Aldo Moro was party president, he greatly oversha-
dowed Benigno Zaccagnini, the political secretary.
Today's incumbent, Arnaldo Forlani, creates the im-
pression of being?at best and only on occasion?the
equal of Flaminio Piccoli, the political secretary.
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Christian Democratic Party Political Secretaries
1. Alcide de Gasperi
2. Attilio Piccioni
3. Giuseppe Cappi
4. Paolo Emilio Taviani
5. Alcide De Gasperi
6. Amintore Fanfani
7. Aldo Moro
8. Mariano Rumor
9. Flaminio Piccoli
10. Arnaldo Forlani
11. Amintore Fanfani
12. Benigno Zaccagnini
13. Arnaldo Forlani
14. Flaminio Piccoli
April 1946?September 1947
September 1947?May 1948
May 1948?April 1950
April 1950?September 1953
September 1953?July 1954
July 1954?February 1959
February 1959?September 1964
September 1964?January 1969
January-November 1969
November 1969?June 1973
June 1973?July 1975
July 1975?January 1980
January-November 1980
November 1980?
The National Council is the party's deliberative body
and theoretically must meet at least once every three
months, although this rule is not carefully observed.
Its membership is composed of 160 people elected by
the national congress, 80 from Parliament and 80
nonparliamentary. In addition, seats are held by the
prime minister, most current and past DC cabinet
ministers, plus the chairmen of the DC parliamentary
delegations, and regional secretaries. Ex officio mem-
bers include under secretaries, editors of the party's
national publications, and other party functionaries.
The true inner sanctum of DC power is the Central
Directorate. Using the proportional method, to reflect
the strength and importance of party factions, the
National Council elects the Central Directorate,
largely from its own membership; the Directorate
determines party political programs and even deliber-
ates on the resolution of cabinet crises. In practice this
is the forum where party factions work out their
differences and make deals. The Directorate is sum-
moned and chaired by the political secretary, who is
usually the leader of the party's most powerful faction
or is a figure acceptable to it and the other major
factions. To carry out the daily business of the party,
the secretary is assisted by deputy secretaries and the
heads of various party offices who are frequently
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Table 1
Parliamentary Members of the
Christian Democratic National Council,
by Faction, February 1980
Dorotei
Abis, Senator Lucio
Bisaglia, Senator Antonio
Campagnoli, Deputy Mario
Castelli, Senator Angelo
Danesi, Deputy Emo
Degan, Deputy Costante
Ferrari-Aggradi, Senator Mario
Gaspari, Deputy Remo
Gava, Deputy Antonio
Lattanzio, Deputy Vito
Mazzola, Deputy Franco
Micheli, Deputy Filippo
Petrucci, Deputy Amerigo
Piccoli, Deputy Flaminio,
Faction Leader
Pucci, Deputy Ernesto
Ruffini, Deputy Attilio
Scarlato, Deputy Vincenzo
Sedati, Deputy Giacomo
Tesini, Deputy Giancarlo
Area Zac ("Base")
nselmi. Denutv Tina
Bodrato, Deputy Guido
Bonalumi, Deputy Gilberto
Cabras, Deputy Paolo
Cossiga, Deputy Francesco
Dell' Andro, Deputy Renato
De Mita, Deputy Ciriaco
Fracanzani, Deputy Carlo
Galloni, Deputy Giovanni
Giglia, Deputy Luigi
Granelli, Senator Luigi
Grippo, Deputy Ugo
Gui, Deputy Luigi
Gullotti, Deputy Antonino
Kessler, Deputy Bruno
Ligato, Deputy Lodovico
Marcora, Deputy Giovanni
Martinazzoli, Senator Mino
Martini, Deputy Maria Eletta
Misasi, Deputy Riccardo
Pisanu, Deputy Giuseppe
Salvi,-Deputy Franco
Zaccagnini, Deputy Beniamino,
Faction Leader
Andreottiani
Andreotti, Deputy Giulio,
Faction Leader
Bisagno, Deputy Tommaso
Carenini, Deputy Egidio
Cristofori, Deputy Adolfo Nino
Drago, Deputy Antonino
Evangelisti, Deputy Franco
Quattrone, Deputy Franco
Scotti, Deputy Vincenzo
Signorello, Senator Nicola
Tantalo, Deputy Michele
Fanfaniani
Arnaud, Deputy Gian Aldo
Bartolomei, Senator Giuseppe
Bosco, Deputy Manfredi
d'Arezzo, Senator Bernardo
Darida, Deputy Clelio
Fanfani, Senator Amintore,
Faction Leader
Forlani, Deputy Arnaldo
Gioia, Deputy Giovanni Giuseppe
Malfatti, Deputy Franco Maria
Scalfaro, Deputy Oscar Luigi
Forze Nuove
Andreoni, Deputy Giovanni
Colombo, Senator Vittorino
Donat Cattin, Senator Carlo,
Faction Leader
Faraguti, Deputy Luciano
Leccisi, Deputy Pino
Mannino, Deputy Calogero
Mazzarino, Deputy Mario
Morazzoni, Deputy Gaetano
Russo, Deputy Vincenzo
Sinesio, Deputy Giuseppe
Spitella, Senator Giorgio
Tiriolo, Senator Elio
Toros, Senator Mario
Valiante, Senator Mario
Proposta
Bonferroni, Deputy Franco
Mazzotta, Deputy Roberto
Prandini, Deputy Gianni
Segni, Deputy Mario
members of parliament and representative of the
factions. This staff in some ways resembles a shadow
government, but it also mirrors the factional divisions
and power relationships in the DC. Fundamental to
the successful management of the party and its
national office is a modicum of harmony among these
elements, something which depends greatly on the
skill of the political secretary.
The Factions
Difficult though they are to define, the factions of the
DC are the essence of the party, the fundamental
practical dimension which does not appear on any
formal organization chart.
13
Factionalism has been a prominent feature of Italian
political life since the country's unification, and to a
degree not found in other countries. Most Italian
parties have factions, but only those of the DC have
become veritable miniparties. The phenomenon also is
typical of the Catholic political movement in Italy and
predates the founding of the DC; the factions are an
unfortunate reflection of the experience of the old
PPI. Because the DC is a large party appealing to all
classes of society, some such divisions are inevitable.
It is their degree of institutionalization, though, which
is unique. Their relations with each other and to the
party as a whole largely determine the DC's conduct.
The number of factions at any time may vary, but the
divergence of their views is wide enough to ensure that
almost any act of one will contravene the interests of
at least one other. Thus it is difficult to move the
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Table 2
Central Directorate of Christian Democracy
(As of 5 March 1980 Election)
President a
Political Secretary
Deputy Political Secretaries
Arnaldo Forlani (Fanfaniano)
Flaminio Piccoli (Doroteo)
Ciriaco de Mita (Area Zac)
Vittorino Colombo (Forze Nuove)
Editor of II Popolo Franco Maria Malfatti (Fanfaniano)
Editor of La Discussione Corrado Belci (Area Zac)
Number of Percent of Number of Percent of
Representatives Membership Representatives Membership
Dorotei 7 22 Franco Evangelisti
Emo Danesi Salvatore Lima
Mario Ferrari Aggradi Nicola Quarta
Remo Gaspari
Antonio Gaya
Vito Lattanzio
Corrado Montemaggiori
Vincenzo Scarlato
Area Zac (Base)
Corrado Belci
Guido Bodrato
Ciriaco De Mita
Giovanni Galloni
Luigi Gui
9
28
Nino Gullotti
Riccardo Misasi
Franco Salvi
Andreottiani 4 12.5
Giulio Andreotti
Fanfaniani 4 12.5
Gian Aldo Arnaud
Angelo Becciu
Manfredi Bosco
Giovanni Gioia
Forze Nuove 6 19
Emilio Colombo
Carlo Donat Cattin
Luciano Faraguti
Sandro Fontana
Mario Mazzarino
Vincenzo Russo
Proposta 2 6
Roberto Mazzotta
Gianni Prandini
Total
32 100
a Also included as members with right to vote: the Prime Minister,
the heads of the DC delegations of the Chamber and the Senate,
Gerardo Bianco and Giorgio Di Giuseppe; ex party secretaries
Fanfani, GoneIla, Rumor, Taviani, and Zaccagnini, the delegate of
the Women's Movement, Gabriella Ceccatelli, and the delegate of
the Youth Movement, Marco Follini.
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party because consensus is difficult to reach. The
worst aspect of factionalization is the uncertainty it
creates for the party, because defection by even one
group can threaten the life of DC-led governments.
No doubt a majority of the government crises since
World War II has been caused by factional disputes
within the DC. This phenomenon also underscores
another unfortunate aspect of factionalization?the
virtual merger of party and government under the
DC's dominance. In effect, factional competition for
control of the party has become practically synony-
mous with control of the national government, and
this in no small degree has heightened public cynicism
about the DC and the governing process.
Factionalism is not, however, wholly without virtue.
Factions provide outlets for the party's diverse con-
stituency because almost any interest group can find a
"current" with which to identify. Also, endless com-
petition among the groups fosters, willy-nilly, continu-
ing policy debate as well as a system through which
more than one set of leaders can rise to the top, thus
providing leadership options at all times. Factions also
provide an easy mechanism for semiofficial contact
with other parties where similar views can be found,
thus creating the bridges crucial to the formation of
government coalitions. Conversely, this can and does
dull the distinctions between government and opposi-
tion. Because the Italian parliamentary system does
not have politically "acceptable" or numerically via-
ble alternative parties strong enough to form a gov-
ernment, the interplay of factions seems to have been
rationalized into filling the role of "loyal" opposition.
As a constraint on the party in power, this arrange-
ment is far from ideal.
No statement about a faction remains valid for any
significant length of time. Not only does factional
composition often vary, but the faction itself may
move back and forth across the political spectrum.
Since the war some factional labels have remained
constant, and a few individuals have not varied their
ideological stands. Nevertheless, the ideological con-
tent and orientation associated with a given faction
can be quite fluid. If one were to trace this phenom-
enon in the career of an individual, that of Amintore
Fanfani probably would be the most illuminating. In
the course of his 35 years in Parliament, Fanfani has
15
at one time or another been associated with several
factions and been labeled as leftist, rightist, and
occasionally in the center.
Although the composition and ideology of factions
change constantly, these features may be caught
momentarily, like a snapshot, at national party con-
gresses. The voting at the most recent congress in
February 1980 shows six factions in the DC (tables 1
and 2 show factional alignments). At that time ideo-
logical positions were somewhat more clear than
normal because the congress voted on a "preamble," a
broad statement of principle rejecting collaboration
with the PCI (see text in box). In the summer of 1981
this preamble's principle was rejected by the National
Council, indicating that factional alignments had
once again shifted.' Even so, at more normal congress-
es, it is the votes for the lists of candidates for election
to the National Council presented by the various
currents that show a faction's strength. The next such
opportunity to catch a snapshot will be at the Nation-
al Congress scheduled for April 1982.
While Alcide De Gasperi lived, factionalism existed
only on the edges of the party because he enjoyed such
widespread support in the center as to mute the
impulse to division. Despite his personal resistance to
factionalism, De Gasperi and his Centristi (Centrists)
group acquired a distinction within the DC commen-
surate with their political position.' Although some
other DC leaders of De Gasperi's time tried to
promote their views and create a personal following,
the welter of groups whose names are the key to
internal party evolution began to appear in the early
1950s. The first significant attempt at forming a
group was the left-leaning Politica Sociale (Social
Policy) faction in the late 1940s led by Giovanni
Gronchi, formerly a Catholic labor leader and later
Factional changes at the Council meeting of 31 July to 2 August
1981 were too fluid to indicate a clear new alignment. All accounts
agree, however, that the center-right "Preamblist" majority no
longer exists and that the new orientation appears to be moving
center left. It is currently referred to as the "management major-
ity." See below page 17.
' In this instance the name of the current is self-explanatory, but
often such is not the case. Normally, a faction's label is derived
from its relative political position within the party, a place where it
meets, a leader's name, or the title of the faction's paper or journal.
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Preamble
The fourteenth national congress of Christian Democracy:
In the face of the country's grave problems, as well as those in the in-
ternational sphere, burdened by tension which Soviet expansionism
has accentuated with its passage to direct aggression and with the
threat to the energy resources of the economy of the industrialized
world;
Expresses the conviction that a course out of these difficulties can be
successfully followed so long as the Party is oriented, now and
henceforth, by the principles and values of its popular and
democratic tradition which have given it strength in the past to
assemble a broad and lasting consensus and in the role of guide for
the founding of the Republic, developing freedom, promoting civil,
social, and economic progress, with the extraordinary transforma-
tion of the country within the guaranteed framework of democratic
institutions;
It is aware that the Italian people today demand a more efficacious
and intense struggle against the terrorist threat to the state and a
firm and intelligent effort to coordinate the active will with which
the great majority of its citizens are working to overcome economic
difficulties;
Confirms the unflagging pledge of Christian Democracy to uphold
Western solidarity and that of the Atlantic Community as the
fundamental instruments of defense and the essential means of
discouraging the system of aggression and to hasten formation of
balances which constitute the indispensable foundation for the
resumption of detente;
Confirms as well that Christian Democracy will develop a line of
economic policy capable of promoting the maintenance of income
levels which have already been achieved, their expansion and, in
addition, a better territorial and social distribution of these benefits,
notable in the South, by means of planning, reinforcing the system's
free economy characteristics, both of market and enterprise, in a
manner that will insert the nation more and more into the European
Community as well as into the competition between free, industrial-
ized economies.
The fourteenth congress of Christian Democracy expresses confi-
dence in and approval of the Cossiga government with loyal
recognition to the parties which collaborate with it, support it, and
permit it to work toward a more broadly based political equilibrium.
The congress, while noting the evolution achieved to date by the
Italian Communist Party, perceives that the contrasting positions
still existing on clearly indicated problems do not permit Christian
Democracy's assumption of any leadership coresponsibility with that
party. The Congress entrusts the National Council of Christian
Democracy with the task of promoting a political policy initiative
which, with prior and open verification between the constitutional
parties at the appropriate time and place, seeks to make the nation's
government more safe and stable, in the spirit of national solidarity
and of the recognition of equal dignity between the political forces
which intend to collaborate.
The fourteenth congress asks all organs of Christian Democracy,
which?with their pledge?renew themselves, to work with diligent
commitment to give the Party organizational force and a presence in
society; directs to the voters an ardent and confident call to confirm
and broaden their assent for the Party, also in the regional and
administrative elections in the spring, in the assurance that Christian
Democracy holds firmly in its hands and which will never permit the
flag of liberty to be lowered for the Italian people.
Rome, 21 February 1980
President of the Republic. Some would argue, how-
ever, that Cronache Sociali (Social Chronicles), the
leftist current founded by Giuseppe Dossetti in the
same period, was the most important early faction
because of the continuity of its rather intellectual
viewpoint in subsequent groups. On the right, Vespa
(The Wasp) developed in the mid-1950s, taking its
name from a club where its membership gathered.
This broad prototype of left, center, and right factions
was present in the first legislature of 1948-53 and has
remained more or less constant over the years, with an
occasional proliferation to as many as nine or 10
simultaneously identifiable currents.
The father of more recent DC factional organization
is Amintore Fanfani who, following De Gasperi's
death in 1954, organized Iniziativa Democratica
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(Democratic Initiative) from remnants of both Dosset-
ti's and De Gasperi's followers; this was the majority
faction through most of the 1950s. On the left two
other groups formed: Forze Sociali (Social Forces),
from the labor elements of the party, and La Base
(The Base or Grass Roots), a more ideologically leftist
force. To the right at that time was Primavera
(Spring) headed by Giulio Andreotti.
In 1959 Iniziativa Democratica split. Led by Mariano
Rumor, its largest remnant formed the Dorotei, a
center-right faction named for the Rome monastery
where it gathered. This current remains the largest
group in the party even if its leaders, membership,
and political orientation have fluctuated. The Dorotei
owe their long dominance in the party to a fairly
consistent community of action with the followers of
Aldo Moro, known as the Morotei, a current formed
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during Moro's time as Prime Minister in the 1960s.
While the latter tended to keep faith with the views of
their leader after his death in 1978, members of this
faction have slowly dispersed into other groups, pri-
marily La Base.
The Fanfaniani, those elements who went with
Fanfani in the Iniziativa Democratica breakup, were
also known by the name of their journal, Nuove
Cronache (New Chronicles), and originally were cen-
ter left. They, together with the more leftist labor
union faction of Carlo Donat Cattin, Rinnovamento
Democratico (Democratic Renewal), and a somewhat
smaller Primavera on the right led by Andreotti,
completed the major groupings of the first half of the
1960s.
By 1980-81, the two strongest factions were the
Dorotei and La Base. The latter is the largest compo-
nent of the Area Zac (the Zaccagnini group); Dorotei
holds 38 of the elective seats of the National Council
(19 each from the parliamentary and nonparliamen-
tary membership of the party) and Area Zac has 46.
The Dorotei, whose followers possibly exceed those of
Area Zac in number at the moment, is today's center
current. The Zaccagnini group together with the
Andreottiani (20 seats) are on their left. The group
farthest to the right and the largest of that side of the
spectrum is Donat Cattin's Forze Nuove (New Forces)
(28 seats) which has been increasingly associated with
the Fanfaniani (20 seats). The smallest group (8 seats),
known as Proposta (Proposal), must be regarded as
something of an unknown quantity whose most promi-
nent members, Mario Segni and Roberto Mazzotta,
are identified with conservative viewpoints. The occa-
sional gravitation of Andrea Borruso and Massimo de
Carolis toward Proposta also adds a certain quasi-
clerical element. In any event, the so-called preambo-
lista majority is a combination of Dorotei, Forze
Nuove, and Fanfaniani, with support from parts of
Proposta.
Because governments have been controlled so long by
the DC, it is hardly surprising to note that the choice
of prime minister and the political orientation of his
cabinet are reflections of factional relationships exist-
ing when a government is formed. Not only does the
most powerful current dominate the cabinet, but other
factions share seats either as ministers or under
17
secretaries in rough relation to their influence. Thus
the party's internal system of proportional power
sharing appears in governments. Understanding this
phenomenon is central to comprehending how internal
DC conflict can bring down a government and to
recognizing the degree to which party and govern-
ment have merged.
To attach any lasting or specific political ideology to
any faction is ultimately risky. Until the summer of
1981 traditional party principles, often stronger
among rightist factions, prevailed in the DC due to
the strength of the Preamble majority. Pragmatic
considerations?some would call it opportunism?
have more commonly flourished on the left. The basic
unifying element for all is maintenance of DC integri-
ty (more factually accurate is mutual interest in
holding on to power); even anti-Marxism is attenuated
when leftist factions control the party. Except on
issues involving religious principles?divorce and
abortion, for example?Church interests and alle-
giance to Catholic beliefs appear to follow all else.
Reduced to bedrock, the pragmatic maintenance of
power even more than the old belief that the party has
a mandate to rule dominates DC conduct whoever the
politician, whatever his faction. In practical terms, the
DC is an oligarchy emanating from the various
currents which in turn approximate miniparties under
one umbrella that protects the power of all.
Illustrative of the shared power motivation is the so-
called management majority which replaced the Pre-
amble group in August 1981. As the name implies,
there is no dominant ideological current in the DC.
This would indicate that Preamble principles are out
and new factional jockeying is in progress which,
according to who wins, will yield the new orientation
and determine which DC figures enter the next
governing combination.
Party Finances
The financing of political parties was long one of the
better, kept secrets in Italy. To an extent this changed
in 1974 with the passage of legislation providing
public funding for parties and an annual publication
of a financial report. Nevertheless, it is commonly
assumed that major sources of income remain hidden
and that published information is doctored.
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If expenses and expenditures for the DC cannot be
determined with any precision, the nature of the
party's income is reasonably well known. Essentially it
derives from five sources: the state apparatus and the
parastate industrial complex, contributions, party
dues, subsidies under the 1974 law, and foreign
subventions.
In the first instance, the virtual merger of the DC and
the Italian state provides numerous opportunities for
the party to exploit its dominant position. The exam-
ples are endless, but such practices as payment of
extra commissions on public contracts, an additional
sum on building licenses, acceptance of "gratuities"
for the granting of special privileges or favors, or
utilization of the so-called secret funds, a sort of slush
fund that prime ministers have had at their disposal
for almost a century, suggest a few of the available
devices. The vast parastate industrial establishment
(see section on Auxiliary Support Organizations) with
its multibillion-dollar activities brought in enormous
"contributions" until theoretically ended by the 1974
law. Contributions of a more conventional and less
tainted nature come to the party from various inter-
ests, but these are said to go almost exclusively to the
individual factions, usually for support of a group
whose political stance can promote the interests of
wealthy backers. Doubtless the sums are occasionally
quite large, but this is the least known of party income
sources. There are also the dues paid by each DC
member, but the fee is small enough (about $5 per
head) to meet only a negligible part of the party's
overall needs. The public law for party funding pro-
vided that both election expenses and normal party
operating expenses be subsidized in proportion to the
party's demonstrated electoral strength. In 1978, for
example, the DC thus received a total of almost 16
billion lire (approximately $18 million at the time),
some 3 billion more than the PCI, the next largest
recipient. Finally, as confirmed by the Pike and
Church reports to the US Congress in the mid-1970s,
various anti-Communist parties of Western Europe,
including the DC, received considerable amounts of
money from the United States after 1948.
Confidential
In some instances the
handling of these matters has led to scandal. More
than a few figures have had their careers terminated
or put in eclipse by their involvement in such question-
able activities.
The public funding law's requirement that parties
publish annual accounts of their income, public and
private, has been obeyed; but few people take the
reports at face value despite safeguards in the law for
checking their accuracy. The DC's original obstruc-
tionism to the legislation also caused various sectors to
assume the party was reluctant to have its coffers
inspected by the public, particularly since the new bill
forbade parastate groups to pay any funds to political
parties. When the law was submitted to a national
referendum in 1978 and was approved by the public,
the DC favored keeping it. Ethically, however, it
could do no less.
Beyond these general statements about party financ-
ing, nothing more can be said with certainty. The DC
appears to have adequate financing for its activities,
but its efficiency in using funds is simply not known.
DC financial scandals have been so numerous and
frequent for so many years as to make them appear
endemic to the Italian political scene. Even if some
cases may have been exaggerated, the conventional
wisdom has long assumed that corruption is a major
element in the party's way of life. Ultimately, though,
the party's political future may be determined more
by its casual and ineffectual organization than by its
finances. To give substance to the word "democratic"
in its name and to be the mass interclass party of its
claims, the DC would have to put real flesh on the
complex organizational skeleton described in its stat-
ute. Were it not flanked by so many support groups,
its failure to be effectively dynamic and self-renewing
in and of itself would have altered its role in govern-
ment well before now.
Party Membership
The size of a political party's membership has long
been regarded in Italy as an index of the group's
organizing ability, particularly of its success in estab-
lishing solid roots within its natural constituency as
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Figure 5
Comparative Growth of DC and PCI Membership, 1946-77
Hundred Thousand Persons
3.0
Percent of Variation in Membership
40
30
20
10
?10
DC
.5
?20
?30
0 ?40
1946 50 55 60 65 70 75 1946 50 55 60 65 70 75
585805 2-82
well as for the creation of lasting links among its
followers. From a modest numerical start in the
1940s, making an exception for the election year of
1948, the DC's period of greatest growth was in the
decade of the 1950s. Until 1973 the party continued
to gain members on a gradually rising curve. Surges
and lapses exist in that timespan with upswings
appearing in the years of elections or national party
congresses. The consistent growth of the party was
based on the organizational efforts and expertise of
Amintore Fanfani in his years as party secretary in
the 1950s.
In the early 1960s DC membership reached and
passed that of the PCI for the first time (see figure 5).
There is, however, little correlation between the par-
ties' formal membership and their records at the polls.
Similarities in the two parties' organizations and
membership are few, but a comparison highlights
some aspects of the DC today. For a party of such
long-lived electoral success, the DC, unlike the PCI, is
significantly lacking in internal discipline and does
not boast many visible and active local cadres. In fact,
19
much of the DC rank-and-file membership exists
more on paper than in fact. Also there is relatively
little contact between local sections and the party
hierarchy, the reverse of which is true in the PCI. The
DC membership in many ways is an amorphous and
elusive mass. Unlike the PCI, DC members are not
easily studied. Both parties publish annuals on their
activities, but the DC publication lacks the extensive
figures, tables, and charts of its counterpart. In short,
the party has extensive records on its members and
makes them available to researchers who ask for
them; it does not give them the broad dissemination
the PCI does. Learning about the DC membership is
therefore not simple and conclusions cannot be wholly
satisfactory.
Another problem is that the DC's membership rolls
are often said to be inflated, and DC leaders them-
selves have questioned their accuracy. These statistics
frequently have been the subject of charges and
countercharges, as years of transcripts of national
congress debates show. Inflation occurs because of
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competition between the various factions, which rig
the figures to exploit the party's system of internal
proportional representation. In the past (the practice
may or may not be continuing) the factions have been
accused of registering the dead, fictitious persons, and
relatives, as well as actual persons?but without their
permission or knowledge. Use of this tactic suggests
that the hard core of party membership is in fact
smaller than indicated by "official" figures.
The procedure for becoming a DC member has never
been difficult, although it has changed over the years.
In its first 15 years or so, the DC had many members
who joined largely because they were in the personal
following of local or regional leaders known as nota-
bili (notables). By 1960, as a younger and different
breed of party men began to develop factions geared
to particular political points of view and organized for
more efficient political action, a number of the old
notabili were quickly shoved aside. In either case,
however, membership in the party often was through
sponsorship by one or the other of these groups, the
result being a controlled membership. In the 1970s,
particularly with the new statute of 1979 and the
emphasis on rinnovamento, the goal now is an open
party. Any citizen 16 years old or over may simply
register as a DC member. The only requirements are
that he/she be of irreproachable moral and political
conduct and declare adherence to the party's values.
While sponsorship has not been wholly eliminated (an
applicant needs the signature of two members in good
standing for two years), it has become perfunctory.
Also, anyone age 14 to 16 is similarly eligible for the
DC's youth organization.
It is too soon to determine whether this new enroll-
ment method is a success or a failure. However, its
goal is the attraction of higher quality and more
actively committed members. Still nothing has oc-
curred to stop an ambitious provincial secretary from
pushing for members to flesh out his own following or
from refusing to conduct an enrollment campaign
because it might bring in recruits whom he could not
manipulate. The reform does show that the party
Confidential
recognizes a need to modernize and alter its image.
With the scandals that have plagued its entire history,
the DC can only benefit by getting members of
"irreproachable" conduct.
Even though the DC has long been the largest party in
this open democratic system, it is difficult to get a
clear social picture of its membership. Here one must
underline the distinction between a party's electorate,
which has been studied in detail in Italy, and its
enrolled members. Data on the DC members are not
lacking. The party has extensive records, but they
have to be deflated and other information has to be
weighed against other sources when possible. But
some general observations can be made about DC
growth and decline as well as the socioeconomic
characteristics of its members.
Data from 1978, the most recent available, indicate
that membership was about 1.3 million. (The Prov-
inces of Caserta and Catania did not report that year,
however. See figure 6 and table 3). As with a number
of other years, a national total may not cover the
whole country because local groups appear to be
rather casual, and not all get around to reporting
every year. Still, this is a decline of approximately 35
percent from the 1.9 million reported only five years
earlier. The drop suggests that the old pattern of
increases at the time of elections and congresses,
which kept the curve consistently high in the past, is
no longer operative. Not only does that slump put the
numbers back to something comparable to the late
1950s, but a look at the figures in a broader context
reveals ironically that the timespan when the DC
went from a small initial membership to a peak in
1973 is inversely proportional to the party's election
record. During the same time, it moved from the
enormous success of 1948 to the checks and defeats of
the mid-1970s. Thus the evidence suggests that the
DC passed some milestone or watershed in the 1970s.
Various explanations or rationales have been offered
for this shift, and the consensus does not center on
political bad luck but on the profound changes that
seem to be going on in the attitudes and composition
of party membership as well as in Italian society
generally.
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Table 3
Christian Democratic Party Membership by Region,
1968-78
1968
1973
1978
Piedmont
80,536
89,226
51,453
Valle d'Aosta
3,372
2,646
1,456
Liguria
37,819
42,816
26,416
Lombardy
193,654
201,750
139,887
Trentino-Alto
Adige
29,749
30,666
14,307
Venetia
151,436
178,731
113,986
Friuli-Venezia
Guilia
29,554
33,368
23,035
Emilia-Romagna
74,830
80,507
57,819
Subtotal North
600,950
659,710
428,359
Tuscany
61,076
68,727
54,245
Umbria
19,499
20,341
12,504
Marche
48,524
53,158
36,813
Lazio
152,884
(159,324) a
144,259
Subtotal Center
281,983
(301,550) a
247,821
Abruzzo
77,858
88,316
46,429
Molise
20,273
28,790
15,262
Campania
195,993
209,299
112,812
Puglia
134,681
162,829
134,932
Basilicata
29,432
38,258
23,711
Calabria
85,573
(89,152) b
66,174
Subtotal South
543,810
(616,644) b
399,320
Sicily
202,910
(212,644) c
(199,977)
Sardinia
66,758
82,744
42,823
Subtotal Islands
269,659
(295,388) c
(242,800) d
Total Italy
1,696,402
(1,873,292) c
(1,327,300) c
a Figures are lacking for the Roman Committee's membership in
1973. Based on figures for years before and after, the arbitrary sum
of 75,000 is included here.
b To fill the gap for figures missing from Catanzaro in 1973, a
membership of 30,000 has been added on the basis of statistics for
other years.
c 21,000 has been added for Agrigento, missing in 1973.
d 35,000 has been added for Catania, missing in 1978.
e Final totals have been altered in keeping with figures added. See
notes a to d.
21
Socioeconomic analysis of DC membership (as distin-
guished from the DC electorate) presents special
problems. Official party information is not only unre-
liable but general and inconsistent. Fundamentally it
seeks to demonstrate the party's claim to represent all
classes in society. This is not borne out, however, by
data collected by polling groups. And the contrast is
greater still if the composition of membership and
electorate are measured together.
Tables 4 and 5 serve as an example of problems
inherent in identifying the strata making up DC
membership, although comparability of the data is
hardly satisfactory due to the lack of poll information
for the 1950s as well as changed categorization. If the
party records are assumed to be self-fulfilling percep-
tions based on inflated figures, the poll data are
drawn not only from a smaller sampling but one
which tends to be based on urban interviewing. Nev-
ertheless, if utilized as broad guidelines together with
other sources on the DC, a fairly reliable picture of
the party emerges. To some extent stereotypes and
conventional wisdom are substantiated, but in other
instances unusual differences appear. When consid-
ered alongside DC electoral returns (and known char-
acteristics of the electorate), a reasonably accurate
knowledge of the party's real socioeconomic backing
can be reached. Following the administrative elections
of 1980, when some 85 percent of the electorate went
to the polls, the polling group Demoskopea conducted
an analysis of the voters (see table 6) which, when
coupled with the foregoing tables, provides the most
accurate and up-to-date single-frame picture avail-
able on the party.
Of the stereotypes long attached to the party, none
has survived so well or so long as the belief that the
party is strongest in rural and traditionalist areas and
that women-encouraged by parish priests-consti-
tute an important part of its support. Both views have
some basis in fact but with important refinements.
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Figure 6
Christian Democratic Party Membership by Region, 1968-78
Key
1968
1973
HEM 1978
North Lombardia
Veneto
Piemonte
Liguria
Trentino?Alto Adige
Friuli?Venezia Giulia
Valle D'Aosta
Center Lazioa
Emilia?Romagna
Tuscany
Marche
Umbria
South Campania
Puglia
Calabriab
Abruzzo
Basilicata
Molise
Islands Siciliac, d
Sardegna
Thousand Persons
0 25 50
75
100
125 150
175
200 225
66.
a Figures are lacking for the Roman Committee's membership in 1973. Based on figures
for years before and after, the arbitrary sum of 75,000 is included here.
h To fill the gap for Figures missing from Catanzaro in 1973, a membership of 30,000
has been added on to the basis of statistics for other years.
C21,000 has been added for Agrigerito, missing in 1973.
d 35 000 has been added for Catania, missing in 1978.
585806 2-82
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Table 4
Party Membership, by Sector
(DC Records)
Percent
Table 5
Party Membership, by Sector
(DOXA Poll Organization)
Percent
Economic Sector
1959
1977
Economic Sector
1977
Agriculture
24.9
12.4
Workers
14.3
Industry
17.7
18.4
Agriculture
4.9
Business and banking
6.0
7.7
Artisans, shopowners
10.3
Artisans
5.8
5.2
Professionals, teachers
8.6
Professions
2.1
2.8
White collar
23.2
Public employees
8.9
15.8
Students
1.1
Students
2.5
5.4
Housewives
18.6
Pensioners
3.8
5.7
Pensioners
15.9
Housewives
25.5
20.6
Unemployed and others
3.1
Unemployed and others
2.8
6.0
Total
100.0
Total
100.0
100.0
Membership
1,602,742
1,077,388
The rural traditionalist areas of Italy are concen-
trated in the center and south (including the two
major islands), and the north-south distinction has
been clear for many years. The meridionalizzazione
(southernizing) of the party began in the 1950s and
dovetails with the importance of the notables whose
classic region of dominance is the south. In fact this is
still true although signs are present implying that
change-which means modernization in this case-is
coming in the south at last. Party membership is
dropping more there than in any other region. But if
one looks at DC electoral returns in those areas,
clearly the party still enjoys considerable strength (see
figures 14 and 15). The signs of change are as yet
confined more to certain provinces and cities than to
regions, with the possible exception of Puglia which
has long had some elements in common with the
advanced north.
The other region of great DC strength, the northeast,
is very different in character. If the party still enjoys a
hold on some southern regions like Molise, Calabria,
or Sicily, it is due to the persistence of older social
customs and hierarchies. The northeast, particularly
Venetia, is strongly DC because of more conscious
23
religious conviction. Although the south may change
through economic expansion, the northeast is more
affected by new winds within Catholicism.
The role of women in the DC as party members
and/or electors is more significant than in other
Italian parties, but they do not function simply as
mothers and wives who support the party for its
espousal of traditional moral values and the family.
Indeed women are enrolled in the DC in greater
numbers in the south, but their level of participation
in party activities is quite limited. The region's Catho-
lic subculture has few organizations to bring them
out, and there is no women's liberation movement of
any significance there. In much of the south party
membership of women is passive and associational,
supportive of a male family member active in DC
politics. Overall national figures for women reveal
that their enrollment is higher in urban areas than in
rural. Quite possibly city life does not make the
demands on an urban woman's time as those expe-
rienced by farm women. Interestingly, in the PCI,
which has long encouraged women into political activ-
ism, female membership has run between 23 percent
and 25 percent from 1960 to the mid-1970s. In the
same period for the DC, the percentage of women in
the membership went from a minimum of 34 percent
in 1960 to a maximum of 38 percent in 1974. Since
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Table 6
Social Background of Electorate by Party a
Sex Age
Male Female 18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 Over 65
Education
High
School/ High None
College
Junior Elementary/
DC
39.5
60.5
14.0
16.8
16.9
18.1
14.5
19.7
17.5
22.6
59.9
PCI
54.8
45.2
21.4
23.1
19.5
14.2
9.6
12.2
20.2
25.7
54.1
PSI
58.3
41.7
14.6
17.5
20.3
18.7
13.9
15.0
20.7
27.3
52.0
PRI
56.3
43.7
17.6
18.5
21.0
21.9
9.2
11.8
37.4
28.6
34.0
PSDI
53.9
46.1
11.8
12.9
23.9
19.8
10.7
20.9
20.4
30.1
49.5
PLI
50.0
50.0
17.7
14.9
14.9
14.9
15.6
22.0
51.6
21.9
26.5
MSI/DN
64.3
35.7
23.8
21.4
16.7
6.0
15.4
16.7
22.6
34.5
42.9
PDUP/DP
52.4
47.6
42.9
42.8
5.9
NEGL
5.9
2.5
45.2
40.5
14.3
a This analysis of the Italian electorate was compiled by the Demosko-
pea polling organization on those who voted in the elections of 8 June
1980. It was published in Panorama, 23 June 1980.
then the percentage has been declining. As table 6
shows, the ratio of women who vote for-the DC is far
larger than those who become party members.
Another assumption about the DC is that its member-
ship tends to be among older groups but the last few
years have seen an encouraging increase in the num-
bers of youth, particularly those in the college years
and immediately after. Recent indications are that
more DC members and electors are in the older
segments of the population, while the youth element is
not so large as some believed and possibly hoped.
There is in reality only a modest increase among
youth from the small numbers of a few years ago.
Notwithstanding the lack of comparability mentioned
earlier in relation to official party records vis-a-vis
polling information and the DC membership, the
DOXA (another polling group) data may be nearer to
current reality as Italy grows ever more urban. With
such a caveat, what summary observations can be
made about the DC's members? If the DC believes
itself to be an interclass party, data on the member-
ship do not now bear this out, but information on the
DC electorate does show quite diverse class character.
Confidential
More and more party electors are middle class and
mildly conservative, and their economic activity is
particularly interesting. Although considerable differ-
ences exist from one geographical region to another,
basic trends are present in consolidated national
figures. Here the DC's rural base potential is suffer-
ing something more than erosion since those members
whose income is from agriculture have declined more
than 50 percent in the last 20 years (see also figure 11)
showing shrinkage of the agricultural sector in gener-
al. A slight rise has occurred in the industrial sector,
notably among blue-collar workers. The only signifi-
cant increase by economic activity is in the tertiary
sector of service and public employees, and the gener-
al group of impiegati (salaried white-collar employees)
is the party's largest: 23.2 percent. Housewives and
pensioners make up the next largest categories, fol-
lowed by workers and artisans.
In all the statistics and diagnostic dissections of the
DC membership, the most important information
concerns the verification of fundamental changes in
party membership which relate to and derive from
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Table 6 (continued)
Percent
Profession
Professional/
Manager
Independent
Business
Clerical/
Secretarial/
Salaried
Employees
Businessmen/
Artisans
Farmers
Teachers/
Students
Workers
Housewives
(Upper,
Middle Class)
Housewives
(Lower
Class)
Pensioners/
Others
1.5
9.2
6.7
4.2
8.9
15.8
17.6
11.6
24.5
0.8
9.2
6.8
1.6
10.7
35.3
8.3
11.5
15.8
1.6
12.7
9.3
3.0
11.1
23.4
11.4
6.4
21.1
1.7
26.1
9.0
1.7
12.6
14.0
13.3
7.6
14.0
4.3
8.6
8.6
2.2
10.2
19.4
14.0
9.7
23.0
7.8
14.1
12.5
NEGL
12.5
4.7
18.8
1.6
28.0
1.2
9.5
10.7
2.4
16.7
19.0
6.0
7.1
27.4
2.4
7.1
4.8
NEGL
45.2
23.8
2.4
2.4
11.9
recent pontificates and ideas emanating from the
Vatican Council of the 1960s. Simply stated, Church
developments in the last two decades have had a
profound effect on the Catholic subculture. On the
one hand, large-scale secularization of national life
has occurred, and on the other faithful practicing
Catholics are less numerous but stand out as a more
committed element. The DC in turn has also probably
lost its faint-hearted members, and those who remain
are more active in party or Catholic organizations just
as they are more faithful in attendance at Mass.
Theoretically the party ought to benefit from im-
proved quality in membership if not in increased
numbers; but faithful Catholics in Italy are not so
numerous as foreigners assume, and the change has
probably cut into party strength.
The party is aware of this trend to an extent, and the
rinnovamento and the new statute show the desire to
be more open. Other tactics have been the Feste
dell'Amicizia (Friendship Festivals), carnival-like
celebrations with arcades, games, food, and political
rallies designed to heighten the party's social pres-
ence. The gatherings are an aping of PCI Feste
deli 'Unita (Unity Festivals) which apparently are
somewhat more successful.
25
Benigno Zaccagnini, while he was party secretary in
the 1970s, also launched the GIP movement, the
Gruppi di Impegno Politico (Political Commitment
Groups). Their goal is to carry the party's presence
into factories, offices, and schools. In 1978 there were
2,100 such groups, but again it is not clear what
success they may be having.
If indeed the smaller numbers mean a more commit-
ted and more manageable party membership, the DC
ought to benefit. Nevertheless, there are persistent
indications that actual participation in party activity
by members is extremely low. If renewal and revital-
ization are to be achieved, the DC is making little
progress when at least 50 percent of the members
never participate in party activities and only 5 to 10
percent work for the party with any regularity. In
contrast with the PCI's comparable publications,
L'Unita and Rinascita, DC interest level is extremely
low when only a tiny percentage admits to reading the
DC daily newspaper, Il Popolo, and even fewer read
the weekly journal, La Discussione. It is little wonder,
however, that a committed DC member is not inclined
to read the party press. Both major publications are
characterized by stodgy and turgid prose.
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The DC is, then, more and more a party of Catholics;
that is, of those people who practice their religion
regularly, more and more the middle class and mid-
dle-aged segment of the Italian population, the solidly
conservative elements. And as the country becomes
more secularized and demographically younger, the
so-called diaspora dei cattolici a sinistra (the flight of
the Catholics to the left) will continue. Indications are
that the party is slipping away from the broad-based
membership and wide appeal it once had and that its
place is being increasingly filled by other parties,
particularly the PCI, which is becoming less class
oriented.
If the assessment of DC membership suggests some-
thing less than optimism for the future strength of the
party, this is only part of the problem. The party's
support has never come solely from within its own
ranks. From the time of its founding it has relied
heavily on the auxiliary support it receives from an
enormous number of Catholic lay organizations. Be-
cause of the existence of such groups, the DC will
doubtless continue to practice a certain amount of
benign neglect of its own party structure, no matter
how much renewal may be trumpeted. In effect, the
DC has been able to permit itself to have an erratic
and creaky membership so long as these support
groups existed. The party seems to take little or no
note that recent pontificates and events in Italian life
have altered and loosened ties to the Church and the
nature of its organizations. Nevertheless, this support
network seems likely to hold up well for a time and,
ironically, is the closest link remaining between party
and Church.
Significant support also is offered by the sottogoverno
(literally subgovernment, with the implied meaning of
patronage), those who owe their livelihood to the DC's
continued rule. The party has "colonized" a vast area
of state-dependent organizations far out of proportion
to its actual electoral strength, and this clientele will
continue for some time to be another important source
of party members, notably in the south.
Therefore, as of 1981, the DC retains a sizable
membership which is undergoing erosion, albeit in
slow motion. Nothing implies its imminent collapse or
even precipitate decline, but there is nothing to sug-
gest that true renewal and growth can be expected.
Confidential
The issue becomes whether the confessional can com-
pete effectively with the dynamism of late-20th-
century consumer capitalism.
Auxiliary Support Organizations
As the DC's organization has long been weak and
fragmented and its membership amorphous, the party
has from its beginnings relied heavily on outside
support groups. These organizations are closely relat-
ed to the Church on the one hand and to the so-called
parastate organizations on the other. In a sense the
DC can be viewed as an uneasy, tenuous union of
religious, industrial, agricultural, and worker interest
groups. The cement of the components is in part
religion, in part the enjoyment of the fruits of power.
DC politicians have to balance among these not-
always-harmonious interests and, without frequent
success, attempt to formulate governmental policies.
All elements combine to produce a situation charac-
terized by one author as "the DC iceberg." Several
observers say candidly that the DC simply "occupies
power" and that party and state have now become
indistinguishable. The DC has become the state and
the state the DC, with the transgressions of one being
identical with those of the other. Such a relationship
is not unknown in other countries, but the degree to
which the DC utilizes outside support groups is
unusual in a democracy. The result and implications
are best summarized in a statement of Gianni Agnelli,
head of the FIAT corporation: "With 40 percent of
the votes, the DC controls 80 percent of the power."
Cynical Italians say of the DC that absolute power
has corrupted absolutely.
Church-Related Support Groups
As a party of Catholics, the DC naturally has close
links with the enormous network of Church-related
organizations, recently estimated to be at least 8,000
in number. Since John XXIII's reign and the changes
of Vatican Council II, when the Church began dis-
tancing itself from Italian politics, the DC's most
substantive and consistent association with Catholi-
cism has been through the lay organizations. This
relationship varies greatly, however, with issues and
groups at any given moment. In the mid- and late
1940s, Church organizations and the DC were virtu-
ally indistinguishable. Relatively undisturbed by the
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uonimential
fascist government, they provided the structure and
arena for political activity that gave the DC its initial
thrust onto the national political scene. Although the
roles are in some senses now reversed with a party
that is theoretically able to stand alone, the DC can
and does fall back on the Church's lay organizations
to supplement its own insufficiencies.
No study exists to substantiate the assertion, but it is
doubtless safe to assume that in many instances
membership in the Church organizations replicates
the DC's lists. This is certainly the case in the "white"
or Catholic northeast. And if relationships vary from
good to bad, that, too, is a reflection of the general
loosening of ties?or the secularization?which has
occurred in Italian life since about 1960. Despite this,
the Church's lay organizations remain the matrix
from which DC leadership comes. None of today's
party leaders has made it to the top of the hierarchy
without some years of active apprenticeship in at least
one of the following organizations.
Azione Cattolica Italiana, ACI (Catholic Action). This
is the oldest, largest, most prestigious, and most
powerful Catholic lay organization in Italy. Most
simply defined, it is an apostolate of the laity under
the guidance of the ecclesiastical hierarchy. ACI's
responsibility is to coordinate in the secular world the
work of priests and other religious leaders or, as
specified by Vatican II, to evangelize and educate
humanity to Christian values.
ACI is more than a century old and grew out of a
youth movement in the "white" area of Venetia. Its
present name came into use around World War I. The
connection it has had with the Catholic political
movement in Italy is an intimate one as suggested by
the fact that Don Luigi Sturzo, before he founded the
PPI in 1919, had already been secretary general of
ACI for four years. Pope Pius XI, who frowned upon
direct Catholic political activity, favored ACI to the
extent that he is known as the "Pope of Catholic
Action." While he tolerated the supression of the PPI,
he protected and favored ACI in various clashes with
Mussolini's government. During his pontificate the
movement was greatly expanded and largely given the
organizational form it has today. ACI's conservative
27
character was firmly established under Pius XI and
Pius XII, although subsequent reformers like John
XXIII have altered it to some extent.
ACI's membership has fluctuated, reaching a high of
about 3 million in the decade after the war. Although
down to 700,000 members today, it remains the most
overtly political arm of the Church and can always
provide a nationwide body of political workers at
election time. No one has equaled the power of Luigi
Gedda as president of ACI in the 1950s, but the Red
Brigades regarded one of its former presidents,
Vittorio Bachelet, as worthy of assassination in Feb-
ruary 1980. Dr. Alberto Monticone, professor of
Modern History in the University of Rome, became
president of ACI in early 1981, succeeding Prof.
Mario Agnes. Monticone was formerly president of
the Movimento Laureati. He, like all other ACI
officers, is flanked by a cleric with the title of
Assistant. Often this assistant is from the top of the
Church hierarchy, most recently the Patriarch of
Venice, Marco Cardinal Ce.
ACI is a federation of related organizations each of
which has other groups within it and beneath it.
When all are considered, no segment of life or
professional activity is unrepresented. Size may have
little to do with the influence of a particular group,
but ACI is not generous in publishing its enrollment
figures. The overall membership has slipped consider-
ably in the last 10 to 20 years, but presumably those
who remain can be considered as faithful and commit-
ted followers.
Technically ACI is a federation with the heads of the
four major groups being vice presidents of the parent
organization and president of their own division:
Unione Uomini di AC, UUAC (Men's Union of
Catholic Action). President Prof. Livio Crepaldi.
UUAC is for all married men and single men 30 or
over.
Unione delle Donne di ACI, UDACI (Women's Union
of Catholic Action). President Paola Bignardi.
UDACI enrolls married women and unmarried wom-
en over 30.
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Gioventu Italiana di AC, GIAC (Italian Youth of
Catholic Action). President Dr. Paolo Nepi. Single
men 30 or under.
Gioventu Femminile di AC, GF (Young Women of
Catholic Action). President Maria Teresa Vacari. For
single women under 30.
Federazione Universitaria Cattolica Italiana, FUCI
(Federation of Italian Catholic University Students).
FUCI enrolls only undergraduates in separate sec-
tions for men and women. National presidents are
Giuseppino Monni and Laura Rozza.
Movimento ecclesiale di impegno culturale (Ecclesial
Movement of Cultural Commitment). President,
Franco Cavasola. This organization is still known
better by its former name, Movimento Laureati di
Azione Cattolica (University Graduates' Movement).
The name change occurred in 1980 to coincide with a
move for the organization's revitalization.
Movimento Maestri di AC, (Teachers' Movement,
known only by its name). For elementary school
teachers, this group is presided over by Prof. Tomaso
Seu.
An outgrowth of the Teachers' Movement and closely
related to it is the Associazione Italiana di Maestri
Cattolici, AIMC (Association of Italian Catholic
Teachers), which represents all public school teachers.
Its founder and first president, Maria Badaloni, was
Under Secretary for Public Instruction in eight con-
secutive governments beginning in 1960 and was
succeeded in that position for three more governments
by the current president, Senator Carlo Buzzi. Both
were elected to Parliament on the DC ticket. AIMC,
in contrast to the Movimento Maestri, places empha-
sis on professionalism but also expects religious
commitment.
Generally women's organizations have the larger
numbers, and the men's groups are more visibly
active. Of the more specially oriented groups for
students, graduates, and teachers, records show that
despite their influence, they have never enrolled more
than 3 to 7 percent of eligible individuals in their
sectors. The value of these organizations to the DC is
immediately evident in the biographies of members of
Confidential
Parliament. Two of many leading examples of men
whose careers began in FUCI are Giulio Andreotti
and Aldo Moro.
Once closely related to ACI and one of its most
powerful arms is the Associazioni Cristiane Lavora-
tori Italiani, ACLI (Christian Associations of Italian
Workers). Formed by ACI immediately after World
War II to bring the Church presence to the working
classes and to compete with Marxist activities, ACLI
soon became an important part of the labor scene. It
began blazing its own independent course under the
presidency of Livio Labor in the 1960s when it came
into open opposition with ACI and the DC. In the
elections of the early 1970s, it refused to support DC
candidates and openly endorsed leftist candidates,
including some Communists. Labor himself left the
movement, joined the PSI, and was elected senator on
their ticket in 1976. ACLI remains important today
although its 380,000 members in some 5,000 clubs put
it far below its peak enrollment in the past. Relations
between the DC and ACLI have improved, but ACLI
remains proudly independent. A candidate supported
by it in an election is virtually assured of victory. Part
of ACLI's strength derives from its strong parallel
patrons' organization which handles pensions and
reputedly has taken in as much as $150 million a year.
Zaccagnini's founding of the GIP in the 1970s and
the formation of the Movimento Cristiano Lavoratori,
MCL (Christian Laborers' Movement) were intended,
although not admittedly so, to offset the hostile
influence of ACLI. The MCL's stated purpose is that
of being a moderate alternative to ACLI, and it
currently has some 180,000 members.
Some measure of the pervasive Catholic influence is
reflected in the following partial list of the ACLI's
other related organizations:
? Hospital assistants (ACOS), 16,000 nurses and
paramedics.
? Artisans (ACAI).
? Physicians (AMCI), 6,000 members in more than
100 sections.
? TV and radio station owners (AIART) and listeners
who monitor TV and radiobroadcasts (ALIAS).
? Catholic parents of schoolchildren (AGESC),
50,000 members.
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?uunimenutal
? Boy and girl scouts (ASGI and AGI).
e The press (USCI) (Flaminio Piccoli, currently DC
secretary general, was once president of this
organization).
o Businessmen (UCIC).
^ Entrepreneurs and managers (UCID).
o Publishers (UECI).
The list could continue at some length and show
prominent DC figures in key positions in virtually all
of them. Each organization extends its influence and
maintains cohesion through journals, newsletters, and
newspapers. The potential for reaching the public and
for supporting DC causes is obvious. However, in a
nation where the Vatican is located and where cyni-
cism is a national character trait, the public can be
staunchly independent and deaf to blandishments on
religious viewpoints with which it is all too familiar.
Several other Catholic-related organizations merit
mention either for their continuing strength or for
their unusual nature. In the former group is the
Confederazione Nazionale dei Coltivatori Diretti,
Coldiretti (The National Small Farmers Confeder-
ation), perhaps the most powerful single interest group
in the country. Although Italy has become rapidly
more urban and industrial since the war, this coalition
of rural and traditionally Catholic landowners main-
tains unduly large influence in parliament and within
the DC. It is ardently in favor of private property and
hence vehemently anti-Communist, and its members
in parliament sometimes align themselves with right
or center-right factions of the DC or, on occasion,
with even more conservative parties. Because of its
mode of organization in "families" or "associations"
Coldiretti's size is difficult to ascertain. However, it is
far smaller now than at its peak in the 1950s when
claims to 6 to 7 million members were made. If its
present claim to represent 90 percent of the farmers is
accurate, its membership would be roughly between 2
million and 2.6 million. A somewhat smaller figure is,
however, more credible.
Reminiscent of ACI, the Coldiretti has in its ranks
prelates with the title of "assistant," and it is general-
ly regarded as a group of Catholic inspiration. But the
organization has increasingly taken independent posi-
tions and now assumes attitudes critical of the -DC,
29
which it has accused of being too "popular" and
"insufficiently Christian." Beginning in February
1980 Coldiretti went through a period of virtually
leaderless drifting when its longtime president, Dr.
Paolo Bonomi, was hospitalized with Parkinson's
disease. Although allowed to remain as honorary
president, Bonomi was replaced in October 1980 by
Arcangelo Lobianco. In his maiden address to the
Coldiretti national assembly, Lobianco sternly threat-
ened the DC that his organization would not necessar-
ily continue its long relationship with the party. He
frequently refers to Coldiretti as a union, and, in an
unprecedented move in April 1981, the farmers'
organization leadership met with officials of the three
major trade unions as well as of Confcoltivatori, the
small leftist association of small farmers, to map a
concerted effort to improve farm conditions.
An illustration of the depth of the DC-Coldiretti
relationship and of the implications of possible loss of
its support is found in the career of Paolo Bonomi. He
founded the organization in 1944 and remained its
president for 36 years, a period when he also served as
deputy in the Constituent Assembly of 1946 and all
legislatures to the present. He has never held a
cabinet position, but he has long been a member of
the influential Chamber Commission on Agriculture
and Forests. The years of conservative legislation
favoring farmers are evidence of his influence and
that of Coldiretti. Until 1954 he was the "grey
eminence" of the DC due to his role in extending its
influence throughout rural areas via Coldiretti. Brief-
ly Bonomi also headed the powerful Federconsorzi,
Federation of Cooperatives. His enormous power was
challenged when Fanfani became party secretary in
1954, but Bonomi was long considered as much a
party leader as was possible for someone without high
party office. Election posters for 15 years after the
war often referred to him variously as "savior of the
peasants' birthright" and "the anti-Bolshevik bulwark
in the countryside." His replacement by Lobianco, a
disciple who has now broken with the master's policy
if not with the man himself, is of profound importance
for the DC's main link to its biggest constituency, the
rural electorate.
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Beyond this degree of Coldiretti involvement in the
DC, four of the DC's senators and 28 of its deputies
are directors of various levels of the organization. A
number of other members of Parliament mention
Coldiretti membership in their biographical sketches.
Nevertheless, despite the organization's preeminent
role as a DC support group, increasing industrializa-
tion and the concomitant decline of citizens in the
agrarian sector (see figure 11) are making its influ-
ence somewhat disproportionate to the element it
represents. Even so, Coldiretti maintains an active
program of organizations for women and youth as
well as regional and provincial offices throughout the
country. Under its new president it is also said to be
showing signs of revitalization, but as yet one cannot
determine if the DC will benefit or not from the
change. Some conservative facets clearly remain in
Coldiretti, but other evidence implies that it well may
go an independent way in the future.
A similar organization with Catholic influence is the
Conicooperativi (Confederation of Cooperatives),
which competes in an area?farm co-ops?first
staked out by the PSI some years ago. The movement
is notably important in the Catholic northeast. Still,
as the agrarian sector continues to shrink, vote poten-
tial for the DC in rural areas also declines.
Although big industry and large business have never
felt comfortable with the DC, a segment of that sector
has long supported the DC. The Church-related orga-
nization of this group is the Confederazione Italiana
dei Dirigenti d'Azienda (Italian Managers' Confeder-
ation), which embraces store managers up through
factory and bank administrators. In some senses, this
group is an urban parallel of Coldiretti. Its influence
is not to be underestimated but unlike its rural
counterpart, the body includes only a part of the
business community. Nevertheless, several DC mem-
bers of Parliament emphasize their membership in it.
Still in the realm of Catholic-related organizations
but with a newer and somewhat different character is
the organization Comunione e Liberazione (Commun-
ion and Liberation), founded in November 1969 at the
Sacred Heart University in Milan as an outgrowth of
student and labor upheavals of that time. CL stands
as probably the leading symbol of younger elements in
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the Catholic political movement (as distinguished
from precise connection with the DC itself) who seek
to renew their religious commitment to a society
based on Christian principles. The name of the move-
ment is a case in point: communion as an instrument
of the liberation of man from sin. CL borders on
mysticism in its affinity to religious orders and semi-
clandestinity that it equates with organizational mo-
desty. The structure of CL is pyramidal with a small
controlling body at the top that includes both clerics
and laymen, all in their thirties and forties. Member-
ship in directly related organizations and associated
groups is said to run perhaps as high as 300,000 to
400,000. Viewed with some suspicion by parts of the
Italian clerical hierarchy, CL is nevertheless closely
associated with the former Archbishop of Milan,
Giovanni Cardinal Colombo. The publishing house,
Jaca Book of Milan, is the font of numerous CL
publications.
Beginning with the election of 1976, CL was influen-
tial in promoting the successful candidacies of several
DC deputies, notable among them Andrea Borruso,
one of CL's founders. The organization's strength is
greater in the north as its backing of others such as
Costante Portatadino (Varese), Vittorino Colombo
(Milan), Antonio Marzotto Caotorta (Milan), and
Roberto Mazzotta (Milan) indicates. Their success in
the elections of 1979 was somewhat more restricted,
however. CL has organized branches in both universi-
ty and working-class sectors and promoted the
launching of Movimento Popolare, MP (Popular
Movement), a more openly political body promoting
conservative Catholic candidates for office. Borruso,
the principle political figure in CL, believes the
movement must be more than a simple obstacle
blocking the road to the PCI; it must find a renewed
commitment to carry Catholics a step ahead in offer-
ing alternatives to the public.
The MILLE (Movimento per l'Italia Libera nella
Libera Europa, Movement for a Free Italy in a Free
Europe), promoted by DC deputy Massimo de Caro-
lis, is a movement of similar political inspiration and
is also associated with young conservative Catholic
leaders of Lombardy, but it has less clerical influence.
MILLE is difficult to define beyond noting that it is a
movement of small industrialists, merchants, and
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professionals devoted to public renewal of conserva-
tive and Christian principles. In fact, it appears to
overlap considerably with CL and MP. Whether the
allusion to the expedition of the Mille (The Thousand
of Garibaldi of 1860) and the liberation of Sicily in
the Risorgimento is deliberate or not is unclear, but
the implication is not missed by the public. The
MILLE has been important in backing candidates for
the Chamber to the extent that the biographical
manual published privately after the election of each
new legislature lists in its most recent edition the
names of those deputies whose candidacies the group
supported. The list of 88 names significantly did not
include the major DC leaders.
What has been more significant in recent elections,
particularly in those of 1976 and 1979, has been the
progressive decline of official Catholic support for DC
lists, particularly since the election of John Paul II.
CL and MILLE, with their heavy religious overtones,
are exceptions. This does not signify withdrawal of
ACI and other specifically Church-related groups,
nor does it mean they have denied the DC their
support. Rather the tactic has been consistent with
the "open party" and the goal of attracting new
candidates and creating a new image which is some-
what less obviously confessional. It appears that the
result of these tactical changes and new organizations
has, at best, allowed the DC only to hold its own for
the time being. The nature of these organizations and
the rapidly changing character of Italian society
suggest that the trend is to divergence, not a promis-
ing prospect for the party. "Catholic" in this instance
seems less than universal.
Sottogoverno and Clientelismo
Church-related groups may maintain the DC's link to
its philosophical roots, but Italy's parastate organiza-
tions and other governmental agencies provide the
party with its sweeping hold on power. The two terms
clientelismo and sottogoverno (patronage, or literally,
"undergovernment") are nearly interchangeable in
street-corner parlance and summarize succinctly how
the system works. The use of jobs, favors, and money
by a ruling political party occurs worldwide and is a
prerogative of power. However, the mode of using
these privileges distinguishes practical politics from
corruption and abuses. Time and again it has been
31
said that the DC in ruling uninterruptedly for 35
years has become indistinguishable from the state and
that the party has promoted this identification. No
one doubts that the DC has taken care of its support-
ers by giving them government jobs and that as it
moved away from the Church its strength came more
and more from "colonizing" organs of the state with
its own people. Some observers also argue that by
making itself part and parcel of the system, the DC
satisfies its anti-Communist mission. Whether true or
not, the practice has made the DC vulnerable to
criticism, and some Italians even say the situation has
the feel of a "35-year Watergate."
Any verification of the number of DC members and
backers in government-controlled jobs is impossible.
Popular wisdom holds that three of every four govern-
ment jobs are filled by such people, and this propor-
tion does not seem unreasonable. Compared with the
party's consistent showing of an average of about 40-
percent voter support, the ratio is excessive. Even in
Molise, where the party consistently racks up its
largest victory margins, the DC share rarely has
exceeded 60 percent of the vote. By any standards, the
DC's manner and degree of patronage use becomes
gross occupation of power in a democratic state.
However, since the mid-1970s the party has been
forced more and more to share these spoils with other
parties.
Clientelism and patronage are more than mere pork-
barrel tactics. Clientelism suggests people who are or
can be obligated to the party rather than individuals
whose livelihood depends directly on it. The distinc-
tion is admittedly subtle and fuzzy, but the DC client
is more likely to be someone like a builder who
receives a government contract. Also, to utilize the
Italian expression clientela/parentela (client/relative),
clients are also the families of state employees who
support the party on the assumption that failure to do
so would cost a father, brother, or other relative his
job. Ironically, as the DC completed this pervasive
web of dependence, it displaced or made subservient
many of the old notables, particularly in the south and
the islands. The result was a sort of democratization
of the access to power, but it was done more to assure
the party's control than to promote values and goals.
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Indeed, clientelism is more commonly associated with
the south in the Italian mind. Its practice may or may
not entail corruption, but many studies of the region
concur in their negative judgment of the results.
Without question the DC has aided the south and
islands, but it has demanded their support in return.
The area's underdevelopment has thus promoted its
dependence on the party in power. One authority calls
it "pragmatism without ideas."
"Undergovernment" is the more important and also
more insidious area where political strong-arm tactics
can be used. The word cannot be fully comprehended
unless one keeps in mind the breadth of its implica-
tions. It refers to all those positions or power centers
which in Italy are assigned by the central government
executive. For example, this includes big banks, steel
mills, and a host of enormous organizations, several of
which have balance sheets of billions of dollars. In
Italy, State participation in the so-called parastate
organizations is one of the largest and oldest such
practices in the world. The executives who head these
organizations do so at the pleasure of the DC. Their
power, prestige, and wealth are best understood as
being fully comparable to those of a cabinet minister.
A directory of the parastate corporations is as exten-
sive as that of Church-related organizations. The
great state holding companies are all under the
control of the Ministry of Government Holdings (or
State Participations), established in December 1956,
long after the creation of the largest companies it
controls. The position of minister has constantly re-
mained in the hands of powerful DC men and, by the
admission of one of them, Ciriaco de Mita, regularly
provided patronage to party supporters (see pages
122-123 and foldout chart, figure A-5). Until the
Cossiga government yielded this portfolio to PSI
deputy Gianni de Michelis in 1979 it had been out of
DC hands only for a six-month period in 1958; never
has the ministry been without at least a DC under
secretary; and never have the major corporations it
controls been without a majority of DC faithful at
their helms. The potential influence of the state-
controlled corporations can be imagined just by noting
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the number of their employees: approximately
800,000 in 1979. The only larger employment area
under the government is education with some 865,000
employees in the 1978-79 school year.
The most powerful and famous of the Italian para-
state entities is IRI, Instituto per la Ricostruzione
Industriale (Institute for Industrial Reconstruction),
founded by Mussolini in the Depression as a tempo-
rary device to save banks and industries threatened
with failure. In 1937, when it was clear that these
institutions could not return to the private sector and
survive, IRI was made a permanent agency to manage
the government's shares in joint-stock companies. At
the end of World War II IRI was the mechanism for
reconstructing Italian industry. Since that time it has
grown steadily and has always been headed by a DC
figure. Its current president, Pietro Sette, has spent
his entire career in state-related organizations.
The companies owned and operated by IRI include
FINMARE, operator of Italy's worldwide fleet of
passenger ships; FINSIDER, the largest complex of
steel mills on the Mediterranean; FINMECCANICA,
producer of industrial machinery and nuclear equip-
ment; FINCANTIERI, the largest network of ship-
yards in the Mediterranean; the Alfa Romeo auto
works; the national airline, Alitalia; the biggest banks
of the country, Banca Commerciale, Credito Italiano,
and Banco di Roma; and a host of other companies
and industries.
No better example of the link between IRI and the
DC can be found than the career of Giuseppe PetriIli,
who was president of the company from 1960 until he
was succeeded by Sette in 1979. Not only was he a
deputy in the Constituent Assembly and the First
Legislature, but he was Under Secretary of the
Treasury in several De Gasperi governments and for
10 years a member of the DC Central Directorate.
Since leaving IRI in 1979 he has been a DC senator
from Tuscany.
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The other well-known parastate organization is ENI,
the National Hydrocarbons Agency (Ente Nazionale
degli Idrocarburi), founded in 1953 to develop nation-
al policy on energy as well as national resources for
hydrocarbon products. As a public holding company
with shares in more than 180 subsidiaries in Italy and
abroad, it operates not only in the petroleum industry
but also in chemicals, nuclear products, manufactur-
ing and engineering services, restaurants, hotels, tour-
ist facilities, and elsewhere. Its better known subsid-
iaries include the petroleum distribution network of
AGIP, (recognized by tourists for its logo of the six-
legged dog) the textile mills of Lanerossi, and the
industrial machinery plants of Nuovo Pignone.
Recently ENI and its subsidiaries have been the arm
of the Italian Government involved in bringing natu-
ral gas to Italy from North Africa and in developing
plans for the natural gas pipeline projected from the
Soviet Union. Italy's poverty in energy resources
places ENI in an extremely responsible and sensitive
position for national security and international poli-
tics. Its current director, another loyal DC backer, is
Alberto Grandi. No one, however, is ever likely to rise
to the power and fame of ENI's first director, Enrico
Mattei, who was killed in a mysterious plane crash
near Milan in 1962. Mattei broke the practice of
American, British, and Dutch oil companies of divid-
ing oil revenues 50-50 with the producing country by
giving 75 percent to the home country and taking 25
percent for ENI, an arrangement rumored to have
made him the victim of sabotage.
Alongside these colossi are other major state-partici-
pation organizations: EFIM (Ente Partecipazione e
Finanziamento Industria Manufatturiera, Participa-
tion and Financing Agency for the Manufacturing
Industry); EGAM (Ente Autonomo di Gestione per le
Aziende Minerarie Metallurgiche, Autonomous
Agency for Management of Metallurgical and Min-
ing Enterprises); and EAGC (Ente Autonomo per la
Gestione Cinematografia, Autonomous Agency for
Management of the Film Industry).
33
EFIM, founded in 1962, is in charge of intervening in
and developing the industrial sector and is involved in
industrial machinery, railroad rolling stock, helicop-
ters, aluminum, paper, glass, tires, food processing,
products, and distribution as well as promoting new
initiatives in the south in both industry and tourism.
Included in EFIM's holdings is Breda Ferroviaria
which is under contract to provide subway cars for the
Washington Metro. For some years before he went to
IRI, Pietro Sette headed EFIM; currently the presi-
dent is Dr. Corrado Fiaccavento.
EGAM, established in 1958, did not really start
operations until 1971 and is now the country's leader
in mining as well as mineral exploration. EGAM is
somewhat smaller than other state-participation agen-
cies, but it is branching into new areas such as textiles
and seems headed for continued growth.
EAGC, which derived from institutions in the cinema
sector left over from Mussolini's regime, was founded
in 1958 with added impetus from the postwar movie-
making boom in Italy. Of the companies within
EAGC, the Istituto Luce (Light Institute) is the
oldest, established in 1925 by the fascists to produce
newsreels and documentaries for propaganda pur-
poses. There is also the massive complex of film
studios on the outskirts of Rome, Cinecitta, started in
the Mussolini years. Finally, Italnoleggio (Italian
Distribution) works in film management and distribu-
tion. For a state-run operation, EAGC is a bit con-
trived for a democratic country, but its justification
lies in providing direction for an important sector of
Italy's economy and in promoting cultural develop-
ment. Least important of the organizations of state
participation, EAGC nevertheless is an information
forum of obvious potential influence and has consist-
ently been headed by a loyal backer of the DC, such
as present Director General, Dr. Pasquale Lancia.
In the last year or so, two noteworthy cases of the
state's withdrawing from participation in industry
have occured: the giant chemical and electrical con-
glomerate headquartered in Milan, Montedison, of
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which the government owned about 10 percent, re-
turned wholly to private hands, as did the EAGAT
(Ente Autonomo per la Gestione delle Aziende Ter-
mall, Autonomous Agency for the Management of
Thermal Resorts) group of enterprises in thermal
spas.
Because of the magnitude of the parastate sector in
Italy, only the parent holding companies are men-
tioned here. Their hundreds of subsidiaries, however,
cannot be forgotten as providers of jobs and/or favors
for people who are willing to accept DC hegemony.
These concerns, in turn, are not without influence in
ancillary sectors of the economy when it comes to
subcontracting and the like. Still, in the midst of this
soft patronage atmosphere, it would be erroneous to
assume that political litmus tests are more important
than professional, technical, and administrative com-
petency. The nature of the work of most of the
parastate organizations is highly sophisticated and,
given Italy's position in the world, must be competi-
tive. Hence, most of the higher echelons of these
companies are competent even if the fact remains that
in a majority of cases, when party affiliation or
preference is known, the men at the top are either
DC-connected or apolitical. Useful as this sector has
been for the DC, the public is increasingly resentful of
and openly hostile to this relationship. As the younger
generation of university-trained specialists grows,
many of them both unemployed and anti-DC, political
discrimination will be forced to yield?aided by other
parties whose long exclusion from these fruits has
intensified their criticism and public irritation.
Other Support Elements
The groups which can be considered as offering
support potential for the DC also include direct
government employment areas and the labor move-
ment. As in most European countries, Italy has a
series of state monopolies such as railroads, post and
telegraph, tobacco, and other services, not to mention
the civil service, which are wholly government-run. To
say that these have been "colonized" like the para-
state corporations is to impugn the integrity of the
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civil service. Nevertheless, as any resident of Italy
would know from conversations with postal employ-
ees, railroad conductors, and other state employees,
the DC sympathizer usually gets the nod when there
is more than one applicant for a civil service vacancy.
Italy has only one nationalized industry, ENEL (Ente
Nazionale per l'Elettrica, National Electric Energy
Agency), and it has been utilized for placing party
backers. ENEL's development projects also tend to be
in areas chosen by companies known for their support
of DC governments. The press on occasion has aired
controversies about some projects, citing manipulation
of rates and development of new electric service in
areas to be industrialized, as well as questions of
opportunities favoring one region over another. While
some of the criticisms appear to have little validity,
the ultimate effect is the addition of one more irritant
to a public all too willing to believe that it is being
treated unfairly. Rarely if ever has the DC, not ?
merely ENEL, been effective in rebutting any of these
accusations.
Like virtually everything else in Italy, the labor
movement is highly politicized (in terms of party
relationships). The DC's arm amongst organized
workers is the CISL (Confederazione Italiana dei
Sindacati Lavoratori, Italian Confederation of Work-
ers' Unions). This organization was formed in 1950 by
Catholic unionists who seceded from the CGIL (Con-
federazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro) because of
its increasing domination by Communist elements.
Initially CISL attempted to be politically nonpartisan
and lay its primary emphasis on enrolling workers
who were Catholics. Nevertheless the founding of
CISL was symptomatic of the polarization of the
labor movement within a society which was lining up
in Catholic and Communist sectors. Promoting DC
ideals, CISL tried to appeal beyond classes, thus
rejecting class conflict and seeking to unionize various
levels of Italian life. Members grew to regard this
approach as potentially subordinating their interests
to Catholic or DC goals, and the outlook soon became
typically working class, primarily blue-collar oriented.
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Table 7
Union Membership, 1976-80
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
CISL
Workers
2,536,787
2,489,613
2,490,967
2,510,230
2,610,072
Pensioners
286,948
320,289
377,770
396,000
447,648
Total
2,823,735
2,809,902
2,868,737
2,906,230
3,057,720
CGIL
Workers
3,544,123
3,612,342
3,544,597
3,527,331
3,439,331
Pensioners
762,528
872,718
983,365
1,056,143
1,104,143
Total
4,306,651
4,485,060
4,527,962
4,583,474
4,543,474
UIL
Workers
1,086,630
1,129,400
1,210,000
1,243,700
1,250,498
Pensioners
50,000
61,500
74,000
82,500
90,000
Total
1,136,630
1,190,900
1,284,000
1,326,200
1,340,498
Across the years, particularly since the 1960s, CISL
members have gone from being Catholic workers
allied with the DC to being workers who are anti-
Marxist first and Catholic second. By 1969 or 1970,
CISL, followed by CGIL,4 evolved into greater inde-
pendence of the DC, and from 1974 until 1980 CISL
sought common cause as much or more with CGIL
than with the DC. Other unions in this same period
increasingly became more independent in their align-
ments with other parties. Even the CISL has on
occasion favored general strikes and pursued a policy
of confrontation with DC leaders despite continuing
contact with and sympathy for the DC left wing. In
any event Luigi Macario, the secretary general of
CISL, was elected senator on the DC ticket in
Piedmont in 1979, when he took shelter in the DC to
escape CISL elements who favored more leftist or
CGIL (Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro, General
Confederation of Italian Labor) is the Communist Union and UIL
(Unione Italiana dei Lavoratori, Italian Union of Workers) is
aligned with the PSI, PSDI, and PRI.
35
worker-oriented policies. Macario's resignation to run
for the Senate opened the way for election of Pierre
Carniti as secretary general, a gruff and lifelong
product of the labor movement whose sentiments are
quite leftist.
Even though the old bonds are much loosened, CISL
is still regarded as linked to the DC. Realistically,
however, the union has retained its strength not so
much because of its connection with the party as its
role as a non-Marxist alternative for workers and its
recent promotion of worker share purchases in indus-
trial management. Carniti, like Macario before him,
has demonstrated a noteworthy independence charac-
terized by primary interest in rank-and-file labor
benefits. He is, however, much more forceful and
respected as a leader, and CISL membership, unlike
CGIL's, is growing under his guidance (see table 7).
But two other significant developments will inevitably
test Carniti and affect the future relationship between
the DC and CISL. One is the aging of the work force,
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which is leading to greater increase in union pension-
ers than in active members. The other factor is the
growth in the number of autonomous unions and ad
hoc "struggle committees" (comitati di lotta). In
short, numerous signs point to increasing grass-roots
dissatisfaction with the conventional unions and their
methods, and CISL is not immune.
In retrospect, all the DC's support organizations have
been undergoing a slow but perhaps decisive change
for as much as 10 years and the process is gradually
accelerating. Church-related groups, while altering
their mode of backing the party, are slimmed down
and more coherent, even though they are showing
signs of less involvement in the mainstream of secular-
ized national life. These groups remain, however, the
area of greatest support and slowest erosion.
The complex of state-related corporations is under
increasing attack from the public, particularly as the
Italian economy continues to face ever greater prob-
lems without significant responses from the govern-
ment. A complaint about DC monopolization of the
parastate sector was formally inscribed in the Pro-
grammatic Accord of 1977 (see pages 99-101), but the
DC has only recently begun to yield its influence in
any degree. Demands for the breakup of vast holdings
such as IRI and ENI, particularly from the labor
world, are increasing and cannot long be ignored. DC
immobilism in this area results in backsliding which
affects the national economy. Again, the era of DC
monopoly cannot last much longer, but the implica-
tions of changes are so sweeping for the economy that
party considerations may soon have to be overridden
for the general good.
In the area of labor, the entire national work force
appears to be finding its own distinct identity
independent of party. For all intents and purposes, the
DC, PCI, and PSI have already lost the degree of
control and support they once took for granted from
their respective union subsidiaries. Essentially the DC
is left with the intrinsically anti-Marxist segments of
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labor, but the result is a metamorphosis of what was
once a solid hold on a significant part of the work
force. The Catholic link is now mainly ephemeral.
Although it could once be included as at least a
partial support element for the DC's interests and also
for the party, the enormously important Confindus-
tria (Confederazione dell' Industria Italiana, Confed-
eration of Italian Industry), Italy's National Associ-
ation of Manufacturers, is less and less in sympathy
with the party. Confindustria cannot be considered an
opponent of the DC, but its more active support is now
with other parties, either with the PSI, led by Bettino
Craxi or, more naturally, with the Republicans or
Liberals. If the DC is a party of business, the support
comes mainly from professionals, small industry,
shopkeepers, and clerks, the segment of society with a
less complex concept of private property.
The main conclusion about the DC and its support
groups may be that lacking effective renewal and
refoundation within the party itself, the DC is already
relying increasingly on the auxiliary support network,
which itself is in the process of changing and shrink-
ing. At the same time, the extent of secularization
over the last 20 years has made the Catholic subcul-
ture only a part, and a minority one at that, of
national life. The DC has not kept pace with the
change in the Church, a process the Church describes
as aggiornamento (updating, with the connotation of
modernizing). Unless the DC experiences a much
fuller aggiornamento of its own, it will continue to
lose support from many of these organizations. In the
parastate sector the top-level positions already are
falling rapidly to other more relevant criteria than
political loyalties.
The DC's Electoral Record
Beginning with the referendum on the monarchy and
the election for the Constituent Assembly in 1946, the
new democratic Italy embarked on what has become a
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myriad of consultations of the electorate. These elec-
tions fall into five categories: national, regional, pro-
vincial, communal, and referendums. For all of them
the Italian Government has provided voluminous
data.
Before assessing the data, several cautionary observa-
tions are essential:
? Italian elections over a relatively brief timespan are
inconclusive for interpretative purposes.
? Conclusions drawn on the basis of the political
regions or whole Chamber districts alone are incon-
clusive and possibly misleading; the smaller divi-
sions such as provinces are more reliable indicators.
? Urban and rural voting patterns do not necessarily
conform to conventional patterns.
? No generalizations can be made for the nation as a
whole without risk of creating erroneous assump-
tions for large individual geographical areas.
? Failure to consider the enormous changes in occupa-
tional sectors and population shifts can skew the
meaning of voting patterns.
? Similarity of party numerical returns from one
election to another does not reflect the often signifi-
cant changes among elected representatives.
? The complexities of the operation of Italy's propor-
tional representation system subtly alter the makeup
of elected bodies.
All of this relates directly to the Christian Democratic
Party; hence, an assessment of its present and future
status in the national body politic is a complex and
inexact undertaking requiring constant consideration
of the party's showing in many relative situations.
Again this reflects the slow-motion factor in Italian
politics where any assumptions must be drawn on a
longer than usual perspective and predictions hazard-
ed on the basis of relatively long-term possibilities
rather than certainties.
Also, before specific statements can be made about
any one party, some recognition must be accorded the
broad concepts that have developed about the Italian
37
party system in general. Beyond the simplistic asser-
tion that Italy has a multiparty system, three more
sophisticated viewpoints can be stated:
? Italy has a pluralistic party arrangement in which
centrifugal tendencies pull the electorate to extreme
ideological poles.
? Italian parties offer such a spectrum of choice that
fragmentation is inevitable; the voter finds and stays
within his niche, and election results tend at first
sight to show little change.
? The system is an imperfect two-party arrangement
in which the DC and PCI share the majority of the
votes and the other parties can never hope for more
than junior partner status. Each view appears in
postelection journalistic commentary and often con-
fuses observers not intimately acquainted with the
Italian political scene.
The characterization of Italian politics as an imper-
fect two-party system comes closest to reality, al-
though there are useful aspects to the other views.
The system is imperfect because the opposition PCI is
considered disloyal and hence has not had a chance
for inclusion in the government. Alternation thus
cannot occur and the small party partners become a
crucial factor by holding the balance of power. These
small groups provide the DC with internal support for
coalitions or external tolerance necessary to permit
one-party or monocolore governments. As the two
major parties drew closer together in electoral
strength, notably in 1976, the question became wheth-
er the DC could remain the larger party and thus
continue to claim the right to form the government, or
whether it would slip behind and be forced to deal
with the PCI. The junior partners, some of whom are
not averse to collaborating with the PCI, may begin to
weigh which of the two large partners is more advan-
tageous for them to support.
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The basic question which has to be considered in
analysis of the DC's record at the polls is whether
evidence is appearing to substantiate the hypothesis
that the party's organization is not being renewed and
that its support groups are showing signs of profound
change and altered loyalties?in short, that the DC is
eroding as a force in Italian politics.
Authorities on Italy take the elections of 1948 and
1974 as the high and low points of DC fortunes at the
polls. The peak, achieved on 18 April 1948, occurred
in the election for the first legislature, when the DC's
candidates won more than 48 percent of the votes
cast. On 12 May 1974, in a national referendum on
the 1970 law permitting civil divorce, the DC commit-
ted itself wholeheartedly to repeal of that legislation
and lost by a landslide with 59 percent favoring its
retention. As is often the case with conveniently
simplistic reference points such as these, conclusions
can be misleading. The election in 1948 was held
under unusual circumstances, and the referendum of
1974 was a black-and-white choice with possibly less
meaning than the outcome of 1975 regional elections
and the 1976 renewal of Parliament.
Today there are the increasingly important adminis-
trative regions whose elections since 1970 are produc-
ing another focal point of enhanced political power
and changing voter patterns. Finally, lower level
administrative elections at the provincial and commu-
nal strata break returns into small enough segments to
permit identification of trend areas. What results
from any analytical view in 1981, of the composite of
these various election statistics is a picture of DC
erosion which increases inversely to the level of the
populace consulted. If there is no evidence that DC
support will disappear, there is still much to suggest
that it is shrinking and will continue to do so unless
the party alters its strategies or eventually succeeds in
its timeworn renewal aspirations.
Confidential
National Legislative Elections
Since World War II, Italy has had nine national
legislative elections: one for the Constituent Assembly
of 1946 and eight for the houses of Parliament from
1948 to 1979. Viewed as a whole, the returns of these
elections, except for 1948, are unusually uniform, a
political bas-relief of strikingly static character (see
tables 8, 10 to 17, and figures 8-10). Only with an
unconventionally long overview and careful compari-
son of parliamentary election returns from various
geographic regions do meaningful patterns begin to
emerge. In fact, assessments do not acquire a true
third dimension unless information from regional,
provincial, and communal elections is considered as
well (see pages 72-81 and tables A-17-A-32). Because
Italian politics move with glacial speed the basic shifts
are found primarily in subsurface movements.
-
The first national vote after the war, on 2 June 1946,
produced a political spectrum that has tended to
repeat itself in the 35 subsequent years. This first
election appears now as a harbinger of a certain
stagnation in Italian voting patterns that belies in part
the conventional belief that Italy is unstable. The
election of 1946 is most remembered today for its
verdict to abolish the monarchy of the House of Savoy
and to make Italy a republic. At the same time,
however, Italians voted for their first postwar legisla-
tive body, the unicameral Cost ituente (Constituent
Assembly), a body of 556 members empowered to
write a constitution for the new republic.
In both 1946 votes, the election results demonstrate
the close division of viewpoints in the nation (see
tables 8 and 9). In the referendum on the monarchy?
the so-called institutional question?the electorate
supported founding a republic by a margin of only
2 million voters (8.54 percent of the participating
electorate). In the simultaneous election of the assem-
bly the margin was even narrower ideologically, par-
ticularly if one recalls the affinity of the Communist
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Table 8
Election for the Constituent Assembly, 2 June 1946
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
Percent of
Membership
Christian Democrats
8,082,486
35.18
207
37.23
Socialists
4,765,665
20.74
115
20.68
Communists
4,358,243
18.97
104
18.70
National Democratic Union
1,560,037
6.79
41
7.37
Common Man Front
1,210,021
5.27
30
5.40
Republicans
1,003,086
4.37
23
4.14
National Freedom Bloc
636,330
2.77
16
2.88
Party of Action
334,877
1.46
7
1.26
Democratic Concentration of Labor
2
Italian Unionist Movement
220,196
0.96
1
0.72
Social Christian Party
1
Sicilian Independence Movement
4
Sardinian Action Party
2
Democratic Party of Labor
803,328
3.49
1
1.62
Peasants' Party
1
Front of Progressive Democratic Republicans
1
Total
22,974,269
100.00
556
100.00
Table 9
National Institutional Referendum, 2 June 1946
Number of
Votes
Percentage
For the creation of an Italian
Republic
12,719,641
54.27
For the retention of the monarchy
of the House of Savoy
10,718,802
45.73
Total
23,437,269
100.00
39
and Socialist viewpoints at that time. The DC won
35.2 percent of the vote, and the two parties of the left
39.7 percent (PSI 20.7 percent; PCI 19.0 percent).
This combined total for the three major parties, some
75 percent, is roughly the pattern which has prevailed
ever since, save for 1948. Over the entire timespan,
fluctuation has occurred among the DC, PSI, and
PCI, but their combined total has remained much the
same (see figure 7).
Italy's new Constitution went into effect on 1 January
1948, and the general election for the first legislature
of the Parliament was held on 18 April. Such a
consultation would have been significant in any cir-
cumstances as the first of a new regime, but circum-
stances elsewhere in Europe rendered it more dramat-
ic. The Communist coup in Czechoslvakia in late
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Figure 7
Major Parties' Share of Vote, 1946-79
Percent
50
40
DC
? 36.5 Christian
30
Democrats
PCI
?29.6
Communists
20
10
0
N0,11.3
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1946 48 53 58 63 68 72 76 79
PSI
Socialists
Percent of votes for Christian Democrats, Communists and Socialists
in elections for the Constituent Assembly of 1946 and the Chamber
of Deputies, 1948-79. Figure on right is party majority in election
for European Parliament, June 1979. (With a law of 1975, voting age
was lowered to 18 years, increasing the electorate by some 3,000,000,
effective in 1975.)
585807 2-82
February made the election in Italy, with the largest
Communist party outside the Russian sphere of influ-
ence, all the more ominous. In an atmosphere of the
beginning of the cold war, American interest in the
Italian contest rose. Public statements by President
Truman, urging Italo-Americans to write relatives in
Italy to vote DC, and the pro-DC stance of the
Catholic community in the United States rose to a
crescendo by election day. As a result, the DC for
some years had to cope with allegations that its
victory was bought with US dollars and that it was an
American puppet.
Other elements of more lasting import from both
1946 and 1948 need to be noted for the bearing they
have on today's Italian political scene and on the DC
in particular. First, neither of these early elections
took place in normal times, given contemporary condi-
tions in Italy and Europe. Italy had not had a free
Confidential
Figure 8
Composition of Constituent Assembly, 1946
Percent (Seats won)
Party Composition:
Others (CUN) 0.72
(4)
PRI-4.14
(23)
DC-37.23
(207)
Others (non-CUN)-1.62
(9) PdA-1.26
(7)
BNL-2.88
PSIUP-20.68 (16)
(115)
PCI-18.70
(104)
UDN-7.37
(41)
UQ-5.40
(30)
585608 2-82
election since 1921, when the electorate was restricted
to males. If a normal election is defined as a free
consultation in peacetime, then the last such vote in
Italy was probably that of 1909 when the country had
not yet instituted even universal male suffrage.
Hence, at best the 1946 and 1948 elections were the
first normal ones after two world wars, 20 years of
dictatorship, and a depression. In any event, these
elections were the first with universal male and
female suffrage for all citizens age 21 and over.
Furthermore, the electorate was roughly triple that of
1921. Catholics participated in an Italian election for
the first time with full Vatican approval, and genuine-
ly mass parties with mass support participated for the
first time. Thus the overwhelming majority of the
electorate in 1946 had no experience of a freely
exercised franchise and representative democratic
government.
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Table 10
Italy's Eight Postwar National Elections
(Voting for the Chamber of Deputies), 1948 and 1953
1948
1953
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
Percent of
Membership
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
Percent of
Membership
Christian Democrats
(DC)
12,741,299
48.50
305
53.14
10,864,282
40.10
263
44.58
Communists (PCI) a
8,137,047
30.98
183
31.88
6,121,922
22.60
.143
24.24
Socialists (PSI)
3,441,305
12.70
75
12.71
Social Democrats
(PSDI) b
1,858,346
7.07
33
5.75
1,223,251
4.52
19
3.22
Liberals (PLI) e
1,004,889
3.83
19
3.31
816,267
3.00
13
2.20
Republicans (PRI)
652,477
2.48
9
1.57
437,988
1.62
5
0.85
Neo-Fascists (MSI)
526,670
2.00
6
1.04
1,582,567
5.84
29
4.91
PNM
PMP (Monarchists) f
PDIUM
729,174
2.78
14
2.44
1,855,842
6.85
40
6.78
Radicals (PRad)
0
0
Others
619,010
2.36
5
0.87
749,319
2.77
3
0.51
Total
26,268,912
100.00
574
100.00
27,092,743
100.00
590
100.00
Voter Turnout
26,854,203
92.23
28,410,326
93.82
a In 1948 Fronte Democratico Popolare per la Liberia, la Pace, il
Lavoro (coalition of PCI and PSI). One hundred thirty-two deputies
(23.00 percent of the Chamber) declared themselves PCI members;
51(8.88 percent) PSI.
b Unita Socialista in 1948.
e In 1948 Blocco Nazionale with Uomo Qualunque.
d Coalition of PRI and PRad in 1958.
e From 1972, also MSI-DN, Movirnento Sociale Italiano and Destra
Nazionale.
f In 1948 and 1953, PNM; in 1958, PNM and PMP; in 1963 and
1968, PDIUM.
Whatever faults may be laid to the DC now, it was
the pivotal political grouping that brought Italy into a
new order against a backdrop of war, destruction,
economic hardship, and inexperience. And this leap
into sophisticated government occurred without
violence.
In the election of 1948, the DC's margin of viotory
overshadows all else. Seen more than 30 years later,
the size of its vote is still remarkable. The margin of
victory then has since proved to be a mixed blessing, a
performance for which there has been no encore. For
years the DC touted the 1948 results as proof of its
massive support in the population and often asserted
41
that it had won an absolute majority. Opposition
groups have frequently argued against this, though,
pointing out that the popular vote was not absolute
even if the Italian proportional representation system
did give the DC an absolute majority of seats in both
houses of Parliament (see tables 10 and 14). Worse for
the DC, the party was long accused of insinuating its
1948 victory into a greater mandate than appeared
warranted to other groups. More than a few innuen-
dos from other quarters suggested that only US
intervention-"votes bought with dollars"-account-
ed for the DC's 48-percent share of the vote.
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Table 11
Italy's Eight Postwar National Elections
(Voting for the Chamber of Deputies), 1958 and 1963
1958
1963
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
Percent of
Membership
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
Percent of
Membership
Christian Democrats
(DC)
12,522,279
42.36
273
45.80
11,775,970
38.29
260
41.27
Communists (PCI) a
6,704,706
22.68
140
23.49
7,768,228
25.26
166
26.35
Socialists (PSI) a
4,208,111
14.23
84
14.09
4,257,300
13.84
87
13.81
Social Democrats
(PSDI) b
1,345,750
4.55
22
3.69
1,876,409
6.10
33
5.24
Liberals (PLI) e
1,046,939
3.54
17
2.85
2,143,954
6.97
39
6.19
Republicans (PRD a
405,574
1.37
6
1.01
420,419
1.37
6
0.95
Neo-Fascists (MSI) e
1,407,913
4.76
24
4.03
1,571,187
5.10
27
4.28
PNM
PMP (Monarchists) f
PDIUM
659,865 f
776,942
2.23
2.63
11
14
1.85
2.35
536,991 f
1.75
8
1.27
Radicals (PRad)
0
0
Others
485,554
1.64
5
0.84
407,999
1.32
4
0.64
Total
29,563,633
100.00
596
100.00
30,758,031
100.00
630
100.00
Voter Turnout
30,437,770
93.81
31,766,058
92.91
a In 1948 Fronte Democratico Popolare per la Liberia, la Pace, il
Lavoro (coalition of PCI and PSI). One hundred thirty-two deputies
(23.00 percent of the Chamber) declared themselves PCI members;
51(8.88 percent) PSI.
b Unita Socialista in 1948.
e In 1948 Blocco Nazionale with Uomo Qualunque.
d Coalition of PRI and PRad in 1958.
e From 1972, also MSI-DN, Movimento Sociale Italiano and Destra
Nazionale.
f In 1948 and 1953, PNM; in 1958, PNM and PMP; in 1963 and
1968, PDIUM.
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Table 12
Italy's Eight Postwar National Elections
(Voting for the Chamber of Deputies), 1968 and 1972
1968
1972
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
Percent of
Membership
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
Percent of
Membership
Christian Democrats
(DC)
12,441,553
39.12
266
42.22
12,919,270
38.66
266
42.22
Communists (PCI)
8,557,404
26.91
177
28.10
9,072,454
27.14
179
28.41
Socialists (PSI) a
Social Democrats
(PSDI)
4,605,832
14.48
91
14.45
3,210,427
9.62
61
9.68
1,717,539
5.14
29
4.60
Liberals (PLI)
1,851,060
5.82
31
4.92
1,297,105
3.88
20
3.18
Republicans (PRI)
626,567
1.97
9
1.43
954,597
2.86
15
2.38
Neo- Fascists (MSI)
1,414,794
4.46
24
3.81
2,896,762 b
8.67
56
8.89
Monarchists (PNM)
414,423 c
1.30
6
0.95
0
Radicals (PRad)
0
0
Proletarian Unity
(PSIUP) d
1,414,544
4.44
23
3.65
648,763
1.94
0
0.00
Others
477,076
1.50
3
0.47
697,862
2.09
4
0.64
Total
31,803,253
100.00
630
100.00
33,414,779
100.00
630
100.00
Voter Turnout
33,003,249
92.79
34,524,106
93.18
a Temporary merger in 1968 of PSI and PSDI as Part ito Socialista
Unificato.
b From 1972, also MSI-DN, Movimento Soci ale Italiano and Destra
Nazionale.
c In 1948 and 1953, PNM in 1958, PNM and PMP; in 1963 and
1968, PDIUM.
d PSIUP in 1968 and 1972; Democrazia Proletaria in 1976.
43
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Table 13
Italy's Eight Postwar National Elections
(Voting for the Chamber of Deputies), 1976 and 1979
1976
1979
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
Percent of
Membership
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
Percent of
Membership
Christian Democrats
(DC)
14,218,298
38.71
262
41.59
14,026,924
38.29
261
41.43
Communists (PCI)
12,622,728
34.37
227
36.03
11,129,298
30.38
201
31.91
Socialists (PSI) a
3,542,998
9.64
57
9.05
3,591,579
9.81
62
9.84
Social Democrats
(PSDI) a
1,237,270
3.37
15
2.38
1,405,008
3.84
21
3.33
Liberals (PLI)
478,335
1.31
5
0.79
713,486
1.94
9
1.43
Republicans (PRI)
1,134,936
3.09
14
2.22
1,107,826
3.02
15
2.38
Neo-Fascists (MSI)
2,245,376 b
6.12
35
5.56
1,927,233 b
5.28
31
4.92
Monarchists (PNM)
0
0
Radicals (PRad)
394,212
1.07
4
0.64
1,264,082
3.44
18
2.86
Proletarian Unity
(PSIUP) c
582,770
1.58
6
0.95
601,036
1.65
6
0.95
Others
270,350
0.74
5
0.79
863,271
2.35
6
0.95
Total
36,727,273
100.00
630
100.00
36,629,743
100.00
630
100.00
Voter Turnout
37,760,520
93.41
38,150,395
90.35
a Temporary merger in 1968 of PSI and PSDI as Part ito Socialista
Unificato.
b From 1972, also MSI-DN, Movimento Sociale Italiano and Destra
Nazionale.
c Unita Proleteria per il Comunismo.
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Table 14
Italy's Eight Postwar National Elections
(Voting for the Senate), 1948 and 1953
1948 1953
Number Percentage Number Percent of Number Percentage Number Percent of
of Votes of Seats Membership of Votes of Seats Membership
Christian Democrats 10,899,640 48.11 131 55.26 9,692,584 39.87 . 113 47.68
(DC)
Communists (PCI) a
6,969,122
30.76
72
30.38
4,912,093
20.21
51
21.52
Socialists (PSI)
2,893,148
11.91
26
10.97
Social Democrats (PSDI) b
943,219.
4.16
8
3.38
1,046,659
4.34
4
1.69
Liberals (PLI) c
1,216,934
5.37
7
2.95
695,985
2.86
3
1.27
Republicans (PRI)
594,178
2.62
4
1.69
262,484
1.08
0
0.00
PRI-PSDI/PRI-DC
607,792 d
2.68
4
1.69
186,447 e
0.78
3
1.27
Neo-Fascists (MSI) f
164,092
0.73
0
0.00
1,473,596
6.07
9
3.78
PNM
393,510g
1.74
3
1.27
1,562,653g
6.44
14
5.91
PMP (Monarchists) g
PDIUM
Radicals (PRad)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Others
868,803
3.83
8
3.38
1,563,702
6.44
14
5.91
Total
22,657,290
100.00
237
100.00
24,309,351
100.00
237
100.00
Voter Turnout
23,842,919
92.15
25,483,201
93.78
a In 1948, Fronte Democratic? Popolare per la Liberta, la Pace, il
Lavoro (coalition of PCI and PSI).
b Unita Socialista in 1948.
Blocco Nazionale in 1948 with Uomo Qualunque.
d In 1948, PRI-PSDI coalition in Lombardy, Venetia, Friuli-
Venezia Giulia, and Liguria.
e In 1953 and 1963, PRI-DC coalition in Emilia-Romagna.
f From 1972, MSI was joined by Destra Nazionale (DN).
g In 1948 and 1953, PNM; in 1958, PNM and PMP; in 1963 and
1968, PDIUM.
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Table 15
Italy's Eight Postwar National Elections
(Voting for the Senate), 1958 and 1963
1958
1963
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
Percent of
Membership
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
Percent of
Membership
Christian Democrats
(DC)
10,782,262
41.23
123
50.00
10,032,458
36.52
129
40.95
Communists (PCI) a
5,701,019
21.80
59
23.98
6,933,842
25.24
84
26.67
Socialists (PSI) a
3,682,806
14.08
35
14.23
3,849,878
14.02
44
13.97
Social Democrats
(PSDI) b
1,165,402
4.46
5
2.03
1,744,213
6.35
14
4.44
Liberals (PLI) c
1,008,830
3.86
4
1.63
2,028,379
7.38
18
5.72
Republicans (PRI)
363,461
1.39
0
0.00
223,107
0.81
0
0.00
PRI-PSDI/PRI-DC
0
185,889 d
0.68
4
1.27
Neo-Fascists (MSI) e
1,149,873
4.40
3.25
1,459,046
5.31
14
4.44
PNM
PMP (Monarchists) f
PDIUM
510,823 f
1.94
0.81
429,339 f
1.56
2
0.64
Radicals (PRad)
0
0
Others -
1,787,523
6.84
10
4.07
584,935
2.13
6
1.90
Total
26,151,999
100.00
246
100,00
27,471,086
100.00
315
100.00
Voter Turnout
27,391,239
93.89
28,831,008
93.04
a In 1948, Fronte Democratico Popolare per la Liberta, la Pace, il
Lavoro (coalition of PCI and PSI).
b Unita Socialista in 1948.
Blocco Nazionale in 1948 with Uomo Qualunque.
a In 1953 and 1963, PRI-DC coalition in Emilia-Romagna.
e From 1972, MSI was joined by Destra Nazionale (DN).
f In 1948 and 1953, PNM; in 1958, PNM and PMP; in 1963 and
1968, PDIUM.
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contwenual
Table 16
Italy's Eight Postwar National Elections
(Voting for the Senate), 1968 and 1972
1968
1972
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
Percent of
Membership
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
Percent of
Membership
Christian Democrats
(DC)
10,965,790
38.34
135
42.86
11,466,701
38.08
135
42.86
Communists (PCI)
8,583,285 a
30.01
101
32.06
8,475,141 a
28.14
94
29.84
Socialists (PSI) b
Social Democrats
(PSDI)
4,355,506
15.23
46
14.59
3,225,804
10.71
33
10.48
1,613,603
5.36
11
3.49
Liberals (PLI)
1,936,943
6.77
16
5.08
1,316,058
4.36
8
2.54
Republicans (PRI)
620,658
2.17
2
0.64
917,989
3.04
5
1.59
PRI-PSDI/PRI-DC
0
0
Neo-Fascists(MSI)
1,380,452
4.83
11
3.49
2,737,695
9.09
26
8.25
PNM
PMP (Monarchists)
PDIUM
308,916 c
1.08
2
0.64
0
Radicals (PRad)
0
0
Others
499,697
1.57
2
0.64
361,915
1.20
3
0.95
Total
28,601,247
100.00
315
100.00
30,114,906
100.00
315
100.00
Voter Turnout
30,212,701
92.88
31,454,873
92.72
a Coalition of PCI and PSIUP in 1968 and 1972.
b Temporary merger in 1968 of PSI and PSDI as Part ito Socialista
Unificato.
In 1948 and 1953, PNM; in 1958, PNM and PMP; in 1963 and
1968, PDIUM.
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Table 17
Italy's Eight Postwar National Elections
(Voting for the Senate), 1976 and 1979
1976
1979
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
Percent of
Membership
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
Percent of
Membership
Christian Democrats
(DC)
12,226,768
38.88
135
42.86
12,010,716
38.34
138
43.81
Communists (PCI)
10,640,471
33.84
116
36.83
9,855,951
31.46
109
34.60
Socialists (PSI)
3,209,987
10.21
29
9.21
3,252,410
10.38
32
10.16
Social Democrats (PSDI)
966,771
3.07
6
1.90
1,320,729
4.21
9
2.86
Liberals (PLI)
436,751
1.39
2
0.64
691,718
2.21
2
0.64
Republicans (PRI)
846,505
2.69
6
1.90
1,053,251
3.36
6
1.90
PRI-PSDI/PRI-DC
0
0
Neo-Fascists(MSI)
2,090,635
6.65
15
4.76
1,780,950
5.68
13
4.12
PNM
PMP (Monarchists)
PDIUM
0
0
Radicals (PRad)
265,397
0.84
0
0.00
413,444
1.32
2
0.64
Others
768,896
2.43
6
1.90
951,626
3.04
4
1.27
Total
31,448,181
100.00
315
100.00
31,330,795
100.00
315
100.00
Voter Turnout
32,557,373
93.27
32,968,054
90.73
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Figure 9
Composition of Chamber of Deputies, 1948-79
Percent of Votes (Seats won)
1948
PR1-2.48,
(9)
N.
PSDI-7.07h
(33)
PSI/PCI-30.988
(183)
DC-48.50
(305)
411*74
/PL1-3.83c
(19)
/MSI-2.00e
/ (6)
PNM-2.781
Others-2.36
1968
PRI 1.97
DC-39.12
PL1-5.82
(9)
(266)
(3))
PSUPSDI-14.48/\
/NISI-4.46
(91) \ \
/ (24)
(5)
1953
PRI-1.62PLI-3.00
(5) /03)
PSDI-4.52 / ,MSI-5.84
(19) / / (29)
//
PSI-12.70-- /PNM -6.85
(75) ,/,,,/ (40)
PC1-22.60 _.--Others-2.77
(143) 590 _-------
(3)
DC-40.10
(263)
PCI-26 91
(177)
PSI UP-4.44
(23)
630
/PNM-1.30
/ (6)
_-Others- 1.50
(3)
1972
PS 1)1-5.14
(29)
PRI- 2.86
(15)
1958
PRI-1.37d
(6)
PSDI -4 55
(22)
PSI-14.23
(84)
PCI- 22.68
(140)
DC-42.36
(273)
PL1- 3.54
(17)1
596
NISI -4 76
/(24)
,PN M -2.23
/(11)
,PDIUM -2.63
// (14)
Others-1.64
(5)
1963
PRI-1.37
(6) N
PSDI- 6.10 h
(33)
PSI-13.84h
(87)
PCI- 25.26
(166)
630
DC-38.29
(260)
PLI-6.97
/(39)
MSI-5.10
/ (27)
/ / 'PNM-].751
////
/(s
..,-Others -1.32
PSI-9.62.
N
(61)
(179)
PSI
PSIUP-1.94g
At'N w
(0) 630
,DC-38.66
/ (266)
/1' LI -3.88
/ (20)
/MSI-8 67c
/ (57)
thers-2.09
(4)
1976
PSI-9.64
(57)
PCI-34.37
(227)
PSIUP-1
PRad-1.07
58
4k.
(6)
(4) 630
PSDI -3.37 PRI-3.09
(15) (14)
DC-38.71
(262)
,PLI- 1.31
/ (5)
MSI-6.12 e
(35)
_-01hers-0.74
(5)
1979
(P(62S20I):)9.81 PSDI-3.84
PCI-30.38 (21)1
s
(6)
PRacl -3 44
PS1UP-1.65
(18)
630
am n 1948 Fronte Democratico Popolare per la Liberta, la Pace, il Lavoro, coalition of PCI and PSI.
h Unita Social ista in 1948.
cln 1948 Blocco Nazionale with Uomo Qualunque.
d Coalition of PRI and PRad in 1958.
c From 1972, also MSI-DN, Movimento Sociale Italiano and Destra Nazionale.
fIn 1948 and 1953, PNM; in 1958, PNM and PMP; in 1963 and 1968, PDIUM.
g PSIUP in 1968 and 1972; Democrazia Proletaria in 1976; Proletarian Unity for Communism.
hTemporary merger in 1968 of PSI and PSDI as Partito Socialista Unificato.
585809 2-82
PRI-3.02
(15)
DC-38.29
(261)
PLI - 1.94
//(9)
/ MS1-5.28e
(31)
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Figure 10
Composition of Senate, 1948-79
Percent of Votes (Seats won)
1948 PRI-PSDI/PRI-DC - 2.68 r
(4)
PRI-2.62--
(4)
PSDI -4.16?
(8)
PO/PSI-30.76a
(72)
DC-48.11
(13)
PLI -5.37e
(7)
MSI-0.73h
(0)
z PNM-PMP-
Z PDIUM -1.74'
(3)
Others-3.83
(8)
1968
1953
PRI-PSDI/PRI-DC -0.788
(3)
PRI -1.08
(0)
PS DI -4.34
(4)
PSI-11.91
(26)
PC1-20.21
(51)
DC-39.87 PLI - 2.86
(1)3)
(3)
.MS1-6.07
(9>
---PNM-PMP-
PDIUM -6.44'
(14)
Others-6.44
(14)
1958
PRI-1.39
(0)
PSDI -4.46
(5)
PSI-14.08
(35)
PCI- 21.80
(59)
DC-41.23
(123)
PLI-3.86
(4)
PRI-2.17
(2)
PSI- 15.23d
(46)
PC!-30.0l6
(101)
DC-38.34
(135)
315
PLI- 6.77
(16)
MSI -4.83
(11)
/PNM-PM P-
PDIUM -1 081
(2)
Others-1.57
(2)
1972
PRI -3.04
(5)
PSDI -5.36
(11)
PSI- 10.71
(33)
PCI -28. I 4 b
(94)
DC-38.08
(135)
PLI-4.36
/ (8)
MS!-9.09
(26)
----Others-1.20
(3)
1976
MS1-4.40
(8)
P-
PDIUM -1.94'
246 (2)
Others-6.84
(10)
1963
PRI-PSDI/PRI-DC-0.68g 1963 PLI -7.38
(4) DC-36.52 (18)
PRI-0.81 (129) MSI -5.31
(0) (14)
PSDI- 6.35 PNM-PMP-
(14) PDIUM -1.56
315 (2)
PSI-14.02 PCI -25.24 Others-2.13
(44) (84) (6)
PRI -2.69
(6)
PSDI 3.()7
(6)
PSI-10.21
(29)
PCI -33 .84
(116)
DC-38.88
(135)
PLI- 1.39
(2)
MSI -6.65
(15)
Others-2.43
(6)
PRad-0 84
(0)
1979
PRI-3.36
(6)
PSDI -4.21
(9)
PSI-10.38
(32)
PCI-31.46
(109)
aln 1948, Fronte Democratico Popolare per la Liberta, la Pace, il Lavoro (coalition of PCI and PSI).
h Coalition of PCI and PSIUP in 1968 and 1972.
c Unita Socialista in 1948.
dTemporary merger in 1968 or PSI and PSDI as Partito Socialista Unificato.
e Blocco Nazionale in 1948 with Uomo Qualunque.
fIn 1948, PRI-PSDI coalition in Lombardy, Venetia, Friuli-Julian Venetia and Liguria.
g In 1953 and 1963, PRI-DC coalition in Emilia-Romagna.
h From 1972, MSI was joined by DN, Destra Nazionale.
'In 1948 and 1953, PNM; in 1958, PNM and PMP; in 1963 and 1968, PDIUM.
DC-38.34
(138)
PRad- 1.32
(2)
PLI -2.21
(2)
MSI -5.68
(13)
Others-3.04
(4)
585810 2-82
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Figure 11
Labor Force by Economic Sector, 1951-80
Percent
50
30
20
10
Othera
Industry
Agriculture
0
1951
60 70 80
a Includes commerce, transportation, communications,
hotels, banking, public administration, social services,
and so forth.
585811 2-82
Two other sets of data for a comparable time period
demonstrate, paradoxically, how much Italy has
changed. The most striking are data on employment
sectors (see figure 11). In 1951, 43.87 percent of
Italians engaged in agricultural pursuits, the largest
single sector. By 1980 that sector had dropped to the
smallest, with only 14.14 percent still deriving their
living from the land. The smallest sector in 1951?
independent businessmen, professionals, and service
occupations, with only 26.66 percent?grew to 48.27
percent by 1980. Industry, the other major area of
work, rose in the same years from 29.47 percent to
37.59 percent. Recalling that the DC's most impor-
tant support was said to come from the rural voter,
the DC's share of the vote from these areas has
declined, surprisingly, less steeply.
The second area of comparison, population growth
and change, also yields important information. From
1951 to 1979, Italy's overall population increased
20.35 percent (see table 18). During that time, the
growth of both the northwest and center increased
51
Figure 12
Urbanization and Support for the
Christian Democrats, 1953-79
Percent Change in
DC Vote Share
?10
?15
?40 ?20 0 20 40 60
Rate of Urbanization
Each point in this figure represents one of thirty electoral districts in the
Chamber of Deputies. The rate of urbanization is measured as the percent-
age change in total population in each district between 1953 and 1979. The
change in the vote share of the Christian Democrats is measured also as a
percentage change over the same period. Two districts (Valle d'Aosta and
Trieste) were excluded from the analysis because they were not comparable
to the other districts.
585812 2-82
much more rapidly. The northeast, south, and islands,
traditionally DC strongholds, fell behind the nation as
a whole in growth. Paradoxically the party base in
these areas, measured in numbers of voters, has
eroded only in certain areas?Sardinia, the city of
Naples, and the Provinces of Taranto and Ragusa, for
example.
If election results are contrasted with the employment
sectors and population, a curious phenomenon ap-
pears: politics do not seem to reflect these other facets
of national life. In a broader sense, keeping in mind
the great changes in social and economic realities, the
variance seems even greater. When applied to the DC
specifically (and perhaps to some other parties), the
implication is that the party is not coping well with
economic, social, and demographic change.
The situation described here is best summed up in the
title of a book on the national election of 1979,
Mobility Without Movement, a phrase highlighting
the paradox of contemporary Italy. The country is by
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Table 18
Population by Geographical Region, 1951 and 1979
1951
1979
Change,
1951-79
Percentage
Change
Northwest a 11,745,432
15,435,163
3,689,731
+31.41
Northeast b
5,575,781 e
6,457,898
882,117
+15.82
Center e
7,507,069
9,772,932
2,265,863
+30.18
South d
16,627,480
18,598,959
1,971,479
+11.86
Islands e
5,762,772
6,563,559
800,787
+13.90
Italy
47,218,534 f
56,828,511
9,609,977
+20.35
a Northwest: Piedmont, Valle d'Aosta, Lombardy, and Liguria.
b Northeast: Trentino?Alto Adige, Venetia, and Friuli?Venezia
Giulia.
e Center: Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany, Umbria, and Marche.
d South: Lazio, Abruzzi, Molise, Campania, Puglia, Basilicata, and
Calabria.
e Islands: Sicily and Sardinia.
f Trieste, which became part of Italy in October 1954, is not
included. Its estimated population in 1954 was 297,003.
most measures among the leading nations in the world
in many spheres. In politics, however, it often appears
more exemplary of the Third World. As the largest
political party and a participant in every government
from 1945 to 1981, the DC must bear a large portion
of the blame for this, even if other parties also share
responsibility. The word Italians use most in describ-
ing the DC is immobilismo (immobilism) in reference
-to the party's characteristic failure to act on many
major issues and thus leave the country somewhat
anachronistic politically.
If exception is made for the anomaly of 1948, the
stability of the DC's ranks in the Chamber is striking
in terms of numbers. For the seven other legislatures
beginning in 1953, the party's share of the vote
ranged from 42.36 percent to 38.29 percent (1958 and
1963). But if 1958 is also excluded, the range narrows
to a mere 1.81 percent (from 40.10 percent in 1953 to
38.29 percent) over a 25-year period (see tables 10 to
13). Nearly the same phenomenon appears with the
Confidential
Table 19
Population and Voting by Sex, 1948 and 1979
1948
1979
Males
Females
Males
Females
Total
22,868,008
23,953,962
27,767,759
29,060,752
Percentage of
population
48.84
51.16
48.86
51.14
Eligible to vote
Total
13,908,860
15,208,694
20,237,003
21,986,810
Percentage of
population
47.77
52.23
47.93
52.07
Actual voters
Total
12,855,102
13,999,101
18,400,272
19,750,123
Percentage of
population
92.42
92.05
90.92
89.83
DC Senate delegation, despite the difference in its
electorate caused by the age qualification for voting
eligibility (see tables 14 to 17). With this evidence
over a period of roughly 30 years, how can the erosion
hypothesis be sustained?
Here the significance of district-by-district analysis
becomes clear. If on the surface the DC's vote
percentages and the number of its deputies and
senators remain so similar across the years, geo-
graphic shifts in its strength and changes in delega-
tion personnel are masked but quite real. For exam-
ple, the election of 1979 was widely hailed?
particularly in the press?as a great success for the
party compared to 1976. True, the DC doubled its
distance from the PCI, but this resulted primarily
from Communist losses. The DC, on the other hand,
lost 0.42 percent of the votes in 1979 relative to 1976.
More telling Was its decline in 22 of the 32 districts
for the Chamber (see figure 14) In the 20 Senate
districts, the party fell below its 1976 level in 13 (see
figure 15) Also among the 261 DC deputies elected in
1979, one less than in 1976, there were 59 new people,
To be eligible to vote in Senate elections, a citizen must be at least.
25 years old.
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Figure 13
Population Change (1951-79) in Relation to DC Representation Change
(1948-79) in the Chamber of Deputies; shown by Political Region
Percent Change
Key
Percent of Population Change 1951-79
11979 DC Representation Change Relative to 1948
I 1979 DC Representation Change Relative to 1953
Piemonte
-100 -50
50
100 -
Valle d'Aosta
7
Lombardia
Trentino-Alto Adige
(411.1
Venetoa
Friuli-Venezia Giuliab
Liguria
Emilia-Romagna
Toscana
Er
Sardegna
-100 -50
50 100
Trentino-
Alto
Adige
Aosta
Lombardia
Veneto
Friuli-
Venezia
Giulia
? Piemonte
Emilia-Romagna
+s)
Marche
Sardegna
A few deviations from traditional regional boundaries are nude in the formation or the
thirty?two electoral districts of the Chamber. Population and representation Figures have
been adjusted accordingly here. In the case of the Veneto, the province of Helium, is not
included in the region's statistics.
Figures include the province of Belluno (see note a). The province of Trieste was added to
Italy in October 1954. Thus the population and representation statistics utilized here for
years prior to that dale do not include Trieste. Addition of the 300,000 citizens Of that area
thus alter statistics given for the region. If Trieste is excluded, the area had a slight decline
in population as well as in its number of allocated seats.
Toscana
Umbria
Lazio
Umbria
-100 -50
Marchec
1
50
100
Laz od
Abruzzi
Abruzzi
Molise
-1=
Campania
Molise
Er
Campania Puglia
Puglia
Basilicata
Er
Basilicata
Calabria
LI
Calabria
Sicilia
O Figures to etude the province of Rieti (see note a).
,The province of Rieti is not included (see note a).
Note: Italy's rust reliable postwar census was taken in September 1951. Figures from that
report form the basis of comparison in this table together with population statistics reported
for the compilation of electoral roles for the general elections of 1979. There is thus a
slight variation implied in calculating the percentages of delegation representation in both
1948 and 1953. In addition, the ItalianGovernment's mode of reporting 1948 and 1953
election returns (to include those deputies elected through the Single National College)
make a precise percentage calculation impossible. With each of these exceptions. no
significant alteration of the results occurs.
Sicilia
-100 -50
cro
50 100
585813 2-82
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Figure 14
Christian Democratic Share of Electoral District Delegations, 1948-79
Chamber of Deputies Percent
Key
Percent of votes received by Christian Democrats
.8 year average
18 year median
0
20
40
60
80
100
I. Torino 1948
1953
Novara 1958
Vercelli 1963
1968
1972
1976
1979
'
I
II. ?Cuneo
Alessandria
Asti
,
III. Genova
Imperia
La Spezia
Savona
,
,
,
'
IV. Milano
Pavia
V. Como
Sondrio
Varese
'
VI. Brescia
Bergamo
,
,
,
,
VII. Mantova
Cremona
,
,
,
,
,
_
VIII. Trento
Bolzano
,
,
a No list of DC candidates presented in elections.
b Trieste became a part of the Italian Republic in
October 1954. ?
cCalculations based on exceptions cited in notes
a and b.
0
20
40
60
80
100
IX. Verona
Padova
Vicenza
Rovigo
X. Venezia
Treviso
XI. Udine
Belluno
Gorizia
Pordenone
0 20 40 60 80 100
0 20 40 60 80 100
XVII. Ancona XXV.
Pesaro
Macerata
Ascoli Piceno
XVIII. Perugia
Terni
Rieti
XIX. Roma
Latina
Viterbo
Frosinone
XII. Bologna
Ferrara
Ravenna
Forli
XIII Parma
Modena
Piacenza
Reggio Emilia
XX. L'Aquila
Pescara
Chieti
Teramo
XXI. Campobosso
Isernia
Lecce
Brindisi
Taranto
XXVI. Potenza
Matera
XXVII. Catanzaro
Cosenza
Reggio Calabria
XXVI
I.Catania
Messina
Siracusa
Ragusa
Enna
XXIX.
Palermo
Trapani
Agrigento
Caltanissetta
XIV. Firenze
Pistoia
XV. Pisa
Livorno
Lucca
Massa Carrara
XVI. Siena
Arezzo
Grosseto
XXII. Napoli
Caserta
XXIII. Benevento
Avellino
Salerno
XXX
Cagliari
Sassari
Nuoro
Oristano
XXXI
Valle D'Aosta
XXIV. Bari
Foggia
XXXI'
. Trieste
Italy IN
ational Average
Fe
585814 2-82
55
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Figure 14
Christian Democratic Share of Electoral District Delegations, 1948-79
Senate
Percent
Key
o Percent of votes received by Christian Democrats
= 8 year average
um 8 year median
I.
1948
Piemonte 1953
1958
1963
1968
1972
1976
1979
'
.
II.
Valle d'Aosta
'
,
ya
_=
III.
Lombardia
,
=
IV.
Trentino?Alto Adige
,
,
,
V.
Veneto
,
,
,
,
,
?,
VI.
Friuli-1, enezia Giulia
b
b
,
,
?b
b
VII.
Liguria
r --=
VIII.
Emilia?Romagna
'
,c
,c
........
allo DC list presented in the elections of this year. The
average and median are thus for 5 elections.
b The city and province of Trieste were not a part of
this region until the elections of 1958. The 8 year
average and median are also shown without Trieste.
cThe DC and PRI presented a unified list in these
elections.
IX.
Toscana
,
,
X.
Umbria
--,
XI.
Marche
,
,
,
XII.
Lazio
'
,
,
,
,
XIII.
Abruzzi
,
'.
1--d
XIV.
Molise
.1?d
XV.
Campania
,
XVI.
Puglia
,
,
d n the elections of 1953, 1958, and 1963 Abruzzi and
Molise constituted one region and hence one senatorial
electoral district. Statistics shown here are official
breakdowns for returns in those years for each of the
two parts.
e DC and PSDI presented a unified list.
fUnified list of DC and PLI.
XVII. Basilicata
,
1, "...
XVIII. Calabria
,
XIX. Sicilia
,
XX. Sardegna
=
Italy National Average
,
,
,
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Figure 15
Distribution of Seats by Electoral District (Region)
Key
Number below years in light type shows number of seats won by Christian Democrats.
Number below years in bold type shows total number of seats in a particular electoral dstrict.
Cluunberofflepufies
Electoral District
1948
1953
1958
1963
1968
1972
1976
1979
Torino-Novara-Vercelli
13/26
11/26
11/26
11/33
11/32
12/34
13/38
12/39
Cuneo-Alessandria-Ami
9/16
8/16
8/14
7/14
7/15
7/14
7/16
7/15
Genovainapefia-La Spezia-Savona
9/19
8/17
9/21
8/23
8/22
8/22
8/22
7/23
Milano-Pavia
18/36
16/36
15/39
15/45
17/47
16/45
19/52
18/52
Como-Sondrki-Varese
9/14
9/15
8/14
9/17
9/17
9/17
9/19
9/20
Brescia-Bergamo
14/19
12/18
12/19
12/19
12/20
12/20
12/21
12/23
Mantova-Cremona
5/10
5/10
5/10
4/9
4/9
4/8
4/8
4/8
Trento-Bolzano
5/9
5/8
5/10
5/10
4/9
5/10
4/9
4/10
Verona-Padova-Vicenza-Rovigo
19/28
17/28
18/29
17/29
17/28
17/28
16/28
16/29
Venezia-Treviso
10/16
10/16
9/16
9/17
9/18
9/18
8/16
8/17
Udine-Belluno-Gorizia-Pordenone
9/14
9/15
8/14
7/14
7/15
7/14
6/13
6/11
Bologna-Ferrara-Ravenna-Forli
7/24
7/22
7/27
6/27
6/25
7/27
7/27
7/27
Parma-Modena-Piacenza-Reggio Emilia
7/19
7/19
7/19
6/19
6/20
6/20
6/19
6/19
Firenze-Pistoia
6/13
5/13
5/13
5/16
5/16
5/16
5/15
5/14
Pisa-Livorno-Lucca-Massa Carrara
7/14
6/13
6/15
5/15
5/15
6/16
6/14
5/14
Siena-Arezzo-Grosseto
3/9
3/10
3/9
3/10
3/9
3/9
3/9
3/9
Ancona-Pesaro-Macerata-Ascoli Piceno
9/17
8/15
8/19
7/19
7/17
7/17
7/16
7/17
Perugia-Terni-Rieti
5/11
4/11
5/13
4/12
4/13
4/11
4/12
4/10
Roma-Latina-Viterbo,Frosinone
20/34
15/38
16/39
16/48
17/47
17/48
19/55
20/54
L'Aquila-Pescara-Chiefi-Teramo
9/16
7/14
8/17
7/16
8/15
8/15
7/14
7/14
Campobasgrlsemia
3/4
3/5
4/6
3/4
3/5
3/4
3/4
3/4
Napoli-Caserta
17/31
12/31
14/34
15/38
15/38
14/38
15/39
16/38
Benevento-Avellino-Salerno
11/18
8/20
10/21
10/21
10/21
11/23
9/18
10/18
Bari-Foggia
12/22
9/22
10/22
10/23
11/23
10/24
10/23
10/23
Lecce-Brindisi-Taranto
9/16
8/16
9/18
9/18
9/19
9/18
8/18
9/18
Potenza-Matera
4/6
4/7
4/8
4/8
5/8
5/8
4/8
4/7
Catanzaro-Cosenza-ReggiooCalabfia
13/24
11/25
13/26
12/26
11/26
10/24
10/23
10/23
Catania-Messina-Siracusa-Ragusa-Enna
15/26
11/25
13/29
12/29
13/29
12/30
12/29
12/27
Palermo-Trapani-Agrigento-Caltanissetta
13/25
11/25
13/29
12/29
12/29
13/30
12/25
12/26
Cagliari-Sassari-Nuoro-Oristano
9/14
7/14
8/15
8/18
8/19
8/17
7/16
7/17
Valled'Aosta
1/1
1/1
0/1
0/1
1/1
0/1
0/1
0/1
Treiste
2/4
2/3
2/3
2/4
2/3
1/3
Totals
305/574
263/590
273/596
260/630
266/630
266/630
262/630
261/630
585815 2-82
Senate
Electoral District
1948
1953
1958
1963
1968
1972
1976
1979
Piemonte
8/17
8/17
9/18
9/24
10/24
9/24
10/25
9/25
Valle d'Aosta
1/1
11/1
0/1
0/1
1/1
0/1
0/1
0/1
Lombardia
18/31
16/32
16/33
19/45
20/45
20/45
21/48
21/48
Trentino-Alto Adige
4/6
4/6
4/6
4/7
4/7
5/7
3/7
3/7
Veneto
14/19
6/19
13/20
14/23
13/23
14/23
14/23
14/23
Friuli-Venezia Giulia
4/6
4/6
4/6
4/7
4/7
4/7
4/7
4/7
Liguria
4/8 1/8
4/8
4/11
4/11
5/11
4/10
4/10
Emilia-Romagna
6/17 1/17
6/18
3/22
6/22
6/22
7/22
6/22
Toscana
7/15 6/15
7/16
6/20
7/20
7/20
7/20
7/20
Umbria
3/6
/6
2/6
3/7
2/7
3/7
2/7
2/7
Marche
4/7
/7
4/7
4/8
4/8 .
4/8
4/8
4/8
Lazio
10/16
/16
8/17
8/24
9/24
8/24
10/27
11/27
Abruzzi
4/6
/6
4/6
4/7
4/7
4/7
4/7
4/7
Molise
2/2
/2
2/2
2/2
2/2
2/2
1/2
2/2
Campania
11/21
/21
10/22
11/29
11/29
11/29
12/29
13/29
Puglia
8/15
/15
8/16
10/21
9/21
9/21
9/20
9/20
Basilicata
3/6
/6
4/6
4/7
4/7
4/7
3/7
4/7
Calabria
5/10
/10
5/10
5/12
5/12
5/12
5/11
5/11
Sicilia
12/22
/22
10/22
11/29
11/29
11/29
11/26
12/26
Sardegna
3/6 4/6
4/6
5/9
5/9
4/9
4/8
4/8
Totals
131/237
13/237
123/246
129/315
135/315
135/315
135/315
138/315
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Table 20
Eligible Voters by District, 1948 and 1979
Region and
District
Eligible Voters, Chamber
Eligible Voters, Senate
Population
in 1951
Population
in 1979
Percentage
Change
1948
1979
Percentage
Change
1948
1979
Percentage
Change
Piedmont
1
1,602,276
2,503,112
+56.22
2
952,798
979,024
+2.75
2,345,808
3,067,601
+30.77
Total
2,555,075
3,482,136
+36.28
3,518,177
4,538,020
+28.99
Liguria
3
1,108,119
1,477,501
+33.33
1,018,535
1,321,860
+29.78
1,566,961
1,852,903
+18.25
Lombardy
4
2,033,439
3,388,216
+66.62
5
783,004
1,271,566
+62.40
6
912,835
1,372,897
+50.40
7
533,328
548,522
+2.85
3,855,332
5,724,503
+48.48
Total
4,262,606
6,581,201
+54.39
6,566,154
8,929,703
+36.00
Trentino-Alto Adige
8
440,591
636,264
+44.41
390,539
541,766
+38.72
728,604
873,995
+19.95
Venetia a
9
1,420,031
1,883,682
+32.65
10
821,168
1,152,485
+40.35
2,099,256
2,751,182
+31.06
Total
2,241,199
3,036,167
+35.47
3,918,059
4,338,292
+10.73
Friuli-Venezia Giulia b
11
772,341
946,337
+22.53
32
239,456
543,693 c
871,346
+60.26
Total
772,341
1,185,793
+53.53
929,118
1,245,611
+34.06
Emilia-Romagna
12
1,285,313
1,777,675
+38.31
13
1,064,093
1,333,688
+25.32
2,094,830
2,751,273
+31.34
Total
2,349,406
3,111,363
+32.43
3,544,340
3,963,151
+11.82
Tuscany
14
785,447
1,133,129
+44.27
15
800,524
1,035,617
+29.37
16
542,487
627,602
+15.69
1,917,572
2,482,823
+29.48
Total
2,128,458
2,796,348
+31.38
3,158,811
3,594,607
+13.80
Note: Since March 1975, voting eligibility in Italy, except for the
Senate, is 18 years of age. Prior to that it was 21. To vote for the Sen-
ate, one must be 25.
a For elections to the Chamber of Deputies, the Province of Belluno
is incorporated into District 11 with Friuli-Venezia Giulia. Figures
given here for Chamber voters thus exclude Belluno. For elections to
the Senate, Belluno Province is included in the Veneto. These figures
therefore include Belluno for the Senate as well as for the 1951 and
1979 populations.
b District 11 includes the Province of Belluno for Chamber elections
(see preceding note). Senate elections in Friuli-Venezia Giulia do not
include Belluno which instead returns to Veneto.
c The city and Province of Trieste became a part of Italy in October
1954 and were then formed into Chamber District 32. Therefore,
figures for 1951 population and 1948 Senate elections do not include
Trieste. Estimated population of Trieste in 1954 was 297,003 and in
1979 was 294,062, or a decline of 0.99 percent. If figures for 1979
are adjusted to show growth in Friuli-Venezia Giulia excluding
Trieste, the region gained only 2.41 percent in population over 1951.
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Table 20 (continued)
Region and
District
Eligible Voters, Chamber
Eligible Voters, Senate Population Population Percentage
in 1951 in 1979 Change
1948 1979 Percentage 1948
Change
1979
Percentage
Change
Marche
17
Umbria d
860,897 1,102,747 +28.09
756,935 964,248 +27.39 1,364,030 1,409,845 +3.36
18 619,572 743,491 +20.00
Lazio e
444,743 559,154 +25.73 803,918 805,329 +0.18
19
Abruzzi
1,868,802 3,584,800 +91.82
1,758,543 3,178,384 +80.74 3,340,798 5,037,255 +50.78
20 765,621 996,896 +30.21
Molise
667,291 864,162 +29.50 1,277,207 1,233,397 -3.43
21
Campania
241,338 285,372 +18.25
210,085 247,295 +17.71 406,823 332,914 -18.17
22
23
Total
Puglia
1,496,077
912,735
2,408,812
2,437,809 +62.95
1,288,593 +41.18
3,726,402 + 54.70
2,095,718 3,082,703 +47.10
4,346,264 5,420,390 + 24.71
24
25
Total
Basilicata
984,816
731,391
1,716,207
1,474,834 +49.76
1,202,198 +64.37
2,677,032 +55.99
1,500,302 2,226,952 +48.43
3,220,485 3,889,422 + 20.77
26
Calabria
334,700 447,636 +33.74
289,824 374,762 +29.31 627,586 618,312 -1.48
27 1,093,613 1,508,930 +37.98
Sicily
946,577 1,257,160 +32.81 2,044,287 2,067,269 +1.12
28
29
Total
Sardinia
1,340,804
1,249,969
2,590,773
1,870,890 +39.53
1,783,366 +42.67
3,654,256 +41.05
2,282,832 3,074,663 +34.69
4,486,749 4,970,595 +10.78
30
Valle d'Aosta
687,388 1,101,657 +60.27
603,771 917,284 +51.93 1,276,023 1,592,964 +24.84
31
61,130
87,821
+43.66
56,402
77,066
+36.64
94,140
114,537
+21.67
Italy
29,106,647 f
42,223,813
+45.07g
25,878,588 f
36,336,187
+ 40.41 g
47,218,534
56,828,511
+20.35
d For Chamber elections, the Province of Rieti is detached from its
region of Lazio and added to District 18. Chamber figures here thus
include Rieti while Senate and population figures show Umbria and
District 18 without Rieti.
Chamber figures exclude Rieti Province; Senate and population
include Rieti. See preceding note.
Confidential
f Trieste not included.
The following changes occur if figures are adjusted to show growth
without Trieste: Eligible voters for the Chamber, 1979: 41,984,357
(+44.24 percent); eligible voters for the Senate, 1979: 36,139,293
(+39.65 percent); population, 1979: 56,631,617 (+19.73 percent).
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tontinential
Table 21
Population by Administrative Region,
Voting for the Chamber of Deputies, 1951 and 1979 a
1951
1979
Piedmont
3,518,177
4,538,020
Valle d'Aosta
94,140
114,537
Lombardy
6,566,154
8,929,703
Trentino?Alto Adige
728,604
873,995
Venetia b
3,679,790
4,137,327
Friuli?Venezia Giulia e
1,167,387
1,446,576
Liguria
1,566,961
1,852,903
Emilia-Romagna
3,544,340
3,963,151
Tuscany
3,158,811
3,594,607
Umbria d
983,075
949,252
Marche
1,364,030
1,409,845
Lazio e
3,161,641
4,893,332
Abruzzi
1,277,207
1,233,397
Molise
406,823
332,914
Campania
4,346,264
5,420,390
Puglia
3,220,485
3,889,422
Basilicata
627,586
618,312
Calabria
2,044,287
2,067,269
Sicily
4,486,749
4,970,595
Sardinia
1,276,023
1,592,964
Italy
47,218,534
56,828,511
a See more detailed chart in appendix, tables A-15 and A-16 for
figures on the number of eligible voters, Chambers of Deputies and
Senate.
b Province of Belluno not included.
e Belluno included in 1951 but not Trieste; 1979 includes Belluno
and Trieste. The population of Trieste in 1979 was 294,062.
d Figures include Province of Rieti.
e Rieti not included.
a 22.61-percent turnover in a group reduced numeri-
cally by only 0.38 percent. In the Senate the situation
was similar. The party's vote fell by only 0.54 percent,
but it actually gained 3 seats. The increase was only
2.22 percent in the delegation size, but with 35 new
faces (25.36 percent).
63
The irony of these statistics is compounded, in fact, if
the same comparisons are made for the election of
1972. Although 1976 was considered a near disaster
for the party, the DC's showing that year revealed a
decline over 1972 in only 14 of the Chamber districts
and seven for the Senate. Also, its share of the raw
vote for both Chamber and Senate was actually
slightly higher than in 1972. Indeed, had there not
been the interim defeat on the divorce referendum
(1974) and large setbacks in regional, provincial, and
communal votes (1975), 1976 might not have ap-
peared so gloomy, even considering the PCI's large
share of the returns. If the DC had anything with
which to flatter itself in 1979, it was in having a
relatively smaller loss than the PCI. Otherwise the
record of that year had elements of the same erosion
occurring since 1974.
Not only do these selected instances suggest that
Italian political movement occurs below the surface,
they also imply that election analysis risks becoming a
numbers game. Reliance on statistics is unavoidable,
but in Italy quantification has to be abandoned at
some point to make way for elements which do not fit
finite sytems. For example, the northeastern regions
of Friuli?Venezia Giulia and Venetia are known as
"white" Italy because of their fidelity to the Church.
Yet other regions have large Catholic majorities, even
if they do not carry their religion to the ballot box so
obviously. Both the Valle d'Aosta and the Trentino?
Alto Adige are known for their religiosity, but their
French and German ethnicity tend to color their
voting behavior more than does their faith.
In the light of so many qualifications, what can be
said of the DC's record in national legislative elec- 25X1
tions? First of all, using 1948 data for assessing
subsequent DC electoral performance warps the rec-
ord. A more realistic measure can be achieved by
starting with 1953 because that and subsequent elec-
tions took place in essentially normal times.
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In the Chamber of Deputies, one piece of conventional
wisdom about the DC seems to be borne out: highly
urbanized areas, particularly in the northwest, are not
centers of party numerical strength (see figure 16). In
districts including Turin, Milan, and Genoa (numbers
1, 3, and 4) where the party came close to achieving a
45- to 50-percent share of the votes in 1948, the
decline has been steady in later years. The DC's
delegation size there and in other urban areas such as
Rome and Naples has remained stable, but simulta-
neously population shifts and seat reallocation under
proportional representation have increased the num-
ber of deputies elected. The result is a drop in the
DC's share of parliamentary seats. District 4 with
Milan has gone from 36 deputies in 1948 to 52 in
1979, a period during which the DC fell as low as 15
seats and peaked at 19 seats in the supposedly bad
elections of 1976. The district including Rome is quite
similar. In a country which is urbanizing so rapidly,
this is not an optimistic sign.
The assumption that the DC is also strong in rural
areas is borne out in some instances, the most striking
being district 21 in Molise. However, this area, small
to begin with, is losing population faster than any
other. But the DC's strength and appeal in rural areas
is difficult to discern in Chamber district breakdowns.
Instead, provincial and communal figures have to be
consulted, since the districting for the Chamber, with
only rare exceptions, today includes more and more
urban components.
A clearer understanding of the DC record is achieved
by comparing annual percentages of the party vote in
each district rather than noting the number of party
deputies in relation to size of district delegation.
Figure 16 demonstrates on a national basis not only
the steady decline of party fortunes but the slow swing
from north to south. A line could almost be drawn
across the peninsula from Rome to Pescara below
which the party's averages have either held or de-
clined more slowly than in the north. Some unusual
exceptions do exist in the south, though, such as
Sardinia (number 30) which has the most consistent
record of DC shrinkage. Curiously, too, DC leader
Confidential
Emilio Colombo's district 26 in Basilicata shows a
rather notable decline. Not to be overlooked are
districts like 19 and 22 with Rome and Naples. Even
if there is apparently more encouragement there for
the DC in national elections, the provincial and
communal returns put clouds on the horizon since
both cities have reported increasing PCI votes and
have had leftist city administrations for some five
years now. Still in the comparative percentages of
several years, there is a persistent decline in DC
strength in its "safe" northeastern areas of districts 6,
8, 9, 10, and 11, encompassing parts or all of Venetia,
Trentino?Alto Adige, and Friuli?Venezia Giulia. Dis-
trict 8, the home of De Gasperi, is no longer a DC
stronghold, even if its SVP 6 party quite often sides
with the DC in Parliament. Taken together the
northeast is still a strong area for the party, but the
consistency of decline there is striking as a pattern.
Figure 16 shows a comparable pattern in Senate
election returns.
Nowhere does the complexity of analysis of party
performance appear so clearly as in contrasting voting
results for both Chamber and Senate with the actual
representation achieved (compare figures 9 and 10). If
there is in most instances a clear and progressive
decline in the DC's share of votes, the regional
distribution of the party's delegation members is
almost static. At the same time the DC share of the
overall delegation from any area has shrunk consis-
tently since 1948. If any element appears here to
substantiate the erosion hypothesis, it is the size of the
DC Chamber delegation. That, however, has re-
mained static since 1963.
6 Suedtiroler Volkspartei.
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Figure 16
Change in DC Delegation Size by Geographic Region, 1948-79
Key
DC proportion of Senators or Chamber of Deputy delegates
: Overall regional proportion of Christian Democrats in Senate or Chamber of Deputies
CI Total Christian Democratic proportion in Senate or Chamber of Deputies
Numbers in red indicate number of Christian Democrat (DC) delegates from a particular region elected to the Senate or Chamber of Deputies
Senatea
1948
1953
1958
1963
1968
1972
1976
1979
Northwest
31
29
29
32
35
34
35
34
Northeast
22
20
21
22
21
23
21
21
--=
3
_1
____
_
Center
20
15
19
16
19
20
20
19
==
=7

3"
--,
South and Islands
58
49
54
_
59
60
58
59
64
_
_3
==
==
==

==
_
Total
____
___1
1
131
113
123
129
135
135
_____
135
138
Chamber of Deputiesb
1948
1953
1958
1963
1968
1972
1976
1979
Northwest
64
58
56
54
57
56
60
57
_
Northeast
57
---=
53
--=
54
____7
52
____=
51
_
_1
52
____J
48
47
_._
.
Center
44
40
==
41
?7
36
36
38
--1
38
37
==
=
=
73
South and Islands
135
106
?1
122
118
?1
122
?1
120
116
120
--j
1
1
=
1
--1
________1
_=
_______I
_____=
?
Total
I
?1
i
II
I
305
I
263
273
260
266
266
262
261
585816 2-82
a Regions:
Northwest: Piemonte, Valle d'Aosta, Lombardia, Liguria
Northeast: Trentino-Alto Adige, Veneto, Friuli-Venezia
Giulia
Center: Emilia-Romagna, Toscana, Umbria, Marche
South: Lazio, Abruzzi, Molise, Campania, Puglia,
Basilicata, and Calabria; Islands: Sicilia,
Sardegna
b Districts:
Northwest: 1-5,7, and 31
Northeast: 6, 8-11, and 32
Center: 12-16, and 18
South: 17 and 19
Islands: 28-30
65
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Table 22
Chamber of Deputies: Percentage of Eligible Voter Turnout in Eight National Parliamentary Elections
1948
1953
1958
1963
1968
1972
1976
1979
Eight-Year
Average
1. Turin-Novara-Vercelli
93.29
94.16
95.83
95.69
95.39
95.70
94.96
93.47
94.81
2. Cuneo-Alessandria-Asti
92.74
94.51
94.99
95.25
95.49
96.01
95.74
93.97
94.84
3. Genoa-Imperia-La Spezia-
Savona
91.53
93.97
94.25
94.02
93.87
94.72
95.10
92.13
93.70
4. Milan-Pavia
93.82
95.83
96.24
96.14
96.49
96.79
95.93
94.39
95.70
5. Como-Sondrio-Varese
93.61
94.81
95.71
95.60
96.18
96.54
95.47
94.11
95.25
6. Brescia-Bergamo
93.75
94.75
94.72
94.69
95.85
96.45
95.96
94.67
95.11
7. Mantua-Cremona
96.56
97.06
97.25
97.17
97.88
97.96
97.53
96.61
97.25
8. Trento-Bolzano
93.40
96.59
96.46
97.00
94.95
95.08
95.67
93.33
95.31
9. Verona-Padua-Vicenza-Rovigo
94.40
95.02
95.16
95.97
96.83
97.10
97.12
94.69
95.79
10. Venice-Treviso
93.00
93.73
93.85
94.35
95.32
95.76
96.21
93.43
94.46
11. Udine-Belluno-Gorizia-
Pordenone
91.38
90.39
89.76
91.48
90.45
91.66
94.31
90.54
91.25
12. Bologna-Ferrara-Ravenna-Forli
95.52
96.88
97.42
97.15
97.51
97.86
97.78
96.41
97.07
13. Parma-Modena-Piacenza-
Reggio Emilia
95.01
95.39
95.56
95.63
96.36
96.80
96.85
95.05
95.83
14. Florence-Pistoia
96.21
97.12
97.16
97.19
97.03
97.51
97.20
95.71
96.89
15. Pisa-Livorno-Lucca-Massa
Carrara
92.99
94.85
95.04
95.27
95.59
96.04
96.40
94.25
95.05
16. Siena-Arezzo-Grosseto
94.92
96.86
96.78
96.68
97.06
97.52
97.54
96.07
96.68
17. Ancona-Pesaro-Macerata-
Ascoli Piceno
94.27
95.76
94.78
94.19
94.73
95.29
95.79
92.79
94.70
18. Perugia-Terni-Rieti
93.61
95.58
94.97
93.86
94.68
95.73
95.93
93.67
94.75
19. Rome-Latina-Viterbo-Frosinone
90.17
94.33
94.72
94.15
93.90
94.19
94.64
91.37
93.43
20. L'Aquila-Pescara-Chieti-
Teramo
90.79
90.36
87.41
86.50
86.33
86.80
89.51
82.90
87.58
21. Campobasso-Isernia
92.05
90.14
85.85
79.47
82.04
82.14
85.40
74.66
83.97
22. Naples-Caserta
88.05
92.75
93.40
91.63
90.61
91.19
90.34
87.44
90.68
23. Benevento-Avellino-Salerno
90.17
91.36
89.33
85.77
85.02
84.86
86.26
84.23
87.13
24. Bari-Foggia
93.54
94.80
94.05
91.70
91.36
90.94
91.70
87.09
91.90
25. Lecce-Brindisi-Taranto
93.78
94.83
93.97
91.82
91.39
90.73
91.59
88.94
92.13
26. Potenza-Matera
91.73
92.01
91.43
88.44
87.92
87.89
88.71
84.55
89.09
27. Catanzaro-Cosenza-Reggio
Calabria
88.21
89.21
87.67
85.10
84.33
83.63
84.65
77.46
85.03
28. Catania-Messina-Siracusa-
Ragusa-Enna
87.86
89.56
90.67
87.30
86.08
86.96
87.98
82.72
87.39
29. Palermo-Trapani-Agrigento-
Caltanissetta
88.18
90.13
89.53
84.59
82.06
82.76
83.88
77.85
84.87
30. Cagliari-Sassari-Nuoro-Oristano
90.06
91.69
91.94
88.75
89.20
90.19
91.09
86.70
89.95
31. Valle d'Aosta
85.46
86.69
92.45
93.53
92.30
91.74
92.58
91.83
90.82
32. Trieste
96.35
95.59
94.60
95.22
96.07
93.85
95.28
Italy
92.23
93.82
93.81
92.89
92.79
93.18
93.41
90.35
92.81
a Trieste became a part of Italy in 1954.
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Table 23
Senate: Percentage of Eligible Voter Turnout in
Eight National Parliamentary Elections
1948
1953
1958
1963
1968
1972
1976
1979
Eight-Year
Average
Piedmont
92.64
93.92
95.18
95.30
95.22
95.15
94.86
93.44
94.46
Valle d'Aosta
82.97
86.22
91.67
92.83
91.66
91.49
91.50
91.12
89.93
Lombardy
93.83
95.60
96.12
96.18
96.44
96.16
95.99
95.07
95.67
Trentino-Alto Adige
92.65
94.73
95.27
94.85
94.42
94.12
94.57
92.88
94.19
Venetia
93.44
93.97
94.21
94.56
95.43
95.06
96.02
94.23
94.62
Friuli-Venezia Giulia
90.48
89.84
86.83
90.67
91.44
92.02
92.89
92.42
90.82
Liguria
90.94
93.48
94.07
93.79
93.70
94.07
94.54
92.14
93.34
Emilia-Romagna
95.15
96.22
96.62
96.67
97.01
96.65
97.33
95.90
96.44
Tuscany
94.47
95.96
96.27
96.26
96.43
96.29
96.73
95.06
95.93
Umbria
94.17
95.60
95.30
94.25
94.62
95.06
95.88
93.76
94.83
Marche
94.61
95.71
95.24
94.55
94.71
94.59
95.66
92.73
94.73
Lazio
89.52
93.90
94.55
93.92
93.68
93.29
94.02
91.86
93.09
Abruzzi
91.53
91.20
88.53
87.30
86.91
86.70
89.22
82.44
87.98
Molise
92.78
91.26
87.54
81.00
83.08
82.42
85.68
74.98
84.84
Campania
89.32
92.24
92.03
89.83
88.90
88.91
89.04
86.38
89.58
Puglia
93.72
94.71
94.31
92.29
91.76
90.81
91.74
88.71
92.26
Basilicata
92.29
93.19
92.46
89.60
88.76
88.30
89.46
85.90
90.00
Calabria
88.75
89.96
88.72
86.24
85.26
84.09
85.14
78.05
85.78
Sicily
88.32
90.16
90.46
86.75
84.53
84.92
85.78
81.10
86.50
Sardinia
90.41
92.11
92.39
89.40
89.55
90.04
91.10
87.25
90.28
Italy
92.15
93.78
93.89
93.04
92.88
92.72
93.27
90.73
92.81
In a nation that utilizes proportional representation,
particular attention has to be given population change
and growth of the eligible voting public (see tables 22
and 23 and tabulations 3 to 6). Also, since the
introduction of suffrage for 18-year-olds in 1975, the
orientation of the youth vote is important. The degree
to which youth may be leftist in Italy has been
disputed, but the success of leftist parties since 1975
probably depended significantly on younger voters.
On the other hand, given the increase of abstentions
in both 1976 and 1979, youth may have been less
concerned about voting. Italians have tended to argue
that abstentions and spoiled ballots are protests of
disillusioned citizens, whereas the indifference of
youth may be an equally valid explanation. With the
secrecy of the ballot, the question cannot be answered
with any certainty. (See appendix for further informa-
tion on this question.)
67
As the population grows and becomes more mobile,
and as eligible voters increase, the shift is subtle; but
the growth is greater in areas where the DC is sliding,
particularly in districts 1 and 4 in Piedmont and
Lombardy. This may be offset a bit by high growth in
districts 6, 22, and 25 where the DC can be guardedly
optimistic on some counts. Basically, it remains a
break-even phenomenon, though, which gives the DC
no accrued advantage. From a negative viewpoint,
however, the growth rate of population and eligible
voters in areas of traditional DC strength such as
Sicily, Venetia, Molise, and others are below the
national average.
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Ranking of Chamber Districts, by Average Voter
Turnout, 1948-79
1.
97.25
7
Mantua-Cremona
2.
97.07
12
Bologna-Ferrara-Ravenna-Forli
3.
96.89
14
Florence-Pistoia
4.
96.68
16
Siena-Arezzo-Grosseto
5.
95.83
13
Parma-Modena-Piacenza-Reggio
Emilia
6.
95.79
9
Verona-Padua-Vicenza-Rovigo
7.
95.70
4
Milan-Pavia
8.
95.31
8
Trento-Bolzano
9.
95.28
32
Trieste (on the basis of six elections,
1958-79)
10.
95.25
5
Como-Sondrio-Varese
11.
95.11
6
Brescia-Bergamo
12.
95.05
15
Pisa-Livorno-Lucca-Massa
Carrara
13.
94.84
2
Cuneo-Alessandria-Asti
14.
94.81
1
Turin-Novara-Vercelli
15.
94.75
18
Perugia-Terni-Rieti
16.
94.70
17
Ancona-Pesaro-Macerata-Ascoli
Piceno
17.
94.46
10
Venice-Treviso
18.
93.70
3
Genoa-Imperia-La Spezia-Savona
19.
93.43
19
Rome-Latina-Viterbo-Frosinone
92.81
National Average
20.
92.13
25
Lecce-Brindisi-Taranto
21.
91.90
24
Bari-Foggia
22.
91.25
11
Udine-Belluno-Gorizia-Pordenone
23.
90.82
31
Valle d'Aosta
24.
90.68
22
Naples-Caserta
90.61
Median
25.
89.95
30
Cagliari-Sassari-Nuoro-Oristano
26.
89.09
26
Potenza-Matera
27.
87.58
20
L'Aquila-Pescara-Chieti-Teramo
28.
87.39
28
Catania-Messina-Siracusa-
Ragusa-Enna
29.
87.13
23
Benevento-Avellino-Salerno
30.
85.03
27
Catanzaro-Cosenza-Reggio
Calabria
31.
84.87
29
Palermo-Trapani-Agrigento-
Caltanissetta
32. 83.97
21 Campobasso-Isernia
Confidential
Ranking of Chamber Districts by Rate of Eligible
Voter Increase, 1948-79
Percentage
Increase
District
Number
Percentage
Increase
District
Number
1.
91.82
19
17.
38.31
12
2.
66.62
4
18.
37.98
27
3.
64.37
25
19.
33.74
26
4.
62.95
22
20.
33.33
3
5.
62.40
5
21.
32.65
9
6.
60.27
30
22.
30.21
20
7.
56.22
1
23.
29.37
15
8.
50.40
6
24.
28.09
17
9.
49.76
24
25.
25.34
13
45.07 (or
44.24) a
Average
44.54
Median
10.
44.41
8
26.
22.53
11
11.
44.27
14
27.
20.00
18
12.
43.66
31
28.
18.25
21
13.
42.67
29
29.
15.69
16
14.
41.18
23
30.
4.53
32 a
15.
40.35
10
31.
2.85
7
16.
39.53
28
32.
2.75
2
3 The city and Province of Trieste, incorporated into Italy in October
1954, were formed into District 32 and first voted in national
elections in 1958 when the area had 229,071 eligible voters. The
increase in voters shown here is for the period 1958-79. All other
districts are calculated on the 1948-79 timespan. If the figures for
Trieste are subtracted, the rate of growth of eligible voters in Italy
since the elections of 1948 is 44.54 percent; the median does not
change.
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Ranking of Senate Districts,
by Average Voter Turnout, 1948-79
Percent Ranking of Senate Districts by
Rate of Eligible Voter Increase, 1948-79
1.
96.44
Emilia-Romagna
2.
95.93
Tuscany
3.
95.67
Lombardy
4.
94.83
Umbria
5.
94.73
Marche
6.
94.62
Venetia
7.
94.46
Piedmont
8.
94.19
Trentino-Alto Adige
9.
93.34
Liguria
10.
93.09
Lazio
92.81
National average
11.
93.26
Puglia
12.
90.82
Friuli-Venezia Giulia
90.64
Median
13.
90.28
Sardinia
14.
90.00
Basilicata
15.
89.93
Valle d'Aosta
16.
89.58
Campania
17.
87.98
Abruzzi
18.
86.50
Sicily
19.
85.78
Calabria
20.
84.84
Molise
Percentage Increase District
1. 80.74 Lazio
2. 60.26 Friuli-Venezia Giulia a
3.
51.93
Sardinia
4.
48.48
Lombardy
5.
48.43
Puglia
6.
47.10
Campania
40.41 (or 39.65) a
Average
7.
38.72
Trentino-Alto Adige
8.
36.64
Valle d'Aosta
9.
34.69
Sicily
10.
32.81
Calabria
31.52
Median
11.
31.34
Emilia-Romagna
12.
31.06
Venetia
13.
30.77
Piedmont
14.
29.78
Liguria
15.
29.50
Abruzzi
16.
29.40
Tuscany
17.
29.31
Basilicata
18.
27.39
Marche
19.
25.73
Umbria
20.
17.71
Molise
a The figure for Friuli-Venezia Giulia is calculated with the city of
Trieste which was incorporated into Italy in October 1954. Trieste
first voted in the region's senatorial elections in 1963 when it had
193,882 eligible voters. In 1979 the number was 196,894, an increase
of 1.55 percent. Natural growth of the eligible voter group, without
Trieste, would place the region in 19th place with an increase of
24.05 percent. Adjustment of the national average would bring it to
+39.65 percent.
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Confidential
A partial projection can be made about DC prospects
in future elections, particularly following seat redis-
tribution due after the 1981 census. (The Chamber
and Senate seats are reallocated following each decen-
nial census.) Chamber representation, while deter-
mined largely on population per district, has remained
fixed at 630 members since 1963. An initial assign-
ment is made for each area, but it can be altered by
party performance. The system is complex, but it
allows for addition or subtraction of seats from dis-
tricts according to the relationship between a party's
showing nationally and in the given constituency.
Generally the north has been favored with additional
seats since it is more civic minded and produces better
voter turnouts. With DC strength sliding in the north,
this is a negative adjustment. However, even if a
projection based on 1979 population figures could be
accurately done now, it would be altered by the
returns in the next election. But the numbers-game
factor in a reallocation is evident already because the
northwest would lose four to six seats, the northeast
would remain the same, the center would decline by
perhaps five, and the beneficiary in any instance
would be the south with a rise of at least five. This
would occur despite the fact that the south as a whole
is losing population. Even after adjustments for the
election record itself, the DC probably can expect
more or less to hold its own nationally, thanks to the
added southern seats.
On the other hand, if one considers DC representation
by geographical region (see figure 16) the old pattern
is replicated. But again, when translated into percent-
ages, the growth of DC strength in the south and,
modestly, in the center, together with decline in the
northwest and, surprisingly, also in the northeast, has
been going on roughly since 1968. Except for the
northwest, though, change is so slight that once again
Italian politics appear to be stagnant. In conclusion,
as regards the Chamber, there is no sign that the DC
is improving its situation nationally. But its weaken-
ing is coming in the areas considered most dynamic
and vital, those of the north and center. Strength in
the south may ensure some future numerical stability
for the DC, but in the nonquantifiable area of human
perceptions the question arises as to how long Milan
and Turin will continue to submit to a majority party
whose strength is increasingly in Palermo or the
Mezzogiorno more generally.
Confidential
Table 24
Ranking of Chamber of Deputies Districts
by Eligible Voters, 1979
District
Number
Number
of Voters
Current
Seats
Projected
Change a
1.
19
3,482,136
54
NONE
2.
4
3,388,216
52
-1
3.
1
2,503,112
39
-3
4.
22
2,437,809
38
+3
5.
9
1,883,682
29
-1
6.
28
1,870,890
27
+1
7.
29
1,783,366
26
+1
8.
12
1,777,675
27
-2
9.
27
1,508,930
23
NONE
10.
3
1,477,501
23
-3
11.
24
1,474,834
23
+1
12.
6
1,372,897
23
-2
13.
13
1,333,688
19
-1
14.
23
1,288,593
18
+1
15.
5
1,271,566
20
NONE
16.
25
1,202,198
18
+1
17.
10
1,152,485
17
+1
18.
14
1,133,129
14
+2
19.
17
1,102,747
17
-1
20.
30
1,101,657
17
+1
21.
15
1,035,617
14
+1
22.
20
996,896
14
NONE
23.
2
979,024
15
-1
24.
11
946,337
11
+2
25.
18
743,491
10
+1
26.
8
636,264
10
NONE
27.
16
627,602
9
NONE
28.
7
548,522
8
NONE
29.
26
447,636
7
NONE
30.
21
285,372
4
NONE
31.
32
239,456
4
-1
32.
31
87,821
1
NONE
a Estimated variation resultant from 1981 census and consequent
redistribution of seats.
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The DC's record in the Senate, even though the body
is elected by a smaller and presumably more "ma-
ture" electorate, differs only slightly from that in the
Chamber. Again there are the same declining ratios
between the size of a DC group and a region's number
of seats. And once more the areas of DC stability or
growth are below the line beginning with Lazio and
the Abruzzi, although for 1979 Marche can be includ-
ed. Again Sardinia and Basilicata demonstrate behav-
ior comparable to the Chamber returns. The DC
share of geographic regions' portion of the delegations
is still small with a bit more strength in the south and
islands and less slippage in the northeast and
northwest.
Projection of Senate seats in a reapportionment can
be done with certainty because no election pattern
alters it. Even if population figures are only for 1979,
there seems little likelihood the 1981 census will
change them much. Three regions from the northeast
and center, Piedmont, Emilia-Romagna, and Tus-
cany, lose seats; one southern region, Puglia, and the
islands of Sicily and Sardinia each pick up a seat.
Given the patterns of recent elections, the DC might
have a chance here of a small gain simply because of
the role of the southern base. This could be offset,
however, by the strength of the leftist parties in the
center regions where their chance of holding their
present share is excellent. With one less seat to
contest in those areas, the DC could be hard pressed
to hold its present numbers.
Data are plentiful to suggest that the DC has been
slowly but steadily going downhill for a long time and
that events of the mid- 1970s should not have been as
surprising as they were. Conversely, when the idiosyn-
cracies of the proportional representation system and
its distribution of seats come into play, the DC's
future looks less bleak, even if signs of growth are
virtually nonexistent. Still, the deep feelings of preju-
dice in Italy between north and south are important.
To go one more step, the impression remains that so
long as Italy experienced some measure of economic
prosperity and growth the country was willing?
perhaps reluctantly?to muddle along with its politi-
cal representation and governing system. With in-
creasingly high inflation, trade deficits, and unem-
ployment, as well as persistent terrorism, the DC's
stewardship of the nation may look less tolerable.
71
Table 25
Ranking of Senate Districts by Eligible Voters,
1979 Elections
Province
Number
of Voters
Current
Seats
Projected
Change a
1. Lombardy
5,724,503
48
NONE
2. Lazio
3,178,384
27
NONE
3. Campania
3,082,703
29
NONE
4. Sicily
3,074,663
26
+1
5. Piedmont
3,067,301
25
?1
6. Emilia-Romagna
2,751,273
22
?1
7. Venetia
2,751,182
23
NONE
8. Tuscany
2,482,823
20
?1
9. Puglia
2,226,952
20
+1
10. Liguria
1,321,860
10
NONE
11. Calabria
1,257,160
11
NONE
12. Marche
964,248
8
NONE
13. Sardinia
917,284
8
+1
14. Friuli?Venezia
Giulia
871,346
7
NONE
15. Abruzzi
864,162
7
NONE
16. Umbria
559,154
7
NONE
17. Trentino?Alto Adige
541,766
7
NONE
18. Basilicata
374,762
7
NONE
19. Molise
247,295
2
NONE
20. Valle d'Aosta
77,066
1
NONE
Estimated variation resultant from 1981 census and consequent
redistribution of seats.
Although the evidence is not conclusive, extensive
study of Italy's postwar legislative elections leaves the
unavoidable impression of slow Christian Democratic
decline. The party is not likely to disappear, but its
capacity to merge itself with the government is near-
ing an end. Furthermore, the day may come when the
DC will not be the largest group emerging from a
national election. Even more importantly, the party
may ultimately slip enough that it cannot hold either
a majority of the Cabinet posts or those which are
most important. Because the DC is more than ever a
coalition of factions for power sharing, that kind of
loss of access to the spoils could cause elements of the
party to break away. Again, this is not likely in the
next few years, but loss of the premiership in 1981 is
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another significant chip at the party's power struc-
ture. Finally, if the prognosis for the party on the
national level is unclear, further unsettling clues as to
its health and viability appear in regional, provincial,
and communal elections, where distinctions that are
merged and lost in Chamber and Senate races often
show up.
Administrative Elections: The Regions
Evolution of the Regions. The region is Italy's largest
administrative subdivision and represents a profound
innovation in the country's governmental structure.
These units did not, however, come into existence
easily or rapidly, and a word of background clarifies
not only their evolution but the DC's role in the
process.
Basically, the region is a contemporary revival of
sovereign political divisions existing in Italy before
national unification. More than one plan for "stitch-
ing the boot" in the 19th century envisioned a feder-
ation of these states as semiautonomous regions in a
larger political entity. Such schemes acknowledged
that Italians traditionally identified more with their
home locale than with a national state. ' That old
loyalty remains a sort of mystique or historic identity
felt by most Italians and is an obvious counterattrac-
tion to the sense of nationality. When Italian unity
was achieved under the leadership of the Kingdom of
Piedmont-Sardinia, its governing institutions were
extended to the whole nation. The system was a close
copy of the French centralized state instituted by
Napoleon. Although there were provincial councils,
all power was concentrated in the national govern-
ment, and the various provinces, the basic administra-
tive unit, were ruled through prefects appointed by
the central government. The regions ceased to exist in
any formal sense.
Although the idea of regions never died, plans to
institute them which came up on several occasions
never reached fruition. When the fascists came to
power, most remaining vestiges of local autonomy
were either rapidly eliminated or wholly appropriated
by the regime. The heavyhanded central authority
' The untranslatable word campanilismo, alluding to the bell tower,
symbol of a town, refers to this attitude.
Confidential
exercised by Mussolini's government exasperated the
populace and made the desire for more local power a
principal aspiration of the groups that rebuilt Italy
after the war. Centralization, in fact, was identified in
the popular mind with the fascists, their misgovern-
ment and corruption, as well as ultimate national
defeat. Hence, the dream of local self-government and
democratization of political life below the national
level captivated many sectors of the Constituent As-
sembly. Of the major sponsors of regionalism immedi-
ately after the war, the Christian Democrats were
preeminent, notably in opposition to the Socialists and
Communists who wanted no reduction in the powers
of the national parliament. But, as in virtually all
significant issues faced by the Assembly, the debate
over regionalism resulted in a compromise solution
providing only partial decentralization. Hence, the
regions were given fewer powers than desired by the
Christian Democratic representatives.
Ironically, in the years of building the new republican
state the DC became the most determined obstructor
of regionalism. Once rooted firmly in power, the party
became reluctant to implement the regions, particu-
larly when it became obvious that in so doing DC
power would be limited and, in the Red Belt, might be
completely excluded. Moreover, the fear was quite
common that semiautonomous regions, particularly
those dominated by the PCI, might be exploited by
alien elements?in this case the Soviet Union.
Nevertheless, centrifugal political forces were so
strong in some areas that local initiatives for new
government preceded even the election of the Con-
stituent Assembly. Sicily, always prone to separatism,
entertained the idea of trying to become part of the
United States, but the island settled for a statute of
local government which stopped just short of
independence. The first De Gasperi government,
faced with this fait accompli, had little alternative but
to endorse it officially in May 1946, an act later
sanctioned by the Constituent Assembly in February
1948.
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Administrative Regions
Ranked by Population
as of 1979
1.
Lombardy
8,929,703
2.
Campania
5,420,390
3.
Lazio
5,037,255
4.
Sicily
4,970,595
5.
Piedmont
4,538,020
6.
Venetia
4,338,292
7.
Emilia-Romagna
3,963,151
8.
Puglia
3,889,422
9.
Tuscany
3,594,607
10.
Calabria
2,067,269
11.
Liguria
1,852,903
12.
Sardinia
1,592,964
13.
Marche
1,409,845
14.
Friuli-Venezia Giulia
1,245,611
15.
Abruzzi
1,233,397
16.
Trentino-Alto Adige
873,995
17.
Umbria
805,329
18.
Basilicata
618,312
19.
Molise
332,914
20.
Valle d'Aosta
114,537
Meanwhile, the draft constitution made specific provi-
sion for the establishment of regions, giving them a
certain autonomy in some spheres. The Assembly
specifically recognized Sicily and three other regions
which had also written statutes for themselves: Sar-
dinia, Trentino-Alto Adige, and Valle d'Aosta.
These, with Sicily, were classified as areas of "spe-
cial" statute because of their status as border regions
and because of their particular ethnic and linguistic
differences. Subsequently, in 1963 the one remaining
area with such characteristics, Friuli-Venezia Giulia,
was also made a special statute region.
Thus, with only four regional goverments in place
when it took office in April 1948, the first Italian
Government under the new constitution became re-
sponsible for completing these units in the remainder
of the country. In practice, though, every government
for more than 20 years fell far short of fulfilling that
73
Ranking of Administrative Regions
by Rate of Population Change, 1951-79
Percentage
Change
District
1. +50.78 Lazio
2. +36.00 Lombardy
+34.48 Median
3. +34.06 Friuli-Venezia Giulia a
4. +28.99 Piedmont
5. +24.84 Sandinia
6. +24.71 Campania
7. +21.67 Valle d'Aosta
8. +20.77 Puglia
+20.35 (or +19.73)'
Average
9. + 19.95
Trentino-Alto Adige
10. +18.25 Liguria
11. +13.80 Tuscany
12. +11.82 Emilia-Romagna
13. +10.78 Sicily
14. +10.73
15. +3.36
16. +1.12
17. +0.18
18. -1.48
19. -3.43
20. -18.17 Molise
Venetia
Marche
Calabria
Umbria
Basilicata
Abruzzi
The city and province of Trieste were incorporated into Italy in
October 1954, adding at that time 297,003 inhabitants to Friuli-
Venezia Giulia. Ranked at number 3, the region's growth reflects the
addition of Trieste. Subtracting the 1979 population of Trieste
(294,062) in order to determine natural growth of the region would
place it at 15, a growth rate of +2.41 percent. The national average,
if adjusted without Trieste, would be +19.73 percent.
requirement, except for the case of Friuli-Venezia
Giulia. Not until 1976 did the law pass that specified
the powers that were granted to the 15 regions of
"regular" statute, and even today major questions
remain unsolved as to their finances. Still, a basic
framework was in place by 1970, and on 7 June of
that year the first elections for the regular regions
took place.
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Through all the labored years of creating the regions,
the DC's conduct gave many Italians the impression
of deliberate delay and bad faith. Such a feeling has
not been dispelled by the party's political maneuver-
ing within the regional governments once they came
into existence. The DC's attitude and conduct toward
its rivals, particularly the PCI, has often appeared to
be obstructionist and a mirror reflection of the politi-
cal wheeling and dealing that goes on in Rome.
Although the party's view is that actions taken in
regional affairs could become precedents for unwant-
ed national events, critics see the DC attitude as one
of perfidy and arrogance, or even as outright proof of
a willingness to use any device to hang on to power.
Because this touches individual voters closer to home
the DC has created more problems for itself with the
electorate. Not surprisingly, then, the party's share of
the vote at the regional level falls below what it gets
nationally.
Although the parallel is poor, an Italian region might
roughly be compared with an American state. The
regions vary among themselves in terms of their
power. This is notably true of those in the "special"
statute group. All, however, are basically administra-
tive units interposed between the central government
and the provinces, but they are more subject to
Rome's control than states are to Washington. The
old provincial structure, as well as the office of
prefect, still exists but in altered importance. Prefects,
in fact, although once presumed to be destined for
elimination, continue to function in the provincial
organization, but regional commissioners now replace
them as the principal link to the national government.
These new officials, however, are essentially invested
with coordination functions between Rome and the
regions.
The 15 regular regional governments consist of a
Council (legislative assembly) elected by universal
suffrage, a Junta chosen by the Council from among
its own members, and a president of the Junta, elected
by that body from among its own ranks. The Council
sits as the legislative body while the Junta serves as
the executive organ?a kind of cabinet, where each
member (assessore) is responsible for such sectors as
finance, agriculture, planning, and so forth. The
Confidential
president is the head of the executive branch and
represents the region in outside relations as well as
promulgating laws and directing the administrative
functions of the regional government.
Regional councils are elected every five years, but
some of the special statute areas are not yet in
synchronization with the others. The size of councils
varies according to population. Areas with more than
6 million inhabitants elect a Council of 80 members;
smaller regions have proportionately smaller councils
down to a minimum of 30 for areas of fewer than 1
million. Sicily, with 90 members, is the sole exception
to this pattern. This basic structure for the assembly
exists in all 15 regular regions, but the five special
statute arrangements are each somewhat different,
the most unusual being Trentino?Alto Adige. There
the two provincial councils sit as a single body on the
regional level. The true significance of the overall
system today is that in the 10 years since it became
almost wholly operational there has been a major shift
of many governmental activities from Rome to the
various regional administrations. Consequently, much
of the political leverage once exercised in Rome is now
dispersed to the 20 regional capitals. There has been a
resultant loss of power for the DC which illustrates
the reasons for its opposition to implementation of the
system. The spoils that go with any governing body
and that once were controlled from Rome have been
dispersed in part to the new regional capitals. If the
DC was once able to control more patronage as the
majority party when spoils were dispensed from
Rome, the new situation quite simply means that
some regions where the DC is not dominant are
slipping under the control of other parties (see table
26). The potential for power struggles is extremely
important at the regional level, and the tenacity of
some parties in their determination to be part of those
governments illustrates their significance. If the po-
litical makeup of Italy appears to have changed in the
1970s, the regions have been an important element in
that process. Indeed, it should be emphasized that the
years when the regions have been fully operational are
coincident with the period when Italian national
politics began to change.
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Table 26
Party Composition of Regular Statute Region Governments
DC controlled
Venetia
Lazio
Molise
Basilicata
None
Venetia
Coalitions including DC
Piedmont: DC, PSI, PSU, PRI
Lombardy: DC, PSI, PSU, PRI
Liguria: DC, PSI, PSU, PRI
Marche: DC, PSI, PSU, PRI
Abruzzi: DC, PSI, PSU, PRI
Campania: DC, PSI, PSU, PRI
Puglia: DC, PSI, PSU, PRI
Calabria: DC, PSI, PSU
Lombardy: DC, PSI, PSDI, PRI
Venetia: DC, PRI
Marche: DC, PSI, PSDI, PRI
Abruzzi: DC, PSI, PDSI, PRI
Molise: DC, PSDI, PRI
Campania: DC, PSI, PSDI, PRI
Puglia: DC, PSI, PRI
Basilicata: DC, PSI, PSDI
Calabria: DC, PSI, PSDI, PRI
Regions With Giunta
Lombardy: DC, PSI, PSDI, PRI
(no change)
Campania: DC, PSI, PSDI, PRI
(same plus PLI)
Basilicata: DC, PSI, PSDI
(no change)
Abruzzi: DC, PSDI, PRI
(same plus PSI)
Molise: DC, PSDI
(no change)
Regions Without Giunta
(situation at election)
Puglia: DC, PSI, PSDI, PRI
Calabria: DC, PSI, PSDI, PRI
Marche: PSI, PSDI, PRI
(DC external support)
Coalitions without DC
Emilia-Romagna: PCI, PSIUP
Tuscany: PCI, PSI, PSIUP
Umbria: PCI, PSI, PSIUP
Piedmont: PCI, PSI
Liguria: PC!, PSI
Emilia-Romagna: PCI, PSI
Tuscany: PCI, PSI
Umbria: PCI, PSI
Lazio: PSI, PSDI, PRI
PCI controlled
None
None
Piedmont: PCI, PSI
(same plus PSDI)
Emilia-Romagna: PCI, PSI
PCI controlled
Tuscany: PC!, PSI
(no change)
Umbria: PCI, PSI
(no change)
Regions Without Giunta
(situation at election)
Liguria: PCI, PSI
Lazio: PCI, PSI, PSDI
(PRI external support)
Emilia-Romagna
(effective following 1980
election)
75
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Table 27
Regional Council Election Results in 15 Regular Statute Regions, 1970-80 a
1970b
1975c
1980d
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
DC
10,305,258
37.85
287
10,707,682
35.29
277
11,153,439
36.77
290
PCI
7,584,439
27.86
201
10,149,135
33.45
247
9,555,767
31.50
233
PSI
2,838,276
10.43
67
3,636,647
11.98
82
3,851,722
12.70
86
PSU
1,897,092
6.97
41
NONE
0
NONE
NONE
0
NONE
PSDI
NONE
0
NONE
1,700,983
5.61
36
1,505,607
4.96
31
PRI
785,238
2.88
18
961,016
3.17
19
922,970
3.04
18
PLI
1,290,890
4.74
27
749,749
2.47
11
816,418
2.69
15
PSIUP
877,285
3.22
16
NONE
0
NONE
NONE )
0
NONE
PdUP
NONE
0
NONE
417,725
1.37
8
372,102
1.23
8
DP
NONE
0
NONE
NONE
0
NONE
274,100
0.90
2
MSI-DN
1,424,411
5.23
32
1,951,011
6.43
40
1,785,750
5.89
37
Other
222,643
0.82
1
70,789
0.23
NONE
95,491
0.32
NONE
Total
27,225,532
100.00
690
30,344,737
100.00
720
30,333,366
100.00
720
a These returns are for the 15 regions of regular statute category
which includes the 75 provinces that according to the 1971 census
had a population of 45,817,864.
b 92.32-percent turnout of eligible voters; 4.50 percent of ballots cast
were invalid.
c 92.79-percent eligible voter turnout; 3.96 percent of ballots were
invalid.
d 89.59-percent eligible voter turnout; 6.21 percent of ballots were
invalid.
See tables A-17-A-24 in appendix.
The Regional Elections. To an extent, comparison of
election returns on the regional level is complicated by
the fact that the five special regions vote at different
times as a result of their earlier beginnings. Originally
each of the special areas elected its council at four-
year intervals, a divergence recently eliminated. In
any event, the 15 regulars that vote simultaneously
include some 80 percent of the national population
and are regarded as more homogeneous. Still, the two
groups are more easily analyzed in separate sets of
statistics (see tables 27 to 30).
Confidential
Regional elections were not ignored prior to 1970, but
when the majority of the nation voted simultaneously
for the first time that year the significance attached to
the new assemblies was almost as great as for national
legislative consultations. And the regional council
elections of 1975, called the "earthquake of 15 June,"
were those which gave the DC more cause for alarm
than any other vote since World War II. Aside from
the DC's great slide in power that year, the critical
new element of 1975 was that the 18- to 20-year-old
age groups voted for the first time in Italy.
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Because of the secret ballot it is difficult to ascertain
how the youngest group voted. However, the elector-
ate was increased by approximately 2 to 3 million,
roughly 6 percent of eligible voters. Also the highest
turnout of eligible voters to participate in regional
elections on a national basis cast ballots that year
(92.79 percent; see appendix for detailed regional
statistics.) An increase of only 6 percent is not great in
relation to the entire electorate, but it is more than
sufficient to alter the outcome. Certainly the DC
could find little encouragement for the future in a poll
published in August 1974 by the widely respected
Demoskopea organization. Newly enfranchised youth
were asked to express their party preferences and
responded thus: PCI, 38 percent; DC, 16 percent;
MSI, 12 percent; PSI, 10 percent; PSDI and PLI, 4
percent each; and the remainder scattered among
splinter groups, a noteworthy segment of which went
to the extreme left. The significant increase for the
PCI and other left parties was probably owed to those
who could vote for the first time in 1975.
In general, regional elections since 1970 show pro-
gressively how close the political contest between the
two major parties has become. Mathematically the
DC can still claim to be the largest national party in
regional voting results, but whether the party contin-
ues to be the largest nationally is less important at this
level. For example, the 1980 returns from the 15
regular regions gave the DC a smaller percentage of
the vote and of the total number of Council seats by
only one point or so below that of 1970. However, the
makeup of regional juntas was slipping more and
more out of DC control as shown in table 26. The PCI
for its part showed an improvement in 1980 over
1970, but it was not able to equal its 1975 showing.
Again, though, the evidence of rising Communist
power is found in the composition of regional govern-
ments. More noteworthy, perhaps, is how the parties'
regional totals add up nationally. In that context, the
PCI made a major leap in 1975. While it fell back in
1980, the loss may be only temporary. In any event,
the PCI's gain of 2.6 million votes in 1975 translated
into a plurality of seats in the councils of Piedmont,
77
Liguria, Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany, Umbria, and La-.
zio. Although the PCI remained farther behind the
DC in the southern regions, its rate of growth there
was approximately the same as in the north and
center. Of greatest importance for 1975, however, is
the DC's achievement of a majority of council seats in
only two regions, Venetia and Molise.
In sum, if party dominance on a regional basis truly
counts for influence and shoring up a party elector-
ate?its clientela and parentela?then 1975 was in-
deed a bad year for the DC which, at best, had to
contemplate coalition arrangements, some of which
resulted in its exclusion. And since the PSI has been
willing to collaborate with the PCI on the regional
level, the mathematics of party representation in
various regions theoretically?and in some real in-
stances?permits coalitions without the DC.
Special note can be made for another phenomenon
developing on the regional level in the special areas.
With the sole exception of Sicily, regional parties are
progressively cutting farther into the DC's dominant
position there. In some instances the political orienta-
tion of local groups is not too far from the DC?as in
the case of the Suedtiroler Volkspartei in Trentino?
Alto Adige, but the DC nevertheless is facing a
challenge to its patronage potential. And while there
is great fragmentation of voting in the specials, a
trend to the left is evident.
Concerning the 1980 regional elections, many pundits
made the same error in evaluating them as they did in
1979 for the national parliament, erroneously pro-
claiming a DC comeback from its slump in the middle
of the decade. Total votes and percentages do, it is
true, suggest a modest recovery as well as an increase
in the DC's lead over its principal competitor, the
PCI; but the reality of returns on the regional basis
does not substantiate this optimism. Broken down by
region, the DC's greater rebound in southern areas
was just enough higher than in the remainder of the
country as to create a misleading impression for the
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Table 28
Regional Council Election Results by Geographical Region, 1970-80
North a
1970b
1975c
1980
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
DC
5,522,649
38.48
112
5,613,979
35.55
109
5,687,829
36.51
112
PCI
3,887,639
27.09
78
5,303,710
33.58
103
4,970,942
31.91
97
PSI
1,553,980
10.83
26
2,036,476
12.89
36
2,049,353
13.16
36
PSU
1,086,630
7.57
18
...
. . .
PSDI
...
. . .
. . .
918,334
5.81
14
776,449
4.98
13
PRI
400,239
2.79
7
513,036
3.25
8
485,614
3.12
8
PLI
828,952
5.78
14
483,637
3.06
7
561,281
3.60
9
PSIUP
497,255
3.46
7
...
PdUP
229,938
1.46
3
197,787
1.27
4
DP
. . .
. . .
162,334
1.04
1
MSI-DN
493,431
3.44
8
664,150
4.21
10
613,156
3.94
10
Others
82,008
0.57
. . .
30,249
0.19
73,331
0.47
Total
14,352,783
100.00
270
15,793,509
100.00
290
15,578,076
100.00
290
Center e
DC
1970 f
1975g
1980h
2,088,698
32.73
61
2,197,747
30.81
60
2,285,076
32.11
62
PCI
2,182,463
34.20
64
2,819,152
39.52
75
2,719,994
38.22
73
PSI
560,116
8.78
13
743,827
10.43
18
799,729
11.24
19
PSU
430,215
6.74
9
...
PSDI
. . .
. . .
. . .
351,674
4.93
8
299,828
4.21
6
PRI
198,052
3.10
5
227,139
3.19
5
237,994
3.34
5
PLI
250,333
3.92
5
126,516
1.77
1
134,301
1.89
3
PSIUP
201,200
3.15
4
.. .
PdUP
123,528
1.73
3
86,033
1.21
3
DP
. . .
.. .
63,377
0.89
MSI-DN
424,259
6.65
9
532,306
7.46
10
478,265
6.72
9
Others
46,515
0.73
11,532
0.16
12,724
0.17
Total
6,381,851
100.00
170
7,133,421
100.00
180
7,117,321
100.00
180
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Table 28 (continued)
South i
19701
Number Percentage Number
of Votes of Seats
1975'
Number
of Votes
Percentage Number
of Seats
19801
Number Percentage Number
of Votes of Seats
DC
2,693,911
41.50
114
2,895,956
39.04
108
3,180,534
41.64
116
PCI
1,514,337
23.33
59
2,026,273
27.32
69
1,864,831
24.42
63
PSI
724,180
11.16
28
856,344
11.54
28
1,002,640
13.13
31
PSU
380,247
5.86
14
PSDI
430,975
5.81
14
429,330
5.62
12
PRI
186,947
2.88
6
220,841
2.98
6
199,362
2.61
5
PLI
211,605
3.26
8
139,596
1.88
3
120,836
1.58
3
PSIUP
178,830
2.76
5
PdUP
64,159
0.87
2
88,282
1.16
1
DP
48,389
0.63
1
MSI-DN
506,721
7.81
15
754,555
10.17
20
694,329
9.09
18
Others
94,120m
1.46
1
29,008
0.39
9,436
0.12
Total
6,490,898
100.00
250
7,417,807
100.00
250
7,637,969
100.00
250
Ellipsis indicates the party presented no candidates.
a Regular statute regions of Piedmont, Lombardy, Venetia, Liguria,
and Emilia-Romagna (34 provinces, 22,799,444 population by 1971
census).
h 94.87-percent turnout of eligible voters; 4.18 percent of ballots
were invalid.
c 94.95-percent turnout of eligible voters; 3.76 percent of ballots were
invalid.
d 92.25-percent turnout of eligible voters; 6.24 percent of ballots
were invalid.
e Tuscany, Umbria, Marche, and Lazio (20 provinces, 10,298,269
population by 1971 census).
f 93.68-percent turnout of eligible voters; 4.13 percent of ballots were
invalid.
79
g 93.99-percent turnout of eligible voters; 3.21 percent of ballots
were invalid.
h 91.01-percent turnout of eligible voters; 5.89 percent of ballots
were invalid.
Regular statute regions of Abruzzi, Molise, Campania, Puglia,
Basilicata, and Calabria (21 provinces, 12,720,151 population by
1971 census).
86.08-percent turnout of eligible voters; 5.55 percent of ballots were
invalid.
k 84.90-percent turnout of eligible voters; 4.25 percent of ballots
were invalid.
183.48-percent turnout of eligible voters; 6.44 percent of ballots were
invalid.
m In Campania the monarchists of PDIUM won one seat.
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Table 29
Regional Election Results in Five Special Statute Regions, 1968-81
1968.71a
1973-76
1978-81 e
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
DC
1,669,358
37.68
127
1,962,810
39.47
130
1,967,054
38.98
125
PCI d
969,835
21.89
70
1,187,160
23.87
71
1,037,139
20.55
70
PSI e
629,961
14.22
40
526,678
10.59
36
602,242
11.93
33
PSDI
NONE
0
NONE
233,730
4.70
13
180,342
3.57
12
PRI
160,834
3.63
6
147,988
2.98
7
180,559
3.58
11
PLI
179,719
4.06
13
121,342
2.44
6
94,327
1.87
6
Local parties f 203,603
4.60
29
203,783
4.10
36
281,876
5.59
44
DP
NONE
NONE
15,163
0.30
NONE
44,879
0.89
3
PdUP
NONE
NONE
NONE
NONE
19,740
0.39
1
MSI-DN
522,330
11.79
23
445,337
8.96
22
334,446
6.63
14
Others g
94,974
2.14
4
128,667
2.59
9
303,740
6.02
17
Total
4,430,614
100.00
312
4,972,658
100.00
331
5,046,344
100.00
336
a 84.21-percent turnout of eligible voters; 4.21 percent of ballots
were invalid.
b 87.18-percent turnout of eligible voters; 3.43 percent of ballots
were invalid.
e 88.55-percent turnout of eligible voters; 3.28 percent of ballots were
invalid. Figures do not include Sicily for which the 1981 statistics are
not available.
d In 1968 includes PSIUP in all Five regions. For breakdown, see
separate regional tables.
e In 1968, PSI and PSDI were united as PSU, Partito Socialista
Unificato. Figures also include PSDI in Sicily in 1971.
f Included are PPTT, SVP, and Nuova Sinistra in Trentino-Alto
Adige; Union Valdotaine, Rassemblement Valdotain and Democra-
zia Popolare in Valle d'Aosta; and Part ito Sardo d'Azione in
Sardinia.
g For groups included, see individual regional tables.
nation as a whole. Only in four regions-Lombardy,
Lazio, Abruzzi, and Campania-did the party gain
more than one Council seat. Although this is not
negligible, because the three largest regions of the
country are included, the gain was not enough to alter
the fundamental situation. Furthermore, attention
Confidential
should be paid to the composite vote for the leftist
parties, as well as to their seat count in councils. The
result is not quite an approximation of the PCI's 1975
highwater mark, but the left as a whole remains
extremely close to the DC. Conversion of the 1980
raw vote into actual seats in the various regions left
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the DC in virtually the same position as 1975 in that
the combined forces of other parties could force its
hand and in some cases exclude it altogether. In fact,
the evidence of static or reduced DC power is found in
the party combinations in various regional
governments.
The regional government situation as of 1980 also
demonstrates the DC's drift toward becoming a sec-
tional party of the south with a remaining stronghold
elsewhere only in Venetia. The situation is no better in
the special regions. Sardinia's government has been in
crisis since late 1980 with every hint that the PCI will
enter the coalition or have sufficient strength to cause
a stalemate. The regional election in Sicily earlier this
year suggests imminent difficulties for the DC there.
Although the party gained 0.6 percent of the popular
vote?with fewer voters participating?it lost one
Council seat because of proportional representation.
In Sicily the party can comfort itself that the PCI
slumped significantly, but this does not convert into
ultimate advantage for the DC. And the three re-
maining special regions, because of their ethnic and
linguistic differences as well as local issues, may be
unknown quantities for the future.
If the regions continue to grow in importance as they
have in their first decade of full operation, and even if
the DC can hold its own in their governments, the fact
remains that its part of the vote is not sufficient to
ensure it freedom of action except in a backwater like
Molise. The new access of other parties to the spoils of
power at the regional level is of maximum significance
for building bases of support which doubtless will
enhance their national strength. The detailed infor-
mation provided here on the regions' voting patterns
may be the best data for assessing and projecting the
potential for change in national politics in the future.
The DC's hold on power is tenuous at best in the
regions, and scandal or any excess of factional strife
could seriously, perhaps permanently, erode the par-
ty's position.
81
Administrative Elections: Provinces and Communes
Provincial Elections. The province, once the principal
administrative element of the Kingodm of Italy, is
now reduced to a second-echelon unit of relatively
small importance. At the end of World War lithe
country was divided into 92 provinces, to which three
have been added under the Republic: Pordenone
(Friuli?Venezia Giulia), Isernia (Molise), and Oris-
tano (Sardinia). The once powerful figure of provincial
prefect has been demoted to a position of liaison
between the province and the regional government.
In their structure provincial governments mirror those
of the regions. The Council is elected by universal
suffrage, and its size is determined by the province's
population. From its ranks a Junta is elected?again
reflecting party strengths?and the Junta then elects
the president. The latter's responsibilities are to pre-
side over Council and Junta meetings and perform
general executive duties.
In practice, the provincial government is relatively
unimportant, except for the favors or spoils its leaders
can dispense. Essentially, the province manages af-
fairs of a technical and business character concerning
public works. Reduced in importance as they may be,
the larger provinces clearly still have some signifi-
cance for political parties. From an analytical point of
view, provinces and communes have the advantage of
giving a small enough sector of voting information to
show the diversity that is lost when amalgamated into
regional and national figures.
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Table 30
Regional Election Returns, 1968-81 a
Region
Percent
1970 1975 1980 Region 1970 1975 1980
Regular Statute Group
Abruzzi Marche
DC
48.3
42.5
45.8
DC
38.6
36.5
37.1
PCI
22.8
30.3
27.5
PCI
31.8
36.9
37.2
PSI
9.0
10.2
10.8
PSI
8.5
9.8
10.1
Basilicata
Molise
DC
42.5
41.9
45.2
DC
52.1
50.6
55.4
PCI
24.0
27.1
24.9
PCI
15.0
17.9
15.8
PSI
12.7
13.2
13.7
PSI
9.5
10.0
9.4
Calabria
Piedmont
DC
39.7
39.5
41.2
DC
36.7
32.1
32.5
PCI
23.3
25.2
24.2
PCI
25.9
33.9
31.6
PSI
14.1
14.7
16.6
PSI
10.6
12.9
14.2
Campania
Puglia
DC
39.7
36.7
39.0
DC
41.3
39.3
42.1
PCI
21.8
27.1
24.1
PCI
26.3
28.5
24.6
PSI
11.0
10.4
12.6
PSI
10.7
11.9
13.3
Emilia-Romagna
Tuscany
DC
25.8
25.3
25.6
DC
30.6
28.5
28.7
PCI
44.0
48.3
48.2
PCI
42.3
46.5
46.4
PSI
8.1
10.2
10.3
PSI
8.7
10.7
11.8
Lazio
Umbria
DC
35.2
31.5
34.1
DC
30.2
27.6
27.6
PCI
26.5
33.5
30.7
PCI
41.8
46.2
45.2
PSI
8.8
9.8
10.6
PSI
9.5
13.9
14.3
Liguria
Venetia
DC
32.1
30.4
30.7
DC
51.9
48.1
47.6
PCI
31.3
38.4
36.1
PCI
16.8
22.8
21.8
PSI
11.3
13.5
13.4
PSI
10.5
12.8
12.1
Lombardy
DC
40.9
37.5
38.9
PCI
23.1
30.4
28.1
PSI
12.4
14.1
14.5
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Table 30 (continued)
Percent
Region 1970 1975 1980 Region 1970 1975 1980
Special Statute Group
1968
1973
1978
Friuli-Venezia Giulia
DC
44.9
39.7
39.6
PCI
20.1
20.9
21.8
PSI b
10.1
12.3
9.5
1971
1976
1981
Sicily
DC
33.3
40.9
41.5
PCI
20.8
26.8
20.6
PSI
11.3
10.3
14.4
1968
1973
1978
Valle d'Aosta
DC
37.8
21.4
21.2
PCI
20.4
19.5
19.5
PSI b
10.3
8.5
3.6
1969 1974 1979
Sardinia
DC
44.6
38.3
37.7
PCI
19.8
26.8
26.3
PSI
11.9
11.7
11.2
1968
1973
1978
Trentino-Alto Adige
DC
37.1
35.6
30.4
PCI c
7.9
7.5
8.9
PSI b
11.4
8.4
6.3
a For detailed data on each region's elections with returns for all
parties, see appendix, pages 129-143.
b PSI and PSDI as PSU in 1968.
PCI with PSIUP and independents in 1968.
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Table 31
Provincial Council Results by Party in 91 Provinces a
1970
1975
1980
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Votes
Percentage
DC
11,392,741
36.73
11,794,271
34.24
12,239,062
35.60
PCI
8,383,976
27.03
11,389,053
33.07
10,780,232
31.35
PSIUP
1,056,521
3.41
PSI
3,351,159
10.80
4,345,017
12.62
4,531,850
13.18
PSDI
2,254,976
7.27
2,002,567
5.81
1,842,351
5.36
PRI
975,407
3.15
1,187,693
3.45
1,201,527
3.49
PLI
1,533,285
4.94
935,425
2.72
1,005,254
2.92
MSI-DN
1,995,686
6.43
2,468,856
7.17
2,233,693
6.50
Others
74,651
0.24
318,320
0.92
547,925
1.60
Total
31,018,402
100.00
34,441,202
100.00
34,381,804
100.00
Footnote to be provided later.
The provinces hold elections every five years, and at
least 75 of them normally vote simultaneously. Thus
only 20 are out of phase, and some of those can be
integrated easily into composite figures for an over-
view (see table 31 and figure 17).
At the provincial level the DC's fate at the hands of
the electors appears to sound real danger warnings. In
fact, taking the figures in table 32, the DC record is
not even good at the national level. The distance
between DC and PCI in 1975 was the smallest of any
election, and even its presumed "recovery" in 1980
did not put it as far ahead of the Communists as on
other electoral levels. Conversely, the number of votes
for the parties shows a greater difference. But the test
of the fate of the parties is in the seats they won and
the councils they were able to dominate. Figures 18
and 19 present the provincial council votes and party
seats on a national basis and by geographical regions.
Beyond the regional and national tables, the evidence
in tables 24 and 25 permits a view of where each party
Confidential
stands in the various provinces. This table shows, for
example, that if Piedmont reports national and re-
gional electoral strength for the PCI, the breakdown
by province reveals pockets of otherwise hidden DC
strength and at least one case of decline (Cuneo). This
type of analysis also illustrates that the DC has some
beachheads even in the Red Belt which disappear in
composite figures for larger areas. In Tuscany, for
example, Lucca stands out as a party stronghold. On
the other hand, entering wedges of PCI strength in
the DC's preserve of the south can be found, areas
which bear watching in the future to ascertain the
degree to which that area might be altering its
political orientation. Puglia and Sicily are consistently
faithful to the DC at higher level elections, but areas
of PCI strength appear in lesser elections in places
like Taranto and Ragusa. Taken overall, however, the
evidence again shows the DC to be rural and southern
but without a large number of growth areas even in
that sphere.
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Confidential
Figure 17
Provincial Council Election Results
by Party in 91 Provinces, 1960-80'
Percent
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
DC
PCI
PSI MSI-DN
10
PSDI
5
PL
Others
1960b 64b 70 75 80
a Not included are the provinces which did not hold
provincial elections in the years 1960, 1964 and 1970:
Aosta, Trent, Bolzano, Pavia, Ravenna, Rome, Viterbo
Avellino and Foggia. For the years 1975 and 1980
statistics were not available for the province of Gorizia,
but Avellino, which conducted provincial elections in
1974 and in 1980, is included.
b Sicilian provincial elections held in 1959 and 1963 are
included in figures for 1960 and 1964.
cmn 1964 and 1970 PSIUP won, respectively, 2.75 percent and
3.46 percent of the total. Ideologically close to the PCI, figures
for the two parties could be combined for more
comnlete internretation of halIntc rad' for the extreme left
585817 2-82
Here, though, decline in agrarian activity as well as
urbanization cannot be forgotten as regards tradition-
al DC electoral support (see figures 11 and 12). The
makeup of provincial councils is particularly revealing
for the hypothesis of DC erosion. Using the office of
provincial president as an indicator of party strength,
the DC record in 1974 was 68 presidencies out of 94
(Oristano Province had not yet been created). Four
years later in 1978, the DC had lost so much that it
held only 34 of 95 provincial presidencies-17 of
those lost went to the PSI and 11 to the PCI. Of note
85
are locations where the DC had to surrender the
office: in the south to the PSI in Bari, Brindisi,
Catanzaro, Naples, and Reggio Calabria; also in the
south or islands in Cagliari, Foggia, Matera, and
Sassari to the PCI. The erosion, then, must be said to
have made a significant incursion into the traditional
DC south. Even in Venetia the DC lost Belluno to the
PSDI and Rovigo to the PCI.
Despite the relative unimportance today of the prov-
ince, it remains at a level where the individual voter
can be influenced by the perception he gets of party
activity affecting him. The rising strength of other
parties and the serious decline of the DC in provincial
executives is therefore to be watched carefully.
Communal Elections. The commune, the smallest of
Italian administrative subdivisions, encompasses a
city or town and its immediate hinterland. It varies
some from the municipal structure in the United
States, but the largest communes?Milan, Turin,
Rome, and Naples?might be compared to American
urban areas with regional organs that attempt to
coordinate a metropolis and its suburbs. There are
8,081 communes in Italy, and they range in popula-
tion from the millions of the big cities to a few
hundred in rural areas. The importance of some
communes stems from their being larger than several
of the regions.
Good electoral data are readily available only for
those communes that are also provincial capitals. Not
all communes vote at the same time, but the councils
are renewed at five-year intervals. In communes of
more than 5,000 inhabitants the council is elected by
proportional representation; in the smaller ones, a so-
called limited vote is used where the elector picks a
given number of names from a list. The larger
communes are more likely to register significant
political change.
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Table 32
Provincial Council Election Returns by Party
in 86 Provinces, 1975 and 1980 a
1975
1980
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
DC
10,747,421
34.73
949
11,116,374
35.96
981
PCI
10,105,682
32.65
860
9,603,214
31.06
816
PSI
3,949,176
12.76
333
4,119,964
13.33
343
PSDI
1,816,471
5.87
143
1,673,324
5.41
129
PRI
1,050,755
3.40
72
1,062,303
3.44
78
PLI
847,850
2.74
42
911,445
2.95
52
MSI-DN
2,110,815
6.82
162
1,923,005
6.22
144
Others
320,661 b
1.03
10
505,480 d
1.63
28
Total
30,948,831 .
100.00
2,571
30,915,109 .
100.00
2,571
a The official 1971 census gave the population of these provinces as
47,760,090.
b Includes 9,993 (0.03 percent, one seat) for center-left groups;
205,133(0.66 percent, four seats) for extreme left groups; and 46,449
(0.15 percent, five seats) for local parties.
. 91.6 percent of eligible voters.
d Includes 268,118 (0.87 percent) for extreme left parties.
. 88.3 percent of eligible voters.
See table A-32 in appendix.
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Province
DC PCI PSI 2;
.), 28.2 38.3 11.6
32.. cAsutnle0 .Perugia
39.1 27.6 10.1 ,
g
,
4. Novara . 47.6 14.4 15.6 51 52, .,,T e r? n I
5Province.si e n
1. Alessandri a
.
31.6 33.5 14.4 : 9 'Pisto
5. Turin 27.2 37.7 52.,Aneglia,
_ 12.4 '
56,Pekaro I Urbino 6, Vercelli 30.2 38.3 12,4 54. Ascoli Picerio
7. Aosta 55. Nlacerata .,',.,
8. Bergamo 55.2 18.1 13.3 n 11.1
9 46.1 25.0 13.3
5566974: ?fiF:aigetitS7i?On?n
9. Brescia .5 - 25:1 12.8
2.1 ' 20.7
44.8 22.8 - 14.4 11.1
28 1103.. Cmoumano
,
40.5, 31.8 16.6
11. Cremona 14.1
12. Mantua 30.2 38.3 17.4 0.6 2287..58.
14. Pavia . 6P,r!.9"?.,.
44.6
30'6 ' 34'6 148..26 77776541,:. LNre.eoraigpncgideeiiass; _
- - - 6: .." ,tY:eqr,buil 9.3
15. Sondrio 45.3 17.7 21.2 36.7 26.3 12.4
16. Varese
17. Bolzano
67,1sernia ''', 32,4 32.4 10.9
46.2 37.1 167
3" ' 36_74 14.! 6-642:PC:'41ectair"
665; re naem,6,6,. - ,
41.5, , 21.3 11.6 <
., _ _
211098.: TrentPI3aedi Iuuna ? 40.7 19.9 17.4 42.5 ' 10.9 14.6
52.5
38.5 4.2 21.3 15.7
7,6 ?6. 11.7'
49.4 18.6 14.2 6668.: A Campobassov e I .1i no *
O. Caserta 21. Rovigo
22. Treviso 32 73: 1 0:8
23.5 22.8 15.1
29.0 34.7 ' 9.7
23. Venice
24. Verona 34.6 35.0 15.9
34.7 23.3 12.9
48.6 20.6 14.1
25. Vicenza 72. Salerno
34.1 28.6 13.2
58.1 14.6 11...6
- / 3, Bart ' '
36.1 29.6 12.5
26. Gorizia
27. Pordenone 39.6 24.4 16.4
31.7 28.5 - -
40.7 20.7 16.5
28. Trieste
41.2 20.8 15.4 77. Taranto
78. Matera ' , 35.1 34.4 9.8
29. Udine
30. Genoa 35.7 32.2 / 2.6
28.0 39.4 13.3 .
31. imperia 36.3 30.4 11.6 - 79. Potenz% 39.9 26.9 14.5
32. La Spezia 29.5 43.0 13.1 " 80, Catanzaro < . 37.4 36.2 14.4
33. Savona 29.7 39.1 15.1 Of. Cosenza . < 35.8 27.4 18.1
34. Bologna 23.2 51.7
3365: Fort
uara 21.4 48.8 194i63 8623:,,ARge9riig9iegn.foai,,a,bria . 3329:58 ' 2266:33 1144;76
24.2 48.3 9.3 84. Caltanissetta 37.7. 23.3 13.8
37. Modena259 54.2 8.9 86, Catania 37.0 22.5 10.2
.
' 4365.46 216661 - 1143:82
28.8 40.5 16,4 ' 86. gone ''''
38. Parma
39, Piacenza 32.9 38.0 16_3 81. Messina
40. Ravenna - - 41.0 _ 2.1.1 10.3
86, Paierm0
26.4 53.3 10,5 ag, Ragusa 36.8 - 30.6 '" 12.0
4421.. AR reegzgzioo E m di a
32.3 46.2 10,3 ' -' 96, SyracuSe
53 43. Florence 26.7 50.1 9.4 - - 91, Trapani- 3,0.5 25.4 14.3
37.6 21./ 16.0
44. Grosseto 23.9 43.9 ' 12,4 , 96 Cagliar,L 31.0 36.7 12.2
5 5 443: Lucca
aorn 20.9 54.3 11.1 93, Nuoro-;., 367. 31.2 12.3
6
42.6 29.1 11.3 94 OristanO 34.6 26.0 10.0
47. Massa Carrara 29.5 35.5 14.7 95, Sassari: 34.1 28.9 13.0
48. Pisa 26.6 47.6 167
Province data will sum 100 when the f ejcy coher i included,
Party Vote Percentage
Other
Socialist
(PSI)
Communist
(PCI)
9
*The total number of Italian provinces is 95. Those not included are Aosta, Trent,
Bolzano, Gorizia, Pavia, Ravenna, Rome, Viterbo, and Foggia. Aosta does not have a
true provincial council. In Trent and Bolzano, the regional councillors elected in their
respective territories sit separately for provincial councils. The remaining provinces
voted at otter times: Pavia and Viterbo in 1977; Rome and Foggia in 1976; and
Ravenna in 1978.
*1Avellino election data from 1974.
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Province
DC PCI PSI 2;
.), 28.2 38.3 11.6
32.. cAsutnle0 .Perugia
39.1 27.6 10.1 ,
g
,
4. Novara . 47.6 14.4 15.6 51 52, .,,T e r? n I
5Province.si e n
1. Alessandri a
.
31.6 33.5 14.4 : 9 'Pisto
5. Turin 27.2 37.7 52.,Aneglia,
_ 12.4 '
56,Pekaro I Urbino 6, Vercelli 30.2 38.3 12,4 54. Ascoli Picerio
7. Aosta 55. Nlacerata .,',.,
8. Bergamo 55.2 18.1 13.3 n 11.1
9 46.1 25.0 13.3
5566974: ?fiF:aigetitS7i?On?n
9. Brescia .5 - 25:1 12.8
2.1 ' 20.7
44.8 22.8 - 14.4 11.1
28 1103.. Cmoumano
,
40.5, 31.8 16.6
11. Cremona 14.1
12. Mantua 30.2 38.3 17.4 0.6 2287..58.
14. Pavia . 6P,r!.9"?.,.
44.6
30'6 ' 34'6 148..26 77776541,:. LNre.eoraigpncgideeiiass; _
- - - 6: .." ,tY:eqr,buil 9.3
15. Sondrio 45.3 17.7 21.2 36.7 26.3 12.4
16. Varese
17. Bolzano
67,1sernia ''', 32,4 32.4 10.9
46.2 37.1 167
3" ' 36_74 14.! 6-642:PC:'41ectair"
665; re naem,6,6,. - ,
41.5, , 21.3 11.6 <
., _ _
211098.: TrentPI3aedi Iuuna ? 40.7 19.9 17.4 42.5 ' 10.9 14.6
52.5
38.5 4.2 21.3 15.7
7,6 ?6. 11.7'
49.4 18.6 14.2 6668.: A Campobassov e I .1i no *
O. Caserta 21. Rovigo
22. Treviso 32 73: 1 0:8
23.5 22.8 15.1
29.0 34.7 ' 9.7
23. Venice
24. Verona 34.6 35.0 15.9
34.7 23.3 12.9
48.6 20.6 14.1
25. Vicenza 72. Salerno
34.1 28.6 13.2
58.1 14.6 11...6
- / 3, Bart ' '
36.1 29.6 12.5
26. Gorizia
27. Pordenone 39.6 24.4 16.4
31.7 28.5 - -
40.7 20.7 16.5
28. Trieste
41.2 20.8 15.4 77. Taranto
78. Matera ' , 35.1 34.4 9.8
29. Udine
30. Genoa 35.7 32.2 / 2.6
28.0 39.4 13.3 .
31. imperia 36.3 30.4 11.6 - 79. Potenz% 39.9 26.9 14.5
32. La Spezia 29.5 43.0 13.1 " 80, Catanzaro < . 37.4 36.2 14.4
33. Savona 29.7 39.1 15.1 Of. Cosenza . < 35.8 27.4 18.1
34. Bologna 23.2 51.7
3365: Fort
uara 21.4 48.8 194i63 8623:,,ARge9riig9iegn.foai,,a,bria . 3329:58 ' 2266:33 1144;76
24.2 48.3 9.3 84. Caltanissetta 37.7. 23.3 13.8
37. Modena259 54.2 8.9 86, Catania 37.0 22.5 10.2
.
' 4365.46 216661 - 1143:82
28.8 40.5 16,4 ' 86. gone ''''
38. Parma
39, Piacenza 32.9 38.0 16_3 81. Messina
40. Ravenna - - 41.0 _ 2.1.1 10.3
86, Paierm0
26.4 53.3 10,5 ag, Ragusa 36.8 - 30.6 '" 12.0
4421.. AR reegzgzioo E m di a
32.3 46.2 10,3 ' -' 96, SyracuSe
53 43. Florence 26.7 50.1 9.4 - - 91, Trapani- 3,0.5 25.4 14.3
37.6 21./ 16.0
44. Grosseto 23.9 43.9 ' 12,4 , 96 Cagliar,L 31.0 36.7 12.2
5 5 443: Lucca
aorn 20.9 54.3 11.1 93, Nuoro-;., 367. 31.2 12.3
6
42.6 29.1 11.3 94 OristanO 34.6 26.0 10.0
47. Massa Carrara 29.5 35.5 14.7 95, Sassari: 34.1 28.9 13.0
48. Pisa 26.6 47.6 167
Province data will sum 100 when the f ejcy coher i included,
Party Vote Percentage
Other
Socialist
(PSI)
Communist
(PCI)
9
*The total number of Italian provinces is 95. Those not included are Aosta, Trent,
Bolzano, Gorizia, Pavia, Ravenna, Rome, Viterbo, and Foggia. Aosta does not have a
true provincial council. In Trent and Bolzano, the regional councillors elected in their
respective territories sit separately for provincial councils. The remaining provinces
voted at otter times: Pavia and Viterbo in 1977; Rome and Foggia in 1976; and
Ravenna in 1978.
*1Avellino election data from 1974.
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Table 33
City Council Election Results Shown
With and Without Eight Major Cities, 1975 and 1980 a
1975
1980
Total With Cities
Total Without Cities
Total With Cities
Total Without Cities
Percent
of Vote
Number
of Seats
Percent
of Vote
Number
of Seats
Percent
of Vote
Number
of Seats
Percent
of Vote
Number
of Seats
DC
32.06
1,434
35.35
1,260
33.13
1,515
37.00
1,333
PCI
30.90
1,110
28.88
922
28.91
1,038
26.95
860
PSI
12.44
500
13.23
439
13.59
527
13.53
453
PSD!
6.31
229
6.19
194
5.51
207
5.62
177
PRI
4.54
145
4.26
120
4.40
157
4.51
134
PLI
3.40
86
3.04
70
3.86
98
3.37
79
MSI-DN
8.16
272
7.18
220
7.23
213
5.68
166
Others
2.19
54
1.87
45
3.38
75
3.34
68
Total
100.00
3,830
100.00
3,270
100.00
3,830
100.00
3,270
a The figures given are for 82 provincial capitals with a total
population of 13,459,722 in 1971. Percentages in parentheses show
the change that occurs if the eight major cities (Turin, Milan,
Venice, Bologna, Florence, Naples, Catania, and Palermo) with
6,480,817 population are eliminated. The cities of Bolzano, Trento,
Frosinone, and Isernia are included in these statistics although they
voted out of phase (on 17 November 1974) until 1980.
Communes are structured like regions and provinces
with a Communal Council which in turn elects a
Junta or Municipal Council as well as the Mayor.
Table 33 and figures 20 and 21 illustrate the political
composition of the communal electorates in a number
of cities; the largest communes in the area are shown
separately. This picture is one of rapidly increasing
gloom for the DC, because by 1981 it had lost the
position of mayor in all the largest cities except
Palermo. It is also in communal elections where the
DC has had the largest losses relative even to the 1975
or 1976 elections. The few cases of DC improvement
in recent elections have not come in the largest cities,
suggesting that urbanization has promoted the for-
tunes of the left and seriously damaged the DC. Even
the commune of Venice, largest city in the Catholic
northeast, kept the PCI as the plurality party in 1980;
and in Rome and Naples, once considered DC
91
strongholds, the party's share of the vote dropped by 3
percent in the 1980 and 1981 elections. Noteworthy
as the PCI's slippage was in the communal election of
1981, this still seems to be an administrative level
where the DC has now truly lost its hegemony. In
1974 it held the mayorality in 67 of 94 provincial
capitals; in 1978 that had fallen to 51 of 95. The drop
is neither slow nor small, and nothing short of a
miracle or cataclysm seems likely to reverse the trend.
In some communes, the DC may soon have to concen-
trate its efforts so as not to fall into third place among
the three major parties. While Italy becomes rapidly
more urban, nowhere is party erosion so visible as in
the communal elections, although it is moving at
varying rates from area to area.
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Figure 20
City Council Election Results by City and Geographic Region-1975
Northeast
Turin
(Torino)
Milan
(Milano)
/?
Gepoa,_ _
*I
(Geno-va)
Bologna
Venice ---
(Venelia)
?7
7
Florence
(Firenze)
Center
\\.
me*1 \>
Ro- -
(Roma)
Nap lis
(Napoli)
Party Vote Percentage
IIOther Christian Democratic
Socialist*.
ommunist
6311162-62
*Regional data exclude cities located on map
*1 Rome, Genoa, and Bari elections were held in 1976
93
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Figure 21
City Council Election Results by City and Geographic Region-1980
Turin
(Torino)
Milan
(Milano)
Genoa*I
en ova)
Bologna
Northeast
Venice
(Venezia)
Florence
iFirenze)
Center
Rome*
(Roma)
Party Vote Percentage
Other Christian Democratic
Socialist
Communist
631117 2-82
Palermo
Naples
(Napoli)
*Regional data exclude cities located on map
*1 Rome. Genoa. and Bari elections were held in 1981
95
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Table 34
Comparative Communal Election Returns, 1975 and 1981:
A Composite of 98 Communes With More Than 5,000 Inhabitants
Party
1975-80 a
1981
Number of
Votes
Percentage
Number of
Seats
Number of
Votes
Percentage
Number of
Seats
DC
1,202,763
33.49
1,007
1,031,012
30.83
997
PCI
1,242,694
34.60
858
1,099,327
32.88
801
PSI
361,085
10.06
333
458,474
13.71
418
PSDI
160,712
4.48
127
194,792
5.83
163
PRI
139,778
3.89
61
126,269
3.78
71
PLI
58,274
1.62
9
91,964
2.75
20
Dem. Prol.
48,834
1.36
10
30,689
0.92
9
MSI-DN
302,239
8.42
117
218,155
6.52
83
Others
74,711
2.08
78
92,971
2.78
58
Total
3,591,090
100.00
2,600
3,343,653
100.00
2,620
a These 98 communes voted over this entire timespan until 1981
when they were brought into synchronization.
Composite national figures for the 1975-80 period do
not seem to indicate DC erosion, but the reports from
the largest cities in that group do show overall party
decline. The data provided in table 34 encompass a
broader cross section of communes?towns and cities
that range in population from 5,000 to nearly 3
million, some provincial captials and other simple
communes?and illustrate the hypothesis more clear-
ly. When the five largest cities are separated out, the
DC decline again appears, underscoring the future
prospects with on-going urbanization (see table 35).
Admittedly, these two sets of statistics derive from
different bases and suggest the opportunity for multi-
ple interpretation. The most objective analytical judg-
ment is probably that they indicate a process which is
in a relatively early stage. If the critical and pivotal
change for the party occurred in 1974-75, both tables
portray the beginning of this shift. Also, because this
level permits the closest scrutiny of voter behavior, it
bears continuing observation to identify movement
that is lost in national and regional returns.
Confidential
Another curious aspect of voting patterns appears
when they are simultaneously examined at the provin-
cial and communal levels. Political science assumes
that urban areas are more liberal, progressive, or
leftist, and that rural areas tend to be traditionalist
and conservative. Separating out the returns from the
provincial capitals in provincial and communal elec-
tions?in effect, dividing the urban from the rural
vote?shows this belief not infrequently to be errone-
ous in the Italian case. In fact, the city or provincial
capital may give more conservative returns than its
surrounding province. One such example from the
elections in June 1981 is Foggia where the DC won
47.8 percent of the vote in the communal election (up
from 41.1 percent in 1976) and the PCI dropped from
22.9 percent to 15.4 percent. However, the election
held the same day in Foggia Province produced 33.2
percent for the DC (1976, 35.6 percent) and a very
close 32.3 percent for the PCI (1976, 37.6 percent).
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Table 35
Comparative Communal Election Returns, 1976 and 1981,
in Five Provincial Capitals a
Party
1976
1981
Number of
Votes
Percentage
Number of
Seats
Number of
Votes
Percentage
Number of
Seats
DC
932,770
32.93
116
748,785
29.28
106
PCI
1,001,264
35.35
103
871,121
34.06
92
PSI
258,902
9.14
33
326,609
12.77
50
PSDI
115,788
4.09
16
139,017
5.44
23
PRI
116,786
4.12
10
101,050
3.95
10
PLI
53,406
1.89
4
84,624
3.31
9
Dem. Prol.
41,256
1.46
1
26,730
1.05
MSI-DN
262,716
9.27
25
185,872
7.27
18
Others
49,922
1.75
2
73,548
2.87
2
Total
2,832,810
100.00
310
2,557,356
100.00
310
a Rome, Genoa, Bari, Foggia, Ascoli Piceno.
Whether this peculiar rural-urban phenomenon indi-
cates a broad national trend is difficult to say. If so,
the implications for the DC are more negative since it
has long been assumed that the party's strength lay in
its hold on rural areas. Again, urbanization means the
decline of a traditional DC preserve. There is, though,
another side of this coin. If the DC's vote-drawing
power in some urban areas is indeed improving,
perhaps another base is coming into existence. How-
ever, the earlier admonition is still valid; Italian
election returns must be handled with care if they are
not to become a mere numbers game and skew
analytical judgment.
Finally, the law regulating the structure and function-
ing of provinces and communes also has implications
for the DC. Unlike the regions, legislation governing
these lowest units was already on the books at the
institution of the Republic. Legal arguments not yet
settled arose in connection with the 1946 referendum
which abolished the monarchy, specifically as to
whether that vote also implied abolition of laws passed
under the Kingdom. That discussion is largely aca-
demic today, but the fact remains that no action was
97
taken by the Constituent Assembly to abolish old
legislation. Therefore, a certain part of the legal
framework regulating today's provinces and com-
munes is still that instituted by Mussolini's law of
1934. Modifications were introduced with legislation
in 1951 and 1960, but citizens are often annoyed
when regulations dating to the fascist era still affect
them. The DC is held responsible for this failure to
make a clean break with the dictatorship, even if the
reason was political expediency at a time when the
alternative of starting over meant doing so in an
assembly where the far left's influence seemed dan-
gerously large. This element combined with the pro-
gressively worsening position of the DC, in elections
as well as in council offices, places the party in the
least promising perspective yet surveyed. Trends on
these levels closest to the grass roots are the clearest
and most ominous of all for the DC in the future. The
trend is subtle, though, and is identifiable most clearly
now in the largest communes but in varying degree as
one moves down in size. Both provincial and commu-
nal elections may prove to be the most reliable
barometer for predicting any changes in national
voting patterns.
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DC Policy, the Other Parties, and Prognosis
For many years the Christian Democrats, as they so
often claim, represented a broad interclass cross sec-
tion which reflected the sentiments of a significant
share of the nation. Also, the party has pursued a
pragmatic policy, often devoid of ideas and scant on
ideology, which accommodated the changing aspira-
tions of at least some of the Italian people. This ease
of adaptation not infrequently brings charges of op-
portunism. In foreign policy, the DC has been some-
what more consistent in its support of?or conform-
ism to?the goals of the Western alliance, taking an
independent line only on the colonels' government in
Greece and in certain facets of Middle Eastern af-
fairs. But events of the last decade have increasingly
raised the question of whether the party continues to
be effective in comprehending and promoting the
public's aspirations. Perhaps more ominous or even
hazardous is the expediency practiced by the DC. In a
dramatically changed nation, it is questionable wheth-
er the party has grasped the new ethos or whether
pragmatism may not have led to excessive compro-
mise of what it claims to stand for. More germane for
US interests is whether the DC continues to serve as a
valid and valued ally. Does it even become a liability?
Answers and analyses for any of these questions or
observations are extremely important and potentially
far reaching in their implications. Aside from Italy's
pivotal geographic location, the country's internal
political spectrum, simultaneously fragile and rigid,
permits only minimal maneuvering space among a
few coalition alternatives, all of which seem to include
a powerful and previously unacceptable PCI or an
unrealistically small PSI.
In foreign policy, the DC's support of NATO, the
European Community, theater nuclear forces, and
most facets of US policy has made Italy an ally so
taken for granted as, in effect, virtually to discount
any need for involving her in great power consulta-
tions, a tactic that has greatly annoyed her leaders of
late. Despite irritants in the relationship or minor
deviations Italy may have attempted internationally,
any basic change in national political orientation that
would alter foreign policy could create a serious need
for reevaluation of US calculations. Backing compa-
rable to that of the DC has come only from tiny
Confidential
parties such as the PRI, PLI, and to an extent PSDI,
with some erratic PSI support. The formulation and
successful implementation of any foreign policy, how-
ever, is dependent on the relative internal political
strengths and alignments of a nation's parties. Hence,
the DC's continuing prosperity has been considered as
sine qua non for the nation's foreign policy and its role
in the Western alliance.
Clearly the DC is slowly becoming less representative
of majority opinion. Even if conclusive evidence is
lacking, more than a few signs give cause for appre-
hension. Various elements suggest, for example, that a
changing Italian public is not aligning with a DC
which has been unable?its many expressions of
desire for "renewal" notwithstanding?to maintain
more than a tenuous hold on its already weakened
position. Erratic as the work of strengthening the
party's hold on the public may be, what has been
attempted is insufficient and cause for pessimism.
First, contrary to wide belief?the DC has not won
back its old positions lost in the early 1970s. The PCI
may have appeared to suffer a slippage greater than
that of the DC, but this may not be symptomatic of a
continuing trend. Any assumption that the threat
from the left is declining defies facts. Second, the DC
has maintained its ratio of the vote in legislative
elections by siphoning support from smaller parties
largely to its right. How long can that type of
transfusion give life to the party when it has so often
been forced to rely on those very groups to govern in
coalition?
Where, then, does the party seem to be moving?
What may be its future in the overall Italian political
spectrum?
Has the DC Lost the Way?
The DC gives more than a little evidence of having
lost its way, except for its inveterate reliance on
pragmatism. This is the least damning mode of
describing the party's flirtation in recent years with
"historic compromise," a euphemism for an alliance
or some kind of modus vivendi with the PCI. The
process has been tortuous, reminiscent of the twists
and turns of the early 1960s that led to the apertura a
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sinistra (opening to the left) with the PSI, an arrange-
ment causing no little alarm even before it was
concluded. In some sense a repeat of that process
might be considered as an attempt on the DC's part to
arrive at a more modern or responsive approach to the
nation's demands. In practice, though, it comes across
overwhelmingly as an implicit negation of the party's
anti-Communism, a fundamental and unchanging te-
net from its founding and, to many now, a crass device
to ensure DC retention of power.
In terms of domestic policy demands and what they
signify for the party and the electorate, the DC did at
least acquiesce in the Programmatic Accord of 29
July 1977, a document the PSI, PSDI, PRI, PLI, and
PCI adhered to as well. No more comprehensive
document exists outlining the critical issues in Italian
life which cried for action. DC underwriting of this,
commendable as it is, still approximated signature of
a list of its own unfulfilled promises. Be that as it
may, the accord was a collective commitment by the
six parties to address and resolve these issues. Had it
not become a dead letter, as much as anything
because of the DC and its internal differences, the
program might have been a turning point for solving
many nagging national problems, some at least two
decades old. Although the program did threaten some
DC areas of influence, there is no reason to believe
that even its partial fulfillment would have constituted
the kind of renewal the DC was seeking in the eyes of
the voting public. That the PCI would have had an
important role in this, doubtless more than desired in
Washington, was also evident. Events altered all this,
but the fatal flaw of the Programmatic Accord was
that it was contingent on the initiative and direction
of Aldo Moro. Moro's sudden and violent death left
the DC, for all intents and purposes, without gifted
leadership. As a result, the party's failure to provide
the support necessary to revitalize the nation?and
itself?through these reforms has placed it in the
same or worse position than before the initiative was
undertaken. In its own terms, perhaps it was guilty of
a sin of omission.
As of 1981, the perspective on the decade of the 1970s
is not as great as might be desired, yet some tentative
conclusions may prove valid. First is the impression
99
that despite its continuation as Italy's largest party in
the last decade, the DC appears to have been wander-
ing in a wasteland, one somewhat of its own creation
either by inaction or erroneous judgment. Whether in
its faulty assessments that allowed the divorce refer-
endum fiasco in 1974 or its lack of response to student
and worker upheavals in 1968 and 1969, the party
showed its inability to determine a clear and consist-
ent course for itself. Its attitudes toward the "historic
compromise" and the Programmatic Accord are evi-
dence of this loss of direction. The DC's first steps in
seeking renewal, under Moro and after Zaccagnini
became party secretary, do allow the assumption that
things might have been different.
The DC's major electoral setbacks between 1974 and
1976 not only prompted the calls for renewal, they
also forced an awareness of the party's growing
inability to govern without some acknowledgment of
the PCPs vastly enhanced strength. In various quar-
ters at that juncture, questions were also being raised
for the first time about the DC's ultimate ability to
survive. To an extent, the DC leadership of that
moment saw a pragmatic escape hatch in the flirta-
tions of Italy's Marxist left with Eurocommunism, a
phenomenon that altered thinking in various quarters
about the PCI. And Eurocommunism, at least hypo-
thetically, deserved consideration if only because the
arguments advanced against it were self-serving, if
not downright specious. During the time it captivated
Italian political thinking, Eurocommunism served to
make "historic compromise" more palatable. Indeed,
such a deal could be rationalized into yet one more
example of transformism, a practice characteristic of
years of government in Italy.'
Historically, transformism is dated even to preunification political
tactics used by Cavour in the 1850s and utilized by several famous
politicians after him, notably Giolitti early in this century. Most
simply described, this is the practice whereby one party or faction,
usually the majority of the moment, co-opts the principles and
practices of its opposition, ostensibly for the general good. Implicit
in the concept, however, is an unprincipled desire to retain power
even at the cost of a major sellout. At best it has always been
viewed as amoral opportunism.
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Whatever the justification offered, the very entertain-
ment of such a compromise with the PCI was not only
antithetical to the DC's past but was also a tacit
admission that the party was considerably less autono-
mous than before. The 1976 parliamentary election,
in fact, verified this. Even in coalition with its small
allies of the past, the DC could hardly proceed to
govern thereafter without some acknowledgment of
the growth of Communist power. In the judgment of
many at the time, the DC was reaching the inevitable
moment of truth deriving from its unfulfilled prom-
ises, and the voters were penalizing it for its years of
immobilism. On regional, provincial, and communal
levels, notably since the 1975 administrative election,
the reality of PCI power was forced on the DC. It was
at this juncture that the PCI's momentum contributed
to reaching the Programmatic Accord, in all likeli-
hood the pivotal tactic in Moro's game plan for
beating the PCI on its own grounds.
Moro's leadership, convoluted even for Italians accus-
tomed to Byzantine maneuverers, was remarkably
effective as a moderating force which muted factional
frictions quietly behind the scene. Although the con-
servative correnti in the party opposed any move
toward the PCI, Moro was slowly and determinedly
moving the DC his way. The tactic first met heavy
weather when the United States spoke out in January
1978 against any PCI involvement in the Italian
Government. The Red Brigades, the force least inter-
ested in promoting US interests, inadvertently aided
these and altered the political landscape by kidnaping
Moro in March. Although it was not evident even in
May when Moro's corpse was found in downtown
Rome, there already was a premonition that not only
the DC but perhaps Italian politics had reached a
critical juncture. Certainly the Communists soon un-
derstood the implications of a newly emerging politi-
cal world.
The largest majority ever to vote confidence in an
Italian cabinet hastily approved the government of
"national solidarity" on the day Moro was kidnaped.
In some senses, this ministry presided over by Giulio
Andreotti was a realization of historic compromise
because of PCI backing. Nevertheless, in the suspi-
cion, innuendo, and recrimination that typified the
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political scene in the weeks of limbo until Moro's body
was found, the always latent makings of political
division soon reappeared. Without the master manip-
ulator, the grand coalition fell apart almost immedi-
ately, and for its part the DC went back to its earlier
positions, those more coherent with its traditional
opposition to the PCI, and to a tense relationship with
its erstwhile ally, the PSI. Whether hidden or visible,
the DC's division between Moro's flagbearers and the
more conservative anti-PCI elements effectively re-
established the party's old immobilism.
Against this backdrop, Italy went to the polls in 1979.
Whether mistakenly or with self-induced optimism,
the DC persuaded itself that the response of the
electorate that year was rejection of the PCI, even if
the DC's own showing was far from an overwhelming
endorsement by the voters. Detailed analysis of that
election in this report points out that the old fissures
were not only still present but even growing. Notwith-
standing this failure to make a leap forward, faction-
alism continued to paralyze the party until the conserv-
atives succeeded at the party congress in February
1980 in establishing as DC policy opposition to any
understanding with the PCI. The majority at that
meeting approved a preamble to the party's general
reaffirmation of principle which encompassed this
stand, thus labeling its backers as the preambolisti
(backers of the preamble) (see above pages 15-17). The
stresses and strains remained, eventually reappearing
at the fall of Cossiga's second government and forcing
party secretary Piccoli to demand again at the De-
cember 1980 National Council meeting that factions
be disbanded?a demand still unmet almost a year
later. Finally, in late July 1981, after the party's loss
of the premiership, the Council abandoned the pream-
ble and reopened the way for alternative possibilities
envisioned by Moro.
Tiresome as is the narrative of the DC policy flip-flop,
it illustrates the party's continuing crisis, what the
Italian press has occasionally called "the Christian
Democratic question." Without doubt this reflects an
erosion of leadership and a resultant indecisiveness on
basic policy. Simultaneously, however, it is an inad-
vertent recognition by the DC that it must respond to
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a different political orientation but that it feels its
very foundation threatened. The party's future thus
seems to become a question of whether the price that
must be paid for continued primacy is indeed compro-
mise with the traditional enemy, the PCI.
The composite described here demands to be placed in
the broader context of Italian affairs. If not, it
becomes readily evident that crucial issues in Italy are
increasingly lost in this morass of political jockeying.
Another phrasing would pose the question of whether
Italy can long afford this public internal thrashing
about by the DC while national problems worsen.
Terrorism continues to be a major issue in Italy, and
even the public's reactions to it?persistent criticism
of government ineffectuality in dealing with terrorism
and its causes?are taken as examples of disgust with
the DC. Inflation persistently rises with only the most
ephemeral moments of respite. Unemployment re-
mains high, and old labor problems continue unre-
solved. Reforms in the judicial, penal, economic,
welfare, educational, and other sectors are constantly
delayed. Ironically, these are all major aspects of the
Programmatic Accord, almost all still far from
realization.
Leadership Vacuum?
If DC domestic policy vacillates, is there any evidence
of a will in the leadership for a change which might
reestablish stability? As so common in the past, the
number of names that rise above the party rank and
file is small. Although there are nearly 400 DC
members of Parliament, the only ones who might fill
the bill are the same figures who have been on the
scene for years. Superstars like Andreotti and Fanfani
now get attention primarily as candidates to succeed
Alessandro Pertini at the Quirinale Palace. Even if
Fanfani, perennially available, has less than subtly
expressed his willingness to form an "institutional"
government, his popularity is quite limited, and to
some he is totally unacceptable. Fanfani, for all his
boundless ambition, has no youth following. Further-
more, he was party secretary when the DC wallowed
into the trough of its mid-1970s losses. Andreotti, on
the other hand, still enjoys high esteem as revealed in
a January 1981 Demoskopea poll, but he reputedly
has no desire to be premier again. Zaccagnini, as
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much because of his poor health as his age, is no
alternative. Since his departure from the party secre-
taryship two years ago, the DC has had only second-
rate leadership either in its own administration with
Piccoli or with Cossiga and Forlani as Prime Minis-
ters. Discussion of these most obvious men must take
note, too, of the fact that they are older figures; and,
whether in years or events, they are associated with
party fatigue, scandal, and inactivity. New and youn-
ger blood is what the DC leadership desperately
needs, but little on the horizon augurs the arrival of a
savior. When Zaccagnini was chosen as political
secretary in 1975 at age 63, the DC probably missed
its most critical opportunity for rejuvenating itself.
What chances there have been of late among younger
men appeared well over a year ago and came from the
right, but the capi storici (historic leaders) viewed the
major individuals in question as mavericks and too
rebellious. A name often mentioned from this group
was Massimo de Carolis of Milan, but he was already
jeopardizing himself within the party before his name
was included on lists of members reputed to belong to
the P-2 Masonic Lodge.9 Another Milanese political
figure, Andrea Borruso, for all the backing he enjoys
from the Comunione e Liberazione movement (see
section on auxiliary support organizations), gives no
evidence of drawing the mass support essential for a
broad-based party.
9 The "Propaganda-2" Masonic Lodge scandal began attracting
public attention in Italy in the early spring of 1981 and became a
major issue in mid-May when Prime Minister Forlani felt it
necessary to release the names of purported members of the group,
a total of nearly 1,000. The list included numerous high-ranking
figures from government, political parties, banking, the media,
security agencies, and other important sectors of public life. Aside
from historic attitudes in Italy toward Masonry?which regard the
organization as antithetical to Catholicism?the P-2 Lodge was
alleged to have sinister implications for government stability,
democratic institutions, and national security. Italy's regular Free-
masons denounced P-2 as "illegal" and disavowed any connection
with it. Numerous figures named as P-2 members denied any
involvement with the group, and various statements caused skepti-
cism as to the actual role of some individuals who appeared on the
list. Regardless of these and other doubts, this renegade lodge was
believed to have sinister and semitreasonous goals, and the reputa-
tions of all who were said to be involved with it were seriously
compromised. P-2 was most frequently referred to as "a covert
center of power." Since the Constitution explicitly bans all secret
organizations, anyone proved to be associated with P-2 could be
liable for criminal prosecution.
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The truly ominous nature of the DC leadership
situation appears on the party's left. While a large
number of DC rank-and-file youth are moving left, as
documented studies show, there are no party leaders
of that ideological persuasion with any stature, much
less any charisma. And, based on even the most
judicious assessment of the laicization of Italian soci-
ety, it seems that only the realm of fantasy could
conjur a rightist DC leader who might attract to the
party those thousands of voters who no longer accept
the religious tenets important to the conservatives of
the party. And if some compromise figure, a man of
the center with moderate tendencies either right or
left, is the final alternative, names are still lacking
since none has a sufficient track record to permit
predictions. One of several figures who could be cited
in such a category would be Roberto Mazzotta, the
40-year-old deputy from Milan. Even if ideas and a
formulated policy might be achieved by a party group,
the dynamic leadership to carry it forward cannot be
so easily devised and is currently nowhere in sight.
Another facet of Italian politics that must be weighed
is scandal, particularly as it has so often concerned
either the DC or its leading figures.' If the DC has or
has not had a monopoly on government and political
scandal in postwar Italy, the party still seems guilty in
many eyes. Even if the most skeptical view is taken,
the sheer number and occasional magnitude of DC
scandals is nothing short of appalling. One book on
the subject, muckraking and sensational as it may be,
makes it impossible to reject the fact that malfeasance
is an old strain in the DC that has been associated
with the party even before 1946. In only the most
recent years, Giovanni Leone's forced resignation
from the Presidency of the Republic for various
'? Here, however, a brief comment is necessary. The Italian public
does not simply assume corruption, and hence scandal, is inherent
in government; nor do they indifferently tolerate it. The man in the
street may seem more cynical or acquiescent than, say, an Ameri-
can, but this does not make it axiomatic that he, even as a Latin,
accepts unprincipled government as a way of life. Italians do tend to
dismiss scandal a bit more rapidly as evidence of human frailty, but
political sociologists find this reaction the norm in societies?such
as Italy?with a long-accumulated public consciousness of the
governing experience. Therefore, the Italians perhaps respond a bit
differently, but their sense of ethical outrage in the face of a
scandal is very real.
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misdeeds, the $2 billion petroleum scandal of 1980,
presumed incompetence in earthquake relief in and
around Naples in 1980, and the recent P-2 Masonic
Lodge scandal all deeply involved the party.
These examples also make one wonder when and how
Italy, or the DC, will contrive to produce the ultimate
scandal. Almost any natural disaster in Italy auto-
matically produces a scandalous tale on the DC. The
press points out in such instances that the DC first
presented a bill to provide relief mechanisms for such
disasters in 1951. The bill is still to be approved 30
years later, just another example of DC immobilism.
Why does the Italian voter continue to cast his ballot
for the DC when, as has occasionally been said, it
represents a 35-year Watergate? Progressive accumu-
lation of public disapproval undoubtedly does account
in some degree for the party's failure to improve at
the polls. In reality, what Italians consider the lack of
a good alternative has given them no place else to go
except to the spoiled ballot or abstention (see appen-
dix, pages 125-128). The Italian voting public, though,
is certainly sophisticated enough to weigh the relative
merits of a corrupt incumbent DC and the potentially
duplicitous nature of the PCI, or just protest by
abstention or spoiled ballot. Nevertheless, it is safe to
assume that sooner or later the Italian voter will reject
the offenders; what the catalyst will be is impossible
to guess.
A last element, one always nominally central to the
DC as a party of Catholics, concerns the Vatican and
its role in the party's future. The shrinkage of the
Catholic segment of the electorate and its significance
must be juxtaposed to the occupancy of the Holy See
by a non-Italian pope. The presence of the first
foreign pontiff in well over four centuries is in many
ways almost as important for Italy as for the Church.
On the other hand, John Paul II assumed his mantle
well after fundamental changes had begun in Italy
between Church and state. Indeed, since the reign of
John XXIII the Vatican has not only been declining,
relatively speaking, as a factor in Italian affairs, but
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the entire relationship has also undergone a continu-
ing metamorphosis. Except for issues such as divorce
and abortion, pronouncements by the pope or mem-
bers of the Curia have progressively been more inter-
mittent, one reason being that the Church found?
sooner than the DC?that interjecting religion into
Italian politics can be counterproductive. But even
prior to the death of Pius XII, in the final days of the
traditional Church, Italian attitudes toward interven-
tion in state matters were changing. Outsiders again
have to note that Italians, and particularly Romans,
have lived so closely with the passage of popes over
the centuries that they long ago developed a certain
nonchalance about the Church and its leaders. Never
has the average Italian, devout practicing Catholics
included, been as subservient or uncritical of his
Church as many other nationalities. And today, with
the immensely changed and modernized institution?
by its own term, the Church is aggiornata (updated)?
Italians and the Vatican have a profoundly different
view of religion as it relates to politics. If the separa-
tion of Church and state in Italy has not yet been
legally sanctioned, the practice approaches something
comparable. Political activism of Catholic figures in
Italy may now, in fact, be leftist and distinctly non-
DC, quite often in social spheres.
During the long pontificate of Paul VI the Church
fitfully but generally drew back from Italian politics,
albeit with a few noteworthy exceptions. Still the
attitude increasingly was one of benign tolerance or
indifference, neither of which militated much to the
DC's benefit. When Polish Cardinal Karol Wojtyla
became the first non-Italian pope in centuries, the
change meant somewhat less for Italy than for the
Vatican. In other words, he was merely one more step
in the detachment of the Church from Italian politics.
Although John Paul II reiterated the papal view on
abortion in the 1981 referendum, not even the attempt
on his life four days before the voting had any
influence on its outcome.
The present Pope certainly is more conservative or
traditional than parts of the post-Council Church
would like. Still, his experiences in Poland have made
him a realist. He may make his views known in terms
that are not widely acceptable in Italy, but he has
103
given no indication of any desire to reverse the trend
of 20 years of Church-state developments. Nothing
suggests that he will do other than accept reality
there, albeit with occasional attempts to influence
public opinion. In any event, the Roman Catholic
Church is no longer an avenue open or willing to place
heavy pressure on Italian governments, even in the
event of a consummated DC-PCI compromise.
Finally, what prognosis may be tendered for the
Italian Christian Democrats in 1981? What might
reasonably be foreseen for the party if Italy, as
increasingly more often is mentioned, were to have an
election in the near future?
The thrust of this report has sought to indicate less
the DC's imminent demise than its fundamentally
altered position in the national political spectrum. The
party, to state the obvious, is less in control of the
nation, as for the first time neither the President nor
Prime Minister belongs to the DC. Party leadership is
tarnished, aging, and fatigued; its policy orientation
and electoral position are shaky. Practicing Catholics
committed to the DC are declining in numbers;
Catholic youth is moving left; and Church-related
support organizations long crucial to party success are
slipping into independent courses of their own.
Nominally this panorama calls for pessimism. But, be
that as it may, Christian Democracy is not in immi-
nent danger of rolling over and dying. The party is,
and may remain through one or more elections, the
largest in Italy. Loss of the premiership is undoubted-
ly only temporary, and the Spadolini Cabinet's make-
up is a monument to the continuing importance of the
DC in government. Its role in and manner of govern-
ing cannot, however, be the same again. The sacred
images have been shattered; the DC's control of the
premiership is no longer invulnerable. Even if the
party has other prime ministers, their performance
and that of the DC must now produce concrete results
or risk another expulsion from the top. Fundamentally
the party is master of its own fate, but whether its
continuing importance derives from the continued size
of its following or from revitalized response to the
needs of government will depend on events of the next
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two or three years. If it fails to shake itself from being
a coalition of factions primarily intent on enjoying
power, it can never again presume to govern alone,
even with benevolent abstentions from other parties.
In short, its record will be scrutinized more critically
from now on.
To what extent might the DC, so as to assure its
survival in power, accept some accommodation with
the PCI? The potential for variables here is too large
to answer with any certainty, but the possibility or
even likelihood of a DC-PCI "historic compromise"
cannot be ruled out. On levels beneath the national,
some such arrangement even seems probable in the
not too distant future, now that the Preamble has
been dropped. The precedent would certainly have
more validity in such a domestic case than would the
recent inclusion of Communists in the Mitterrand
government of France.
The dangers that are presumably implicit in a DC-
PCI accommodation are of a far different nature than
popularly perceived. Leaving aside the vulnerability of
the DC to charges of perfidious betrayal of its
heritage, the PCI might well risk even more. The very
least either party would have to answer for would be
responsibility for inevitably unpopular decisions and
possible failure of programs. In short, such an experi-
ment might well fall of its own weight on the national
or any other level.
Another possibility for the Christian Democrats is the
intensification of ever-present centrifugal forces at
work in the party. This may seem remote, but so did
the party's loss of the premiership only a few years
ago. In the case of a prolonged absence from the
prime ministry or that of a DC-PCI coalition, splin-
tering even appears likely. If the prime ministry has
now been lost, a key ministry with access to sotto-
governo spoils will also perhaps be lost in the future.
The resultant reduction of access to power and pa-
tronage could cause some elements to split off or
simply wither out of existence for lack of their
clientelistic bases. A compromise with the PCI, on the
other hand, quite probably would drive factions of the
DC right into the independence they have always
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threatened when hints of such a deal have been
dropped. Implications of any splintering have to be
viewed in light of what they would do to the DC's
strength relative to all other parties. The DC could
become less than the nation's largest party with the
loss of only a small segment of the electorate.
In a similar vein, note must be taken of some general
characteristics of Italian voting as they relate to the
DC and public opinion. First is the clear evidence in
almost all Italian elections since the war of a broader
segment of voters casting ballots for parties of the left
than those of the right. Exceptions do exist, particu-
larly in smaller constituencies such as provinces or
communes, but ever since the Constituent Assembly
election of 1946 a majority of the nation has voted to
the left. This ideological tendency has persisted until
the present even if votes continue to be scattered
among several groups. Despite this longstanding pat-
tern, the consistently right or center-right orientation
brought by the DC?notwithstanding the years of
presumed "opening to the left" with the PSI?marks
a distinction between the majority desire of citizens
and the governments that have ruled them.
Second, there is a striking constancy of the Italian
electorate in giving 75 percent of the vote to DC, PCI,
and PSI in almost every election at any level for 35
years. The configuration for potential coalitions has
thus been and may yet long remain determined
largely by these three parties and the combinations
they can devise. Were the PCI to emerge as a truly
legitimate alternative, the PSI would become even
more pivotal than now; and the small parties' future
might become very uncertain. Speculation on possible
coalition combinations in such an event suggests
interesting turns. In a more finite sense of the present,
the size of the vote segment accruing to the major
groupings suggests that Italy is primarily a three-
party system where only political circumstances have
unduly enhanced the role of small parties to make the
country exemplary of the dominant party system by
default.
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contmential
Implications for US Policy
What in all this are the implications policymakers
might glean for the future? Fundamentally, the pic-
ture is relatively clear, and the options are rather few,
some perhaps less than palatable.
In light of the probable persistence of conditions that
require government by coalition, what political allies
will the United States have to contemplate as DC
partners? The most obviously viable party is the PSI
under Bettino Craxi. Here, however, any assumption
that future US hopes can be pinned to the PSI, with
or without the DC, are probably foolhardy. No matter
how optimistic the view?or how fortuitous the
events?the PSI has little hope of sustaining the
growth essential to making it a real alternative, except
as a coalition member. Neither the recent French nor
Greek elections of socialist governments seem to
augur victory for the PSI. The influence of those
events May indeed reflect in Italy, but differences
peculiar to Italian politics seem to preclude a socialist
victory in the foreseeable future. The PSI has shown
vigor and seemingly unusual growth since Craxi
became party secretary. However, as the DC discov-
ers almost daily, socialist strength depends very much
on the whims of this one politician. Without Craxi?
whose dominance of the PSI has tolerated no obvious
successor?the party's chance of increasing signifi-
cantly its current 10-percent share of the national
electorate is problematical. Assuming, hypothetically,
that Craxi survives the political wars and leads his
party to as much as 20 percent of a national vote, his
ambitions as well as his abrasive and brittle personal-
ity will make him a difficult ally. Nothing precludes
105
also that Craxi might turn to a coalition with the
PCI?excluding the DC?if this would make him
prime minister. The PSI rank and file certainly has
more in common with PCI views than with those of
the DC.
Speculation on any other combinations?except for
the PCI which has been considered above?must
include the miniparties and, hence, coalitions with
built-in vulnerability. While useful to the DC in the
past, such an arrangement at best now promises a
fragile and temporary viability.
If the DC can be counted on to muddle through and
live a while yet as the plurality party (dropping even to
30 to 32 percent), the overall trend of the mass of data
presented here for all levels suggests that alternative
possibilities must at least be contemplated in the not-
too-distant future. There is no clear evidence to
indicate that Italy will depart from its normal pace of
politics which has been described in this paper in
metaphors of geological time. Thus, the stolidity of
the election returns does seem to give a certain
temporal margin, should the DC take advantage of it.
One cannot avoid recognizing, however, how delicate-
ly poised the political balance has become, and it can
not be ignored that one-third of the voters (the PCI
electorate) is knocking harder at the door to power.
Recapitulating, the evidence concerning failed efforts
at DC renewal and the erosion of support from
auxiliary groups, the party's surrogate for its own
organization, are showing more and more that a
divergence has developed between the public's politi-
cal tendencies and the response it has found from the
DC. Most telling, perhaps, is the rapid rise of powers
in the regional governments and the simultaneous
near collapse of traditional DC control of the nation
at the grass roots. Fast capture of provincial govern-
ments and particularly the largest communal councils
by other parties augurs little but ill for the patronage
central to DC power. The challenge to the party,
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which it has not met to date, is broad and deep. If
meeting it is not impossible, the record of the last
decade nevertheless indicates that the party has not
made the necessary changes either with sufficient
alacrity or appropriate appeal. Even if it did accom-
plish a turnaround of its fortunes, the price would be
rejection of at least some of the fundamental tenets
which have determined its nature to date.
The myriad peculiarities of Italian politics seem to
add up to some kind of Third World sum in today's
international scene. The same nation that is placed by
all international norms among the leading seven or
eight industrial powers of the world is stereotypically
conceived of as constantly unstable and thus some-
what unreliable. The DC almost certainly must bear
responsibility for this image of backwardness despite
the contribution it made to national reconstruction
after 1945. One can only wonder how long the Italian
populace will wait until it forces the DC to answer for
its failures. Increasingly critical economic problems in
Italy, worsened, if not created, by political shortcom-
ings, seem closer than ever to forcing basic changes.
The DC squandered Italy's potential for international
strength commensurate with its industrial power, a
price not easily paid by the country. As the gravity of
politically derived problems threatens the domestic
scene more directly, the DC will unavoidably be
called to account. If and when the electorate decides
"to throw the rascals out," it should be no surprise.
Some political manifestation of the sentiments of the
DC's old following will long be significant in the
national political spectrum, but its form and the
success it can expect will depend on its leaders'
capacity to get back in step with the party's own
constituency.
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Appendix
National Referendums and Elections for the European
Parliament
The provision for popular referendums, like the cre-
ation of regions, was designed to achieve greater
democratization of Italian political life. Article 75 of
the Constitution permits a referendum for repeal of
any law (with a few excepted categories) upon the
demand of either 500,000 voters or five regional
councils. The first use of this provision did not occur
until some 25 years after adoption of the Constitution,
but the outcome of the referendum on divorce in 1974
has become the landmark event of postwar Italian
politics. (The one previous referendum, that of June
1946 which abolished the monarchy, predated the
Constitution.)
After long and acrimonious debate, Parliament voted
a law in 1970 that for the first time permitted civil
divorce. Passage of the law did not quiet opposition to
what Catholics believed was an intolerable interfer-
ence with their faith and a challenge to the marriage
sacrament. The DC, which had opposed passage of
the bill, permitted itself to be drawn into this contro-
versy. When enough signatures assured that there
would be a referendum on the issue, the party, in
effect, submitted itself to a vote of public confidence.
If the national election of 1948 is viewed as the high
water mark of the DC, the divorce referendum of 12
May 1974 is?to date?its nadir." To an extent the
vote can also be interpreted as a public rejection of the
Church in public affairs. The initiative tying the DC
to the antidivorce position was primarily the respon-
siblity of party elder stateman, Amintore Fanfani,
who also made it an anti-Communist issue. Shortly
before the vote, the Church lined up behind the DC
when Pope Paul VI expressed his desire to see the law
repealed. Both party and Church, then, submitted
themselves to a vote of confidence. The results, an
" Some authorities regard the 1975 administrative elections as the
DC's postwar low mark because of the party's loss of seats in
regional, provincial, and communal councils.
107
overwhelming expression of a desire to maintain the
law, became the greatest postwar rebuff by the Italian
public of the country's traditional establishment. .
As voting day drew near in the spring of 1974,
indications were that the prodivorce position would
win, but the actual three-fifths majority it achieved
was a major surprise. Analyzed by region (see figure
A-1), the voting results demonstrate where Catholic
and/or DC influence still held some sway. Seven of
the 20 regions voted to abolish divorce, including two
of the three in the "white" northeast and five in the
south. In some of these, however, the margin was
paper thin. No region favoring repeal came close to
the two-thirds majority scored by the prodivorce
forces in six regions of the center and north. But the
chinks in the DC's power structure appear even worse
than immediately meet the eye when areas long
known for their loyalty to the Church are reviewed.
For example, even in Catholic Venetia, despite its
regional plurality favoring repeal, a majority of its
provinces expressed approval of divorce. In Tuscany,
the Catholic enclave of Lucca in the Red Belt also
favored retention of the law (see table A-1).
With this referendum, a clear distinction still shows
between traditionalist areas in the south and
independent regions of the center and north. There
are important exceptions, however; both Sicily and
Sardinia voted against the DC stand. Rome itself, by
more than two-thirds, indicated its approval of di-
vorce. Only 10 of the 95 provincial capitals voted to
abolish divorce, all of them south of Naples.
If the DC hypothetically could comfort itself with the
loyalty of a few of its old centers of strength in 1974,
such was not the case in 1981. The referendum on 12
May 1981 seeking to abolish a 1978 law permitting
abortion came close to producing a nationwide sweep
of regions voting against the DC position. The lesson
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Figure A-1
Results of Divorce Referendum
by Province, 1974
Percent Voting in Favor of Divorce a
0 20 40
60
80
Piemonte
Valle d'Aosta
Lombardia
Veneto
Trentino-Alto
Adige
Friuli-Venezia
Giulia
Liguria
Emilia-Romagna
Toscana
Umbria
Marche
Lazio
Abruzzi
Molise
Campania
Puglia
Basilicata
Calabria
Sicilia
Sardegna
Italy
Divorce Referendum Results in Selected Provincial Capitals
More than
75% in favor:
More than
500/0 in favor:
Less than
500/0 (opposed)
79.8 Turin
73.7 Milan
60.3 Naples
49.9 Foggia
79.7 Ravenna
73.2 Bologna
59.6 Bari
49.8 Campobosso
79.5 Savona
72.5 Trieste
58.5 Trento
49.3 Macerata
78.3 Livorno
72.4 Bolzano
56.2 Palermo
49.0 Messina
75.9 Alessandria
71.2 Florence
54.9 Verona
48.5 Potenza
75.7 Ferrara
70.8 Venice
50.0 Bergamo
47.4 Avellino
75.6 Genoa
68.1 Rome
44.3 Caserta
75.6 Imperia
66.8 Siracusa
43.7 Isernia
75.1 Terni
64.6 Cagliari
41.6 Benevento
75.1 Modena
63.0 Catania
40.6 Reggio Calabria
75.0 Aosta
61.8 Brescia
aPlease note that a vote in favor
of the DC and the church.
of divorce was a vote against the position
585981 2.82
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of 1974 was at least partially learned by the DC,
which did not tie itself so adamantly to the issue as
before. The Church, specifically the Pope, did make a
strong stand against abortion, but it kept enough
distance to avoid the degree of embarrassment in
losing that befell it earlier. For DC interests, this was
fortunate because the 1981 vote was to an extent a
surprise similar to that of 1974. While preelection
opinion polls favored the proabortion forces, their
victory margin was not predicted to be large. How-
ever, when the vote was tallied, 19 of the 20 regions
opted to retain abortion (see figure A-2). Only Tren-
tino-Alto Adige, by the infinitesimal margin of 0.4
percent, voted for repeal. Victory in one region was
scant consolation when juxtaposed to the solid proa-
bortion vote of the entire south and the islands. In
fact, for the first time in Italian history both north
and south voted alike. Regions in the north and center
repeated their prodivorce vote with a general increase
of some 4 percent in 1981; the south, in changing its
position, added 20 percent to its vote on divorce. Even
Molise, with 60.3 percent, joined in to make the vote
of the whole of the traditionalist south and islands
three-fifths or more against positions well known to be
held by DC and Church.
Whether these two referendums should be taken as
evidence of DC erosion across the board is open to
question. But they clearly indicate a loss of the party's
ability to discipline its supporters in traditionalist
regions. Even if the party can still maintain a majority
position in many parts of the south, the voters of the
area nevertheless have indicated an independence of
thought and action unknown heretofore. In short, the
results showed continued dramatic decline of the
Catholic subculture. Consequently, the DC can no
longer assume that its position in traditionalist areas
is firm.
If the emotionally charged divorce and abortion issues
went against the DC, the results on other issues
submitted to referendum could possibly be taken as
guardedly positive. To be sure, these issues enjoyed
enough support in most other parties so that indica-
tors for any one party are difficult to distinguish. But
since most of the initiatives which were approved had
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Table A-1
Results of May 1974 Divorce Referendum in Provincial Capitals a
Ranked in Order of Vote Favoring Retention of Divorce Bill b
Percentage
Capital
Percentage
Capital
Percentage
Capital
79.84
Turin
68.91
Perugia
55.24
Catanzaro
79.73
Ravenna
68.87
Piacenza
54.90
Verona
79.54
Savona
68.32
Pisa
54.76
Taranto
78.33
Livorno
68.14
Rome
54.66
Rovigo
75.99
Alessandria
67.48
Ancona
54.52
Cosenza
75.79
Ferrara
66.89
Siracusa
53.99
Matera
75.67
Genoa
66.74
Udine
53.95
Ascoli Piceno
75.65
Imperia
65.50
Pordenone
53.75
Lecce
75.13
Terni
65.37
Cremona
53.58
Caltanissetta
75.10
Modena
65.21
Arezzo
53.48
Vicenza
75.05
Aosta
64.63
Cagliari
53.24
Teramo
74.26
Vercelli
64.36
Sassari
53.02
Latina
73.81
La Spezia
64.04
Gorizia
52.93
Lucca
73.73
Milan
63.33
Sondrio
52.68
L'Aquila
73.57
Forli
63.23
Rieti
52.33
Frosinone
73.22
Bologna
63.08
Catania
52.31
Trapani
72.53
Trieste
62.06
Varese
52.06
Ragusa
72.48
Bolzano
61.82
Belluno
52.06
Enna
72.38
Novara
61.81
Brescia
51.40
Chieti
72.18
Mantua
61.75
Pescara
50.97
Salerno
72.07
Asti
60.66
Nuoro
50.02
Bergamo
72.03
Reggio Emilia
60.35
Naples
49.43
Foggia
71.97
Grosseto
59.88
Cuneo
49.86
Campobasso
71.60
Parma
59.82
Treviso
49.33
Macerata
71.23
Florence
59.65
Bari
49.08
Messina
70.89
Venice
59.02
Brindisi
48.56
Potenza
70.58
Pistoia
58.53
Trento
47.49
Avellino
69.72
Siena
57.67
Como
44.59
Agrigento
69.38
Massa Carrara
57.10
Padua
44.31
Caserta
69.34
Pesaro
56.80
Viterbo
43.79
Isernia
68.97
Pavia
56.21
Palermo
41.69
Benevento
40.66
Reggio
Calabria
a In 1974 Italy had 94 provinces. Regional capitals are shown in
boldface.
b The wording of the proposition stated, in effect, "I favor repeal of
the law permitting divorce." Hence a negative vote favored divorce,
and the percentages given in this table are for that negative vote.
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Figure A-2
Results of Abortion Referendum
by Province, 1981
Percent Voting in Favor of Abortion
Piemonte
Valle d'Aosta
Lombardia
Veneto
Trentino?Alto
Adige
Friuli?Venezia
Giulia
Liguria
0 20 40
60
80
Emilia?Romagna
Toscana
Umbria
Marche
Lazio
Abruzzi
Molise
Campania
Puglia
Basilicata
Calabria
Sicilia
Sardegna
Italy
The proposition was phrased as follows:
YES: I agree to limit abortion to cases of danger
to the life and physical health of the woman.
NO: I want the present law to be maintained
(which permits, among the reasons for an
abortion, that it be done within the first 90
days of pregnancy for the psychological
health of the woman relative to her social
and family condition).
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Table A-2
Returns of Election in Italy for the European
Parliament, June 1979
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
DC: Christian Democrats
12,753,708
36.45
29
PCI: Communists
10,345,284
29.57
24
PSI: Socialists
3,858,295
11.03
9
PSDI: Social Democrats
1,515,425
4.32
4
PRI: Republicans
895,558
2.56
2
PLI: Liberals
1,270,152
3.63
3
PRad: Radicals
1,283,512
3.67
3
PdUP: Proletarian Unity
406,007
1.16
1
DP: Proletarian Democracy
251,927
0.72
1
MSI-DN: Neo-Fascists and
National Right
DN-CD: National Right
and Constituent of the Right
2,050,234
5.86
4
SVP: South Tyrolean
People's Party
196,277
0.56
1
Others
166,194
0.47
0
Total
34,989,573
100.00
81
Voter Turnout
36,170,620
(85.73)
been supported originally by the DC, the votes show
at least some public approval of the party's stand.
Laws tested by referendum in 1978 concerned provi-
sion of financial subsidies to political parties and
greater government power to maintain public order.
In 1981, life imprisonment, the right to bear arms,
and broader powers to combat terrorism were all
upheld against repeal by a respectable margin.
Another major national election in June 1979?for
Italy's delegation to the European Parliament?pro-
vides additional opportunity to scrutinize DC
strength. This vote, the first of its kind, was held one
week after the national election for Legislature VIII
of Parliament, prompting many observers to express
skepticism on voter reaction to a second call to the
polls in so short a time. Although the returns of the
two elections have a few points of contrast, there is
little to suggest that the electorate was reluctant to
vote again. In any event, the two elections bear
consideration side by side (see table A-2, figure A-3,
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Figure A-3
Election Results* for the Italian National Delegation
to the European Parliament by Political Region-1979
0 ,
K-, c
7/6---c-- ? '\
(r-., 'c'''
'''''''
c-Y
1. Piemonte
2. Valle d' Aosta
3. Lombardia
4. Trentino-Alto Adige
5. Veneto
6. Friuli-Venezia Giulia
7. Liguria
8. Emilia-Romagna
9. Toscana
10. Umbria
11. Marche
12. Lazio
13. Abruzzi
14. Molise
15. Campania
16. Puglia
17. Basilicata
18. Calabria
19. Sicilia
20. Sardegna
14
Party Vote Percentage
Other
'V
Socialist
631118 3-82
Christian Democratic
Communist
*These figures do not include votes from
total number of ballots cast.
Names and boundary representation
are not necessarily authoritative.
Italian residents abroad which is 0.35 percent or 126,630 of the
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Table A-3
European Parliamentary Election Vote Restructured by
Chamber of Deputies Districts
Percent
DC
PCI
PSI
Difference a
1. Turin-Novara-Vercelli
28.16
31.52
11.56
-2.81
2. Cuneo-Alessandria-Asti
39.19
23.56
10.25
-2.16
3. Genoa-Imperia-La Spezia-Savona
29.23
33.87
12.64
-2.93
4. Milan-Pavia
30.52
30.70
13.95
-2.85
5. Como-Sondrio-Varese
41.27
22.17
13.26
-2.33
6. Brescia-Bergamo
50.53
20.67
10.86
-0.53
7. Mantua-Cremona
36.23
33.98
13.59
-1.52
8. Trento-Bolzano
30.80
9.71
7.96
-0.23
9. Verona-Padua-Vicenza-Rovigo
52.68
18.42
10.46
-1.27
10. Venice-Treviso
43.67
23.62
13.59
-0.97
11. Udine-Belluno-Gorizia-Pordenone
41.60
21.63
12.42
-0.07
12. Bologna-Ferrara-Ravenna-Forli
22.97
47.46
9.87
-1.78
13. Parma-Modena-Piacenza-Reggio Emilia
28.92
45.71
10.44
-1.77
14. Florence-Pistoia
26.60
47.07
10.58
-2.51
15. Pisa-Livorno-Lucca-Massa Carrara
30.47
39.76
11.68
-1.96
16. Siena-Arezzo-Grosseto
26.80
47.26
10.99
-1.26
17. Ancona-Pesaro-Macerata-Ascoli-Picena
36.90
35.90
8.97
-0.98
18. Perugia-Terni-Rieti
29.46
41.19
11.55
-1.67
19. Rome-Latina-Viterbo-Frosinone
33.61
28.86
10.10
-2.89
20. L'Aquila-Pescara-Chieti-Teramo
45.78
29.18
8.50
+0.13
21. Campobasso-Isernia
52.58
19.38
8.18
-2.15
22. Naples-Caserta
36.74
26.84
10.19
-2.28
23. Benevento-Avellino-Salerno
46.18
19.65
9.98
-2.39
24. Bari-Foggia
40.11
26.80
9.77
-2.03
25. Lecce-Brindisi-Taranto
43.67
25.67
10.61
-0.05
26. Potenza-Matera
47.70
25.94
10.13
+4.08
27. Catanzaro-Cosenza-Reggio Calabria
40.39
26.63
13.60
-2.33
28. Catania-Messina-Siracusa-Ragusa-Enna
40.99
22.13
10.91
-1.41
29. Palermo-Trapani-Agrigento-Caltanissetta
41.28
22.28
11.09
-3.96
30. Cagliari-Sassari-Nuoro-Oristana
39.41
32.71
8.15
+1.30
31. Valle d'Aosta
17.67
25.00
4.12
32. Trieste
23.21
22.19
5.67
-0.10
a Percent of change in DC vote as compared with that for Chamber
election one week earlier.
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4.-L11111UVIILla1
and tables 13 and 17), and for that reason, the vote for
the European Parliament has been recast here as
though it were for either the Chamber or Senate in
Italy.
Total figures for the European parliamentary election
show a bit smaller voter turnout than for the Italian
Parliament, but the margin between the two leading
parties, DC and PCI, varies only slightly. The DC
vote was about 2 percent smaller and the PCI 1
percent less than their respective showings one week
earlier, with a relatively larger increase for the PSI;
the small parties alone showed any noteworthy vari-
ation. Changes of significance appear, however, if the
vote is structured as though it were a repeat of the
Chamber election (see table A-3). While the DC fell
in 22 of 32 districts in 1979 compared with 1976, in
the second election of June 1979 it fell in 28 districts
relative to the vote achieved only a week earlier.
However, the decline in eight districts was less than 1
percent. Only districts 26 and 29 (Basilicata and
western Sicily), normally areas of DC strength, devi-
ated from the general pattern of modest loss. The
former, already a party bastion, increased its share to
the DC by slightly more than 4 percent, and the
latter, also a party stronghold, dropped by a bit less
than 4 percent.
By restructuring the figures as though they were
returns in a Senate election, the DC slump appears
once again (see table A-4). Fourteen regions gave the
party's candidates less than they had the preceding
week. Only in Liguria did the loss exceed 4 percent,
and five areas of the south increased their share for
the DC. (In neither case can the Valle d' Aosta be
compared since no DC list was presented in the
national elections of 3 June.)
If any knowledge derives from these figures, it possi-
bly appears in the relationship of DC returns to voter
turnout. In the national parliamentary balloting of 3
June, 90.4 percent of the electorate turned out, 4.7
percent more than voted for the European body. On a
113
Table A-4 Percent
Returns of Elections for the European Parliament,
June 1979 if Presented as a Senate Election
Region
DC
PCI
PSI
Difference a
1. Piedmont
31.26
29.28
11.19
-3.75
2. Valle d'Aosta
17.67
25.00
4.18
3. Lombardy
37.24
27.27
13.14
-3.41
4. Trentino-Alto Adige
30.80
9.71
7.96
-2.62
5. Venetia
49.08
20.26
11.68
-2.26
6. Friuli-Venezia Giulia
36.66
22.33
10.75
-1.76
7. Liguria
29.23
33.87
12.64
-4.12
8. Emilia-Romagna
25.48
46.72
10.11
-2:40
9. Tuscany
28.06
44.43
11.08
-2.97
10. Umbria
27.68
43.63
11.57
-2.78
11. Marche
36.90
35.90
8.97
-2.53
12. Lazio
33.80
28.80
10.14
-2.99
13. Abruzzi
45.78
29.18
8.50
-0.57
14. Molise
52.58
19.38
8.13
-0.80
15. Campania
39.97
24.38
10.12
+0.76
16. Puglia
41.72
26.29
10.15
+0.23
17. Basilicata
47.70
25.94
10.18
+3.08
18. Calabria
40.39
26.63
13.60
+0.05
19. Sicily
41.10
22.20
10.99
+0.82
20. Sardinia
39.41
32.71
8.15
-0.22
Note: These figures do not include votes from Italians resident
abroad. That total, however, was only 126,630 or 0.35 percent of the
total number of ballots cast.
a Percent of change in DC vote as compared with that for Senate
election one week earlier.
national basis, this may suggest that lower participa-
tion is more harmful to the DC than others. But, as in
the case of all other Italian voting, what significance
might derive from this would have to be found in
careful comparison of statistics from each district.
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The validity of treating the European Parliament vote
in this way is open to question for several reasons.
First, the recasting of votes as though they were a
Senate contest is artificial in view of the age factor in
a normal election for the upper house,'2 whereas this
restriction did not apply in the European vote and
cannot be calculated. Second, although it cannot be
conclusive, this restructuring without the age differ-
ential allows some speculation on the voting prefer-
ences of the youngest citizens. Using the Senate data,
it would appear that younger voters in the north are
less disposed to vote for the DC and those in the south
more sympathetic to the party. (To make the compari-
son, one must take the European vote as restructured
for the Senate?where the 18- to 20-year-olds are
included?and note that the DC decline is greater
than in the true Senate election. This is most easily
done with Senate districts such as Liguria, Umbria,
Basilicata, and Sardinia which are identical to those
of the Chamber, numbers 3, 18, 26, and 30.)
Finally, since these were the first elections for the
European parliament there is no comparable refer-
ence point. In short, this device should be used with
caution. On the other hand, the DC from its founding
has identified itself firmly with European integration,
and this election can be considered as a test of the
Italian public's view of the party in that context. If
the experiment has some validity, it once again sug-
gests DC erosion and provides little reason for opti-
mism about the party's future.
DC Parliamentary Delegations and the Party's Hold
on Power
Basically, Christian Democracy's hold on govern-
ment?its so-called occupation of power?derives
from its representation in the two houses of Parlia-
ment. Close examination of the men and women who
make up these delegations and of their records pro-
vides some interesting insights. First, the senior lead-
ership, those who could be classified as DC superstars,
are relatively few and are distributed between Cham-
ber and Senate. The upper house, it should be empha-
sized, is constitutionally equal to the lower, despite
the negligible importance sometimes attributed to it.
" See footnote 5, page 52.
Confidential
Nevertheless, in some instances it is a sort of haven
for elder statesmen past their prime but far from
eclipse. Second, turnover in the makeup of DC parlia-
mentary delegations is significant although often
overlooked because of the monotonous consistency of
their size over many years. A third and less evident
development is a slow erosion of DC influence in the
various parliamentary commissions, less in number of
seats and chairmanships than in the extent to which
the DC controls the commissions' activities. None of
these other factors alters, though, what is probably
the most important of all features of the DC parlia-
mentary delegations: the permanence of party figures
in certain ministries and under-secretaryships. This is
a key factor in the DC's control of government, but its
nature is elusive.
In terms of DC leadership generally, but particularly
in the Chamber, there appear to be two echelons
distinguishable to an extent by age and/or length of
service?a two-tiered phenomenon of a limited num-
ber of superstars and a larger group of lesser stars. At
the apex are perhaps 10 to 15 deputies who have
served in at least six legislatures. Seven DC deputies,
however, have served in every legislature as well as in
the Constituent Assembly (see table A-5). Four of
these are 65 or older. Only one, Paolo Bonomi, has
never been a Cabinet member, but his strength as
head of Coldiretti for more than 35 years once gave
him more influence than many Cabinet members,
particularly in the 1950s when his power rivaled even
that of De Gasperi. The other three, Andreotti,
Colombo, and Scalfari, held a combined total of 42
Cabinet portfolios over the years, not counting An-
dreotti's five times as Prime Minister and the one
such term of Colombo. All held assorted appointments
also as under secretaries early in their careers. This
degree of experience in wielding power distinguishes
them from literally hundreds of other DC legislators
who on occasion have held Cabinet offices. Compara-
ble figures for the Senate's DC elder statesmen, such
as Scelba, Rumor, and Fanfani, show an overwhelm-
ing power role for a relatively few figures. In any
event, the composite of a few such elite careers again
belies the argument that Italy is unstable.
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Table A-5
Seniority of Christian Democratic Deputies, VIII Legislature
Names
Number of
DC Members
Number of All Deputies
Who Have Served in All
Legislatures
Constituent Assembly and
eight Legislatures
Andreotti, Bonomi,
Caiati, Colombo,
Gui, Scalfaro,
Zaccagnini
7
14
Eight Legislatures
Micheli, Sedati
2
7
Seven Legislatures
L. M. Galli, Gaspari,
Giglia
3
7
Six Legislatures
Cavaliere, Cossiga,
Forlani, Fusaro, Gioia,
Gullotti, Lattanzio, La Penna,
Malfatti, Misasi,
Pennacchini, F. Piccoli,
Pucci, Radi, V. Russo,
Scalia, Scarlato,
Sinesio, Tantalo
19
25
Five Legislatures
Armato, Arnaud, Azzaro,
Bassi, Bianchi, Bova,
Bressani, Degan, Dell'Andro,
De Mita, Evangelisti,
Laforgia, Lettieri,
M. E. Martini, Piccinelli,
Ruffini, Salvi, G. Urso
18
34
Beneath this august level of DC capi storici (historic
leaders) is another group, both younger and more
numerous, which constitutes an entrenched echelon on
its own. Two of these who have recently been Prime
Minister and seem headed into the top tier are
Cossiga and Forlani. But more characteristic of the
group are figures like Gullotti, Lattanzio, Malfatti,
Evangelisti, and even Tina Anse1mi and Maria Eletta
Martini. In all instances they are people who have
served in the Chamber continuously since at least
1963, individuals who not infrequently give the im-
pression of greater concern for party interests and
tenure of power than for national or constituent
concerns. Significant as this group is to the party, its
presence and longevity in office have caused many
ambitious younger DC deputies to feel that access to
the highest tiers is blocked for them.
115
In effect, then, this next part of the hierarchy, made
up of perhaps 35 to 50 people, appears as the next-to-
the-top layer of a pyramid. The base level consists of a
much larger group of deputies that rotates into and
out of the Chamber for one or two terms. While this
revolving mass is often granted a portion of the spoils
of office holding?an under secretary's post or ap-
pointment to one of the lesser ministries?the likeli-
hood for advancement and thus of leadership renewal
in the higher circles is rather limited. The avenues of
entry into the top two layers are a combination of long
service on lower levels of the DC or in its auxiliary
support groups, plus a considerable degree of subservi-
ence or conformity to the views of the elite and loyal
adherence to one's own faction. One example of
success appears to be Angelo Lobianco, now in his
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fourth term as deputy and the newly elected head of
the major rural support force of the party, Coldiretti.
On the other hand, Milanese deputy Massimo de
Carolis, seems to epitomize the promising future star
who suddenly burned out. As the top votegetter for
the DC in northern Italy in 1976, de Carolis seemed
to presage a new and younger generation rising in the
party, but in 1979 his preference votes dropped
dramatically. De Carolis consistently refuses to play
by the rules and has not followed any faction, and his
individual initiatives, which smack of great personal
ambition, make him less attractive as a good ally for
the old guard. The recent inclusion of his name on the
membership lists of the P-2 Masonic Lodge has
probably completed his exclusion from future power
in the party.
In general, regarding deputies who might rise in the
party, the younger group is essentially rightist in
orientation but not well in step with the old hierarchy.
At present renewal possibilities for the leadership are
not immediately evident. The view toward the left
wing of the party is more grim with no leadership
figure of any seeming promise. After at least seven
years of party commitments to renewal, therefore, the
outlook is bleak.
Younger leaders and women in particular are factors
that could appeal to the contemporary Italian elector-
ate and the DC should consider them for party
renewal as well as continued delegation strength. And
in both areas the DC's position is not entirely nega-
tive. As regards young and new blood, particularly
with the lowered voting age, widely heard criticism
about the aging of the DC does not hold up as far as
delegation age is considered (see figure A-4). Conven-
tional wisdom in Italy in the last few years has
asserted that the DC has an older group in Parliament
than, say, the PCI. The attached chart shows that in
Legislature VIII this is not the case. Although the
PCI has a slight edge in the group under 35, there is
almost no difference between the two delegations for
those aged 35 to 54. And as far as the preferences of
younger voters are concerned, the positions a deputy
takes on issues are doubtless more important than his
age.
Confidential
Table A-6
Women in Parliament
1948 1953 1958 1963 1968 1972 1976 1979
Elected to the Senate
DC
PCI
PSI
PLI
SI a
0 0 0 1 2 2 2 3
2 0 1 2 7 2 8 8
2 1 2 2 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
Elected to the Chamber of Deputies
DC
PCI
PSI
18 12
21 16
3 3
11 11 8 8 9 9
11 15 9 17 39 37
3 1 0 1 1 1
a Sinistra Indipendente.
In the matter of women, certainly quite important for
the DC when the female population makes up so
much of its electorate, the record is rather different.
Although the DC has supported some women as
candidates for the Chamber and Senate, the party's
roster of elected women is far smaller than that of the
PCI (see table A-6). In fact, from an alltime high of
18 DC women elected to the Chamber in 1948, the
number has fallen to 9 in the present legislature and
its predecessor. Meanwhile the PCI as of mid-1981 is
only two short of its alltime high of 39. The extent to
which women's candidacies influence the electorate is
perhaps exaggerated by some Italian observers, al-
though Italian women have recently become far more
independent and articulate, particularly for a Latin
and Mediterranean nation.
Another element of significance for a deputy, particu-
larly in Italy's form of proportional representation, is
the preference vote he achieves (see tables A-7 and
A-8). To an extent this vote indicates the party's
degree of support for individual candidates, but also it
can be a measure of the public's feelings for them.
The importance of these performances is, however,
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Figure A-4
Relative Ages of Parliamentary Delegations: DC, PCI, and PSI, 1948-79
Number of Persons in a Delegation by Age Group, Percent of Total Delegation, and Party
Key
o Christian Democrats
0 PCI
PSI
50
100
150
1948
574 (total)
306
25-34
14.38
28.78
15.68
I
I
29.41
28.03
I
132
35-44
23.53
39.22
35.61
I
45-54
31.38
14.70
I
5.31
i]
55-64
23.53
2.29
j_j
2.27
]
65-74
5.88
75+
1953
11.83
20.28
,I
590
25-34
12.00
262
31.68
I
32.87
I
143
35-44
25.33
35.50
31.46
45-54
22.67
17.18
I
13.99
55-64
29.33
3.81
0.70
65-74
10.67
0.70
75+
1958
10/5
8.57
jj
596
25-34
20.24
273
37.36
i
47.86
I
140
35-44
32.15
33.70
I
25.71
I
45-54
19.05
17.22
16.43
-
1
55-64
15.47
1.47
IA3
1
65-74
11.90
75+
1.19
1963
3.85
3.62
-1-
630
25-34
2.30
260
40.00
I
54.82
166
35-44
54.02
34.62
25.90
45-54
24.14
18.07
I
13.86
I
55-64
11.49
3.46
.20]
65-74
5.75
0.60
75+
2.30
Notes: I. A candidate must be 25 years of age or older
on the date of elections to be eligible to become
a member of the Chamber of Deputies.
2. In the 1968 elections, PSI and PSDI
presented a common ticket under the label PSU
(United Socialist Party).
0
50
100
150
1968
630 25-34 3/9
265 34.71
-,
36.26
i
171 35-44 32.97
41.13
--
49.71
45-54 46.15
1
18.11
9.35
55-64 12.09
3.03
1
2.34
1
65-74 4.40
0.59
75+ 1.10
1972 3.39
8.00
630 25-34 4.92
266 28.57
29.72
175 35-44 31.15
43.23
53.71
45-54 44/6
21.43
7.43111
55-64 14.75
3.0!
.54]
65-74 3.28
0.37
75+ 1.64
1976 9.92
630 25-34 3.51
262 26.34
222 35-44 28.07
49.24
46.85
45-54 45.61
.1
11.07
12.16

55-64 17.55
3.43
045
65-74 3.51
5.45
75+ 1.75
1979 5.36
630 25-34 9.68
261 29.89
._
_
3M34
201 35-44 35.48
43.68
40.30
45-54 32.26
_.
18.77
17.91
55-64 16.13
2.30
j
2.49
i
65-74 4.84
0.50
75+ 1.61
3 Figures in this chart are based on a study Because of certification practices used in Italian
published by the Italian parliament's Office of electoral procedures, the total number of
Statistical and Documentary Services. Each deputies in a party's delegation can change in
deputy's age isdetermined by how old he/she the first weeks of a session. Hence the size of
was on the day when the first meeting of the each party group may vary slightly from figures
new legislature to which he/she was elected given elsewhere in this report.
occurred.
585983 2-82
117
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Table A-7
Preference Votes for Leading Christian
Democratic Deputies a
1968
1972
1976
1979
Giulio Andreotti
252,369
367,235
191,573
302,745
Vincenzo Scotti
61,339
80,164
68,923
210,911
Luigi Ciriaco de Mita
65,231
127,876
112,792
169,431
Vito Lattanzio
120,857
134,911
101,627
151,361
Attilio Ruffini
46,385
93,032
109,555
144,614
Francesco Cossiga
102,814
94,855
178,124
136,383
Antonio Gaya
96,676
100,877
134,053
Antonino Gullotti
91,308
126,231
127,713
128,580
Remo Gaspari
141,927
136,022
91,168
120,452
Gerardo Bianco
57,117
83,188
90,425
117,112
Vincenzo Russo
69,072
104,410
78,764
110,294
Antonino Drago
113,070
78,656
91,087
110,151
Giuseppe Caroli
48,216
76,232
79,743
108,629
Paolo Cirino Pomicino
79,546
105,856
Giuseppe Gargani
54,867
76,511
105,735
Arcangelo Lobianco
74,342
97,561
113,380
105,351
Giuseppe Sinesio
73,135
121,961
107,674
104,706
Arnaldo Forlani
77,333
156,949
177,905
102,969
Giovanni Amabile
58,929
101,092
Calogero Mannino
83,006
100,060
Ellipsis indicates that the individual was not a candidate.
a These 20 deputies are ranked according to their showing in the
general elections of 1979 and are all the DC candidates receiving
more than 100,000 preference votes.
questionable because no pattern seems to fit a signifi-
cant number of individual careers. On the other hand,
a steadily declining preference vote must be regarded
as ominous, a portent of possible impending defeat.
One of the charts shown here gives the record of the
20 highest DC preference votegetters in 1979 and
their levels in three preceding elections. Table A-9
demonstrates the same figures for that group of DC
deputies that appears generally to constitute the
party's "establishment" today, the stars and super-
stars. From the latter, such figures as Gerardo
Bianco, Luigi Ciriaco de Mita, Filippo Maria Pan-
dolfi, Vincenzo Scotti, and others would appear to be
Confidential
Table A-8
DC Chamber of Deputies Delegation
by Preference Vote, 1979 a
More than 100,000
20
90,000-99,999
80,000-89,999
70,000-79,999
60,000-69,999
50,000-59,999
40,000-49,999
30,000-39,999
20,000-29,999
Fewer than 20,000
10 (first election to Chamber: 2)
16 (first election to Chamber: 4)
17 (first election to Chamber: 5)
31 (first election to Chamber: 7)
28 (first election to Chamber: 3)
38 (first election to Chamber: 9)
59 (first election to Chamber: 17)
36 (first election to Chamber: 11)
3
a Of the newly elected deputies in 1979, 10 were last on their party
list, nine were next to last; only one (Casini in District 14, Florence-
Pistoia) led his ticket.
rising in importance. Others such as Gian Aldo
Arnaud, Emilio Colombo, Andrea Borruso, and Fran-
co Salvi, seem to be declining, a conclusion which may
not be valid. In essence, while these votes can be
exploited for influence, a deputy's power-once he is
established-is not necessarily critically measured by
them. A number of improved preference vote stand-
ings would seem to validate a certain resuscitation of
the DC in 1979 compared to 1976. Again, though, no
evidence exists to demonstrate that this is of any great
significance.
Finally, a point must be made concerning the DC
delegation's changes of personnel in 1976 and 1979. If
the party managed to hold almost exactly the same
number of seats in both elections, the earlier case was
curious in that, poor though the overall party record
may have been, 74 new deputies were elected. In
short, if the electorate in 1976 was, on the one hand,
not demonstrating disapproval by the number of DC
deputies it elected, it was at least willing to return a
number of new faces, in a sense to permit a kind of re-
newal. The return of 60 new people in 1979 apparent-
ly confirms a continuation of this feeling. Behind the
general picture, however, seems to lie a deeper mal-
aise: that deputies may be renewed but the party
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Table A-9
Preference Votes for Selected DC Deputies, 1968-79
1968
1972
1976
1979
1968
1972
1976
1979
Giulio Andreotti
252,369
367,235
191,593
302,745
Antonio Gaya
96,676
100,877
134,053
Tina Anse1mi
40,467
38,389
74,403
77,944
Giovanni Gioia b
77,869
123,381
111,037
90,939
Gian Aldo Arnaud
60,608
77,916
54,211
29,538
Luigi Gui
58,768
61,327
c
46,999
Gerardo Bianchi
57,117
83,188
90,425
117,112
Antonino Gullotti
91,308
126,231
127,713
128,580
Guido Bodrato
30,326
39,935
43,890
46,101
Vito Lattanzio
120,857
134,911
101,627
151,361
Paolino Bonomi
145,875
154,966
119,653
89,160
Franco Maria Malfatti
59,638
70,746
49,110
46,458
Andrea Borruso
...
107,829
33,249
Vincenzo Mancini
56,536
74,204
67,553
91,990
Manfredi Bosco
98,312
117,977
86,379
95,777
Filippo Maria Pandolfi
41,439
49,476
67,448
85,864
Bartolomeo Ciccardini
48,476
64,599
96,749
55,774
Flaminio Piccoli
54,256
84,378
37,402
41,800
Emilio Colombo
103,322
118,118
90,420
90,818
Virginio Rognoni
24,918
40,380
30,903
89,313
Francesco Cossiga
102,814
94,855
178,124
136,383
Liugi Rossi di Montelera
...
142,227
81,236
Clelio Darida
57,446
a
74,855
59,468
Attilio Ruffini
46,385
93,032
109,555
144,614
Massimo De Carolis
...
151,555
86,219
Vincenzo Russo
69,072
104,410
78,764
110,194
Costante Degan
34,122
42,325
56,533
52,450
Franco Salvi
44,453
40,626
52,983
39,401
Luigi Ciriaco De Mita
65,231
127,876
112,792
169,431
Oscar Luigi Scalfaro
92,979
114,187
87,459
56,815
Franco Evangelisti
52,216
89,731
63,805
93,206
Vito Scalia
115,336
d
96,608
70,142
Arnaldo Forlani
77,333
156,949
177,905
102,969
Vincenzo Scarlato
82,632
113,407
95,138
89,390
Franco Foschi
50,651
58,843
60,396
57,063
Vincenzo Scotti
61,339
80,164
68,923
210,911
Carlo Fracanzani
38,689
57,623
51,623
38,761
Giuseppe Sinesio
73,135
121,961
107,674
104,706
Giovanni Galloni
66,303
75,805
74,029
74,386
Benigno Zaccagnini
37,866
39,444
101,911
67,673
Remo Gaspari
141,927
136,022
91,168
120,452
Giuseppe Zamberletti
47,523
38,233
68,637
65,257
Ellipsis indicates that the individual was not a candidate.
a Darida resigned his Chamber seat in 1969 to become mayor of
Rome, a post he held until 1976.
b Gioia died 27 November 1981.
c In 1976 Gui ran for and was elected to the Senate.
d Scalia resigned from the Chamber in 1969 to devote himself to
activities in CISL. He did not run again for the Chamber until 1976.
consistently fails to create the comparable revitaliza-
tion of ideals and actions necessary for it to hold its
own. This is the rinnovamento which has now eluded
the DC for seven years.
As concerns the Senate-where the size of the DC
delegation increased in 1979 for the first time since
1968, despite a smaller share of the raw vote-the
delegation is distinguished by the presence of such ex-
greats as Mario Scelba and Mariano Rumor, not to
mention the party's one senator-for-life, Amintore
119
Fanfani, who has been president of the Senate since
1968. Certainly this delegation, if perhaps more dis-
tinguished because of the accomplishments of its
members, is slightly less influential than that in the
Chamber. Carlo Donat Cattin, who moved up to the
Senate from the Chamber in 1979, is one of today's
principal faction leaders. Other DC leaders who are
also Senators are Giovanni Marcora, Vittorino Co-
lombo, and Luigi Granelli. But one former DC pre-
mier and president of the Republic, Giovanni Leone,
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Table A-10
Leading Christian Democratic Senators by Numerical Vote a
1968
1972
1976
1979
Marino Carboni (Lazio: Rome 6) b
65,294
146,713
(percent of turnout)
50.10
33.25
Giovanni Marcora (Lombardy: Vimercate)
97,299
100,723
103,528
105,341
(percent of turnout)
46.39
44.13
41.91
40.55
Vittorino Colombo (Lombardy: Monza) c
(70,676)
(81,923)
100,876
99,680
(percent of turnout)
40.00
38.38
Enzo Berlanca (Lombardy: Clusone)
96,773
(percent of turnout)
59.34
Luigi Carraro (Venetia: Cittadella) d
84,877
91,119
96,368
96,715
(percent of turnout)
64.12
64.74
63.76
61.55
Gian Pietro Rossi (Lombardy: Busto Arsizio)
99,497
96,580
(percent of turnout)
42.61
40.38
Vittorino Colombo (Venetia: Verona I)
95,127
95,619
(percent of turnout)
47.03
46.33
Fermo Mino Martinazzoli (Lombardy: Brescia)
84,749
90,708
90,137
(percent of turnout)
43.43
44.44
43.27
Vincenzo Bombardieri (Lombardy: Treviglio)
88,801
89,487
(percent of turnout)
55.38
53.25
Mariano Rumor (Venetia: Vicenza)
(168,828)
(266,710)
(73,279)
88,028
(percent of turnout)
53.73
Carlo Donat Cattin (Piedmont: Pinerolo)
(43,660)
(72,024)
(50,357)
86,311
(percent of turnout)
35.51
Angelo CasteIli (Lombardy: Bergamo)
(33,246)
(38,838)
90,812
85,947
(percent of turnout)
57.58
53.62
Aristide Marchetti (Lombardy: Varese)
(45,685)
(30,948)
88,457
85,085
(percent of turnout)
39.42
37.09
Delio Giacometti (Venetia: Schio)
84,941
84,919
(percent of turnout)
60.24
58.80
Pietro Schiano (Venetia: Padua)
88,574
84,643
(percent of turnout)
48.68
45.77
Luigi Granelli (Lombardy: Cantu)
(47,047)
(50,929)
(35,965)
83,930
(percent of turnout)
45.18
Guido GoneIla (Venetia: Verona Collina)
(55,992)
77,958
82,949
83,130
(percent of turnout)
59.97
59.99
58.36
Alessandro Codazzi (Venetia: Treviso)
82,619
81,657
(percent of turnout)
55.61
53.47
Mario Costa (Lazio: Latina)
70,192
77,444
81,554
(percent of turnout)
38.40
38.13
38.38
Ellipsis indicates individual was not a candidate.
NOTE: Senators nominally represent a region, but they are elected
in districts within the region. Each party may present a minimum of
three candidates in a region but no more than the equivalent number
of regional districts. Each voter may vote for only one candidate. The
tally is made by counting votes for each candidate and, in turn,
calculating that figure as a percentage of the total valid votes cast,
thus determining personal preference. According to seats assigned to
the district, the victors are determined on their percentage of the
total. For example, in Rome 6 in 1979, 441,194 valid votes were cast,
146,713 (33.25 percent) of which were for Marino Carboni, the
highest single total in the district.
Confidential
a This table shows the 19 DC senators who received more than
80,000 votes in 1979. Numbers in parentheses are for an individual's
vote when elected to the Chamber of Deputies in preceding
legislatures.
b Senator Carboni died 29 December 1979. In 1976 he was elected to
the Senate from Puglia.
c In 1976 Colombo opted for a seat in the Senate although he was si-
multaneously elected to the Chamber from District 4 (Milan-Pavia)
with 59,122 votes.
d Carraro died 8 November 1980.
e In 1979 Donat Cattin was elected to the Chamber from District 1
(Turin-Novara-Vercelli) with 41,619 votes but opted for the Senate.
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uommential
Table A-11
Leading Christian Democratic Senators
by Personal Preference Vote a
Percent
(except where indicated)
1968
1972
1976
1979
Antonio Bisaglia (Venetia: Bassano del Grappa)
(74,577)
(138,241)
(103,819)
62.27
Luigi Carraro (Venetia: Cittadella) b
64.12
64.74
63.76
61.55
Enzo Berlanca (Lombardy: Clusone)
59.34
Tarcisio Salvaterra (Trentino-Alto Adige: Mezzolombardo)
60.58
58.07
Delio Giacometti (Venetia: Schio)
. . .
60.24
58.80
Guido Gonella (Venetia: Verona Collina)
(55,992)
59.97
59.99
58.36
Mario Pedini (Lombardy: Chiari)
(55,467)
(76,339)
55.40
54.43
Mariano Rumor (Venetia: Vicenza)
(168,828)
(266,710)
(73,729)
53.73
Angelo Castelli (Lombardy: Bergamo)
(33,246)
(38,838)
57.58
53.62
Alessandra Codazzi (Venetia: Treviso)
55.61
53.47
Vincenzo Bombardieri (Lombardy: Treviglio)
55.38
53.25
Angelo Pavan (Venetia: Vittorio Veneto-Montebelluna)
53.05
Domenico Raffaello Lombardi (Molise: Campobasso-Isernia)
. . .
51.79
52.46
Luciano Dal Falco (Venetia: Verona Pianura)
45.10
47.59
52.31
52.07
Onorio Cengarle (Venetia: Este)
66.68 .
70.42 .
65.77 .
51.62
Giacomo Mazzoli (Lombardy: Breno)
55.09
66.68 .
53.21
51.61
Errico D'Amico (Abruzzi: Lanciano Vasto)
.
49.49
51.20
Adolfo Sarti (Piedmont: Alba)
(63,422)
51.90
54.18
50.62
Osvaldo Di Lembo (Molise: Larino)
50.14
Adriano Bompiani (Abruzzi: Chieti)
46.53
50.11
Ellipsis indicates individual was not a candidate.
NOTE: See explanatory note on table of Leading Christian
Democratic Senators by Numerical Vote for key to determining a
candidate's preferential vote. In this table, for example, the district
of Bassano del Grappa had 124,343 valid votes cast in 1979, of which
77,435 (62.27 percent) went to Antonio Bisaglia.
a This table shows the 20 DC senators, in order of preference, who
achieved more than 50 percent of the vote cast in their districts.
Numbers in parentheses are for an individual's vote when elected to
the Chamber of Deputies in preceding elections.
b Senator Carraro died 8 November 1980.
. When a candidate achieves 65 percent or more of the vote in his dis-
trict, he is proclaimed as elected by quorum. No other candidates
can be elected in any district where this occurs.
now styles himself as an "independent." In fact,
having been driven from the Quirinale by scandals
prior to the end of his term, Leone is hardly a figure
from whom the DC wants support, nor is he likely to
give it after being sacrificed-he feels-by men who
were no cleaner than he. In any event, from the
party's viewpoint Leone is now a nonperson.
121
As in the case of the Chamber, the Senate's elections
help measure the strength of DC candidates (see
tables A-10 to A-12). Senate elections are more
complex. But given the different modes of Chamber
and Senate districting and election, large personal
preference votes tend to produce winners in those
areas where the population is largest. For the Senate
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Table A-12
DC Senate Delegation by Preference Vote, 1979
More than 100,000
90,000 to 99,999
80,000 to 89,999
70,000 to 79,999
60,000 to 69,999
50,000 to 59,999
40,000 to 49,999
30,000 to 39,999
20,000 to 29,999
Less than 20,000
2
6
11 (first election to Senate: 3)
8 (first election to Senate: 2)
13 (first election to Senate: 2)
30 (first election to Senate: 9) a
39 (first election to Senate: 9)
23 (first election to Senate: 7)
7 (first election to Senate: 4)
1
Personal Preference Vote
More than 60 percent
50.0 to 59.9 percent
40.0 to 49.9 percent
30.0 to 39.9 percent
Less than 30.0 percent
2 (first election to Senate: 1)
19 (first election to Senate: 4) a
55 (first election to Senate: 9) a
61 (first election to Senate: 21)
3 (first election to Senate: 1)
a Includes senators replacing deceased members.
delegation, however, comparative records cannot be
compiled for even as many as four legislatures be-
cause only about half of the top votegetters have been
in the Senate that long. As in the case of the
Chamber, though, these statistics do not necessarily
reflect any apparent position of power or influence on
the part of the individual DC Senators. Between the
two lists, on the other hand, there is with the Senate a
slightly greater likelihood that figures of known politi-
cal clout, such as Antonio Bisaglia or Giovanni Mar-
cora, will be found. Mixed in with them are other DC
Senators whose stature is not outstanding.
These statistics, for the Chamber or the Senate, have
at best only a relative value. They indicate the rise or
fall of various DC office seekers in the eyes of the
electorate, and politicians like to attach importance to
good showings; but their value for establishing a
candidate's power in the party is limited.
Confidential
Ultimately, the question has to be raised of where or
what is the true base of the DC's hold on government.
The answer appears to be almost deceptively simple
and potentially easy to overlook: the DC's longstand-
ing ability to maintain key ministries (see figure A-5).
This has been achieved?unbroken in a few instances
since 1945?by the endless grip of the DC on the
office of minister or under secretary. The fruits in the
lush patronage vineyards of sottogoverno thus assure
a lasting bounty of influence.
The full significance of continued DC control in
certain ministries is not always obvious. Cases in point
are the Ministries of Public Instruction, Post and
Telecommunications, and State Participations. In the
first instance, with extensive control over schools from
elementary to university level, the Minister has a
potential monopoly or predominant influence over
curriculum content as well as the teacher corps and,
in one way or another, is able to inject political
criteria into the educational establishment. Erosion of
DC power in this area is a bit less evident than in
some others, but as regional governments have come
into operation and assumed some functions in the
school system, the party has experienced a decline in
influence because its role in several of the regions has
been, at best, peripheral. And in the case of long and
noisy demands for school reforms, such as occurred
between 1968 and 1970, the DC's ability to remain
immobile has worked to obstruct publicly desired
changes the party thought detrimental to its views.
Post and Telecommunications not only controls the
mails and telephone and telegraph systems but, more
importantly, manages information such as the state
radio and television networks, RAI (Radiotelevisione
Italiana). Until a very few years ago, radio and TV
were a government monopoly, and ever since removal
of that control, specific networks or channels are
known as party mouthpieces, either DC or leftist (PCI
and PSI). RAI-TV's first channel and radio's second
program are still known as DC preserves. The break-
ing of that state monopoly?tantamount to breaking
what was regarded as a DC hammerlock?knocked
another stone out of the wall of the party's power
structure.
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With its overseer's role for the vast network of state-
managed industries and holding companies, State
Participations clearly is a cornucopia of spoils as well
as a potential and frequently exploited source of
financial contributions to the DC itself. The virtually
constant DC tenure of these three Ministries is shown
on figure A-5 for the full span of the party's
governments.
If these three portfolios have a vital and not too subtle
meaning in domestic affairs, other major ministries
such as Interior, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Agri-
culture also have been almost permanent preserves of
the party. The triad of economic ministries, Treasury,
Finance, and Budget, has also been managed in such
fashion as to assure permanent DC "occupation of
power."
Particular note ought to be paid to the tenure of DC
figures in first-echelon ministries. Examples of promi-
nent DC figures who have starred in various minis-
tries include Taviani and Andreotti (Defense), Emilio
Colombo (12 times at the Treasury), Marcora (Agri-
culture), Bo and Bisaglia (State Participations), Gui
and Malfatti (Public Instruction), and Rognoni (Inte-
rior). Also not to be overlooked are the longtime DC
under secretaries, some of whom have held office as
many as eight consecutive terms. Indeed, the trade of
a ministerial post to a coalition ally has rarely cost the
DC its control of that portfolio when the under
secretary(ies) stayed through one government after
another.
These phenomena, while describing a certain stagna-
tion in government, are supplemented by yet another
element suggesting stability in Italy comparable to
that in the United States. Since de Gasperi's first
government in 1945, when Truman had been Presi-
dent less than a year, Italy had only 10 prime
ministers until the summer of 1981 when the first
postwar non-DC premier took office. In the same
period, eight men were President of the United States.
American chief executives, however, came from two
parties; all the Italian heads of government were from
only one, the DC. Furthermore, two of them (Segni
and Leone) became head of state as well. If the
123
systems of government are sufficiently different to
raise questions on the validity of this comparison, the
fact remains that some of the premiers of Italy have
had a greater composite time in office than some US
presidents since the war.
In conclusion, the impression is almost overwhelming
that DC control of the Italian Government has been
extensive, intensive, and pervasive for more than a
third of a century. Not only did the practice devel-
op?broken only a few months ago?that the DC
should always hold either the premiership or the
presidency, but the party also has consistently main-
tained a large bloc of members in both houses of
Parliament. On the other hand, the influence and
relative importance of particular DC figures has been
diverse, and a notably small number has occupied a
majority of the most powerful and influential posts of
government for years on end. Even if this may be
viewed as the prerogative of the majority party in a
democracy, the practice has appeared frequently to
large segments of public opinion as the flouting of
representative principles. Without doubt the DC's
exercise of power as expressed in tenure of the
ministries seems quite out of line with the proportion
of votes it received. Its occupation of power lamented
by other parties, occasionally in strident tones, has
been the target of DC figures themselves who felt
they were being excluded. Hence, DC rule of Italy has
by any definition been that of an oligarchy?even
within the party itself.
If oligarchy has been a typically Italianate form of
government for centuries, there remains the assump-
tion common to many Italians that their republican
regime was supposed to be something different. Even
if there were not seemingly endemic scandal associat-
ed with DC rule, it should be no surprise if large parts
of the Italian public are today cynical about their
national government. The earlier credit an idealist
might say was due the DC for its achievement of a
new policy in Italy after World War II has, by 1981,
been largely offset by cynicism. Such feelings, which
derive unavoidably from DC conduct, benefit neither
nation nor party.
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Table A-13
Chamber of Deputies: Percentage of Valid Ballots Cast
in Eight National Parliamentary Elections
1948
1953
1958
1963
1968
1972
1976
1979
Eight-Year
Average
1. Turin-Novara-Vercelli
98.19
95.21
96.34
95.98
95.33
95.64
96.78
94.87
96.04
2. Cuneo-Alessandria-Asti
97.60
93.91
96.01
95.59
95.38
95.53
95.97
93.96
95.49
3. Genoa-Imperia-La Spezia-
Savona
98.20
96.07
96.92
96.78
96.12
96.95
97.55
95.76
96.79
4. Milan-Pavia
98.50
96.88
97.41
97.17
96.84
97.11
97.73
96.97
97.33
5. Como-Sondrio-Varese
97.75
94.95
97.12
96.96
96.47
96.25
96.95
95.49
96.49
6. Brescia-Bergamo
97.90
95.19
97.27
96.88
96.69
96.99
97.40
96.17
96.81
7. Mantua-Cremona
97.83
95.52
97.45
97.15
96.71
97.00
97.50
96.24
96.93
8. Trento-Bolzano
98.32
96.82
98.02
97.10
97.25
96.52
97.32
96.26
97.20
9. Verona-Padua-Vicenza-
Rovigo
98.13
96.12
97.32
97.14
97.07
97.09
97.44
96.33
97.09
10. Venice-Treviso
97.85
94.89
96.85
96.94
96.78
96.97
97.52
96.57
96.80
11. Udine-Belluno-Gorizia-
Pordenone
97.52
94.09
97.01
96.94
96.64
96.92
97.24
96.22
96.57
12. Bologna-Ferrara-Ravenna-
Forli
98.28
96.66
97.28
97.32
96.97
97.69
98.11
97.53
97.48
13. Parma-Modena-Piacenza-
Reggio Emilia
97.96
95.14
96.79
96.73
96.67
97.08
97.58
98.68
96.83
14. Florence-Pistoia
97.78
96.51
97.06
96.97
96.72
97.05
97.91
96.49
97.06
15. Pisa-Livorno-Lucca-
Massa Carrara
97.64
94.78
96.85
96.72
96.01
96.82
97.47
95.91
96.53
16. Siena-Arezzo-Grosseto
97.76
95.04
96.94
97.21
96.83
98.46
97.94
97.06
97.16
17. Ancona-Pesaro-Macerata-
Ascoli Piceno
97.94
95.19
97.14
96.93
96.32
96.69
97.23
95.73
96.65
18. Perugia-Terni-Rieti
97.04
94.37
96.80
96.58
96.27
97.13
97.64
96.66
96.56
19. Rome-Latina-Viterbo-
Frosinone
98.58
96.44
97.78
97.70
97.06
97.59
97.92
97.46
97.57
20. L'Aquila-Pescara-Chieti -
Teramo
97.82
95.57
96.99
96.82
96.65
97.16
97.31
95.79
96.76
21. Campobasso-Isernia
97.18
93.92
96.17
94.94
95.01
96.16
96.31
95.18
95.61
22. Naples-Caserta
97.69
95.15
97.27
97.16
96.87
97.00
97.36
96.40
96.86
23. Benevento-Avellino-Salerno
97.27
94.05
96.85
95.98
96.31
96.63
96.80
94.42
96.04
24. Bari-Foggia
97.97
95.34
97.81
97.45
97.05
97.03
96.99
96.33
97.00
25. Lecce-Brindisi-Taranto
97.30
93.26
97.37
97.02
96.73
96.76
97.01
96.09
96.44
26. Potenza-Matera
96.14
94.24
96.60
95.31
95.55
96.42
96.27
94.79
95.67
27. Catanzaro-Cosenza-Reggio
Calabria
96.99
93.06
96.68
95.98
95.54
96.22
96.31
95.30
95.76
28. Catania-Messina-Siracusa- 97.37 95.12 97.26 96.34 95.22 95.88 96.21 92.49 95.74
Ragusa-Enna
29. Palermo-Trapani-Agrigento- 97.14 94.66 97.10 96.25 93.67 95.82 95.92 94.70 95.66
Caltanissetta
30. Cagliari-Sassari-Nuoro- 97.64 96.31 97.63 97.77 96.58 96.90 97.75 95.89 97.06
Oristano
31. Valle d'Aosta
93.40
93.97
96.05
94.96
94.78
91.70
94.61
91.14
93.83
32. Trieste
a
98.29
97.90
95.96
97.21
97.96
97.06
97.40
Italy
97.82
95.36
97.13
96.83
96.36
96.79
97.26
96.01
96.70
a Trieste became a part of Italy in October 1954.
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The DC and the Italian Electorate
In most representative political systems it is standard
practice to measure public protest sentiments by the
ratio of eligible voters who turn out for elections and
the number who deliberately cast invalid ballots. In
Italy the attention devoted to these phenomena is
considerable, more than factual evidence seems to
justify. Still, no election occurs in Italy without floods
of journalistic post mortems which consistently find
that abstentions or spoiled ballots appear in such
quantity as to indicate public discontent with govern-
ment and, inferentially, varying degrees of annoyance
with the DC. Italian electoral behavior is sufficiently
atypical as to complicate analysis of this pattern, but
the repeated attention given to it requires that it be
examined.
Among industrialized Western democracies Italy has
set an unparalleled record of high voter participation.
More than 90 percent of eligible voters have partici-
pated in each of the eight national elections since
1948, and the overall average turnout for all elections
to both Chamber and Senate is 92.81 percent (see
tables 22 and 23). The ratio of valid ballots has never
fallen below 95.36 percent for the Chamber and 94.67
percent for the Senate (see tables A-13 to A-16). In
the times that elections have been held for the 15
regular statute regions the record is almost as high.
Provincial and communal elections demonstrate a
similar pattern. The only feature distinguishing the
various levels of voting is a small but steady rise in
abstention and spoiled ballots as one moves to lower
levels of representation. In all instances, the ratio of
voter turnout and invalidated ballots is so small as to
make distinctions seem negligible. Nevertheless, Ital-
ian commentators regard the fluctuations as
significant.
When compared with other nations' voting habits, the
Italian record is admittedly remarkable. In those
instances where eligible voter turnout has fallen below
85 percent, the press has taken it as reprehensible,
even scandalous, and made it the subject of extensive
editorial comment. To foreign observers, though, the
examples of voter protest are so small numerically as
to seem inconsequential despite the interest they
125
Table A-14 Percent
Ranking of Chamber Districts,
by Percentage of Valid Ballots
in Eight Parliamentary Elections
97.57
19
Rome-Latina-Viterbo-Frosinone
97.48
12
Bologna-Ferrara-Ravenna-Forli
97.40
32
Trieste (six elections, 1958-79)
97.33
4
Milan-Pavia
97.20
8
Trento-Bolzano
97.16
16
Siena-Arezzo-Grosseto
97.09
9
Verona-Padua-Vicenza-Rovigo
97.06
14
Florence-Pistoia
30
Cagliari-Sassari-Nuoro-Oristano
97.00
24
Bari-Foggia
96.93
7
Mantua-Cremona
96.86
22
Naples-Caserta
96.84
5
Como-Sondrio-Varese
96.83
13
Parma-Modena-Piacenza-Reggio Emilia
96.81
6
Brescia-Bergamo
96.80
10
Venice-Treviso
96.79
3
Genoa-Imperia-La Spezia-Savona
96.76
20
L'Aquila-Pescara-Chieti-Teramo
96.70
Average
96.65
17
Ancona-Pesaro-Macerata-Ascoli Piceno
96.57
11
Udine-Belluno-Gorizia-Pordenone
96.56
18
Perugia-Terni-Rieti
96.53
15
Pisa-Livorno-Lucca-Massa Carrara
96.44
25
Lecce-Brindisi-Taranto
96.04
1
Turin-Novara-Vercelli
23
Benevento-Avellino-Salerno
95.76
27
Catanzaro-Cosenza-Reggio Calabria
95.74
28
Catania-Messina-Siracusa-Ragusa-Enna
95.70
Median
95.67
26
Potenza-Matera
95.66
29
Palermo-Trapani-Agrigento-Caltanissetta
95.61
22
Campobasso-Isernia
95.49
2
Cuneo-Alessandria-Asti
93.83
31
Valle d'Aosta
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Table A-15
Senate: Percentage of Valid Ballots Cast by Eligible Voters
in Eight National Parliamentary Elections
1948
1953
1958
1963
1968
1972
1976
1979
Eight-Year
Average
1. Piedmont
94.98
94.78
94.67
93.73
93.58
94.78
96.04
93.60
94.52
2. Valle d'Aosta
93.56
94.21
95.28
94.28
94.71
91.59
94.26
88.57
93.31
3. Lombardy
95.17
96.04
95.95
96.11
95.26
96.16
97.13
95.73
95.94
4. Trentino-Alto Adige
94.56
95.25
93.16
94.98
95.10
95.14
96.22
95.52
94.99
5. Venetia
94.98
95.29
95.87
95.60
95.24
96.17
97.03
95.58
95.72
6. Friuli-Venezia Giulia
95.07
95.16
96.00
95.99
95.51
96.74
96.99
96.12
95.95
7. Liguria
95.92
95.50
95.49
95.07
94.45
95.99
96.52
94.96
95.49
8. Emilia-Romagna
95.30
96.01
95.26
95.82
95.70
96.76
97.59
96.72
96.15
9. Tuscany
94.01
95.78
95.40
95.49
94.87
96.07
96.77
95.87
95.53
10. Umbria
93.15
94.84
94.47
93.68
94.68
96.27
97.31
96.07
95.06
I 1 . Marche
94.17
94.83
95.55
95.27
94.33
95.56
96.59
94.86
95.15
12. Lazio
95.65
95.90
95.59
95.55
95.09
96.39
97.22
95.76
95.89
13. Abruzzi
95.02
93.44
94.78
94.33
94.10
95.32
96.39
94.68
94.76
14. Molise
94.16
93.40
93.75
93.40
94.43
94.98
94.72
92.79
93.95
15. Campania
93.94
94.39
95.04
94.80
94.69
95.24
96.15
94.34
94.82
16. Puglia
94.88
95.57
95.68
95.35
95.11
95.86
96.19
94.70
95.42
17. Basilicata
93.78
93.94
94.13
93.58
93.88
95.29
95.13
93.18
94.11
18. Calabria
94.39
93.63
94.25
93.50
93.42
94.42
95.01
93.12
93.97
19. Sicily
94.94
95.41
95.56
94.50
95.53
94.41
95.32
93.07
94.84
20. Sardinia
94.53
95.61
95.05
95.40
94.99
95.44
96.75
94.98
95.34
Italy
95.03
95.39
95.48
95.28
94.67
95.74
96.59
95.03
95.40
rouse. Recently, however, a few more significant
elements have appeared. In any event, given the
national penchant for observation of these protests,
what do they say about the DC?
In regard to any party's electoral showing and to the
national voting record, three factors must be cited.
First, qualification for voting is automatic since each
citizen is registered by his commune on his/her 18th
birthday. When an election occurs, each voter has
merely to pick up his/her registration certificate at a
municipal office and go to the polls. Second, Italian
legislation provides mild civil sanctions for failure to
vote, and social pressure is heavy on everyone for
electoral participation. Everyone is given time off
from work to vote, and rail fares are greatly reduced
Confidential
to get voters back to their home districts (until
recently Italy had no absentee voting). Finally, con-
tinuing memories of fascist dictatorship stimulate
citizen participaton as a safeguard against any return
to authoritarian government.
Evaluation of the overall record of voter participation
and ballot box protest, given the record in the at-
tached tables, is almost statistical hairsplitting. Ob-
servers in Italy argue extensively nevertheless over
meanings of the figures. One common assertion is that
low voter turnout benefits the DC and high participa-
tion assists parties of the left. Comparison of statistics
does not, however, bear this out either for the Cham-
ber or the Senate. In the cases of Veneto and Molise,
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Table A-16 Percent
Ranking of Senate Districts
by Average Valid Ballots, 1948-79
1.
96.15
Emilia-Romagna
2.
95.95
Friuli-Venezia Giulia
3.
95.94
Lombardy
4.
95.89
Lazio
5.
95.72
Venetia
6.
95.53
Tuscany
7.
95.49
Liguria
8.
95.42
Puglia
95.40
Average
9.
95.34
Sardinia
10.
95.15
Marche
11.
95.06
Umbria
12.
94.99
Trentino-Alto Adige
13.
94.84
Sicily
14.
94.82
Campania
15.
94.76
Abruzzi
94.73
Median
16.
94.52
Piedmont
17.
94.11
Basilicata
18.
93.97
Calabria
19.
93.95
Molise
20.
93.31
Valle d'Aosta
both bastions of DC strength, the former ranks among
the highest areas in voter participation and the latter
is nearly always the lowest. To a small degree better
correlation of the view can be found for high voting
ratios favoring the left, but exceptions are not wanting
here. In short, attempts to read partisan interpreta-
tions into the number of people going to the polls
seems pointless. Voting for Parliament in 1979 ap-
pears to be the single possible exception. In that year
every district for both Chamber and Senate had a
smaller voter participation. Most observers interpret-
ed this as public discontent with the national govern-
ment. Some went so far as to say that the larger
abstentions indicated dissatisfaction with the DC
because of its being the majority party in government
and thus most responsible for failed aspirations and
programs. Until other evidence in later elections
substantiates this view, its validity is questionable.
127
A bit more of a pattern seems to be indicated by the
record of invalidated ballots. In this case Italian
voters use two methods of registering protest: handing
in a blank ballot, or deliberate spoiling of the ballot,
often by writing derogatory comments on it. Ironical-
ly, the highest number of spoiled ballots appeared in
the elections of 1953. In 24 of 31 Chamber districts
an alltime high of invalidated ballots was cast. Pre-
sumably that indicated dissatisfaction with the so-
called "swindle law" the DC had sponsored for the
elections, a gimmick which would have ensured it of
an absolute majority of Chamber seats if it had
achieved a given vote plurality. Curiously, though,
there is no discernible similar pattern in Senate
elections of the same year. Thus, at a distance of three
decades, the 1953 case is little more than a historical
oddity.
The only other manifestation of electoral protest
through the ballot was an alltime high of blank ballots
reported in 24 of 32 '3 Chamber districts in 1979.
Although the number of such ballots was significantly
higher in a few districts than for previous elections,
the number rarely exceeded 3 percent of the total
number cast. However, there does not appear even
here sufficient evidence of voter discontent that could
be regarded as directed specifically or exclusively at
the DC.
Generally the indications are that manifestations of
protest at the ballot box are no guide to DC popular-
ity. If there is any validity in the claims about voter
protest, the more significant aspect is apparently the
fluctuation of valid votes given to the parties, not the
spoiled or blank ballot. In this vein, voter desire for
change seems to have turned to parties of the ex-
tremes such as the MSI in 1968 and the Radicals in
1979. If 1976 was indeed a disastrous year for the
DC, the evidence is not in absenteeism from the polls
or blank ballots cast. In 1979 the unusual number of
blank ballots cast might be interpreted by some as
dissatisfaction with the government and hence the
" In the national legislative elections of 1948 and 1953, Italy had
31 electoral districts for the Chamber of Deputies. The city and
Province of Trieste became a part of the country in 1954 and were
constituted as district 32 for the 1958 and subsequent elections.
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DC. Still, if 1976, clearly a critical year for the DC,
was not unusual in protests manifest at the polls, then
1979 is also quite suspect.
If there is utility in analyzing voter turnout and
invalidated ballots, it is more appropriately to be
considered as evidence of civic responsibility. The
participation of voters differentiates Italy into two
distinct sections: the responsible north and the lacka-
daisical south. There is, however, the argument that
lower southern voter turnout is the result of bureau-
cratic inefficiency and not some sign of backwardness.
In other words, communal administrations in areas of
major migration have failed to remove citizens from
the voting rolls when they moved away. The accuracy
of such assertions is quite dubious, though, since voter
absenteeism does not appear when the largest migra-
tions occurred. Also in the south DC control of
government offices and the presumed political prefer-
ences of the areas is such as to say that the party's
interests would be served by full and accurate
registration.
For regional elections little can be said about the
distinction between blank and spoiled ballots, since
figures reported do not categorize them. Also the
elections have occurred for only 10 years and provide
less perspective for analytical accuracy. Again,
though, the broad patterns delineated in national
elections seem to be similar on the regional level (see
figures on the individual regional tables).
The one possible major indicator of voting protest of
noteworthy size seems to have occurred in June 1981.
Regional, provincial, and communal elections were
held then in areas containing approximately 9 million
voters, one-fourth of the electorate. Final figures are
not available for these elections, but reports from
reliable newspapers give information on genuinely
large voter abstention in places like Sicily and Rome,
drops of 10 to 20 percent. However, in some other
areas equally large increases in voter turnout oc-
curred, all of which suggests that guidelines of any
uniformity are difficult or impossible to establish. In
these elections, the press has begun using a new
phrase in refering to large-scale absenteeism. In those
Confidential
instances where the number of nonparticipating voters
was high it was cited as "ii partito invisibile." In
instances such as Rome where the absentees added up
to a figure that would have come in just behind the
DC's returns, the invisible party was thus the third-
largest numerical element in the election.
Finally, if outside opinion finds the issue of blank and
spoiled ballots rather exaggerated, the interest it
arouses in Italy cannot be ignored. With the seeming
likelihood of widespread electoral change in Italy
now, the data provided here may serve as useful
background information in the future. To date, the
utility of any of it as directly explaining DC positions
is obscure at best.
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uonnuential
Regular Statute Group
Table A-17
Regional Council Election Results
Piedmont
7 June 1970 a
15 June 1975b
8 June 1980 e
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
DC
1,030,606
36.70
20
976,817
32.06
20
956,867
32.45
20
PCI
728,455
25.94
13
1,032,842
33.90
22
933,179
31.64
20
PSI
296,687
10.57
5
394,241
12.94
8
418,228
14.18
9
PSU
231,273
8.24
4
NONE
NONE
NONE
NONE
0
NONE
PSDI
NONE
0
NONE
224,153
7.36
4
176,413
5.98
3
PRI
86,760
3.09
1
109,156
3.58
2
98,210
3.33
2
PLI
226,197
8.06
4
152,834
5.02
2
174,743
5.93
3
PSIUP
87,554
3.12
1
NONE
0
NONE
NONE
0
NONE
PdUP
NONE
0
NONE
NONE
0
NONE
29,652
1.01
1
DP
NONE
0
NONE
NONE
0
NONE
24,925
0.85
NONE
MSI-DN
92,796
3.30
2
130,753
4.29
2
117,839
4.00
2
Others
27,717
0.99
NONE
25,645
0.84
NONE
18,973
0.64
NONE
Total
2,808,045
100.00
50
3,046,441
100.00
60
2,949,029
100.00
60
Lombardy
7 June 1970"
15 June 1975a
8 June 1980 f
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
DC
2,137,409
40.90
36
2,186,378
37.50
32
2,241,568
38.87
34
PCI
1,208,968
23.14
19
1,770,540
30.37
25
1,623,256
28.14
23
PSI
648,679
12.41
9
819,964
14.07
11
834,231
14.46
11
PSU
376,463
7.20
5
NONE
0
NONE
NONE
0
NONE
PSDI
NONE
0
NONE
301,145
5.17
3
260,632
4.52
3
PRI
125,563
2.40
2
179,605
3.08
2
152,638
2.65
2
PLI
310,463
5.94
4
163,465
2.80
2
197,207
3.42
2
PSIUP
188,955
3.48
2
NONE
0
NONE
NONE
0
NONE
PdUP
NONE
0
NONE
143,400
2.46
2
86,554
1.50
1
DP
NONE
0
NONE
NONE
0
NONE
96,650
1.68
1
MSI-DN
195,583
3.74
3
263,849
4.53
3
251,897
4.37
3
Others
33,371
0.64
NONE
1,331
0.02
NONE
22,858
0.40
NONE
Total
5,225,454
100.00
80
5,829,677
100.00
80
5,767,491
100.00
80
a 93.56-percent turnout of eligible voters; 5.32 percent of ballots
were invalid.
b 94.12-percent turnout of eligible voters; 5.53 percent of ballots
were invalid.
c 91.52-percent turnout of eligible voters; 7.89 percent of ballots
were invalid.
d 95.41-percent turnout of eligible voters; 4.11 percent of ballots
were invalid.
e 95.05-percent turnout of eligible voters; 3.45 percent of ballots
were invalid.
f 92.47-percent turnout of eligible voters; 6.17 percent of ballots were
invalid.
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Table A-18
Regional Council Election Results
Venetia
7 June 1970 a
15 June 1975b
8 June 1980c
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
Number Percentage
of Votes
Number
of Seats
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
DC
1,287,713
51.91
28
1,339,940 48.06
31
1,337,703
47.63
32
PCI
417,291
16.82
9
636,251 22.82
14
610,788
21.75
13
PSI
259,211
10.45
5
357,384 12.82
8
340,527
12.12
7
PSU
189,266
7.63
3
NONE 0
NONE
NONE
0
NONE
PSDI
NONE
0
NONE
175,377 6.29
3
150,696
5.37
3
PRI
46,684
1.88
1
69,231 2.48
1
73,173
2.61
1
PLI
104,730
4.22
2
63,498 2.28
1
73,933
2.63
1
PSIUP
85,954
3.47
1
NONE 0
NONE
NONE
0
NONE
PdUP
NONE
0
NONE
41,183 1.48
NONE
29,789
1.06
1
DP
NONE
0
NONE
NONE 0
NONE
26,829
0.96
NONE
MSI-DN
81,237
3.28
1
105,240 3.77
' 2
101,941
3.63
2
Others
8,410
0.34
NONE
NONE 0
NONE
13,249
0.47
NONE
Total
2,480,496
100.00
50
2,788,104 100.00
60
2,808,628
100.00
60
Liguria
7 June 1970 d
15 June 1975e
8 June 1980 f
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
Number Percentage
of Votes
Number
of Seats
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
DC
393,893
32.10
14
396,787
30.41
13
378,673
30.74
13
PCI
383,753
31.28
13
500,483
38.36
16
444,329
36.07
15
PSI
138,754
11.31
4
175,714
13.47
5
165,250
13.42
5
PSU
93,620
7.63
3
NONE
0
NONE
NONE
0
NONE
PSDI
NONE
0
NONE
71,409
5.47
2
55,595
4.51
2
PRI
37,737
3.08
1
45,094
3.46
1
38,731
3.14
1
PLI
90,125
7.35
3
51,598
3.95
1
55,768
4.53
2
PSIUP
35,198
2.87
1
NONE
0
NONE
NONE
0
NONE
PdUP
NONE
0
NONE
NONE
0
NONE
11,819
0.96
NONE
DP
NONE
0
NONE
NONE
0
NONE
13,930
1.13
NONE
MSI-DN
46,334
3.78
1
60,373
4.63
2
51,785
4.20
2
Others
7,533
0.61
NONE
3,273
0.25
NONE
15,896
1.29
NONE
Total
1,226,947
100.00
40
1,304,731
100.00
40
1,231,776
100.00
40
a 94.57-percent turnout of eligible voters; 4.09 percent of ballots d 92.83-percent turnout of eligible voters; 4.26 percent of ballots
were invalid, were invalid
b 95.10-percent turnout of eligible voters; 3.59 percent of ballots c 93.03-percent turnout of eligible voters; 3.56 percent of ballots
were invalid, were invalid.
c 91.93-percent turnout of eligible voters; 6.18 percent of ballots f 88.92-percent turnout of eligible voters; 6.36 percent of ballots were
were invalid invalid.
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Table A-19
Regional Council Election Results
Emilia-Romagna
7 June 1970a
15 June 1975 b 8 June 1980c
Number Percentage Number Number Percentage Number Number Percentage Number
of Votes of Seats of Votes of Seats of Votes of Seats
25.28 13 723,018 25.63 13
48.28 26 1,359,390 48.19 26
10.24 4 291,117 10.32 4
0 NONE NONE 0 NONE
5.18 2 133,113 4.72 2
3.89 2 122,862 4.36 2
1.85 1 59,630 2.11 1
0 NONE NONE 0 NONE
1.61 1 . 39,973 1.42 1
0 NONE NONE 0 NONE
DC
673,028
25.77
14
714,057
PCI
1,149,172
44.00
24
1,363,594
PSI
210,649
8.07
3
289,173
PSU
196,008
7.50
3
NONE
PSDI
NONE
0
NONE
146,250
PRI
103,495
3.96
2
109,950
PLI
97,437
3.73
1
52,242
PSIUP
99,594
3.81
2
NONE
PdUP
NONE
0
NONE
45,355
DP
NONE
0
NONE
NONE
MSI-DN
77,481
2.97
1
103,935
Others
4,977
0.19
NONE
NONE
Total
2,611,841
100.00
50
2,824,556
Tuscany
7 June 1970 d
3.68 1 89,694 3.18 1
0 NONE 2,355 0.08 NONE
100.00 50 2,821,152 100.00 50
15 June 1975e 8 June 1980 f
Number Percentage Number Number Percentage Number Number Percentage Number
of Votes of Seats of Votes of Seats of Votes of Seats
DC
711,140
30.57
17
716,539
28.48
15
713,323
28.72
15
PCI
984,227
42.31
23
1,169,616
46.49
25
1,152,696
46.41
25
PSI
203,441
8.74
3
269,406
10.71
4
292,426
11.77
5
PSU
148,640
6.39
3
NONE
0
NONE
NONE
0
NONE
PSDI
NONE
0
NONE
97,372
3.87
2
77,369
3.12
1
PRI
51,726
2.22
1
66,678
2.65
1
70,606
2.84
1
PLI
61,178
2.63
1
29,869
1.19
NONE
31,817
1.28
1
PSIUP
NONE
0
NONE
NONE
0
NONE
PdUP
NONE
0
NONE
51,587
2.05
1
26,672
1.08
1
DP
NONE
0
NONE
NONE
0
NONE
26,533
1.07
NONE
MSI-DN
88,798
3.82
1
106,543
4.23
2
92,016
3.70
1
Others
3,308
0.14
NONE
8,342
0.33
NONE
221
0.01
NONE
Total
2,326,353
100.00
50
2,515,952
100.00
50
2,483,679
100.00
50
a 96.54-percent turnout of eligible voters; 3.11 percent of ballots
were invalid.
b 96.47-percent turnout of eligible voters; 2.72 percent of ballots
were invalid.
e 94.48-percent turnout of eligible voters; 4.62 percent of ballots
were invalid.
d 95.87-percent turnout of eligible voters; 3.79 percent of ballots
were invalid.
e 95.84-percent turnout of eligible voters; 3.42 percent of ballots
were invalid.
193.10-percent turnout of eligible voters; 5.19 percent of ballots were
invalid
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Table A-20
Regional Council Election Results
Umbria
7 June 1970 a
15 June 1975
8 June 1980c
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
DC
155,207
30.15
9
154,288
27.61
9
155,098
27.58
9
PCI
215,044
41.78
13
257,881
46.15
14
254,024
45.17
14
PSI
48,842
9.49
3
77,489
13.87
4
80,188
14.26
4
PSU
22,851
4.39
1
NONE
0
NONE
NONE
0
NONE
PSDI
NONE
0
NONE
13,610
2.44
1
14,530
2.58
1
PRI
12,015
2.34
1
13,466
2.41
1
14,887
2.65
1
PLI
9,386
1.82
NONE
4,377
0.78
NONE
5,838
1.04
NONE
PSIUP
23,669
4.60
1
NONE
0
NONE
NONE
0
NONE
PdUP
NONE
0
NONE
6,210
1.11
NONE
7,228
1.29
NONE
DP
NONE
0
NONE
NONE
0
NONE
NONE
0
NONE
MSI-DN
27,960
5.43
2
31,517
5.64
1
30,628
5.45
1
Others
NONE
0
NONE
NONE
0
NONE
NONE
0
NONE
Total
514,704
100.00
30
558,838
100.00
30
562,421
100.00
30
Marche
7 June 1970 d
15 June 1975
c
8 June 1980 f
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
DC
333,453
38.56
17
346,099
36.46
16
354,464
37.11
16
PCI
275,110
31.81
14
349,962
36.87
15
355,646
37.24
15
PSI
73,086
8.45
3
93,002
9.80
4
96,060
10.06
4
PSU
54,455
6.30
2
NONE
0
NONE
NONE
0
NONE
PSDI
NONE
0
NONE
50,660
5.34
2
42,790
4.48
1
PRI
36,076
4.17
1
32,587
3.43
1
36,289
3.80
1
PLI
23,510
2.72
1
14,591
1.54
NONE
13,668
1.43
1
PSIUP
33,644
3.89
1
PdUP
NONE
0
NONE
20,119
2.12
1
14,555
1.52
1
DP
NONE
0
NONE
NONE
0
NONE
NONE
0
NONE
MSI-DN
34,312
3.97
42,127
4.44
41,121
4.31
Others
1,162
0.13
NONE
NONE
0
NONE
531
0.06
NONE
Total
864,808
100.00
40
949,147
100.00
40
955,124
100.00
40
a 94.01-percent turnout of eligible voters; 3.78 percent of ballots
were invalid.
b 95.01-percent turnout of eligible voters; 3.15 percent of ballots
were invalid.
92.63-percent turnout of eligible voters; 4.81 percent of ballots
were invalid.
Confidential
d 94.07-percent turnout of eligible voters; 4.57 percent of ballots
were invalid.
94.81-percent turnout of eligible voters; 3.94 percent of ballots
were invalid.
f 91.53-percent turnout of eligible voters; 6.12 percent of ballots were
invalid.
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Table A-21
Regional Council Election Results
Lazio
7 June 1970a
15 June 1975b
8 June 1980c
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
DC
888,898
33.22
18
980,821
31.54
20
1,062,191
34.09
22
PCI
708,082
26.46
14
1,041,693
33.50
21
957,628
30.73
19
PSI
234,747
8.77
4
303,930
9.77
6
331,055
10.62
6
PSU
204,539
7.64
3
NONE
0
NONE
NONE
0
NONE
PSDI
NONE
0
NONE
190,032
6.11
3
165,139
5.30
3
PRI
98,235
3.67
2
114,408
3.68
2
116,212
3.73
2
PLI
156,259
5.84
3
77,679
2.50
1
82,978
2.66
1
PSIUP
69,992
2.62
1
NONE
0
NONE
NONE
0
NONE
PdUP
NONE
0
NONE
45,612
1.47
1
37,578
1.21
1
DP
NONE
0
NONE
NONE
0
NONE
36,844
1.18
NONE
MSI-DN
273,189
10.21
5
352,119
11.32
6
314,500
10.09
6
Others
42,045
1.57
NONE
3,190
0.10
NONE
11,972
0.38
NONE
Total
2,675,986
100.00
50
3,109,484
100.00
60
3,116,097
60
Abruzzi
7 June 1970d
15 June 1975e
8 June 19801
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
DC
326,091
48.28
20
323,152
42.50
18
355,934
45.83
20
PCI
153,813
22.78
10
230,501
30.32
13
213,726
27.52
12
PSI
60,512
8.96
3
77,478
10.19
4
84,111
10.83
4
PSU
36,799
5.45
2
NONE
0
NONE
NONE
0
NONE
PSDI
NONE
0
NONE
46,993
6.18
2
35,660
4.59
2
PRI
16,983
2.52
1
19,701
2.59
1
18,966
2.44
1
PLI
19,386
2.87
1
13,417
1.76
NONE
11,317
1.46
NONE
PSIUP
21,572
3.19
1
NONE
0
NONE
NONE
0
NONE
PdUP
NONE
0
NONE
NONE
0
NONE
9,899
1.27
NONE
DP
NONE
0
NONE
NONE
0
NONE
NONE
0
NONE
MSI-DN
38,885
5.76
2
49,076
6.45
2
45,693
5.88
1
Others
1,314
0.19
NONE
NONE
0
NONE
1,266
0.16
NONE
Total
675,355
100.00
40
760,318
100.00
40
776,572
100.00
40
a 91.69-percent turnout of eligible voters; 4.35 percent of ballots
were invalid.
b 92.11-percent turnout of eligible voters; 2.83 percent of ballots
were invalid.
c 89.01-percent turnout of eligible voters; 6.56 percent of ballots
were invalid.
d 85.01-percent turnout of eligible voters; 4.87 percent of ballots
were invalid.
e 87.67-percent turnout of eligible voters; 4.13 percent of ballots
were invalid.
f 82.35-percent turnout of eligible voters; 6.27 percent of ballots were
invalid.
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Table A-22
Regional Council Election Results
Molise
7 June 1970 a
15 June 1975"
8 June 1980 c
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
DC
92,805
52.05
16
100,740
50.64
16
112,769
55.35
17
PCI
26,710
14.98
5
35,621
17,90
6
32,151
15.78
5
PSI
16,922
9.49
3
19,969
10.04
3
19,105
9.38
3
PSU
13,582
7.62
2
NONE
0
NONE
NONE
0
NONE
PSDI
NONE
0
NONE
12,355
6.21
2
9,804
4.81
2
PRI
5,300
2.97
8,996
4.52
1
7,583
3.72
1
PLI
10,879
6.10
2
8,928
4.49
1
8,331
4.09
1
PSIUP
4,087
2.29
NONE
NONE
0
NONE
NONE
0
NONE
PdUP
NONE
0
NONE
2,383
1.20
NONE
1,557
0.76
NONE
DP
NONE
0
NONE
NONE
0
NONE
NONE
0
NONE
MSI-DN
8,018
4.50
1
9,954
5.00
1
8,287
4.07
1
Others
NONE
0
NONE
NONE
0
NONE
4,144
2.03
NONE
Total
178,303
100.00
30
198,946
100.00
30
203,731
100.00
30
Campania
7 June 1970
15 June 1975e
8 June 1980 f
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
DC
1,004,437
39.66
25
1,068,364
36.69
23
1,175,672
39.03
25
PCI
551,800
21.79
13
788,874
27.09
16
725,978
24.10
15
PSI
277,205
10.95
7
302,344
10.38
6
378,018
12.55
7
PSU
178,314
7.04
4
NONE
0
NONE
NONE
0
NONE
PSDI
NONE
0
NONE
191,362
6.57
4
187,355
6.22
3
PRI
77,899
3.08
2
105,465
3.62
2
89,877
2.98
1
PLI
90,376
3.57
2
60,225
2.07
1
51,140
1.70
1
PSIUP
64,045
2.53
1
NONE
0
NONE
NONE
0
NONE
PdUP
NONE
0
NONE
32,486
1.12
1
30,552
1.01
NONE
DP
NONE
0
NONE
NONE
0
NONE
32,909
1.09
1
MSI-DN
223,222
8.81
5
354,870
12.17
7
339,262
11.26
7
Others
65,1838
2.57
1
7,830
0.27
NONE
1,662
0.06
NONE
Total
2,532,481
100.00
60
2,911,820
100.00
60
3,012,425
100.00
60
a 80.05-percent turnout of eligible voters; 5.55 percent of ballots
were invalid.
b 84.41-percent turnout of eligible voters; 5.08 percent of ballots
were invalid.
c 75.37-percent turnout of eligible voters; 5.82 percent of ballots
were invalid.
d 86.77-percent turnout of eligible voters; 5.77 percent of ballots
were invalid.
e 88.32-percent turnout of eligible voters; 5.70 percent of ballots
were invalid.
184.97-percent turnout of eligible voters; 6.37 percent of ballots were
invalid.
One seat won by monarchists (PDIUM).
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Confidential
Table A-23
Regional Council Election Results
Puglia
7 June 1970 a
15 June 1975
b
8 June 1980 .
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
DC
766,153
41.27
22
835,086
39.26
21
924,437
42.10
22
PCI
488,654
26.32
14
607,175
28.54
15
539,894
24.59
13
PSI
197,690
10.65
5
252,739
11.88
5
291,606
13.28
6
PSU
76,178
4.11
2
NONE
0
NONE
NONE
0
NONE
PSDI
NONE
0
NONE
100,067
4.70
2
114,545
5.22
2
PRI
43,475
2.34
1
48,843
2.30
1
54,400
2.48
1
PLI
56,210
3.03
1
36,030
1.69
1
35,604
1.62
1
PSIUP
45,001
2.42
1
NONE
0
NONE
NONE
0
NONE
PdUP
NONE
0
NONE
NONE
0
NONE
28,652
1.30
1
DP
NONE
0
NONE
NONE
0
NONE
NONE
0
NONE
MSI-DN
162,078
8.73
4
229,060
10.77
5
204,137
9.30
4
Others
20,930
1.13
NONE
18,263
0.86
NONE
2,364
0.11
NONE
Total
1,856,369
100.00
50
2,127,263
100.00
50
2,195,689
100.00
50
Basilicata
7 June 1970 d
15 June 1975
.
8 June 1980 f
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
DC
131,865
42.45
14
144,416
41.87
13
161,638
45.17
14
PCI
74,675
24.04
7
93,625
27.14
9
89,190
24.92
8
PSI
39,306
12.65
4
45,655
13.24
4
49,073
13.71
4
PSU
27,311
8.79
2
NONE
0
NONE
NONE
0
NONE
PSDI
NONE
0
NONE
23,704
6.87
2
18,666
5.22
2
PRI
5,227
1.68
NONE
5,515
1.60
NONE
5,627
1.57
NONE
PLI
9,600
3.09
1
7,077
2.05
NONE
6,118
1.71
NONE
PSIUP
7,675
2.47
1
NONE
0
NONE
NONE
0
NONE
PdUP
NONE
0
NONE
NONE
0
NONE
4,612
1.29
NONE
DP
NONE
0
NONE
NONE
0
NONE
3,238
0.90
NONE
MSI-DN
14,985
4.82
1
22,024
6.39
2
19,711
5.51
2
Others
NONE
0
NONE
2,915
0.85
NONE
NONE
0
NONE
Total
310,644
100.00
30
344,931
100.00
30
357,873
100.00
30
a 88.67-percent turnout of eligible voters; 4.66 percent of ballots e 87.40-percent turnout of eligible voters; 6.31 percent of ballots were
were invalid, invalid.
b 89.43-percent turnout of eligible voters; 5.70 percent of ballots 84.56-percent turnout of eligible voters; 6.40 percent of ballots were
were invalid, invalid.
c 86.35-percent turnout of eligible voters; 6.44 percent of ballots were
invalid.
d 85.51-percent turnout of eligible voters; 5.94 percent of ballots
were invalid.
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Confidential
Table A-24
Regional Council Election Results
Calabria
7 June 1970 a
15 June 1975
8 June 1980 c
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number.
of Seats
DC
372,560
39.73
17
424,198
39.48
17
450,034
41.22
18
PCI
218,685
23.32
10
270,477
25.17
10
263,892
24.17
10
PSI
132,545
14.13
6
158,159
14.72
6
180,727
16.55
7
PSU
48,063
5.13
2
NONE
0
NONE
NONE
0
NONE
PSDI
NONE
0
NONE
56,494
5.26
2
63,300
5.80
2
PRI
38,063
4.06
1
32,321
3.01
1
22,909
2.10
1
PLI
25,154
2.68
1
13,919
1.30
NONE
8,326
0.76
NONE
PSIUP
36,450
3.89
1
NONE
0
NONE
NONE
0
NONE
PdUP
NONE
0
NONE
29,390
2.74
1
13,010
1.19
NONE
DP
NONE
0
NONE
NONE
0
NONE
12,242
1.12
NONE
MSI-DN
59,533
6.35
2
89,571
8.34
3
77,239
7.08
2
Others
6,693
0.71
NONE
NONE
0
NONE
NONE
0
NONE
Total
937,746
100.00
40
1,074,529
100.00
40
1,091,679
100.00
40
a 81.83-percent turnout of eligible voters; 7.04 percent of ballots
were invalid.
b 82.73-percent turnout of eligible voters; 4.95 percent of ballots
were invalid.
c 76.66-percent turnout of eligible voters; 6.87 percent of ballots
were invalid.
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Special Statute Group
Table A-25
Regional Council Election Results
Friuli-Venezia Giulia
26 May 1968 a
17 June 1973b
25 June 1978 c
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
DC
344,039
44.93
29
315,198
39.71
26
332,684
39.60
26
PCI
153,923
20.10
12
166,018
20.91
13
182,84521.76
14
PSI
PSU d
PSDI
76,964
10.05
4 d
6
2
97,259
64,959
12.25
8.18
8
4
79,656
41,979
9.48
5.00
5
3
PRI
19,138
2.50
1
21,306
2.68
1
19,716
2.35
1
PLI
37,092
4.84
3
28,883
3.64
2
10,575
1.26
1
PSIUP
35,677
4.66
3
NONE
0
NONE
NONE
0
NONE
PdUP
NONE
0
NONE
NONE
0
NONE
11,228
1.34
1
DP
NONE
0
NONE
NONE
0
NONE
11,184
1.33
1
MSI-DN
39,197
5.12
3
59,585
7.51
4
35,084
4.18
2
Others
59,642 e
7.79
4
40,585 f
5.11
3
115,1758
13.71
7
Total
765,672
100.00
61
793,793
100.00
61
840,126
100.00
61
a 87.92-percent turnout of eligible voters; 2.85 percent of ballots
were invalid.
b 89.67-percent turnout of eligible voters; 3.75 percent of ballots
were invalid.
e 90.60-percent turnout of eligible voters; 4.14 percent of ballots
were invalid.
d Part ito Socialista Unificato. During the council's term in office,
PSI and PSDI split. Four members pronounced themselves as
members of PSI and two of PSDI.
e Figures for four local parties and a monarchist ticket. Two local
parties gained seats: Unione Slovena (one seat) and Movimento
Friuli (three seats). Vote figures are not available.
f Unione Slovena (one seat); Movimento Friuli (two seats). Voting
statistics not available.
s "Per Trieste" (four seats); Movimento Friuli (three seats). Voting
statistics are not available.
Note: Previous regional election: 10 May 1964.
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Confidential
Table A-26
Regional Council Election Results
Sardinia
15 June 1969a
16 June 1974 b
17 June 1979 c
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
DC
329,835
44.59
36
305,071
38.33
32
343,020
37.74
32
PCI
146,155
19.76
15
213,300
26.80
22
238,751
26.28
22
PSI d
87,650
11.85
9
93,007
11.69
9
101,461
11.17
9
PSDI
NONE
0
NONE
46,906
5.89
3
42,274
4.65
4
PRI c
22,187
3.00
1
20,570
2.58
1
29,660
3.26
3
PLI
33,484
4.53
3
22,159
2.78
1
18,066
1.99
1
PSIUP
32,810
4.44
3
NONE
0
NONE
NONE
0
NONE
PdUP
NONE
0
NONE
NONE
0
NONE
8,512
0.94
NONE
Partito Sardo
d'Azione
395
38
3
24,829
3.12
1
30,220
3.33
3
MSI-DN
49,291
6.67
4
62,294
7.83
6
57,618
6.34
4
Others
5,845
0.79
NONE
7,668
0.96
NONE
39,038 f
4.30
2
Total
739,652
100.00
74
795,804
100.00
75
908,620
100.00
80
a 86.43-percent turnout of eligible voters; 4.62 percent of ballots
were invalid.
b 87.05-percent turnout of eligible voters; 2.65 percent of ballots
were invalid.
e 84.46-percent turnout of eligible voters; 2.30 percent of ballots
were invalid.
d In 1969 and 1974 PSI ran a combined list including other socialists
of the PSU. Although a remnant of the PSU was still active in 1974,
PSDI had assumed its own identity again.
e In 1969 PRI ran a combined ticket with MSA, Movimento Sardo
d'Azione.
f Includes 28,068 votes (3.09 percent) for Partito Radicale Sardo
which won two seats.
Note: Previous regional council elections: 8 May 1949, 14 June
1953, 16 June 1957, 18 June 1961, and 13 June 1965.
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Confidential
Table A-27
Regional Council Election Results
Sicily
13 June 1971a
20 June 1976"
21 June 1981 c
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
DC
794,414
33.32
29
1,153,109
40.85
39
1,108,975
41.45
38
PCI
495,579 d
20.78
23
757,247
26.82
24
552,292
20.64
20
PSI
269,515
11.30
11
289,437
10.25
10
383,887
14.35
14
PSDI
135,118
5.67
4
97,254
3.45
2
79,941
2.99
2
PRI
110,238
4.62
3
92,052
3.26
4
117,162
4.38
5
PLI
88,083
3.69
3
59,839
2.12
2
57,669
2.16
3
PSIUP
52,980
2.22
2
NONE
0
NONE
NONE
0
NONE
DP
NONE
0
NONE
15,163
0.54
NONE
25,675
0.96
NONE
MSI-DN
418,258
17.54
15
306,720
10.86
9
227,988
8.52
6
Others
20,190
0.85
NONE
52,193
1.85
NONE
122,031 .
4.56
2
Total
2,384,375
100.00
90
2,823,014
100.00
90
2,675,620
100.00
90
a 81.36-percent turnout of eligible voters; 5.25 percent of ballots
were invalid.
b 85.64-percent turnout of eligible voters; 3.68 percent of ballots
were invalid.
. 76.2-percent turnout of eligible voters; reported by press; other
figures not available to date.
d In several provinces a combined PCI-PSIUP list was presented.
Separated by parties, the results are PCI 251,168 votes (10.53; 11
seats) and PCI-PSIUP (10.25; 12 seats).
e A coalition list of PRI-PLI-PSDI ran in several provinces and won
79,990 votes (2.99; two seats).
Note: Previous regional council elections: 20 April 1947, 3 June
1951,5 June 1955,7 June 1959,9 June 1963, and 11 June 1967.
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Confidential
Table A-28
Regional Council Election Results
Valle d'Aosta
21 April 1968 a
10 June 1973"
25 June 1978
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
DC
25,467
37.78
13
14,980
21.40
7
15,723
21.24
7
PCI
13,742
20.39
7
13,638
19.49
7
14,442
19.51
7
PSI
PSDI d
6,954
10.32
4
5,975
1,409
8.54
2.01
3
1
2,648
1,543
3.58
2.08
1
1
PRI
525
0.78
NONE
904
1.29
NONE
1,395
1.88
1
PLI
3,765
5.59
2
2,052
2.93
1
NONE
0
NONE
PSIUP
1,560
2.31
1
NONE
0
NONE
NONE
0
NONE
UV e
11,237
16.67
6
8,081
11.55
4
18,344
24.78
9
DP
NONE
0
NONE
NONE
0
NONE
1,454
1.96
1
MSI-DN
533
0.79
NONE
1,452
2.07
1
944
1.28
NONE
RV f
3,627
5.38
2
NONE
0
NONE
NONE
0
NONE
DP
NONE
0
NONE
15,643
22.35
8
8,700
11.75
4
Others
NONE
0
NONE
5,856g
8.37
3
8,822h
11.92
4
Total
67,410
100.00
35
69,990
100.00
35
74,015
100.00
35
a 92.64-percent turnout of eligible voters; 8.71 percent of ballots
were invalid.
h 91.77-percent turnout of eligible voters; 4.22 percent of ballots
were invalid.
89.60-percent turnout of eligible voters; 4.94 percent of ballots
were invalid.
d United with PSDI in 1968 as PSU.
Union Valdotaine.
f Ragruppamento Valdese.
s Includes 4,707 votes (6.73 percent, two seats) for Union Valdotaine
Populaire and 1,149 (1.64 percent, one seat) for Ragruppamento
Valdese.
h Includes 1,959 votes (2.65 percent, one seat) for Autonomia
Sociale; 1,183 (1.78 percent, one seat) for Associazione Liberia e
Progresso; 2,315 (3.13 percent, one seat) for Union Valdotaine
Populaire; and 1,118 (1.51 percent, one seat) for Artigiani e
Commercianti.
Note: Previous regional council elections: 24 April 1949,
14 November 1954, 17 May 1959, and 27 October 1963.
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Table A-29
Regional Council Election Results, Trentino-Alto Adige a
Part 1: Trento
17 November 1968
18 November 1973
19 November 1978 b
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
DC
142,882
58.05
16
141,463
55.28
21
137,847
49.04
18
PCI
16,140
6.56
2
23,614
9.23
3
30,028
10.68
4
PSI
PSDI '
37,483
15.23
4
27,786
15,166
10.86
5.93
4
2
25,645
8,473
9.12
3.01
3
1
PRI
6,017
2.44
1
9,922
3.88
1
9,742
3.47
1
PLI
11,404
4.63
1
5,603
2.19
1
5,092
1.81
1
PPTT d
18,182
7.39
2
23,045
9.01
3
36,811
13.10
5
PSIUP
7,721
3.14
1
NONE
0
NONE
NONE
0
NONE
DP
NONE
0
NONE
NONE
0
NONE
5,412
1.93
1
MSI-DN
4,046
1.64
NONE
5,865
2.29
1
5,028
1.79
1
NS .
NONE
0
NONE
NONE
0
NONE
12,315
4.38
1
Others
2,257
0.92
NONE
3,417
1.34
NONE
4,707
1.67
NONE
Total
246,132
100.00
27
255,881
100.00
36
281,100
100.00
36
a The regional council is made up of the provincial councils of the
Provinces of Trento and Bolzano. In 1968, the provincial council of
Trento had 27 members. Growth of the region increased the allotted
council members, hence raising the number to 36 in 1973.
b 91.71-percent turnout of eligible voters; 3.99 percent of ballots cast
were invalid. Comparable figures on the provincial level are not
available for 1968 and 1973. See regional chart for totals in these
years.
c In 1968, PSU, Partito Socialista Unificato.
d PPTT, Part ito Popolare Trentino Tirolese.
Nuova Sinistra.
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Table A-30
Regional Council Election Results, Trentino-Alto Adige a
Part 2: Bolzano (Bozen)
17 November 1968
18 November 1973
19 November 1978 b
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
DC
32,721
14.39
4
32,989
14.09
5
28,805
10.79
4
PCI
PSIUP c
Ind.
13,548
5.96
1
13,343
5.70
2
18,781
7.04
3
PSI
16,277
7.16
2
13,214
5.64
2
8,945
3.35
1
PSDI
NONE
0
NONE
8,036
3.43
1
6,132
2.30
1
PRI
2,729
1.20
NONE
3,234
1.38
NONE
2,884
1.08
NONE
PLI
5,891
2.59
1
2,806
1.20
NONE
2,925
1.10
NONE
PPTT d
NONE
0
NONE
NONE
NONE
NONE
2,274
0.85
NONE
SVP .
138,162
60.76
16
132,185
56.45
20
163,458
61.25
21
DP
NONE
0
NONE
NONE
NONE
NONE
1,154
0.43
NONE
MSI-DN
11,005
4.84
1
9,421
4.02
1
7,784
2.92
1
NS f
NONE
0
NONE
NONE
NONE
NONE
9,754
3.66
1
Others
7,040
3.10
NONE
18,948 s
8.09
3
13,967 h
5.23
2
Total
227,373
100.00
25
234,176
100.00
34
266,863
100.00
34
a The regional council is made up of the provincial councils of Trento
and Bolzano. In 1968 the provincial council of Bolzano had 25
members; increased to 34 in 1973 due to the reigon's growth.
b 93.38-percent turnout of eligible voters in 1978; 2.61 pecent of
ballots cast were invalid. Comparable figures are not available for
the province in 1968 and 1973. For regional composite, see table A-
31.
c In 1968, Sinistra Unita.
d Part ito Popolare Trentino Tirolese.
Sudtiroler Volkspartei. In Italian, PPST, Part ito Popolare Sud
Tirolese.
f Nuova Sinistra.
Includes 12,056 votes (5.15 percent, 2 seats) for SPS, Socialdemo-
cratici sudtirolese; and 4,014 (1.71 percent, one seat) for SFP,
Socialprogressisti Sudtirolesi.
h Includes 5,914 votes (2.22 percent, one seat) for SPS, Socialdemo-
cratici Sudtirolesi; and 3,536 (1.33 percent, one seat) for PDU,
Part ito Democratico Unitario.
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Table A-31
Regional Council Election Results, Trentino-Alto Adige a
Part 3: Regional Composite
Party
17 November 1968 h
18 November 1973 c
19 November 1978 d
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
DC
175,603
37,09
20
174,452
35.60
26
166,652
30.41
22
PCI
PSIUP e
Ind.
37,409
7.90
4
36,957
7.54
5
48,809
8.91
7
PSI
PSDI f
53,760
11.35
6
41,000
23,202
8.37
4.73
6
3
34,590
14,605
6.31
2.67
4
2
PRI
8,746
1.85
1
13,156
2.68
1
12,626
2.30
1
PLI
17,295
3.65
2
8,409
1.72
1
8,017
1.46
1
PPTT s
18,182
3.84
2
23,045
4.70
3
39,085
7.13
5
SVP h
138,162
29.18
16
132,185
26.97
20
163,458
29.83
21
DP
NONE
0
NONE
NONE
0
NONE
6,566
1.20
1
MSI-DN
15,051
3.18
1
15,286
3.12
2
12,812
2.34
2
NS g
NONE
0
NONE
NONE
0
NONE
22,069
4.03
2
Others
9,297
1.96
NONE
22,365 h
4.56
3
18,674 h
3.41
2
Total
473,505
100.00
52
490,057
100.00
70
547,963
100.00
70
a The regional council is composed of the provincial councils of
Trento and Bolzano. For breakdown by province, see appropriate
chart.
h 89.55-percent turnout of eligible voters; 2.23 percent of ballots
were invalid.
c 92.23-percent turnout of eligible voters; 2.63 percent of ballots
were invalid.
d 92.51-percent turnout of eligible voters; 3.32 percent of ballots
were invalid.
In 1968, Sinistra Unita in Bolzano.
f PSU in 1968 in Trento.
See chart for Trento.
h See chart for Bolzano.
Note: Previous regional council elections: 28 November 1948, 16
November 1952, 11 November 1956,6 November 1960, and 15
November 1964.
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Table A-32
Provincial Council Election Results by Party in Geographical Regions, 1975 and 1980
1975
1980
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
North a
DC
5,596,299
35.38
411
5,639,732
36.21
416
PCI
5,255,642
33.23
366
4,955,006
31.82
347
PSI
2,097,453
13.26
145
2,057,335
13.21
141
PSDI
979,497
6.19
65
847,921
5.44
55
PRI
515,417
3.26
26
494,318
3.17
29
PLI
520,623
3.29
23
594,101
3.81
34
MSI-DN
698,871
4.42
40
640,079
4.11
38
Others
153,206 b
0.97
4
345,285 d
2.22
20
Total
15,817,008 c
100.00
1,080
15,573,777 c
100.00
1,080
Center f
DC
1,401,170
30.37
161
1,418,941
30.81
166
PCI
1,963,189
42.55
220
1,951,448
42.55
218
PSI
525,119
11.38
58
559,767
12.15
60
PSDI
218,120
4.73
22
189,952
4.13
20
PRI
148,612
3.22
15
155,586
3.38
15
PLI
60,428
1.31
1
68,478
1.49
1
MSI-DN
247,932
5.37
25
231,724
5.03
24
Others
49,634 g
1.07
2
29,464 .
0.64
0
Total
4,614,204h
100.00
504
4,605,360i
100.00
504
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t..ontwential
Table A-32 (continued)
1975
1980
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
Number
of Votes
Percentage
Number
of Seats
South k
DC
2,415,445
34.78
225
2,606,203
36.50
237
PCI
1,984,559
28.58
169
1,875,886
26.27
155
PSI
883,682
12.73
79
1,014,457
14.21
86
PSDI
422,606
6.21
34
443,338
6.21
34
PRI
227,385
3.27
14
237,472
3.33
16
PL I
159,898
2.30
10
143,476
2.01
7
MSI-DN
783,335
11.28
58
761,316
10.66
54
Others
67,498 I
0.97
2
58,162 a
0.81
2
Total
6,944,408 m
100.00
591
7,140,3100
100.00
591
Islands P
DC
1,334,507
37.35
152
1,451,498
40.37
162
PCI
902,292
25.25
105
820,874
22.83
96
PSI
442,922
12.40
51
488,405
13.58
56
PSDI
196,248
5.49
22
192,113
5.34
20
PRI
159,341
4.46
17
174,927
4.86
18
PLI
106,901
2.99
8
105,390
2.93
10
MSI-DN
380,677
10.65
39
289,886
8.06
28
Others
50,323 q
1.41
2
72,569 s
2.03
6
Total
3,573,211
100.00
396
3,595,662
100.00
396
a The 35 provinces of Piedmont, Lombardy, Venetia, Friuli-Venezia
Giulia, Liguria, and Emilia-Romagna; 22,992,299 population.
h Included are 2,170 (0.01 percent) votes for center-left groups,
123,124 (0.78 percent, one seat) for extreme left parties; and 24,222
(0.15 percent, three seats) for local parties.
c 94.6-percent turnout of eligible voters.
d Includes 184,468 (1.19 percent, five seats) for groups of the extreme
left.
91.9-percent turnout of eligible voters.
The 18 provinces of Tuscany, Umbria, Marche, and Lazio;
population 6,550,817.
g Includes 49,283 votes (1.07 percent, two seats) for extreme left
groups.
h 94.8-percent turnout of eligible voters.
Total figures for extreme left groups.
i 91.0-percent turnout of eligible voters.
145
k The 20 provinces of Abruzzi Molise, Campania, Puglia, Basilicata,
and Calabria; population 12,0062,459.
'Includes 7,823 (0.11 percent, one seat) for center-left groups; 32,726
(0.47 percent, one seat) for extreme left parties.
m 87.0-percent turnout of eligible voters.
a Includes 42,019 (0.59 percent, one seat) for extreme left groups.
83.3-percent turnout of eligible voters.
P The 13 provinces in Sicily and Sardinia; population 6,154,515.
q Includes 12,877 (0.36 percent) for extreme left groups and 22,227
(0.62 percent, two seats) for local parties.
85.0-percent turnout of eligible voters.
'Includes 2,813 (0.08 percent) for center-left groups and 12,167
(0.34 percent) for extreme left elements. Local parties drew 44,795
(1.25 percent, five seats) votes.
80.7-percent turnout of eligible voters.
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Figure A-6
Showing of DC, PCI, and PSI in
Regional Council Elections (Special Statue)
Percent
I I I I I 1 I I I 1 I I I 1111111111 1111111
I I r7-1-?11 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I
0
Valle d'Aostac 60
40
20
Trentino?Alto 60
Adiged
Friuli?Venezia 60
Giulia
40
20
IihiiiiitIllititimilmilimhi
0 1948 50 55 60 65 70 75 80
ala 1947 and 1951 PSI and PCI ran a common ticket, and in 1947 it also
included PSIUP. In 1967, PSI and PSU ran a common list.
bin 1969, PSI figures include PSU.
51n 1949, the DC ran a common list with Union Valdotainc; in 1954 and
1959 the DC joined a cornbined list of centrist parties. PC1. PSI and
PS1UP ran a comrnon list in 1949, 1954 and 1959. In the last year it was
joined also by the Union Valdotaine.
dln 1968 PCI and PSIUP ran a common list. In 1956 PSI figures include
list partners, PSU and PSD1.
586083 2-82
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Figure A-7
Chamber of Deputies Districts
1. Turin-Novara-Vercelli
2. Cuneo-Alessandria-Asti
3. Genoa- Imperib-La Spezia-Savona
4. Milan-Pavia
5. Como-Sondrio- Varese
6. Bergamo-Brescia
7. Mantua-Cremona
8. Trent-Bolzano
9. Verona- Padua- Vicenza-Rovigo
10. Venice-Treviso
11. Udine-Belluno-Gorizia-Pordenone
12. Bologna-Ferrara-Ravenna-Forli
13. Parma-Modena-Piacenza-Reggio Emilia
14. Florence-Pistoia
15. Pisa-Leghorn- Lucca- Massa Carrare
16. Siena-Arezzo- Grosseto
17. Ancona-Pesaro e Urbino-Ascoli Piceno- Macerata
18. Perugia-Terni-Rieti
19. Rome- Latina-Viterbo- Frosinone
20. L'Aquila-Pescara-Chieti-Teramo
21. Campobasso-lsernia
22. Naples-Caserta
23. Benevento-Avellino- Salerno
24. Bari-Foggia
25. Lecce-Brindisi-Taranto
26. Potenza-Matera
27. Catanzaro-Cosenza-Reggio Calabria
28. Catania-Messina-Syracuse-Ragusa-Enna
29. Palermo-Trapani-Agrigento-Caltanissetta
30. Cagliari- Sassari- Nuoro-Oristano
31. Aosta
32. Trieste
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Figure A-8
Senate Districts
1. Piemonte
2. Valle d' Aosta
3. Lombardia
4. Trentino-Alto Adige
5. Veneto
6. Friuli-Venezia Giulia
7. Liguria
8. Emilia-Romagna
9. Toscana
10. Umbria
11. Marche
12. Lazio
13. Abruzzi
14. Molise
15. Campania
16. Puglia
17. Basilicata
18. Calabria
19. Sicilia
20. Sardegna
20
19
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Chamber of Deputies
Table A-33
1 Torino-Novara-Vercelli
1972
1976
1979
District population
2,684,677
3,190,079
3,233,393
Eligible voters in district
2,301,297
2,460,817
2,503,112
Actual votes
(percent turnout)
2,201,444
(95.66)
2,338,532
(95.03)
2,339,699
(93.47)
Blank and invalid ballots
(percent of total)
96,333
(4.38)
74,094
(3.17)
119,922
(5.13)
District percent national vote
6.38
6.21
6.13
Seats assigned district
33
37
37
Electoral quotient
60,146
58,062
56,917
Seats won by whole quotients in district
30
33
33
Seats won by residuals in national pool
4
5
6
1972
1976
1979
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
DC
704,911
33.49
11 + 1
DC
741,841
32.76
12 + 1
DC
687,440
30.97
12
PCI
601,773
28.59
10 -
PCI
865,252
38.21
14 + 1
PCI
729,210
32.85
12 + 1
PSI
228,932
10.87
3 + 1
PSI
231,557
10.22
3 + 1
PSI
234,037
10.54
4 -
PSDI
146,185
6.94
2 -
PSDI
99,971
4.41
1 -
PSDI
107,829
4.86
1 + 1
PSIUP
38,148
1.81
DP
42,037
1.86
- + 1
PdUP
39,315
1.77
1
PLI
166,333
7.90
2 + 1
PRad
38,840
1.71
- + 1
PRad
111,839
5.04
1 + 1
PRI
71,310
3.39
1 -
PLI
61,488
2.72
1 -
PLI
89,986
4.05
1 + 1
MSI-DN
111,397
5.29
1 + 1
PRI
89,592
3.96
1 -
PRI
94,780
4.27
1 + 1
MSI-DN
91,881
4.06
1
MSI-DN
87,066
3.92
1 -
Others
36,122
1.72
-
Others
1,979
0.09
- -
Others
38,275
1.73
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Table A-34
2 Cuneo-Alessandria-Asti
1972
1976
1979
District population
1,229,573
1,242,234
1,304,627
Eligible voters in district
926,475
969,499
979,024
Actual votes
(percent turnout)
888,865
(95.94)
925,881
(95.50)
919,983
(93.97)
Blank and invalid ballots
(percent of total)
29,194
(3.28)
36,181
(3.91)
55,589
(6.09)
District percent national vote
2.58
2.46
2.41
Seats assigned district
15
15
15
Electoral quotient
50,568
52,335
50,846
Seats won by whole quotients in district
13
12
12
Seats won by residuals in national pool
1
4
3
1972
1976
1979
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
DC
384,577
44.73
7
DC
384,340
43.20
7 -
DC
357,466
41.35
7
PCI
175,772
20.45
3 -
PCI
252,169
28.34
4 + 1
PCI
213,214
24.67
4 -
PSI
99,917
11.62
1 + 1
PSI
84,641
9.51
1 -
PSI
83,836
9.70
1 -
PSDI
59,914
6.97
1
PSDI
48,455
5.44
- + 1
PSDI
48,034
5.56
- + 1
PSIUP
14,150
1.65
-
DP
15,638
1.76
-
PdUP
12,125
1.40
- -
PLI
57,144
6.65
1
PRad
11,177
1.26
PRad
29,969
3.47
PRI
27,530
3.20
-
PLI
32,996
3.71
- + 1
PLI
50,461
5.84
- + 1
MSI-DN
29,328
3.41
-
PRI
34,398
3.87
- + 1
PRI
33,513
3.88
- + 1
MSI-DN
25,886
2.91
MSI-DN
23,720
2.74
Others
' 11,339
1.32
-
Others
0
0
- -
Others
12,056
1.39
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Table A-35
3 Genoa-limperia-La Spezia-Savona
1972
1976
1979
District population
1,735,349
1,853,578
1,852,903
Eligible voters in district
1,393,456
1,456,231
1,477,501
Actual votes
(percent turnout)
1,319,522
(94.69)
1,382,651
(94.95)
1,361,158
(92.13)
Blank and invalid ballots
(percent of total)
40,067
(3.04)
33,594
(2.43)
57,711
(4.24)
District percent national vote
3.83
3.67
3.57
Seats assigned district
22
22
22
Electoral quotient
53,310
56,210
54,310
Seats won by whole quotients in district
20
20
18
Seats won by residuals in national pool
2
2
5
1972
1976
1979
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
DC
428,681
33.51
8 -
DC
464,575
34.44
8 -
DC
419,195
32.16
7 -
PCI
404,477
31.61
7 -
PCI
527,236
39.08
9 -
PCI
462,943
35.52
8 -
PSI
143,557
11.22
2 + 1
PSI
147,571
10.94
2 -
PSI
150,260
11.53
2 + 1
PSDI
68,111
5.32
1 -
PSDI
39,972
2.96
-
PSDI
43,144
3.31
- + 1
PSIUP
19,339
1.51
-
DP
14,089
1.05
- -
PdUP
11,346
0.87
-
PLI
74,925
5.86
1 -
PRad
20,484
1.52
- + 1
PRad
63,092
4.84
1 -
PRI
45,371
3.55
- + 1
PLI
24,064
1.78
PLI
43,647
3.35
- + 1
MSI-DN
78,684
6.15
1 -
PRI
51,670
3.83
- + 1
PRI
44,821
3.44
- + 1
MSI-DN
58,672
4.35
1 -
MSI-DN
48,794
3.74
- + 1
Others
16,310
1.27
-
Others
724
0.05
Others
16,205
1.24
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Table A-36
4 Milan-Pavia
1972
1976
1979
District population
3,675,008
4,430,074
4,566,032
Eligible voters in district
3,050,397
3,315,036
3,388,216
Actual votes
(percent turnout)
2,951,236
(96.75)
3,181,031
(95.96)
3,198,089
(94.39)
Blank and invalid ballots
(percent of total)
84,974
(2.88)
73,384
(2.31)
96,962
(3.03)
District percent national vote
8.56
8.44
8.38
Seats assigned district
46
52
52
Electoral quotient
59,713
57,549
57,428
Seats won by whole quotients in district
42
49
50
Seats won by residuals in national pool
3
3
2
1972
1976
1979
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
DC
981,922
34.26
16
DC
1,092,254
35.15
18 + 1
DC
1,034,717
33.37
18 -
PCI
807,810
28.18
13
PCI
1,113,369
35.83
19
PCI
994,768
32.08
17
PSI
352,922
12.31
5 + 1
PSI
368,246
11.85
6 -
PSI
348,495
11.24
6 -
PSDI
140,150
4.89
2
PSDI
98,173
3.16
1
PSDI
125,090
4.03
2
PSIUP
51,218
1.79
DP
79,933
2.57
1
PdUP
60,428
1.95
1 -
PLI
174,939
6.10
2 + 1
PRad
44,423
1.59
1 -
PRad
147,531
4.76
2 -
PRI
112,966
3.94
1 + 1
PLI
44,883
1.44
- + 1
PLI
94,834
3.06
1 + 1
MSI-DN
195,108
6.81
3
PRI
127,019
4.09
2 -
PRI
108,355
3.49
1 + 1
MSI-DN
132,163
4.25
2 -
MSI-DN
124,661
4.02
2
Others
49,227
1.72
-
Others
2,184
0.07
- -
Others
62,248
2.00
- -
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Table A-37
5 Como-Sondrio-Varese
1972
1976
1979
District population
1,365,110
1,615,435
1,785,746
Eligible voters in district
1,103,948
1,227,056
1,271,566
Actual votes
(percent turnout)
1,064,884
(96.46)
1,169,633
(95.32)
1,196,683
(94.11)
Blank and invalid ballots
(percent of total)
39,061
(3.68)
34,099
(2.92)
54,019
(4.51)
District percent national vote
3.09
3.10
3.14
Seats assigned district
19
19
19
Electoral quotient
53,990
54,073
54,412
Seats won by whole quotients in district
15
16
15
Seats won by residuals in national pool
2
3
5
1972
1976
1979
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
DC
471,005
45.92
8 + 1
DC
515,915
45.43
9 -
DC
498,173
43.60
9 -
PCI
182,220
17.76
3
PCI
308,481
27.17
5
PCI
267,419
23.40
4 + 1
PSI
130,761
12.75
2
PSI
134,459
11.84
2
PSI
143,174
12.53
2 -
PSDI
69,158
6.74
1 -
PSDI
42,539
3.75
- -
PSDI
49,798
4.36
- + 1
PSIUP
24,090
2.35
- -
DP
23,152
2.04
+ 1
PdUP
20,490
1.79
- -
PLI
55,290
5.39
1
PRad
11,886
1.05
PRad
41,041
3.59
- + 1
PRI
II-DN
26,576
2.59
- -
PLI
20,029
1.76
- -
PLI
32,807
2.87
- + 1
51,826
5.05
- + 1
PRI
37,849
3.33
- + 1
PRI
33,440
2.93
MSI-DN
41,224
3.63
- + 1
MSI-DN
38,086
3.33
- + 1
Others
14,897
1.45
- -
Others
o
o
- -
Others
18,236
1.60
- -
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Table A-38
6 Brescia-Bergamo
1972
1976
1979
District population
1,627,619
1,786,705
1,863,439
Eligible voters in district
1,177,126
1,316,534
1,372,897
Actual votes
(percent turnout)
1,138,935
(96.76)
1,261,235
(95.80)
1,299,783
(94.67)
Blank and invalid ballots
(percent of total)
33,303
(2.92)
31,572
(2.50)
49,818
(3.83)
District percent national vote
3.30
3.35
3.41
Seats assigned district
20
21
21
Electoral quotient
50,256
53,463
54,346
Seats won by whole quotients in district
19
19
17
Seats won by residuals in national pool
1
2
6
1972
1976
1979
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
DC
613,071
55.45
12 -
DC
654,729
53.25
12
DC
638,294
51.07
11 + 1
PCI
169,043
15.29
3
PCI
283,537
23.06
5 -
PCI
269,755
21.58
4 + 1
PSI
106,568
9.64
2 -
PSI
125,910
10.24
2 -
PSI
124,305
9.94
2 -
PSDI
58,821
5.32
1 -
PSDI
40,977
3.33
- -
PSDI
44,758
3.58
- + 1
PSIUP
29,452
2.66
DP
29,383
2.39
- + 1
PdUP
26,221
2.10
- + 1
PLI
41,432
3.75
- + 1
PRad
11,334
0.92
- -
PRad
34,544
2.76
- + 1
PRI
18,527
1.68
PLI
16,900
1.37
- -
PLI
25,722
2.06
MSI-DN
51,215
4.63
1 -
PRI
25,901
2.11
- -
PRI
24,659
1.97
MSI-DN
40,992
3.33
- + 1
MSI-DN
39,333
3.15
- + 1
Others
17,503
1.58
-
Others
0
0
- -
Others
22,374
1.79
- -
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commential
Table A-39
7 Mantua-Cremona
1972
1976
1979
District population
738,415
711,173
714,486
Eligible voters in district
512,354
541,284
548,522
Actual votes
(percent turnout)
496,704
(96.95)
526,075
(97.19)
529,924
(96.61)
Blank and invalid ballots
(percent of total)
9,835
(1.98)
11,991
(2.28)
19,948
(3.76)
District percent national vote
1.44
1.40
1.39
Seats assigned district
9
8
8
Electoral quotient
44,260
51,408
50,997
Seats won by whole quotients in district
8
7
7
Seats won by residuals in national pool
0
1
1972
1976
1979
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
DC
186,338
38.27
4 -
DC
197,938
38.50
3 -I- 1
DC
192,514
37.75
3 + 1
PCI
145,266
29.84
3 -
PCI
187,274
36.43
3 -
PCI
175,743
34.46
3 -
PSI
71,003
14.58
1 -
PSI
69,329
13.49
1 -
PSI
63,008
12.36
1 -
PSDI
18,579
3.82
-
PSDI
15,328
2.98
PSDI
16,434
3.23
- -
PSIUP
11,575
2.38
-
DP
6,482
1.26
- -
PdUP
9,852
1.93
- -
PLI
14,968
3.07
-
PRad
4,502
0.88
- -
PRad
12,590
2.47
PRI
7,924
1.63
- -
PLI
4,169
0.81
-
PLI
7,696
1.51
- -
MSI-DN
26,089
5.36
- -
PRI
9,577
1.86
-
PRI
8,663
1.70
- -
MSI-DN
19,485
3.79
-
MSI-DN
18,038
3.54
Others
5,127
1.05
- -
Others
0
0
Others
5,438
1,07
- -
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Table A-40
8 Trento-Bolzano
1972 ?
1976
1979
District population
785,967
841,886
873,995
Eligible voters in district
556,374
610,064
636,264
Actual votes
(percent turnout)
528,852
(95.05)
582,523
(95.49)
593,795
(93.33)
Blank and invalid ballots
(percent of total)
18,720
(3.54)
15,141
(2.60)
22,231
(3.74)
District percent national vote
1.53
1.55
1.56
Seats assigned district
10
10
10
Electoral quotient
42,511
47,281
47,630
Seats won by whole quotients in district
7
7
8
Seats won by residuals in national pool
3
2
2
1972
1976
1979
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
DC
200,136
39.23
4 + 1
DC
186,190
32.81
3 + 1
DC
177,362
31.03
3 + 1
PCI
38,855
7.62
- + 1
PCI
74,822
13.19
1
PCI
63,374
11.09
1 -
PSI
35,846
7.03
+ 1
PSI
44,681
7.87
+ 1
PSI
37,876
6.63
- + 1
PSDI
25,215
4.94
- -
PSDI
14,062
2.48
-
PSDI
15,326
2.68
- -
PSIUP
6,793
1.33
DP
13,030
2.30
PdUP
5,008
0.88
PLI
14,826
2.91
- -
PRad
6,960
1.23
-
PRad
24,270
4.25
- -
PRI
9,567
1.88
- -
PLI
5,618
0.99
- -
PLI
7,143
1.25
- -
MSI-DN
19,044
3.73
PRI
15,319
2.70
-
PRI
12,439
2.17
SVPI
153,674
30.12
3 -
MSI-DN
14,661
2.58
- -
MSI-DN
13,453
2.35
- -
SVP
184,375
32.50
3 -
SVP
205,007
35.87
4
Others
6,176
1.21
Others
7,664
1.35
Others
10,306
1.80
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Table A-41
9 Verona-Padua-Vicenza-Rovigo
1972
1976
1979
District population
2,254,852
2,426,385
2,540,043
Eligible voters in district
1,625,002
1,798,094
1,883,682
Actual votes
(percent turnout)
1,574,667
(96.90)
1,743,454
(96.96)
1,783,667
(94.69)
Blank and invalid ballots
(percent of total)
53,518
(3.40)
46,520
(2.67)
65,517
(3.67)
District percent national vote
4.57
4.63
4.68
Seats assigned district
28
28
28
Electoral quotient
50,704
56,564
57,271
Seats won by whole quotients in district
26
26
25
Seats won by residuals in national pool
2
2
4
1972
1976
1979
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
DC
867,645
57.04
17 -
DC
942,301
55.53
16 -
DC
926,990
53.95
16 -
PCI
238,681
15.69
4 + 1
PCI
362,442
21.36
6 -
PCI
336,693
19.60
5 + 1
PSI
128,984
8.48
2 -
PSI
162,179
9.55
2 + 1
PSI
150,745
8.77
2
PSDI
81,009
5.33
1 -
PSDI
62.073
3.66
1 -
PSDI
65,084
3.79
1 -
PSIUP
32,244
2.12
- -
DP
23,344
1.37
-
PdUP
20,356
1.18
- -
PLI
54,850
3.61
1 -
PRad
17,789
1.05
- -
PRad
60,717
3.53
1 -
PRI
29,863
1.96
- 1
PLI
19,343
1.14
PLI
33,273
1.94
- + 1
MSI-DN
70,474
4.63
_?
1 -
PRI
47,162
2.78
- + 1
PRI
45,107
2.63
- + 1
MSI-DN
59,347
3.50
1 -
MSI-DN
57,057
3.32
- + 1
Others
17,399
1.14
-
Others
954
0.06
- -
Others
22,128
1.29
- -
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Table A-42
10 Venice-Treviso
1972
1976
1979
District population
1,356,789
1,475,871
1,597,284
Eligible voters in district
997,367
1,097,717
1,152,485
Actual votes
(percent turnout)
955,319
(95.78)
1,054,432
(96.06)
1,076,716
(93.43)
Blank and invalid ballots
(percent of total)
29,156
(3.05)
30,507
(2.89)
36,974
(3.43)
District percent national vote
2.77
2.80
2.82
Seats assigned district
17
17
17
Electoral quotient
48,745
53,890
54,723
Seats won by whole quotients in district
14
15
14
Seats won by residuals in national pool
4
1
3
1972
1976
1979
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
DC
438,488
47.34
8 + 1
DC
466,092
45.52
8 -
DC
464,157
44.64
8 -
PCI
188,742
20.38
3 + 1
PCI
284,076
27.74
5 -
PCI
263,046
25.30
4 + 1
PSI
102,686
11.09
2 -
PSI
118,756
11.60
2 -
PSI
111,713
10.74
2 -
PSDI
62,322
6.73
1 -
PSDI
47,434
4.63
- + 1
PSDI
47,155
4.54
- + 1
PSIUP
24,560
2.65
- -
DP
18,552
1.81
- -
PdUP
17,415
1.68
- -
PLI
33,707
3.64
- + 1
PRad
11,925
1.16
- -
PRad
41,300
3.97
- + 1
PRI
22,520
2.43
- -
PLI
10,709
1.05
- -
PLI
18,519
1.78
- -
MSI-DN
38,779
4.19
- + 1
PRI
35,107
3.43
- -
PRI
33,180
3.19
- -
MSI-DN
30,778
3.01
- -
MSI-DN
29,474
2.83
- -
Others
14,359
1.55
- -
Others
496
0.05
- -
Others
13,783
1.33
- -
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tAmmuential
Table A-43
11 Udine-Belluno-Gorizia-Pordenone
1972
1976
1979
District population
1,140,574
1,134,383
1,152,514
Eligible voters in district
849,852
900,708
946,337
Actual votes
(percent turnout)
778,027
(91.55)
846,083
(93.94)
856,815
(90.54)
Blank and invalid ballots
(percent of total)
21,506
(2.76)
21,535
(2.55)
32,353
(3.78)
District percent national vote
2.26
2.24
2.25
Seats assigned district
14
13
13
Electoral quotient
47,282
54,969
54,964
Seats won by whole quotients in district
12
10
11
Seats won by residuals in national pool
2
3
0
1972
1976
1979
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
DC
347,284
45.91
7 -
DC
365,838
44.37
6 -
DC
343,654
41.68
6
PCI
133,866
17.70
2 + 1
PCI
209,269
25.38
3 + 1
PCI
192,591
23.36
3
PSI
96,331
12.73
2 -
PSI
106,703
12.94
1 ? 1
PSI
74,561
9.04
1
PSDI
72,663
9.60
1 -
PSDI
54,864
6.65
- + 1
PSDI
62,610
7.60
1
PSIUP
16,253
2.15
-
DP
14,609
1.77
-
PdUP
10,677
1.30
-
PLI
23,625
3.12
-
PRad
0
0
- -
PRad
30,695
3.72
- -
PRI
16,545
2.19
PLI
9,831
1.19
PL I
12,975
1.57
MSI-DN
42,049
5.56
- ? 1
PRI
27,222
3.30
PRI
22,881
2.78
- -
MSI-DN
32,779
3.98
MSI-DN
30,601
3.71
- -
Others
7,905
1.04
Others
3,433
0.42
-
Others
43,217
5.24
- -
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Table A-44
12 Bologna-Ferrara-Ravenna-Forli
1972
1976
1979
District population
2,095,379
2,219,829
2,283,731
Eligible voters in district
1,617,010
1,736,158
1,777,675
Actual votes
(percent turnout)
1,580,906
(97.77)
1,691,887
(97.45)
1,713,852
(96.41)
Blank and invalid ballots
s (percent of total)
34,970
(2.21)
27,767
(1.64)
42,413
(2.47)
District percent national vote
4.58
4.49
4.49
Seats assigned district
26
26
26
Electoral quotient
55,212
59,432
59,694
Seats won by whole quotients in district
23
24
23
Seats won by residuals in national pool
4
3
4
1972
1976
1979
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
DC
379,542
24.55
6 + 1
DC
430,104
25.85
7 -
DC
413,764
24.76
6 + 1
PCI
693,342
44.85
12
PCI
819,224
49.23
13 + 1
PCI
802,158
47.99
13
PSI
119,636
7.74
2
PSI
147,273
8.85
2 -
PSI
138,005
8.26
2
PSDI
90,814
5.87
1 + 1
PSDI
63,054
3.79
1 -
PSDI
65,422
3.91
1
PSIUP
40,367
2.61
- -
DP
15,542
0.93
-
PdUP
16,642
1.00
- -
PLI
54,730
3.54
- + 1
PRad
18,263
1.10
-
PRad
49,385
2.95
- + 1
PRI
87,313
5.65
1 + 1
PLI
15,749
0.94
PLI
24,086
1.44
- -
MSI-DN
65,043
4.21
1 -
PRI
99,783
6.00
1 + 1
PRI
100,111
5.99
1 + 1
MSI-DN
52,331
3.14
- + 1
MSI-DN
45,539
2.72
- + 1
Others
15,149
0.98
-
Others
2,797
0.17
-
Others
16,327
0.98
- -
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uonnaennal
Table A-45
13 Parma-Modena-Piacenza-Reggio Emilia
1972
1976
1979
District population
1,571,301
1,626,926
1,679,420
Eligible voters in district
1,211,340
1,292,359
1,333,688
Actual votes
(percent turnout)
1,173,962
(96.91)
1,249,363
(96.67)
1,267,675
(95.05)
Blank and invalid ballots
(percent of total)
35,583
(3.03)
29,409
(2.35)
42,045
(3.32)
District percent national vote
3.40
3.31
3.32
Seats assigned district
20
19
19
Electoral quotient
51,744
58,093
58,363
Seats won by whole quotients in district
17
16
16
Seats won by residuals in national pool
3
3
3
1972
1976
1979
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
DC
340,722
29.93
6 -
DC
390,179
31.98
6 -
DC
376,092
30.69
6
PCI
486,124
42.70
9 -
PCI
579,845
47.53
9 + 1
PCI
569,457
46.46
9 + 1
PSI
100,912
8.86
1 + 1
PSI
110,022
9.02
1 + 1
PSI
110,261
9.00
1 + 1
PSDI
70,098
6.16
1 -
PSDI
47,460
3.89
- + 1
PSDI
46,597
3.80
- + 1
PSIUP
32,780
2.88
DP
13,139
1.08
- -
PdUP
13,612
1.11
PLI
38,773
3.41
- + 1
PRad
10,684
0.88
-
PRad
29,594
2.41
-
PRI
15,988
1.40
- -
PL I
10,157
0.83
-
PLI
16,121
1.32
- -
MSI-DN
43,916
3.86
- + 1
PRI
23,605
1.93
- -
PRI
22,908
1.87
- -
MSI-DN
34,863
2.86
-
MSI-DN
31,276
2.55
-
Others
9,066
0.80
- -
Others
0
0
- -
Others
9,712
0.79
-
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Table A-46
14 Florence- Pistoia
1972
1976
1979
District population
1,245,702
1,400,702
1,432,859
Eligible voters in district
1,027,377
1,106,146
1,133,129
Actual votes
(percent turnout)
1,000,032
(97.34)
1,072,055
(96.92)
1,084,523
(95.71)
Blank and invalid ballots
(percent of total)
27,765
(2.78)
20,883
(1.95)
38,077
(3.51)
District percent national vote
2.90
2.84
2.84
Seats assigned district
16
16
16
Electoral quotient
50,014
58,398
58,135
Seats won by whole quotients in district
14
15
14
Seats won by residuals in national pool
2
0
0
1972
1976
1979
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
DC
288,685
29.69
5
DC
319,031
30.35
5
DC
304,654
29.11
5
PCI
438,360
45.09
8
PCI
529,458
50.37
9
PCI
506,156
48.37
8 -
PSI
81,627
8.40
1
PSI
91,952
8.75
1
PSI
93,607
8.95
1
PSDI
43,382
4.46
+ 1
PSDI
23,929
2.28
PSDI
23,290
2.23
-
PSIUP
14,522
1.49
- -
DP
13,220
1.26
-
PdUP
14,582
1.39
PLI
26,197
2.69
-
PRad
10,117
0.96
PRad
28,382
2.71
PRI
18,487
1.90
- -
PLI
6,011
0.57
PLI
10,040
0.96
- -
MSI-DN
47,428
4.88
- -I- 1
PRI
25,142
2.39
-
PRI
25,649
2.45
MSI-DN
32,312
3.07
MSI-DN
28,222
2.70
- -
Others
13,579
1.40
- -
Others
0
0
- -
Others
11,864
1.13
- -
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Table A-47
15 Pisa-Livorno-Lucca-Massa Carrara
1972
1976
1979
District population
1,241,127
1,292,509
1,354,809
Eligible voters in district
949,894
1,011,541
1,035,617
Actual votes
(percent turnout)
912,382
(96.05)
973,265
(96.22)
976,089
(94.25)
Blank and invalid ballots
(percent of total)
29,390
(3.22)
23,663
(2.43)
39,947
(4.09)
District percent national vote
2.65
2.58
2.56
Seats assigned district
15
15
15
Electoral quotient
51,940
55,858
55,067
Seats won by whole quotients in district
13
13
12
Seats won by residuals in national pool
3
1
2
1972
1976
1979
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
DC
296,254
33.55
5 + 1
DC
321,240
33.83
5 + 1
DC
303,637
32.43
5
PCI
323,410
36.63
6 -
PCI
406,341
42.79
7
PCI
385,006
41.13
6 + 1
PSI
83,417
9.45
1 -
PSI
101,642
10.71
1 -
PSI
97,122
10.37
1 + 1
PSDI
46,743
5.29
- + 1
PSDI
24,803
2.61
- -
PSDI
27,807
2.97
PSIUP
20,954
2.37
DP
12,275
1.29
PdUP
13,817
1.48
- -
PLI
18,821
2.13
- -
PRad
7,439
0.78
- -
PRad
23,945
2.56
- -
PRI
29,530
3.35
- + 1
PLI
5,652
0.60
- -
PLI
8,984
0.96
MSI-DN
53,983
6.11
1 -
PRI
31,167
3.28
- -
PRI
30,498
3.26
MSI-DN
39,043
4.11
MSI-DN
35,430
3.78
Others
9,880
1.12
Others
0
0
Others
9,896
1.06
- -
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Table A-48
16 Siena-Arezzo-Grosseto
1972
1976
1979
District population
799,331
779,886
806,939
Eligible voters in district
578,703
614,949
627,602
Actual votes
(percent turnout)
563,443
(97.36)
598,595
(97.34)
602,965
(96.07)
Blank and invalid ballots
(percent of total)
13,599
(2.41)
11,523
(1.93)
17,717
(2.94)
District percent national vote
1.63
1.59
1.58
Seats assigned district
10
9
9
Electoral quotient
45,820
53,370
53,204
Seats won by whole quotients in district
9
9
9
Seats won by residuals in national pool
0
0
0
1972
1976
1979
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
DC
159,913
29.08
3 -
DC
172,999
29.47
3
DC
164,226
28.06
3 -
PCI
251,951
45.82
5 -
PCI
293,040
49.91
5 -
PCI
285,289
48.75
5
PSI
50,167
9.12
1 -
PSI
60,510
10.31
1
PSI
59,938
10.24
1 -
PSDI
21,142
3.85
- -
PSDI
11,675
1.99
PSDI
12,896
2.20
- -
PSIUP
13,399
2.44
DP
7,294
1.24
- -
PdUP
7,309
1.25
PLI
10,299
1.87
PRad
3,605
0.61
-
PRad
10,997
1.88
PRI
12,344
2.25
- -
PLI
2,874
0.49
- -
PUT
5,004
0.86
MSI-DN
26,824
4.88
PRI
14,896
2.54
- -
PRI
14,571
2.49
MSI-DN
20,179
3.44
MSI-DN
19,680
3.36
- -
Others
3,805
0.69
- -
Others
0
0
- -
Others
5,338
0.91
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Confidential
Table A-49
17 Ancona-Pesaro-Macerata-Ascoli Piceno
1972
1976
1979
District population
1,347,489
1,359,907
1,409,845
Eligible voters in district
975,043
1,049,455
1,102,747
Actual votes
(percent turnout)
928,921
(95.27)
1,003,303
(95.60)
1,023,232
(92.79)
Blank and invalid ballots
(percent of total)
30,449
(3.28)
26,602
(2.65)
43,735
(4.27)
District percent national vote
2.69
2.66
2.68
Seats assigned district
17
16
16
Electoral quotient
47,288
54,261
54,416
Seats won by whole quotients in district
14
15
13
Seats won by residuals in national pool
3
1
4
1972
1976
1979
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
DC
354,708
39.48
7 -
DC
381,223
39.03
7
DC
371,036
37.88
6 + 1
PCI
295,156
32.85
6
PCI
389,556
39.89
7
PCI
373,016
38.08
6 + 1
PSI
70,808
7.88
1
PSI
80,877
8.28
1 -
PSI
77,604
7.92
1 -
PSDI
39,321
4.38
- + 1
PSDI
27,957
2.86
- -
PSDI
27,494
2.81
- -
PSIUP
22,721
2.53
DP
10,826
1.11
- -
PdUP
15,212
1.55
PLI
21,817
2.43
PRad
7,035
0.72
-
PRad
22,829
2.33
- -
PRI
33,525
3.73
- + 1
PLI
6,560
0.67
- -
PLI
9,772
1.00
MSI-DN
47,109
5.24
- + 1
PRI
33,588
3.44
PRI
34,627
3.54
- + 1
MSI-DN
39,079
4.00
- + 1
MSI-DN
38,757
3.96
- + 1
Others
13,307
1.48
- -
Others
0
0
- -
Others
9,150
0.93
- -
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Table A-50
18 Perguia-Terni-Rieti
1972
1976
1979
District population
957,150
918,945
949,252
Eligible voters in district
672,740
718,739
743,491
Actual votes
(percent turnout)
644,035
(95.73)
688,905
(95.85)
696,423
(93.67)
Blank and invalid ballots
(percent of total)
18,533
(2.88)
16,068
(2.33)
23,277
(3.34)
District percent national vote
1.87
1.83
1.83
Seats assigned district
12
11
11
Electoral quotient
44,678
51,756
51,780
Seats won by whole quotients in district
10
10
10
Seats won by residuals in national pool
1
2
0
1972
1976
1979
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
DC
201,618
32.23
4
DC
215,618
32.05
4 -
DC
209,524
31.13
4
PCI
244,642
39.11
5
PCI
303,770
45.15
5 + 1
PCI
289,598
43.02
5 -
PSI
60,907
9.74
1
PSI
74,571
11.08
1
PSI
75,187
11.17
1
PSDI
24,117
3.86
-
PSDI
11,008
1.64
-
PSDI
12,792
1.90
- -
PSIUP
16,842
2.69
-
DP
6,446
0.96
PdUP
8,526
1.27
PLI
10,414
1.67
PRad
3,865
0.57
PRad
13,671
2.03
PRI
16,005
2.56
- -
PLI
3,054
0.45
-
PLI
5,115
0.76
MSI-DN
44,362
7.09
- + 1
PRI
17,046
2.53
- -
PRI
17,736
2.63
- -
MSI-DN
37,182
5.53
- + 1
MSI-DN
34,447
5.12
- -
Others
6,595
1.05
- -
Others
277
0.04
-
Others
6,550
0.97
- -
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k.onimenual
Table A-51
19 Rome-Viterbo-Latina-Frosinone
1972
1976
1979
District population
3,796,552
4,546,320
4,893,332
Eligible voters in district
3,045,065
3,413,948
3,584,800
Actual votes
(percent turnout)
2,868,464
(94.20)
3,220,885
(94.34)
3,275,483
(91.37)
Blank and invalid ballots
(percent of total)
70,054
(2.44)
61,704
(1.91)
83,191
(2.54)
District percent national vote
8.32
8.55
8.59
Seats assigned district
47
53
53
Electoral quotient
57,110
57,439
58,041
Seats won by whole quotients in district
44
50
49
Seats won by residuals in national pool
4
5
5
1972
1976
1979
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
DC
963,134
34.42
16
+ 1
DC
1,127,263
35.68
19
-
DC
1,164,944
36.49
20
PCI
761,554
27.21
13
PCI
1,138,531
36.04
19
+ 1
PCI
965,403
30.24
16
PSI
212,354
7.59
3
+ 1
PSI
240,205
7.60
4
-
PSI
274,332
8.59
4
+ 1
PSDI
154,616
5.53
2
+ 1
PSDI
105,134
3.33
1
+ 1
PSDI
109,405
3.43
1
+ 1
PSIUP
27,981
1.00
-
-
DP
44,528
1.41
+ 1
PdUP
29,135
0.91
+ 1
PLI
115,268
4.12
2
-
PRad
57,709
1.83
1
-
PRad
166,628
5.22
2
+ 1
PRI
96,232
3.44
1
+ 1
PLI
38,581
1.22
+ 1
PLI
61,262
1.92
1
MSI-DN
413,437
14.77
7
-
PRI
104,961
3.32
1
+ 1
PRI
106,133
3.33
1
+ 1
MSI-DN
298,643
9.45
5
-
MSI-DN
257,877
8.08
4
Others
53,834
1.92
Others
3,626
0.12
Others
57,173
1.79
-
-
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Table A-52
20 L'Aquila-Pescara-Chieti-Teramo
1972
1976
1979
District population
1,206,266
1,166,694
1,233,397
Eligible voters in district
847,753
909,082
996,896
Actual votes
(percent turnout)
735,237
(86.73)
811,500
(89.27)
826,424
(82.90)
Blank and invalid ballots
(percent of total)
20,966
(2.85)
21,562
(2.66)
34,771
(4.21)
District percent national vote
2.13
2.15
2.17
Seats assigned district
15
14
14
Electoral quotient
42,015
49,371
49,478
Seats won by whole quotients in district
14
14
12
Seats won by residuals in national pool
1
0
2
1972
1976
1979
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
DC
344,061
48.17
8 -
DC
349,123
44.20
7 -
DC
361,367
45.65
7 -
PCI
192,601
26.96
4 -
PCI
275,536
34.88
5 -
PCI
246,080
31.08
4 + 1
PSI
49,004
6.86
1 -
PSI
61,325
7.76
1 -
PSI
59,751
7.55
1
PSDI
28,107
3.94
- + 1
PSDI
19,943
2.52
- -
PSDI
20,536
2.60
PSIUP
9,791
1.37
- -
DP
10,308
1.31
PdUP
8,372
1.06
-
PLI
14,671
2.05
PRad
4,865
0.62
- -
PRad
18,316
2.31
PRI
11,467
1.61
-
PLI
5,083
0.64
- -
PLI
6,829
0.86
MSI-DN
54,646
7.65
1
PRI
13,744
1.74
PRI
14,123
1.78
MSI-DN
50,011
6.33
1 -
MSI-DN
46,195
5.84
- + 1
Others
9,923
1.39
- -
Others
0
0
- -
Others
10,084
1.27
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Lontmential
Table A-53
21 Campobasso-Isernia
1972
1976
1979
District population
358,052
319,807
332,914
Eligible voters in district
236,701
247,977
285,372
Actual votes
(percent turnout)
194,373
(82.12)
211,452
(85.27)
213,070
(74.66)
Blank and invalid ballots
(percent of total)
7,382
(3.80)
7,574
(3.58)
10,262
(4.82)
District percent national vote
0.56
0.56
0.56
Seats assigned district
4
4
4
Electoral quotient
31,165
33,979
33,801
Seats won by whole quotients in district
4
4
4
Seats won by residuals in national pool
0
0
0
1972
1976
1979
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
DC
102,959
55.06
3
DC
103,396
50.72
3
DC
110,990
54.73
3 -
PCI
32,430
17.34
1
PCI
52,956
25.97
1
PCI
43,658
21.53
1
PSI
9,484
5.07
PSI
13,618
6.68
- -
PSI
14,927
7.36
PSDI
13,455
7.19
PSDI
7,349
3.60
PSDI
5,614
2.77
PSIUP
3,097
1.66
DP
3,266
1.60
- -
PdUP
3,557
1.75
PLI
5,383
2.88
PRad
1,000
0.49
- -
PRad
3,915
1.93
PRI
4,555
2.44
PLI
3,885
1.91
PLI
4,430
2.18
MSI-DN
13,403
7.17
PRI
6,220
3.05
- -
PRI
4,203
2.07
MSI-DN
12,188
5.98
- -
MSI-DN
10,535
5.20
Others
2,225
1.19
Others
0
0
- -
Others
979
0.48
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Table A-54
22 Naples-Caserta
1972
1976
1979
District population
3,070,570
3,387,888
3,668,673
Eligible voters in district
2,042,059
2,319,555
2,437,809
Actual votes
(percent turnout)
1,858,596
(91.02)
2,074,915
(89.45)
2,131,678
(87.44)
Blank and invalid ballots
(percent of total)
53,833
(2.90)
37,365
(1.80)
76,790
(3.60)
District percent national vote
5.39
5.51
5.59
Seats assigned district
38
39
39
Electoral quotient
45,119
49,696
50,119
Seats won by whole quotients in district
36
36
36
Seats won by residuals in national pool
2
3
2
1972
1976
1979
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
DC
641,626
35.55
14
DC 739,177
36.28
14 + 1
DC 801,798
39.02
15 + 1
PCI
460,661
25.53
10 -
PCI 730,693
35.86
14 -
PCI 556,615
27.09
11
PSI
138,198
7.66
3
PSI 146,968
7.21
2 + 1
PSI 177,389
8.63
3 -
PSDI
82,918
4.59
1 + 1
PSDI 59,694
2.93
1
PSDI 83,805
4.08
1
PSIUP
21,526
1.19
DP 32,127
1.58
+ 1
PdUP 25,571
1.24
- + 1
PLI
42,568
2.36
- + 1
PRad 16,429
0.81
- -
PRad 74,699
3.64
1
PRI
47,471
2.63
1 -
PLI 22,311
1.09
PLI 24,362
1.19
- -
MSI-DN
335,104
18.57
7 -
PRI 53,408
2.62
1 -
PRI 60,240
2.93
1
MSI-DN 233,566
11.46
4 -
MSI-DN 207,990
10.12
4
Others
34,691
1.92
-
Others 3,177
0.16
- -
Others 42,419
2.06
- -
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Table A-55
23 Benevento-Avellino-Salerno
1972
1976
1979
District population
1,690,189
1,671,460
1,751,717
Eligible voters in district
1,117,057
1,220,406
1,288,593
Actual votes
(percent turnout)
946,045
(84.69)
1,046,082
(85.72)
1,085,418
(84.23)
Blank and invalid ballots
(percent of total)
30,095
(3.18)
28,122
(2.69)
60,530
(5.58)
District percent national vote
2.74
2.78
2.84
Seats assigned district
21
19
19
Electoral quotient
39,823
48,474
48,804
Seats won by whole quotients in district
19
17
17
Seats won by residuals in national pool
4
1
1
1972
1976
1979
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
DC
425,374
46.44
10 + 1
DC
467,888
45.96
9
DC
497,813
48.57
10 -
PCI
157,698
17.22
3 + 1
PCI
257,129
25.26
5 -
PCI
211,147
20.60
4 -
PSI
82,553
9.01
2 -
PSI
90,058
8.85
1
PSI
111,973
10.93
2
PSDI
43,012
4.70
1- -
PSDI
43,459
4.27
- + 1
PSDI
44,958
4.39
+ 1
PSIUP
18,728
2.04
DP
13,096
1.29
- -
PdUP
14,724
1.44
PLI
29,554
3.23
- + 1
PRad
4,950
0.49
-
PRad
18,677
1.82
-
PRI
25,028
2.73
- + 1
PLI
17,054
1.67
- -
PLI
12,966
1.27
MSI-DN
120,575
13.16
3 -
PRI
24,585
2.41
PRI
19,479
1.90
MSI-DN
99,741
9.80
2
MSI-DN
74,446
7.26
1
Others
13,428
1.47
Others
0
0
Others
18,705
1.82
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Table A-56
24 Bari-Foggia
1972
1976
1979
District population
1,928,531
2,008,580
2,197,950
Eligible voters in district
1,234,562
1,377,333
1,474,834
Actual votes
(percent turnout)
1,121,789
(90.87)
1,258,487
(91.37)
1,284,387
(87.09)
Blank and invalid ballots
(percent of total)
32,909
(2.93)
34,093
(2.71)
47,085
(3.67)
District percent national vote
3.25
3.34
3.37
Seats assigned district
24
23
23
Electoral quotient
41,880
48,975
49,492
Seats won by whole quotients in district
23
22
21
Seats won by residuals in national pool
1
1
2
1972
1976
1979
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
DC
435,694
40.01
10
DC
497,345
40.62
10
DC
521,409
42.14
10 -
PCI
301,295
27.67
7
PCI
398,490
32.55
8 -
PCI
335,671
27.13
6 + 1
PSI
111,373
10.23
2 + 1
PSI
110,597
9.03
2 -
PSI
126,313
10.21
2 -
PSDI
44,730
4.11
1 -
PSDI
41,317
3.37
- + 1
PSDI
51,469
4.16
1 -
PSIUP
14,110
1.30
DP
12,729
1.04
- -
PdUP
12,131
0.98
PLI
23,589
2.17
-
PRad
8,781
0.72
PRad
31,407
2.54
- + 1
PRI
15,691
1.44
-
PLI
12,920
1.05
- -
PLI
18,874
1.52
-
MSI-DN
133,305
12.24
3
PRI
22,352
1.83
- -
PRI
23,712
1.92
-
MSI-DN
119,863
9.79
2 -
MSI-DN
102,668
8.30
2 -
Others
9,093
0.83
- -
Others
0
0
- -
Others
13,648
1.10
- -
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Table A-57
25 Lecce-Brindisi-Taranto
1972
1976
1979
District population
1,492,686
1,574,207
1,691,472
Eligible voters in district
1,010,147
1,141,404
1,202,198
Actual votes
(percent turnout)
914,691
(90.55)
1,043,626
(91.43)
1,069,197
(88.94)
Blank and invalid ballots
(percent of total)
27,657
(3.02)
30,048
(2.88)
41,853
(3.91)
District percent national vote
2.65
2.77
2.80
Seats assigned district
19
18
18
Electoral quotient
42,239
50,678
51,367
Seats won by whole quotients in district
17
16
16
Seats won by residuals in national pool
1
2
2
1972
1976
1979
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
DC
386,808
43.61
9
-
DC
435,890
43.01
8
-
DC
448,165
43.62
8
+ 1
PCI
206,149
23.24
4
+ 1
PCI
310,484
30.63
6
PCI
269,743
26.26
5
-
PSI
87,013
9.81
2
PSI
94,200
9.29
1
+ 1
PSI
104,474
10.17
2
PSDI
27,081
3.05
-
-
PSDI
28,049
2.77
-
-
PSDI
36,067
3.51
PSIUP
5,861
0.66
-
DP
12,881
1.27
-
PdUP
13,643
1.33
-
-
PLI
18,999
2.14
-
-
PRad
5,786
0.57
PRad
18,748
1.82
PRI
22,404
2.53
-
-
PLI
6,410
0.63
-
PLI
11,178
1.09
-
-
MSI-DN
114,225
12.88
2
-
PRI
21,339
2.11
PRI
20,431
1.99
MSI-DN
97,558
9.63
MSI-DN
92,580
9.01
1
+ 1
Others
18,494
2.08
-
Others
981
0.09
-
Others
12,315
1.20
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Table A-58
26 Potenza-Matera
1972
1976
1979
District population
644,297
603,064
618,312
Eligible voters in district
387,536
423,726
447,636
Actual votes
(percent turnout)
340,466
(87.85)
375,119
(88.53)
378,467
(84.55)
Blank and invalid ballots
(percent of total)
11,992
(3.52)
14,164
(3.78)
19,728
(5.21)
District percent national vote
0.98
0.99
0.99
Seats assigned district
8
7
7
Electoral quotient
32,847
40,106
39,859
Seats won by whole quotients in district
6
7
5
Seats won by residuals in national pool
2
1
2
1972
1976
1979
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
DC
161,476
49.16
4
+ 1
DC
160,491
44.46
4
DC
156,485
43.62
3
+ 1
PCI
81,858
24.92
2
-
PCI
120,341
33.34
3
PCI
103,572
28.87
2
PSI
32,169
9.79
+ 1
PSI
37,065
10.27
+ 1
PSI
39,296
10.95
+ 1
PSDI
15,948
4.86
PSDI
8,842
2.45
-
PSDI
12,770
3.56
-
-
PSIUP
5,856
1.78
-
-
DP
4,317
1.20
PdUP
7,104
1.98
PLI
4,630
1.41
-
PRad
1,572
0.44
-
-
PRad
5,949
1.66
PRI
2,850
0.87
PLI
2,454
0.68
PLI
3,293
0.92
MSI-DN
22,531
6.86
-
-
PRI
3,367
0.93
PRI
4,410
1.23
-
-
MSI-DN
21,778
6.03
-
-
MSI-DN
20,870
5.82
-
_
Others
1,156
0.35
Others
728
0.20
Others
4,990
1.39
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Table A-59
27 Catanzaro-Cosenza-Reggio Calabria
1972
1976
1979
District population
2,045,047
1,988,051
2,067,269
Eligible voters in district
1,247,229
1,377,466
1,508,930
Actual votes
(percent turnout)
1,042,914
(83.62)
1,161,150
(84.30)
1,168,782
(77.46)
Blank and invalid ballots
(percent of total)
-39,084
(3.75)
42,129
(3.63)
54,883
(4.70)
District percent national vote
3.02
3.08
3.06
Seats assigned district
25
23
23
Electoral quotient
37,178
44,760
44,555
Seats won by whole quotients in district
22
21
20
Seats won by residuals in national pool
2
2
3
1972
1976
1979
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
DC
392,790
39.13
10
DC
440,458
39.36
9 + 1
DC
475,879
42.72
10 -
PCI
260,038
25.91
6 + 1
PCI
368,406
32.92
8 -
PCI
297,384
26.70
6 -
PSI
124,553
12.41
3
PSI
128,732
11.50
2 + 1
PSI
142,640
12.81
3 -
PSDI
33,247
3.31
- + 1
PSDI
29,889
2.67
PSDI
35,712
3.21
- + 1
PSIUP
20,564
2.05
- -
DP
16,773
1.50
- -
PdUP
19,526
1.75
- + 1
PLI
16,394
1.63
PRad
5,538
0.50
- -
PRad
21,612
1.94
PRI
20,271
2.02
- -
PLI
7,652
0.68
-
PLI
7,364
0.66
- -
MSI-DN
122,381
12.19
3
PRI
23,602
2.11
PRI
18,540
1.66
MSI-DN
97,971
8.76
2 -
MSI-DN
77,910
6.99
1 + 1
Others
13,592
1.35
Others
0
0
Others
17,332
1.56
- -
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Table A-60
28 Catania-Messina-Siracusa-Ragusa-Enna
1972
1976
1979
District population
2,406,474
2,415,193
2,528,691
Eligible voters in district
1,599,371
1,758,700
1,870,890
Actual votes
(percent turnout)
1,388,561
(86.82)
1,541,462
(87.65)
1,547,497
(82.71)
Blank and invalid ballots
(percent of total)
54,906
(3.95)
54,749
(3.55)
116,235
(7.51)
District percent national vote
4.03
4.09
4.05
Seats assigned district
30
28
28
Electoral quotient
41,676
49,557
47,708
Seats won by whole quotients in district
27
25
24
Seats won by residuals in national pool
3
4
3
1972
1976
1979
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
DC
519,531
38.96
12 -
DC
612,595
41.20
12 -
DC
606,836
42.40
12
PCI
275,725
20.67
6 + 1
PCI
410,588
27.62
8 -
PCI
309,154
21.60
6 -
PSI
101,710
7.63
2 -
PSI
124,241
8.36
2
PSI
144,528
10.10
3
PSDI
44,527
3.34
1
PSDI
47,268
3.18
+ 1
PSDI
70,754
4.94
1 -
PSIUP
39,135
2.93
-
DP
15,553
1.04
PdUP
15,942
1.11
- -
PLI
50,663
3.80
1 -
PRad
12,948
0.87
PRad
39,526
2.76
- + 1
PRI
36,704
2.75
- + 1
PLI
29,253
1.97
- + 1
PLI
26,883
1.88
- -
MSI-DN
243,661
18.27
5 + 1
PRI
43,220
2.91
- + 1
PRI
46,902
3.28
- + 1
MSI-DN
189,080
12.72
3 + 1
MSI-DN
135,534
9.47
2 + 1
Others
21,999
1.65
Others
1,967
0.13
Others
35,203
2.46
- -
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Table A-61
29 Palermo-Trapani-Agrigento-Caltanissetta
1972
1976
1979
District population
2,314,527
2,265,522
2,441,904
Eligible voters in district
1,515,157
1,663,595
1,783,366
Actual votes
(percent turnout)
1,253,286
(82.72)
1,393,628
(83.77)
1,388,416
(77.85)
Blank and invalid ballots
(percent of total)
56,585
(4.51)
55,815
(4.01)
73,605
(5.30)
District percent national vote
3.63
3.70
3.64
Seats assigned district
29
26
26
Electoral quotient
38,603
47,779
46,957
Seats won by whole quotients in district
26
23
22
Seats won by residuals in national pool
4
2
4
1972
1976
1979
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
DC
487,342
40.72
12 + 1
DC
580,189
43.37
12 -
DC
594,800
45.24
12
PCI
262,524
21.94
6 + 1
PCI
366,743
27.41
7 -
PCI
267,999
20.38
5 + 1
PSI
115,565
9.66
2 + 1
PSI
130,116
9.72
2 -
PSI
131,539
10.01
2 + 1
PSDI
48,178
4.03
1
PSDI
43,830
3.28
- + 1
PSDI
57,089
4.34
1 -
PSIUP
27,059
2.26
- -
DP
15,633
1.17
PdUP
16,025
1.22
PLI
38,554
3.22
- + 1
PRad
12,790
0.96
- -
PRad
42,724
3.25
- + 1
PRI
40,357
3.37
1 -
PL I
19,634
1.47
PLI
25,567
1.94
- -
MSI-DN
158,424
13.24
4 -
PRI
43,775
3.27
- + 1
PRI
60,212
4.58
1 -
MSI-DN
122,691
9.17
2 -
MSI-DN
83,924
6.38
1 + 1
Others
18,698
1.56
Others
2,412
0.18
-
Others
34,932
2.66
- -
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Table A-62
30 Cagliari-Sassari-Nuoro (Oristano) a
1972
1976
1979
District population
1,419,362
1,473,800
1,592,964
Eligible voters in district
916,949
1,046,035
1,101,657
Actual votes
(percent turnout)
826,143
(90.10)
945,508
(90.39)
955,134
(86.70)
Blank and invalid ballots
(percent of total)
24,525
(2.97)
15,380
(1.63)
29,715
(3.11)
District percent national vote
2.40
2.51
2.50
Seats assigned district
18
17
17
Electoral quotient
40,080
48,954
48,706
Seats won by whole quotients in district
16
15
15
Seats won by residuals in national pool
1
1
2
1972
1976
1979
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
DC
327,901
40.91
8 -
DC
370,682
39.85
7 -
DC
352,689
38.11
7
PCI
202,593
25.27
5 -
PCI
330,585
35.54
6 + 1
PCI
293,535
31.72
6
PSI
65,289
8.14
1 -
PSI
86,529
9.30
1 -
PSI
82,345
8.90
1 + 1
PSDI
30,937
3.86
- + 1
PSDI
23,959
2.57
- -
PSDI
30,142
3.26
PSIUP
22,626
2.82
- -
DP
14,584
1.57
- -
PdUP
12,236
1.32
- -
PLI
26,655
3.33
-
PRad
7,792
0.84
-
PRad
31,918
3.45
-+1
PRI
19,993
2.49
- -
PLI
10,294
1.11
-
PLI
12,100
1.31
MSI-DN
90,547
11.30
2 -
PRI
18,573
2.00
-
PRI
17,703
1.91
MSI-DN
67,130
7.22
1
MSI-DN
57,860
6.25
1
Others
15,077
1.88
Others
0
0
Others
34,891
3.77
- -
a The Province of Oristano was created in 1975.
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Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7
uommential
Table A-63
31 Valle d'Aosta
1972
1976
1979
District population
100,599
109,150
114,537
Eligible voters in district
79,053
86,031
87,821
Actual votes
(percent turnout)
74,308
(94.00)
79,660
(92.59)
80,647
(91.83)
Blank and invalid ballots
(percent of total)
5,402
(7.27)
4,369
(5.48)
7,145
(8.86)
District percent national vote
0.22
0.21
0.21
Seats assigned district
1
1
1
Electoral quotient
NONE
NONE
NONE
Seat won by simple majority
1
1
1
1972
1976
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
DC
34,083
49.47
1
PCI
26,748
35.53
1 ?
PCI
28,886
41.92
?
PSI
PSI
0
0
?
PDUP
PSDI
0
0
? ?
DC
24,091
32.00
? ?
PSIUP
0
0
? ?
PRI
PL I
3,462
5.02
? ?
UV b
PRI
0
0
? ?
UVP c
MSI-DN
2,475
3.59
?
RV
DP d
20,234
26.87
UVP-
MReg e
PRad
2,020
2.68
MSI-DN
2,198
2.92
Others
0
0
a Unita Sinistra.
b Union Valdotaine.
c Union Valdotaine Progressiste.
d Democrazia Popolare.
e Union Valdotaine Progressiste pour la Reunification des Mouve-
ments Regionalistes.
1979
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
DC
PSDI
PRI
13,442
18.29
US a
23,909
32.53
UV b
UVP c
DP d
PLI
33,250
42.24
1
MSI-DN
2,077
2.82
? ?
Others
824
1.12
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Confidential
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Table A-64
32 Trieste
1972
1976
1979
District population
298,645
300,304
294,062
Eligible voters in district
235,375
241,074
239,456
Actual votes
(percent turnout)
224,188
(95.25)
231,579
(96.06)
224,724
(93.85)
Blank and invalid ballots
(percent of total)
6,303
(2.81)
4,771
(2.06)
6,604
(2.94)
District percent national vote
0.65
0.61
0.59
Seats assigned district
4
4
4
Electoral quotient
36,314
37,801
36,353
Seats won by whole quotients in district
3
3
3
Seats won by residuals in national pool
1
0
0
1972
1976
1979
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
DC
78,270
35.92
2 -
DC 82,615
36.42
2 -
DC
50,854
23.32
1 -
PCI
54,345
24.94
1
PCI 65,007
28.66
1 -
PCI
49,901
22.88
1
PSI
14,251
6.54
- -
PSI 15,776
6.95
-
PSI
8,338
3.82
- -
PSDI
13,642
6.26
-
PSDI 7,025
3.10
- -
PSDI
5,127
2.35
- -
PSIUP
2,850
1.31
DP 2,239
0.99
- -
PdUP
1,490
0.68
PLI
16,959
7.79
- -
PRad 6,931
3.06
PRad
13,572
6.22
- -
PRI
9,443
4.33
- -
PLI 4,504
1.98
- -
PLI
2,193
1.01
MSI-DN
27,350
12.55
- ? 1
PRI 10,357
4.57
-
PRI
3,800
1.74
-
MSI-DN 23,064
10.17
- -
MSI-DN
13,133
6.02
-
AT a
62,704
28.75
1
Others
775
0.36
- -
Others 9,290
4.10
- -
Others
7,008
3.21
a Associazione Triestina.
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F9UapljUO3
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Senate
Table A-65
1 Piedmont
1972
1976
1979
Region population
4,434,802
4,541,271
4,538,020
Eligible voters in region
2,987,409
3,029,886
3,067,601
Actual votes cast
(percent of total)
2,842,430
(95.15)
2,874,220
(94.86)
2,866,334
(93.44)
Blank and invalid ballots
(percent of total)
148,364
(5.22)
113,841
(3.96)
183,500
(6.40)
Regional percent of national vote
9.04
8.83
8.69
Seats assigned to region
24
25
25
Candidates winning by 65-percent quorum
0
0
0
1972
1976
1979
n
c,
=
:1
0.
ft.
0
f-k-.
ro'
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Highest
Personal
Preference
Percent for
Winning
Candidates
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Highest
Personal
Preference
Percent for
Winning
Candidates
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Highest
Personal
Preference
Percent for
Winning
Candidates
DC
983,606
36.51
9
51.90
DC
1,004,108
36.38
10
54.17
DC
939,229
35.01
9
50.61
PCI-
PSIUP
736,706
27.34
7
36.08
PCI
957,961
34.70
9
39.76
PCI
854,527
31.85
9
40.21
PSI
309,165
11.48
3
16.71
PSI
291,131
10.55
2
13.11
PSI
282,547
10.53
3
13.18
PSDI
206,620
7.67
2
10.52
PSDI
139,463
5.05
1
7.48
PSDI
152,946
5.70
1
7.52
PRI
96,267
3.57
0
0
PRI
124,986
4.53
1
8.23
PRI
124,819
4.65
1
8.07
PLI
230,796
8.57
2
18.51
PLI
99,920
3.62
1
8.51
PLI
140,307
5.23
1
15.69
MSI-DN
130,906
4.86
1
5.69
PRad
35,390
1.28
0
0
PRad
79,675
2.97
0
0
MSI-DN
107,420
3.89
1
7.87
MSI-DN
94,424
3.52
1
6.31
Others
0
0
0
0
Others
0
0
0
0
Others
14,360
0.54
0
0
2 5 X 1
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ppUapuUO3
pproved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7
Table A-66
2 Valle d'Aosta
1972
1976
1979
Region population
109,252
113,720
114,537
Eligible voters in region
72,743
75,473
77,066
Actual votes cast
66,555
69,059
70,226
(percent of total)
(91.49)
(91.50)
(91.12)
Blank and invalid ballots
5,597
3,964
8,026
(percent of total)
(8.41)
(5.74)
(11.43)
Regional percent of national vote
0.21
0.21
0.21
Seats assigned to region
1
1
1
1972
1976
1979
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Highest
Personal
Preference
Percent for
Winning
Candidate a
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Highest
Personal
Preference
Percent for
Winning
Candidate a
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Highest
Personal
Preference
Percent for
Winning
Candidate a
DC
RV b
UV c
PSDI
30,296
49.70
1
DC
RV b
UVC
UVP d
PRI
22,917
35.21
1
UV e
UVP d
DP e
PLI
37,082
59.62
1
PLI
2,926
4.80
0
PCI
PSI
PdUP
21,072
32.37
0
US f
19,814
31.85
0
MSI-DN
2,073
3.40
0
MSI-DN
1,806
2.77
0
MSI-DN
2,003
3.22
0
DP e
25,663
42.10
0
DP e
UVP MR a
17,699
27.19
0
PRad
1,601
2.46
0
Others
3,301
5.31
0
a The region's one Senator is elected by majority vote.
b Ragruppamento Valdese.
c Union Valdotaine.
d Union Valdotaine Progressiste.
e Democrazia Popolare.
Union Sinistra.
g Union Valdotaine Progressiste pour la Reunification des Mouve-
ments Regionalistes.
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lepuapijuoj
25X1
1
iulluapuuop
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Table A-67
3 Lombardy
1972
1976
1979
Region population
8,526,718
8,837,656
8,929,703
Eligible voters in region
5,375,903
5,578,858
5,724,503
Actual votes cast
(percent of total)
5,169,312
(96.16)
5,355,016
(95.99)
5,442,167
(95.06)
Blank and invalid ballots
(percent of total)
198,653
(3.84)
153,955
(2.87)
232,198
(4.27)
Regional percent of national vote
16.44
16.45
16.51
Seats assigned to region
45
48
48
Candidates winning by 65-percent quorum
1972
1976
1979
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Highest
Personal
Preference
Percent for
Winning
Candidate
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Highest
Personal
Preference
Percent for
Winning
Candidate
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Highest
Personal
Preference
Percent for
Winning
Candidate
DC
2,072,677
41.70
20
64.24
DC
2,171,018
41.74
21
61.90
DC
2,117,789
40.65
21
59.34
PCI-
PSIUP
1,219,216
24.53
12
39.63
PCI
1,598,078
30.73
16
43.38
PCI
1,530,781
29.38
15
41.21
PSI
644,706
12.97
6
17.38
PSI
613,429
11.79
6
14.70
PSI
620,900
11.92
6
16.19
PSDI
265,065
5.33
2
8.86
PSDI
183,398
3.53
1
5.62
PSDI
217,704
4.18
2
6.51
PRI
157,474
3.17
1
8.77
PRI
185,901
3.57
1
9.07
PRI
162,090
3.11
1
7.64
pu
279,909
5.63
2
15.62
PLI
109,046
2.10
1
9.11
PLI
156,745
3.01
1
9.31
MSI-DN
303,817
6.11
2
14.37
PRad
48,679
0.94
0
0
PRad
154,257
2.96
1
5.73
MSI-DN
213,343
4.10
2
8.75
MSI-DN
186,412
3.58
1
7.08
Others
27,795
0.56
0
0
Others
78,169
1.50
0
0
Others
63,291
1.21
0
0
25X1
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IMJUapljUOD
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Table A-68
4 Trentino-Alto Adige
1972
1976
1979
Region population
839,025
866,377
873,995
Eligible voters in region
508,058
522,012
541,766
Actual votes cast
(percent of total)
478,185
(94.12)
493,660
(94.57)
503,218
(92.88)
Blank and invalid ballots
(percent of total)
23,246
(4.86)
18,667
(3.78)
22,553
(4.48)
Regional percent of national vote
1.52
1.52
1.53
Seats assigned to region
7
7
7
Candidates winning by 65-percent quorum
0
1
1972
1976
1979
..-
.D.
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Highest
Personal
Preference
Percent for
Winning
Candidate
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Highest
Personal
Preference
Percent for
Winning
Candidate
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Highest
Personal
Preference
Percent for
Winning
Candidate
DC
185,854
40.85
5
59.30
DC
168,375
35.45
3
60.58
DC
160,634
33.42
3
58.35
PCI-
PSIUP
35,956
7.90
0
0
PCI
60,820
12.80
1
18.40
PCI
55,372
11.52
1
16.68
PSI
37,968
8.35
0
0
PSI
43,835
9.23
1
13.16
PSI
32,960
6.86
0
PSDI
20,604
4.53
0
0
PSDI
PRI
23,443
4.93
0
0
PSDI
14,281
2.97
0
PRI
7,210
1.59
0
0
PRI
9,115
1.90
0
PLI
8,229
1.81
0
0
PLI
PLI
PRad
6,581
15,897
1.37
3.31
0
0
0
0
MSI-DN
16,937
3.72
0
0
MSI-DN
12,669
2.67
0
9
MSI-DN
11,706
2.43
0
SVP
102,018
22.42
2
60.26
SVP
165,851
34.92
2
80.73
SVP
172,582
35.90
3
86.99
Others
40,163
8.83
0
0
Others
0
0
0
0
Others
1,537
0.32
iuDuaplluop
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mjuapuuop
Approved For Release 2007/12/17: -
Table A-69
5 Venetia
1972
1976
1979
Region population
4,109,787
4,277,501
4,338,292
Eligible voters in region
2,558,972
2,643,515
2,751,182
Actual votes cast
(percent of total)
2,432,578
(95.06)
2,538,380
(96.02)
2,592,521
(94.23)
Blank and invalid ballots
(percent of total)
93,090
(3.83)
75,437
(2.97)
114,660
(4.42)
Regional Percent of national vote
7.73
7.80
7.86
Seats assigned to region
23
23
23
Candidates winning by 65-percent quorum
0
0
0
1972
1976
1979
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Highest
Personal
Preference
Percent for
Winning
Candidate
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Highest
Personal
Preference
Percent for
Winning
Candidate
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Highest
Personal
Preference
Percent for
Winning
Candidate
DC
1,245,737
53.25
14
64.74
DC
1,291,119
52.42
14
63.76
DC
1,272,142
51.34
14
62.27
PCI-
PSIUP
434,839
18.59
4
33.10
PCI
572,425
23.24
6
38.39
PCI
559,446
22.58
6
36.72
PSI
253,899
10.85
2
15.39
PSI
261,355
10.61
2
13.82
PSI
246,369
9.94
2
12.55
PSDI
157,847
6.75
1
11.07
PSDI
113,270
4.60
1
9.35
PSDI
125,213
5.05
1
11.05
PRI
44,837
1.92
0
0
PRI
81,654
3.32
0
0
PRI
77,889
3.14
0
0
PLI
94,887
4.05
1
7.13
PLI
36,933
1.50
0
0
PLI
56,517
2.28
0
0
PRad
PRad
19,474
0.79
0
0
PRad,
NSU
53,637
2.17
0
0
MSI-DN
107,442
4.59
1
7.37
MSI-DN
85,741
3.48
0
0
MSI-DN
75,988
3.07
0
0
Others
0
0
0
0
Others
972
0.04
0
0
Others
10,660
0.43
0
0
a Nuova Sinistra Unita.
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Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7
g Table A-70
6 Friuli-Venezia Giulia
1972
1976
1979
Region population
1,209,810
1,244,553
1,245,611
Eligible voters in region
853,783
860,892
871,346
Actual votes cast
785,641
799,666
805,314
(percent of total)
(92.02)
(92.89)
(92.42)
Blank and invalid ballots
25,626
24,046
31,275
(percent of total)
(3.26)
(3.01)
(3.88)
Regional percent of national vote
2.50
2.46
2.44
Seats assigned to region
7
7
7
Candidates winning by 65-percent quorum
0
1972
1976
1979
0--
a,
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Highest
Personal
Preference
Percent for
Winning
Candidate
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Highest
Personal
Preference
Percent for
Winning
Candidate
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Highest
Personal
Preference
Percent for
Winning
Candidate
DC
336,358
44.26
4
48.08
DC
348,177
44.89
4
49.66
DC
297,399
38.42
4
44.33
PCI-
PSIUP
161,177
21.21
2
31.10
PCI
198,864
25.64
2
33.31
PCI
184,582
23.85
2
30.23
PSI
85,574
11.26
1
19.12
PSI
105,476
13.60
1
21.13
PSI
64,872
8.38
1
13.05
PSDI
67,003
8.82
0
0
PSDI
PRI
PLI
57,538
7.42
0
0
PSDI
45,219
5.84
0
0
PRI
19,331
2.54
0
0
PRI
17,871
2.31
0
0
PLI
31,196
4.10
0
0
PLI
11,102
1.43
0
0
MSI-DN
59,376
7.81
0
0
PRad
11,025
1.42
0
0
PRad
23,596
3.05
0
0
MSI-DN
45,483
5.86
0
0
MSI-DN
32,665
4.22
0
0
Asso.
Trieste
61,911
8.00
0
0
Others
Others
9,057
1.17
0
0
Others
34,822
4.50
0
1E9UapljUOJ
25X1
Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7
? I A
IV9UaptJU03
Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7
Table A-71
7 Liguria
1972
1976
1979
Region population
1,848,539
1,867,383
1,852,903
Eligible voters in region
1,306,832
1,309,579
1,321,860
Actual votes cast
(percent of total)
1,229,308
(94.07)
1,238,082
(94.54)
1,217,928
(92.14)
Blank and invalid ballots
(percent of total)
49,266
(4.01)
43,135
(3.48)
61,422
(5.04)
Regional percent of national vote
3.91
3.80
3.70
Seats assigned to region
11
10
10
Candidates winning by 65-percent quorum
0
0
0
1972
1976
1979
n
0
0
:21
56,
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Highest
Personal
Preference
Percent for
Winning
Candidate
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Highest
Personal
Preference
Percent for
Winning
Candidate
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Highest
Personal
Preference
Percent for
Winning
Candidate
DC
396,182
33.57
5
41.66
DC
406,436
34.01
4
40.46
DC
385,723
33.35
4
38.20
PCI-
PSIUP
384,235
32.56
5
42.19
PCI
464,506
38.87
4
47.79
PCI
418,257
36.17
5
44.49
PSI
141,798
12.02
1
13.43
PSI
149,102
12.48
1
13.97
PSI
136,492
11.80
1
12.88
PSDI
67,243
5.70
0
0
PSDI
PRI
PLI
103,406
8.65
1
18.90
PSDI
42,528
3.68
0
0
PRI
41,594
3.52
0
0
PRI
42,493
3.67
0
0
PLI
76,183
6.46
0
0
PLI
38,521
3.33
0
0
MSI-DN
72,807
6.17
0
0
PRad
16,581
1.39
0
0
PRad
44,624
3.86
0
0
MSI-DN
54,916
4.60
0
0
MSI-DN
42,987
3.72
0
0
Others
0
0
0
0
Others
0
0
0
0
Others
4,881
0.42
0
0
Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7
25X1
Is
1E9U4p1JUOD
Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7
Table A-72
8 Emilia-Romagna
1972
1976
1979
Region population
3,841,103
3,935,834
3,963,151
Eligible voters in region
2,634,221
2,687,822
2,751,273
Actual votes cast
(percent of total)
2,545,924
(96.65)
2,615,948
(97.33)
2,638,597
(95.91)
Blank and invalid ballots
(percent of total)
82,395
(3.24)
63,123
(2.41)
86,641
(3.28)
Regional percent of national vote
8.09
8.03
8.00
Seats assigned to region
22
22
22
Candidates winning by 65-percent quorum
0
1972
1976
1979
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Highest
Personal
Preference
Percent for
Winning
Candidate
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Highest
Personal
Preference
Percent for
Winning
Candidate
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Highest
Personal
Preference
Percent for
Winning
Candidate
DC
665,881
27.03
6
38.00
DC
740,426
29.00
7
38.92
DC
711,580
27.88
6
37.62
PCI-
PSIUP
1,126,206
45.72
11
51.32
PCI
1,231,925
48.26
12
56.72
PCI
1,229,204
48.17
12
53.60
PSI
221,406
8.99
2
13.68
PSI
234,478
9.18
2
14.23
PSI
224,489
8.80
2
13.17
PSDI
153,400
6.23
1
11.54
PSDI
102,563
4.02
0
0
PSDI
110,544
4.33
1
9.39
PRI
98,261
3.99
1
15.14
PRI
114,306
4.48
1
14.44
PRI
114,278
4.48
1
14.35
PLI
95,470
3.86
0
0
PLI
26,157
1.03
0
0
PLI
39,583
1.55
0
0
MSI-DN
102,905
4.18
1
5.94
PRad
19,657
0.77
0
0
PRad,
NSU a
44,150
1.73
0
0
MSI-DN
80,247
3.14
0
0
MSI-DN
68,404
2.68
0
0
Others
0
0
0
0
Others
3,066
0.12
0
0
Others
9,724
0.38
0
0
a Nuova Sinistra Unita.
Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7
mluaplluop
25X1
IMOUaptiUO3
Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7
Table A-73
9 Tuscany
1972
1976
1979
Region population
3,470,915
3,566,763
3,594,607
Eligible voters in region
2,379,162
2,430,932
2,482,823
Actual votes cast
(percent of total)
2,290,970
(96.29)
2,351,426
(96.73)
2,360,143
(95.06)
Blank and invalid ballots
(percent of total)
90,120
(3.93)
75,580
(3.21)
97,541
(4.14)
Regional percent of national vote
7.28
7.22
7.16
Seats assigned to region
20
20
20
Candidates winning by 65-percent quorum
0
0
0
1972
1976
1979
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Highest
Personal
Preference
Percent for
Winning
Candidate
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Highest
Personal
Preference
Percent for
Winning
Candidate
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Highest
Personal
Preference
Percent for
Winning
Candidate
DC
692,880
31.48
7
47.73
DC
730,045
32.08
7
42.21
DC
702,170
31.03
7
47.76
PCI-
PSIUP
960,586
43.65
9
50.68
PCI
1,077,969
47.37
10
54.17
PCI
1,055,528
46.65
11
55.02
PSI
215,436
9.79
2
12.27
PSI
250,384
11.00
2
14.14
PSI
234,679
10.37
2
14.22
PSDI
101,747
4.62
1
6.75
PSDI
PRI
PLI
114,591
5.03
1
11.06
PSDI
60,882
2.69
0
0
PRI
55,549
2.52
0
0
PRI
64,787
2.86
0
0
PLI
52,980
2.41
0
0
PLI
24,787
1.10
0
0
MSI-DN
121,609
5.53
1
9.09
PRad
16,635
0.73
0
0
PRad,
NSU a
38,150
1.69
0
0
MSI-DN
86,222
3.79
0
0
MSI-DN
75,575
3.34
0
0
Others
0
0
0
0
Others
0
0
0
0
Others
6,044
0.27
0
0
a Nuova Sinistra Unita.
lepuapguo
25X1
Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7
Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7
0 Table A-74
co
Fr 10 Umbria
1972
1976
1979
Region population
772,601
795,218
805,329
Eligible voters in region
528,672
539,727
559,154
Actual votes cast
(percent of total)
502,531
(95.06)
517,511
(95.88)
524,235
(93.76)
Blank and invalid ballots
(percent of total)
18,728
(3.73)
13,935
(2.69)
20,620
(3.93)
Regional percent of national vote
3.73
1.59
1.59
Seats assigned to region
7
7
7
Candidates winning by 65-percent quorum
0
0
0
,--,
o
1972
1976
1979
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Highest
Personal
Preference
Percent for
Winning
Candidate
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Highest
Personal
Preference
Percent for
Winning
Candidate
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Highest
Personal
Preference
Percent for
Winning
Candidate
DC
159,378
32.94
3
45.92
DC
158,822
31.54
2
35.97
DC
153,413
30.46
2
34.30
PCI-
PSIUP
210,205
43.45
3
41.30
PCI
237,588
47.18
4
52.00
PCI
233,211
46.31
4
51.79
PSI
53,283
11.01
1
9.71
PSI
58,687
11.66
1
12.81
PSI
59,134
11.74
1
13.44
PSDI
15,027
3.11
0
0
PSDI
7,698
1.53
0
0
PSDI
9,457
1.88
0
0
PRI
9,208
1.90
0
0
PRI
11,601
2.30
0
0
PRI
12,260
2.44
0
0
PLI
6,255
1.29
0
0
PLI
2,032
0.40
0
0
PLI
3,365
0.67
0
0
MSI-DN
30,447
6.30
0
0
PRad
2,323
0.46
0
0
PRad
6,752
1.34
0
0
MSI-DN
24,825
4.93
0
0
MSI-DN
22,331
4.43
0
0
Others
0
0
0
0
Others
0
0
0
0
Others
3,692
0.73
0
0
I - ?
Ig!luaPLIU?3
2 5X 1
Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7
,-'
1109UapljUOD
pprove or e ease uuIiiii I. -
00100050006-7
Table A-75
11 Marche
1972
1976
1979
Region population
1,359,063
1,390,388
1,409,845
Eligible voters in region
902,352
917,237
964,248
Actual votes cast
853,516
877,399
894,129
(percent of total)
(94.59)
(95.66)
(92.03)
Blank and invalid ballots
37,869
29,944
45,939
(percent of total)
(4.44)
(3.41)
(5.14)
Regional percent of national vote
2.71
2.69
2.71
Seats assigned to region
8
8
8
Candidates winning by 65-percent quorum
0
0
0
1972
1976
1979
ca.
25X1
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Highest
Personal
Preference
Percent for
Winning
Candidate
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Highest
Personal
Preference
Percent for
Winning
Candidate
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Highest
Personal
Preference
Percent for
Winning
Candidate
DC
331,846
40.69
4
45.92
DC
345,519
40.77
4
46.74
DC
334,444
39.43
4
44.86
PCI-
PSIUP
284,346
34.86
3
41.30
PCI
336,226
39.68
4
44.59
PCI
330,767
39.00
4
45.00
PSI
72,024
8.83
1
9.71
PSI
71,396
8.43
0
0
PSI
71,537
8.43
0
0
PSDI
35,547
4.36
0
0
PSDI
23,302
2.75
0
0
PSDI
25,164
2.96
0
0
PRI
29,554
3.62
0
0
PRI
28,171
3.32
0
0
PRI
29,932
3.53
0
0
PLI
18,714
2.29
0
0
PLI
5,254
0.62
0
0
PLI
8,294
0.98
0
0
MSI-DN
43,616
5.35
0
0
PRad
4,579
0.54
0
0
PRad
13,991
1.65
0
0
MSI-DN
33,008
3.89
0
0
MSI-DN
31,609
3.73
0
0
Others
Others
0
0
0
0
Others
2,452
0.29
Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7
Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7
* Table A-76
eD
LS' 12 Lazio
1972
1976
1979
Region population
4,702,093
4,921,859
5,037,255
Eligible voters in region
2,886,332
3,037,859
3,178,384
Actual votes cast
(percent of total)
2,692,720
(93.29)
2,856,273
(94.33)
2,919,780
(91.86)
Blank and invalid ballots
(percent of total)
97,140
(3.60)
79,281
(2.78)
123,684
(4.24)
Regional percent of national vote
8.56
8.77
8.86
Seats assigned to region
24
27
27
Candidates winning by 65-percent quorum
0
0
0
1972
1976
1979
.--
t?..)
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Highest
Personal
Preference
Percent for
Winning
Candidate
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Highest
Personal
Preference
Percent for
Winning
Candidate
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Highest
Personal
Preference
Percent for
Winning
Candidate
DC
875,075
33.71
8
45.98
DC
1,006,180
36.23
10
44.10
DC
1,028,568
36.79
11
44.54
PCI-
PSIUP
732,186
28.21
7
34.75
PCI
981,816
35.36
10
42.67
PCI
864,022
30.90
9
36.77
PSI
222,372
8.57
2
13.66
PSI
221,856
8.00
2
9.61
PSI
245,380
8.77
2
10.40
PSDI
143,909
5.54
1
11.47
PSDI
92,233
3.32
1
7.98
PSDI
104,739
3.75
1
8.96
PRI
97,077
3.74
1
5.28
PRI
100,675
3.63
1
5.89
PRI
101,452
3.63
1
5.54
PLI
118,363
4.56
1
12.27
PLI
44,232
1.59
0
0
PLI
62,538
2.24
0
0
MSI-DN
403,885
15.56
4
23.47
PRad
38,085
1.37
0
0
PRad
124,305
4.44
1
6.87
MSI-DN
289,259
10.42
3
14.37
MSI-DN
250,056
8.94
2
11.39
Others
2,713
0.11
0
0
Others
2,656
0.08
0
0
Others
15,036
0.54
0
0
Ig!JuaPiluo3
25X1
Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7
IERUaMJUOD
Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7
Table A-77
13 Abruzzi
1972
1976
1979
Region population
1,163,334
1,211,323
1,233,397
Eligible voters in region
777,156
784,278
864,162
Actual votes cast
(percent of total)
673,788
(86.70)
699,723
(89.22)
712,450
(82.44)
Blank and invalid ballots
(percent of total)
31,538
(4.68)
25,271
(3.61)
37,919
5.32)
Regional percent of national vote
2.14
2.15
2.16
Seats assigned to region
7
7
7
Candidates winning by 65-percent quorum
0
0
0
1972
1976
1979
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Highest
Personal
Preference
Percent for
Winning
Candidate
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Highest
Personal
Preference
Percent for
Winning
Candidate
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Highest
Personal
Preference
Percent for
Winning
Candidate
DC
304,658
47.44
4
49.40
DC
305,807
45.34
4
49.49
DC
312,667
46.35
4
51.22
PCI-
PSIUP
173,145
26.96
2
33.85
PCI
229,860
34.08
3
40.40
PCI
213,670
31.68
3
37.70
PSI
62,461
9.72
1
10.60
PSI
55,788
8.27
0
0
PSI
56,568
8.38
0
0
PSDI
23,416
3.65
0
0
PSDI
16,863
2.50
0
0
PSDI
15,695
2.33
0
0
PRI
9,510
1.48
0
0
PRI
11,061
1.64
0
0
PRI
13,577
2.01
0
0
PLI
13,351
2.08
0
0
PLI
4,513
0.67
0
0
PLI
6,599
0.98
0
0
MSI-DN
55,709
8.67
0
0
PRad
3,450
0.51
0
0
PRad
11,175
1.66
0
0
MSI-DN
45,216
6.71
0
0
MSI-DN
39,773
5.90
0
0
Others
0
0
0
Others
1,894
0.28
0
0
Others
4,807
0.71
0
0
Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7
25X1
Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7
Table A-78
dt,
E 14 Molise
1972
1976
1979
Region population
319,629
329,705
332,914
Eligible voters in region
216,645
213,476
247,295
Actual votes cast
(percent of total)
178,563
(82.42)
182,900
(85.68)
185,431
(74.98)
Blank and invalid ballots
(percent of total)
8,960
(5.02)
9,654
(5.28)
13,371
(7.21)
Regional percent of national vote
0.57
0.56
0.56
Seats assigned to region
2
2
2
Candidates winning by 65-percent quorum
0
0
0
,--?
4Q?
1972
1976
1979
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Highest
Personal
Preference
Percent for
Winning
Candidate
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Highest
Personal
Preference
Percent for
Winning
Candidate
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Highest
Personal
Preference
Percent for
Winning
Candidate
DC
99,043
58.40
2
56.57
DC
93,535
53.99
1
51.79
DC
95,295
55.38
2
52.46
PCI-
PSIUP
PSI
41,835
24.67
0
0
PCI
52,922
30.55
1
32.41
PCI
39,280
22.83
0
0
PSI
12,716
7.39
0
0
PSDI
10,523
6.20
0
0
PSDI
6,421
3.71
0
0
PSDI
4,311
2.51
0
0
PRI
3,409
2.01
0
0
PRI
4,548
2.63
0
0
PRI
3,876
2.25
0
0
PLI
4,519
2.66
0
0
PLI
4,447
2.56
0
0
PLI
3,512
2.04
0
0
MSI-DN
10,274
6.06
0
0
MSI-DN
11,373
6.56
0
0
PRad
2,430
1.41
0
0
MSI-DN
9,977
5.80
0
0
Others
0
0
0
0
Others
0
0
0
0
Others
663
0.39
0
0
2/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7
IM)UVUUOD
25X1
imluapguop
Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7
Table A-79
15 Campania
1972
1976
1979
Region population
5,054,822
5,280,268
5,420,390
Eligible voters in region
2,832,246
2,934,413
3,082,703
Actual votes cast
(percent of total)
2,518,013
(88.91)
2,612,929
(89.04)
2,662,853
(86.38)
Blank and invalid ballots
(percent of total)
119,770
(4.76)
100,518
(3.85)
150,682
(5.66)
Regional percent of national vote
8.01
8.03
8.08
Seats assigned to region
29
29
29
Candidates winning by 65-percent quorum
0
0
0
1972
1976
1979
ft)
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Highest
Personal
Preference
Percent for
Winning
Candidate
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Highest
Personal
Preference
Percent for
Winning
Candidate
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Highest
Personal
Preference
Percent for
Winning
Candidate
DC
858,429
35.79
11
46.82
DC
954,660
38.00
12
47.97
DC
984,934
39.21
13
48.89
PCI-
PSIUP
567,873
23.68
7
34.32
PCI
798,191
31.77
10
45.92
PCI
657,744
26.18
8
37.60
PSI
221,223
9.23
3
12.15
PSI
209,753
8.35
2
12.37
PSI
255,731
10.18
3
21.46
PSDI
135,563
5.65
1
11.09
PSDI
97,165
3.87
1
11.36
PSDI
118,204
4.70
1
9.39
PRI
94,512
3.94
1
14.21
PRI
78,676
3.13
1
9.20
PRI
100,214
3.99
1
10.23
PLI
83,259
3.47
1
10.43
PLI
45,470
1.81
0
0
PLI
38,958
1.55
0
0
MSI-DN
422,128
17.60
5
33.66
PRad
15,216
0.60
0
0
PRad,
NSU a
52,679
2.10
0
0
MSI-DN
313,280
12.47
3
20.39
MSI-DN
270,900
10.78
3
19.92
Others
15,256
0.64
0
0
Others
0
0
0
0
Others
32,807
1.31
0
0
a Nuova Sinistra Unita.
Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7
2 5X 1
Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7
S Table A-80
:711
(si
r45. 16 Puglia
1972
1976
1979
Region population
3,562,377
3,771,329
3,889,422
Eligible voters in region
2,006,880
2,099,810
2,226,952
Actual votes cast
(percent of total)
1,822,400
(90.81)
1,926,457
(91.74)
1,975,617
(88.71)
Blank and invalid ballots
(percent of total)
75,524
(4.14)
73,482
(3.81)
104,768
(5.30)
Regional percent of national vote
5.79
5.92
5.99
Seats assigned to region
21
20
20
Candidates winning by 65-percent quorum
0
1972
1976
1979
,--
c"
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Highest
Personal
Preference
Percent for
Winning
Candidate
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Highest
Personal
Preference
Percent for
Winning
Candidate
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Highest
Personal
Preference
Percent for
Winning
Candidate
DC
686,567
39.30
9
48.55
DC
761,560
41.10
9
50.10
DC
776,234
41.50
9
46.74
PCI-
PSIUP
461,658
26.43
6
36.40
PCI
582,221
31.42
7
40.31
PCI
518,333
27.71
6
37.03
PSI
193,066
11.05
2
16.23
PSI
177,893
9.60
2
13.23
PSI
198,106
10.59
2
14.18
PSDI
75,167
4.30
1
9.19
PSDI
66,812
3.61
0
0
PSDI
87,805
4.69
1
11.42
PRI
33,809
1.94
0
0
PRI
PLI
45,840
2.47
0
0
PRI
41,991
2.24
0
0
PLI
53,451
3.06
0
0
PLI
24,485
1.31
0
0
MSI-DN
228,941
13.11
3
22.48
PRad
10,590
0.57
0
0
MSI-DN
186,761
9.98
2
13.05
MSI-DN
208,059
11.23
2
15.13
PRad,
NSU a
26,990
1.44
0
0
Others
14,217
0.81
0
0
Others
0
0
0
0
Others
10,144
0.54
0
0
a Nuova Sinistra Unita.
IR9UaptIJUOD
25X1
Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7
lulluaNu?3
Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7
Table A-81
17 Basilicata
1972
1976
1979,
Region population
602,389
614,596
618,312
Eligible voters in region
349,688
354,873
374,762
Actual votes cast
(percent of total)
308,762
, (88.30)
317,475
(89.46)
321,919
(85.90)
Blank and invalid ballots
(percent of total)
14,540
(4.71)
15,467
(4.87)
21,969
(6.82)
Regional percent of national vote
0.98
0.98
0.98
Seats assigned to region
7
7
7
Candidates winning by 65-percent quorum
0
1972
1976
1979
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Highest
Personal
Preference
Percent for
Winning
Candidate
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Highest
Personal
Preference
Percent for
Winning
Candidate
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Highest
Personal
Preference
Percent for
Winning
Candidate
DC
135,810
46.16
4
50.75
DC
130,673
43.27
3
45.48
DC
133,837
44.62
4
45.96
PCI-
PSIUP
75,042
25.50
2
30.73
PCI
99,162
32.83
3
35.43
PCI
87,109
29.04
2
32.69
PSI
37,744
12.83
1
24.84
PSI
36,309
12.02
1
23.47
PSI
38,176
12.73
1
26.08
PSDI
14,543
4.94
0
0
PSD!
8,993
2.98
0
0
PSD!
12,007
4.00
0
0
PRI
2,223
0.76
0
0
PRI
PLI
5,509
1.83
0
0
PRI
3,306
1.10
0
0
PLI
5,968
2.03
0
0
PLI
3,179
1.06
0
0
MSI-DN
22,892
7.78
0
0
MSI-DN
20,113
6.66
0
0
PRad,
NSU
3,902
1.30
0
0
Others
0
0
0
0
Others
1,249
0.41
0
0
Others
0
0
0
0
a Nuova Sinistra Unita.
Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7
fo.
eD
25X1
Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7
0 Table A-82
CD
? 18 Calabria
1972
1976
1979
Region population
1,962,899
2,034,425
2,067,269
Eligible voters in region
1,115,585
1,140,525
1,257,160
Actual votes cast
938,132
971,072
981,243
(percent of total)
(84.09)
(85.14)
(78.05)
Blank and invalid ballots
52,383
48,421
67,474
(percent of total)
(5.58)
(4.99)
(6.88)
Regional percent of national vote
2.98
2.98
2.98
Seats assigned to region
12
11
11
Candidates winning by 65-percent quorum
0
0
0
.-
oo
1972
1976
1979
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Highest
Personal
Preference
Percent for
Winning
Candidate
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Highest
Personal
Preference
Percent for
Winning
Candidate
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Highest
Personal
Preference
Percent for
Winning
Candidate
DC
334,440
37.76
5
47.92
DC
365,414
38.63
5
44.79
DC
368,625
40.34
5
42.35
PCI-
PSIUP
247,001
27.89
4
41.97
PCI
306,374
33.21
4
46.03
PCI
260,501
28.51
3
40.19
PSI
117,552
13.27
1
16.69
PSI
117,840
12.77
1
16.04
PSI
139,062
15.22
2
19.42
PSDI
27,493
3.10
0
0
PSDI
20,118
2.18
0
0
PSDI
22,865
2.50
0
0
PRI
15,346
1.73
0
0
PRI
12,269
2.18
0
0
PRI
12,633
1.38
0
0
PLI
8,777
0.99
0
0
PLI
5,300
1.33
0
0
PLI
6,152
0.67
0
0
MSI-DN
135,140
15.26
2
36.77
PRad
4,603
0.50
0
0
PRad,
NSU
12,444
1.36
0
0
MSI-DN
99,733
10.81
1
21.49
MSI-DN
84,217
9.22
1
17.14
Others
0
0
0
0
Others
0
0
0
0
Others
7,270
0.80
0
0
a Nuova Sinistra Unita.
IZ9UapljUOD
25X1
' 8
MlUapUU03
Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7
Table A-83
19 Sicily
1972
1976
1979
Region population
4,667,316
4,861,230
4,970,595
Eligible voters in region
2,809,466
2,882,528
3,074,663
Actual votes cast
(percent of total)
2,385,671
(84.92)
2,472,648
(85.78)
2,493,620
(81.10)
Blank and invalid ballots
(percent of total)
133,417
(5.59)
115,838
(4.68)
172,865
(6.93)
Regional percent of national vote
7.59
7.59
7.56
Seats assigned to region
29
26
26
Candidates winning by 65-percent quorum
0
1972
1976
1979
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Highest
Personal?
Preference
Percent for
Winning
Candidate
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Highest
Personal
Preference
Percent for
Winning
Candidate
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Highest
Personal
Preference
Percent for
Winning
Candidate
DC
810,223
35.97
11
41.91
DC
940,198
30.89
11
44.59
DC
934,772
40.28
12
45.41
PCI-
PSIUP
502,603
22.32
7
29.41
PCI
644,022
27.33
8
35.78
PCI
519,190
22.37
6
33.31
PSI
257,022
11.41
3
20.03
PSI
229,562
9.74
2
19.47
PSI
260,693
11.23
3
19.91
PSDI
92,886
4.12
1
8.55
PSDI
88,472
3.75
1
6.29
PSDI
127,759
5.51
1
9.41
PRI
102,818
4.57
1
9.03
PRI
92,657
3.93
1
11.13
PRI
116,287
5.01
1
11.34
PLI
108,236
4.81
1
11.58
PLI
53,447
2.27
0
0
PLI
49,415
2.13
0
0
MSI-DN
378,466
16.80
5
28.10
PRad
17,509
0.74
0
18.95
PRad,
NSU
54,327
2.34
0
0
MSI-DN
289,883
12.30
3
0
MSI-DN
225,356
9.71
3
16.97
Others
0
0
0
0
Others
1,060
0.05
0
0
Others
32,956
1.42
0
0
a Nuova Sinistra Unita.
Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7
5
25X1
Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7
Table A-84
r.? 20 Sardinia
1972
1976
1979
Region population
1,468,737
1,552,767
1,592,595
Eligible voters in region
821,790
864,424
917,284
Actual votes cast
(percent of total)
739,937
(90.04)
787,529
(91.10)
800,329
(87.25)
Blank and invalid ballots
(percent of total)
33,741
(4.56)
25,633
(3.25)
40,152
(5.02)
Regional percent of national vote
2.35
2.42
2.43
Seats assigned to region
9
8
8
Candidates winning by 65-percent quorum
0
0
0
t.)
c),
Cz)
1972
1976
1979
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Highest
Personal
Preference
Percent for
Winning
Candidates
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Highest
Personal
Preference
Percent for
Winning
Candidates
Party
Total
Percent-
age
Number
of Seats
Highest
Personal
Preference
Percent for
Winning
Candidates
DC
292,057
41.36
4
44.52
DC
313,696
41.17
4
45.59
DC
301,261
39.63
4
44.47
PCI-
PSIUP
162,161
22.96
3
33.70
PCI
262,463
34.45
3
40.92
PCI
244,427
32.15
3
37.05
PSI
79,105
11.20
1
12.17
PSI
81,713
10.73
1
13.78
PSI
71,999
9.47
1
13.03
PSDI
PRI
31,931
4.523
0
0
PSDI
PRI
35,985
4.72
0
0
PSDI
23,406
3.08
0
0
PRI
13,496
1.78
0
0
PLI
25,515
3.61
0
0
PLI
PLI
11,078
1.46
0
0
MSI-DN
88,206
12.49
1
15.69
MSI-DN
68,039
8.93
0
0
PRad
16,417
2.16
0
0
MSI-DN
51,372
6.76
0
0
Others
27,221
3.86
0
0
Others
0
0
0
0
Others
26,721
3.51
Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7
tcpuopuuoj
25X1
Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7
Confidential
Confidential
Approved For Release 2007/12/17: CIA-RDP83B00228R000100050006-7