CHINA S TROUBLED FRONTIER REGIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00227R000100140004-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 16, 2008
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: April 1, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

Directorate of it op secret
11 Intelligence
State Dept. review completed
Top Secret
EA
April IYar2
Copy ` L 5
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Directorate of Ton Secret
Intelligence
China's Troubled
Frontier Regions
Information available as of 27 March 1982
has been used in the preparation of this report.
Top Secret
EA 82-10045C
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Top Secret
China's Troubled
Frontier Regions
Key Judgments Two years after its inception, Beijing's new minority policy appears to be
stagnating. Chinese leaders have not, as they had hoped, been able to carry
the policy far enough to overcome years of economic mismanagement,
racial conflict, and leftist excesses, and thus to strengthen the security of
China's border regions and contain local nationalism. Implementation has
done little to integrate the minority areas more fully into the mainstream
and reduce their drain on the national budget. The government believed
that a moderate, constructive policy toward minorities could play an
important role in improving relations with India and the moderate Arab
countries, which have indeed been impressed with China's concessions to
its Muslim minorities. 25X1
The policy, announced in May 1980, granted minority regions a measure of
increased autonomy, called for minority personnel to replace significant
numbers of Chinese officials, and sought to spur economic development by
increasing aid and implementing incentive systems. Beijing also loosened
restrictions on minority cultures and appointed prominent minority mem-
bers to prestigious, though relatively powerless, positions in the national
and regional governments. 25X1
The policy showed some initial success but now faces major obstacles. The
ambitious economic program will almost certainly fall short of expectations
because of the lack of infrastructure and the shortage of qualified
personnel. The implacable hostility of most minorities toward the Chinese
and the resilience of local nationalism make Beijing leery of permitting
greater autonomy. In addition, ethnic Chinese and minority government
officials and party cadre oppose the policy on a variety of grounds-
including that of ideology-and they fear that their own positions will be
Despite China's efforts, the border regions will remain areas of tension and
a drain on the country's limited economic resources. The chronic and
occasionally serious violence that has plagued the regions is certain to 25X1
China's neighbors, particularly the Soviet Union.
Party Chairman Hu Yaobang is closely identified with minority policy. A
lack of progress in minority affairs or an upsurge in violence could be used
by his rivals as part of a larger campaign to discredit him
iii Top Secret
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Too Secret
Regional Autonomy 7
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Figure 1
CHINA: Ethnolinguistic Groups
Uninhabited
c~aaerai~~ ~^ mea~r~~m -l~
Uninhabited
SING-TIBETAN
Mandarin
1. Northern
2. Eastern
3. Southwestern
Southern dialects
1. Wu
2. Gan
3. Xiang
4. Min
5. Hakka
6. Cantonese
I_; Tibetan
1. Western
2. Central
3. Eastern
Tai
INDO-EUROPEAN
Tajik
AUSTRGASIATIC
ALTAIC
Turkic
1. Kazakh
2. Uighur
3. Kirghiz
Mongolian
2. Western (Khoshot)
3. Western (Oirat)
4. Southern (Ordor)
5. Southern (Chabas)
6. Eastern (Khalkha)
Tungusic
Shenyang
Shapgh
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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Top secret
China's Troubled
Frontier Regions
Introduction
China's vast, sparsely populated minority areas are so
important strategically and economically that they
are a perennial source of concern for the government
in Beijing. These -regions contain important mineral
reserves and sensitive military and intelligence facili-
ties, including the Lop Nor nuclear test site. They
share long borders with the Soviet Union and with its
client states of Vietnam, Laos, Afghanistan, and
Mongolia, as well as with its ally India. All Chinese
regimes have been able to maintain only a tenuous
grip on the border regions; the Communists are no
exception. Beijing has failed to integrate these regions
fully into the Chinese polity and economy. China
does, however, strive to contain the tension so that
hostile neighbors cannot exploit it.
Particularly from the late 1950s, economic misman-
agement and political excesses, culminating in a
campaign for total assimilation, led to heightened
tensions between minority peoples and ethnic Chinese.
Frequent and occasionally large-scale armed clashes
aroused leadership concern about political stability in
the minority areas, particularly in the wake of the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The issue assumed
sufficient importance that senior party leaders, in-
cluding Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping, party Secre-
tary Hu Yaobang, and Politburo member Wang
Zhen, made troubleshooting trips to such areas. F_
Xinjiang and Xizang (Tibet) are the largest and most
important minority areas, and Beijing's problems
seem more acute there than in Inner Mongolia,
Ningxia, Guangxi, and Yunnan-other provinces
with large minority populations. This paper concen-
trates on Xinjiang and Xizang because they are
testing grounds for a minority policy announced in
An Intractable Problem
Beijing's relations with its ethnic minorities would be
difficult and complex under the best of circumstances.
Whereas the heartland is populated by sedentary,
relatively homogeneous, ethnic Chinese, the border
areas contain an extraordinarily diverse and predomi-
nantly non-Chinese population. China has some 56
different minority groups practicing a variety of reli-
gions and speaking a number of non-Chinese lan-
guages. Yunnan alone has over 22 minority groups
and Xinjiang has 13, predominantly Moslem, Turkic
peoples with varyin traditions as traders, farmers, or
nomadic herdsmen. 25X1
China's minority areas are backward and, for the
most part, abysmally poor. In Yunnan local tribesmen
still practice primitive, slash-and-burn agriculture, 25X1
and the Chinese press reports that the basic literacy
rate is less than 20 percent for adults. Even in the
more developed areas of the northwest, the average
annual per capita income of minorities is well below
that of the interior; moreover, the social capital and
economic infrastructure required for modernization
are lacking.' 25X1
Beijing's relations with its minority areas are compli-
cated by the overwhelming influence of the People's
Liberation Army (PLA) in frontier areas, especially in
the far west, the most troubled area. Military officials25X1
have generally been less sympathetic than civilian
leaders to minority sensitivities, fearing that loosening
control could undermine Chinese security. The Army
has played the major role in managing and developing
the economy of Xinjiang and Xizang, including open-
ing state farms, setting up industries, building cities,
25X1
' Peasants in the largely Uighur minority areas of southern Xin-
jiang, for example, have an average annual per capita income of 70
yuan (excluding income from private plots and sideline production),
as compared to 107 yuan for the overall rural provincial average.
Urban factory workers in Xinjiang, most of whom are Chinese and
receive generous government subsidies in addition to their salaries,
average 904 yuan per year. Embassy reporting, Chinese press
reports, and the statements of Chinese leaders reinforce the fact
that the minority areas are among the poorest in the country.=
25X1
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Figure 2
CHINA: Known Resources
Karamay
Dushanzi
Urumqi
- mma
? ? sd/rm
Lop
Nur
'mLanzhad
NINGXIA
FUELS ELECTRICAL
POWER
Refinery
Shale oil
refinery
Oilfield
A Gasfield
Oil basin
Q Major coal
mine
~$ Thermal
Cu Copper
Fe Iron ore
Hydro
Pb Lead and zinc
Mn Manganese
- Transmission
M Magnesite
Mo Molybdenum
line
Hg Mercury
W Tungsten
Sn Tin
NEI
MONGOL
Unix
Md
eQA
BEIJING
I
tiSh
Tangshan
Tianjin
T ryuao-i'
Q6
Q ; Kofeng.,
Xi'an Luoyang Xuzhou
Chengdu!A -.Nanchang
UP ' it /
Kunming
Cu
'Huainan'
Nanjing Fe
Chongqing Changsha
Luzhau Mn Q
Hg k Pb
Fuzhou
GU; NGXI
Mn
WSbW
A WA uangzh
Kao-hsiung
rMaoming
Q Cu
ra
Q
Chi
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative
.
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jt Vumen
Leaghu A
uhan
Cu
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Top Secret
constructing roads and railroads, and overseeing the
settlement en masse of demobilized Chinese troops
and down-to-the-countryside youth. PLA cadre also
established and staffed the party organization in both
areas during the 1950s, and leading PLA command-
ers with longstanding ties to the border areas-such
as Politburo troubleshooter Wang Zhen-continue to
play an important role in local politics.
Beijing's erratic and often harsh minority policies
during the 1950s and 1960s left ill will and suspicion
that cannot be eradicated. During the Great Leap
Forward (1958-60) and the Cultural Revolution
(1966-76), advocates of a moderate policy that at-
tempted to strike a balance between the interests of
the party and those of the local peoples lost out to
those favoring total assimilation. Minority cultures
were viewed as subversive and antisocialist, and mi-
nority leaders were labeled as class enemies. China's
leftists sought to impose the Maoist vision completely
and to rout the "special characteristics" of the minor-
ity areas. Collectivization was imposed on sedentary
25X1
and nomadic peoples alike, Islam and Buddhism were
suppressed as "feudal vestiges," and thousands of
mosques and temples were destroyed.
Maoist policies devastated the already weak econo- 25X1
mies of the border areas. Economic mismanagement
was aggravated by Chinese insensitivity. In Xizang,
for instance, the radicals, insisting that "grain is the
key link," forced the planting of wheat, which caused
shortages of barley-the traditional Tibetan staple.
Ideologically motivated crackdowns on private trade
brought local commerce to a halt; yet the state proved
incapable of providing needed goods and services.)
The human cost of leftist policies was severe both in
personal suffering and the loss of potential adminis- 25X1
trative and technical personnel. Many minority intel-
lectuals in Xinjiang, for example, were accused of
having ties to the Soviet Union or of being "local
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nationalists" and were imprisoned, some for more
than 20 years. Several generations of some of the best
educated and most respected families were wiped out.
Inner Mongolia illustrates the scale of the persecu-
The New Minority Policy
After the purge of the Gang of Four in 1976, party
leaders gradually began to modify the leftist policy of
total assimilation. By 1980 Beijing was convinced that
a massive new program was needed. The leadership
was particularly alarmed by the continued intensity of
anti-Chinese feeling as evidenced by the increase in
minority-Chinese incidents and by the emotional re-
ception given the Dalai Lama's elder brother during a
visit to Xizang in 1979. Chinese leaders also seemed
concerned that the upsurge in Muslim fundamental-
ism in Iran and Pakistan might spill over into Xin-
jiang, Ningxia, and Xizang. The Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan intensified fears regarding the vulner-
Although chiefly motivated by domestic political and
security concerns, Beijing also saw possible diplomatic
benefits from better relations with its minorities.
Beijing hoped to enhance its standing with Islamic
states and to create a climate conducive to improved
relations with India. Accordingly, China began en-
couraging visits by religious delegations from Saudi
Arabia, Somalia, Iran, and Morocco, among others,
and promoting stronger "people to people" ties be-
tween Chinese Muslims and the Islamic world. Mo-
roccan Prime Minister Bouabid, who visited Xian in
early 1982, became the first leader from a Muslim
country to attend public prayers in a Chinese mosque
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ability of the frontier regions.
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A Naxi couple registering their
marriage, Sichuan-Yunnan
area.F I
since 1949. The Chinese have reportedly permitted
the Saudis and others to make large donations to
individual mosques and to the Chinese Islamic Associ-
ation. Muslim associations from China now attend
international Islamic meetings.
? A "policy of recuperation" and economic develop-
ment to revive the traditional economy-specifically
the handicraft industry and animal husbandry. This
included an exemption from taxes and state pur-
chase quotas for two years and an increase in
central payments for five years.
In 1980 China was also attempting to improve rela-
tions with India and to make progress on the border
issue. New Delhi has viewed Beijing's actions in
Xizang-where Chinese treatment of its Tibetan mi-
nority has been an irritant in Chinese-Indian rela-
tions-as a gauge of its sincerity. A change in policy
was clearly indicated.
In May 1980 the new minority policy was announced
amid great fanfare by Hu Yaobang, who was Party
General Secretary at the time, during a trip to
Xizang. The points made in his speech, which includ-
ed specific proposals for Xizang, became the heart of
Central Directive 31 of 1980. Beijing promised:
? Greater autonomy for minority areas and modifica-
tion of central directives to fit the "special charac-
teristics" of each region.
? Replacement of Chinese officials by minority offi-
cials, with minorities to hold roughly two-thirds of
all positions at the upper levels of administration
and almost all posts at grass-roots levels. Those
guilty of abuses during leftist periods were to be
removed.
? Revival of traditional culture, including freedom of
religion, provided that a fundamentally socialist
orientation is maintained. 25X1
Beijing took a number of immediate steps to demon-
strate its sincerity and to right old wrongs. It appoint-
ed prominent minority figures to prestigious, although
largely symbolic, positions in the central and local
governments. The Panchen Lama, second only to the
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Miao girls in ceremonial dress,
Guizhou.)
As a corollary to economic development, Beijing has
ordered greater attention to improving the education-
al system in minority areas. The goal is universal
elementary education by the end of the decade, with a
lesser effort on the development of middle and techni-
cal schools. Beijing has also announced plans to create
more universities in the minority regions and to give
minorities preferential admission quotas.
Implementation:
The Case of Xizang
Xizang provides an excellent case study of the diffi-
culties the government has encountered in implement-
ing its new policy. Beijing considered Xizang a show-
case for the new program, and authorities acted
quickly to institute the promised reforms. This, plus
better and more complete source material, means the
experience in Xizang is also better documented than
that of other minority regions.
Economic Development. Conditions have improved
Dalai Lama in Tibet's religio-political order, for
instance, was appointed to the Standing Committee of
the National People's Congress. Beijing released
scores of minority prisoners, including those con-
demned as "local nationalists" in the 1950s, and
Moslem and Tibetan dissidents whom the Chinese
believed had participated in underground independ-
ence movements. Perhaps the most dramatic gesture
was Beijing's invitation to the Dalai Lama and his
followers to return from exile in India. Beijing gave
permission for four groups of the Dalai Lama's senior
advisers and followers to tour Tibet during 1980. The
Dalai Lama, however, refused to visit the region.
The heart of the new minority policy is an ambitious
economic recovery program whose announced goals
include significantly improving the economies of
"poor and backward" minority areas within two or
three years, surpassing the best post-1949 showing
within five or six years, and achieving "affluence"
within a decade. The plan permits more use of private
plots, traditional crops, barter, and a greater reliance
on material incentives. In Xizang, traditional cross-
border trade with Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim has
been reopened.
marginally in Xizang in the last two years, but
progress is uneven
Beijing claims peasant income has
risen, although significantly more for those in the
pastoral than for those in the agricultural sector.
More consumer goods are available in the cities, and
the free market appears to be flourishing. I
Other sectors of the economy have not fared as well.
Beijing has begun projects designed to develop
Xizang's infrastructure and has assumed complete
control over the region's budget. It is funding new
roads, power plants, and agrarian projects. Because of
the central government's recent budget cuts, alloca-
tions for these projects are far below the level expect-,
ed. In fact, much of the planned rebuilding has
stopped, and the reorganization or closure of factories
and mines has added to unemployment and has
lowered productivity. The Xizang Daily announced in
late June that industry did not fulfill the state plan
and that production costs had risen significantly. F_
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Regional Autonomy. Beijing began to transfer ethnic
Chinese and appoint Tibetans to government and
party positions soon after Hu Yaobang announced the
new policy. Party First Secretary Ren Rong, a mili-
tary man closely identified with the leftist period, was
replaced with Yin Fatang, who, although an ethnic
Chinese, is a Tibetan speaker with long experience in
minority affairs. The Tibetan press also reports that
leftists at lower levels are slowly being removed. F_
Most of the appointments have been in the rural
areas, although some local notables were named to
senior government positions including that of Vice
Chairman of the prestigious Standing Committee of
the Xizang People's Congress. The lowest levels of
rural administration now appear to be dominated by
Tibetans.
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Beijing made some concessions to Tibetan nationalism
by loosening restrictions on language, custom, cos-
tume, and social practices but has moved cautiously in
the area of religion. The regime has permitted monas-
teries to reopen and encouraged pilgrims to visit holy
sites in Xizang, but Beijing has not encoara ed the
revival of a priesthood to serve those sites.
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Continuing deep concern about local nationalism is
likely to preclude additional concessions to the Tibet-
ans. These concerns were reinforced by the mass
demonstrations that occurred in Lhasa in the summer
of 1980 during visits by delegations representing the
Dalai Lama. Beijing abruptly closed Xizang to outsid-
ers and subsequently, in cooperation with Tibetan
authorities, has sought to strengthen public order and
to harness nationalist sentiments.
The economic portions of the policy, by contrast, still
remain largely unfulfilled. Two years after the policy
was announced, a party work team sent to the region
to assess conditions concluded that the standard of
living remained far below that in the Mongolian
People's Republic and in most Chinese provinces, and
that Mongols were worse off than their Chinese 25X1
neighbors. Chinese leaders believe living conditions in
Inner Mongolia must eventually surpass those in the
Mongolian People's Republic. Although admittedly a
long-term goal, Beijing remains committed to devel-
(Beijing has
deemphasized regional autonomy when discussing mi-
nority policy, and it apparently believes it has gone
about as far as it can on this issue.
The Situation in Other Minority Regions
Implementation of the new minority policy seems
most advanced in Inner Mongolia. Mongols, who
constitute just 11 percent of the population of the
region, now hold a disproportionately large share of
both senior and lower level government positions.
Ethnic Chinese, however, still dominate the local
party organization. As in Xizang, the regime has
made concessions on culture and language, and Mon-
gols make up approximately 40 percent of this year's
freshman class at Inner Mongolia University. The
sensitivities of the large ethnic Chinese population
will probably prevent many additional concessions.
steps being 2
my. The lack of infrastructure and national budget 25X1
constraints, however, make it very unlikely that the 25X1
goal will be achieved.
25X1
As in Xizang and Inner Mongolia, Beijing has made
more progress in Xinjiang with cultural than with
economic matters. Probably because of the long bor-
der with the Soviet Union and the history of racial
violence, Beijing has moved more cautiously. Fewer
minority officials have been appointed although
Beijing has promised to begin withdrawing ethnic
Chinese officials within three years. We have no
evidence that large numbers of Chinese have been
transferred so far. Beijing has allowed the mosques
and bazaars to reopen, bolstered minority education,
permitted the use of local languages, and, as a major
concession to Muslim sensibilities, allowed use of the
revered Arabic script. 25X1
Cadre Opposition 25X1
Several groups have an interest in seeing Beijing's
new policy fail. Leftists generally oppose greater
autonomy for minorities and object to the economic
reforms on ideological grounds. Leftist sentiment is
particularly strong in Xinjiang. Last August, 2,000 to
3,000 wallposters reportedly appeared in Urumqi
denouncing Deng Xiaoping and demanding the rein-
statement of Hua Guofeng as party Chairman. The
Xizang press indicates that entrenched leftists are
causing problems for the provincial leadership there
as well.
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Top Secret
Many ethnic Chinese officials, regardless of their
political biases, fear that increased recruitment of
minority officials and their own consequent transfer
out of the province will mean losing special privileges
and hardship bonuses. Minority officials who have
collaborated with the Chinese fear the consequences
of a reduced Chinese presence. Tibetan officials in
particular seem to believe that increased autonomy
will lead to an upsurge of nationalist feeling that
would not only undermine the stability of the region
but threaten them personally.
Security and Subversion
Available evidence indicates that the military fears a
reduced ethnic Chinese presence could jeopardize
public order in minority areas and invite Soviet
meddling. Some military leaders distrust Beijing's
efforts to entice the Dalai Lama back to Tibet; they
believe that the Soviets have undue influence in the
Dalai Lama's camp and support Tibetan demands for
independence.
Military concerns about the impact of the policy on
political tranquillity in the minority areas seem well
founded. Since the introduction of the program, Chi-
nese-minority tensions have increased in some areas.
The most striking example is Xinjiang, where a wave
of minority unrest swept through the largely Uighur
oases along the southern rim of the Tarim Basin as
well as in Aksu and Urumqi in the north following the
inception of the minority policy. Minor incidents
quickly grew into rioting, armed assaults on local
officials and Chinese settlers, and occupation of party
and army offices. In October and November 1981, for
instance, communal violence between Chinese settlers
and native Uighurs escalated, forcing the authorities
to close the southwestern oasis city of Kashgar, 80
miles from the Soviet border.
In November
1981 minority
villagers had beaten local officials attempting to bring
more modern ways to Yunnan, had destroyed schools,
tempts to improve their condition.
and had generally worked against the regime's at-
Chinese officials, particularly military leaders, blame
the Soviet Union, at least partly, for the disturbances
in Xinjiang. Soviet propaganda efforts increased over
the past year, with daily radiobroadcasts in Uighur
and in other Turkic dialects. The Soviets seek to fan
minority fears of extinction and of forced intermar-
riage with the Chinese. They also broadcast reports
alleging the repression of minorities in other areas of
China and paint a glowing picture of life across the
cow's ally, Vietnam, also uses radiobroadcasts in
efforts to stir up trouble between ethnic Chinese
residents and minority peoples along the Sino-Viet-
namese border.
25X1
Soviet propaganda probably falls on receptive ears,
especially in Xinjiang. The Muslim peoples of western
China are of the same ethnic, cultural, and linguistic
group as the Turkic nationalities in the Soviet Union.
Living conditions are generally better on the Soviet
side of the border, and many older intellectuals were
trained and educated in Soviet schools. Chinese offi-
cials claim that Soviet propaganda is responsible for25X1
25X1
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Figure 4
CHINA: Xinjiang Autonomous Region
'Alma-Ata',-
, Sumbi
RYbach'y~_
C
71
Akgl
.Yangak Naryn
)sh
the continuing emigration of Uighurs, Kazakhs, and
other minorities across the border. Although there has
been no large emigration since 60,000 Kazakhs fled
from Ili into the USSR in 1962, the Chinese are
concerned about the continuous trickle of Uighur
emigres. The 1979 Soviet census officially gives the
number of Uighurs in the USSR as 211,000, but
0 Popular unrest, 1980-81
- Railroad
Road
Boundary r?presantativn is
nbt heCBB88fl(y atltho,itegve,
Ithe true figure is perhaps closer to
600,000. The Soviets support an anti-Chinese "Free
Turkestan Movement" and its "Liberation Army,"
led by the aged Gen. Zunun Taipov, which has 25X1
headquarters in Alma Ata. Chinese officials believe
that the Soviets are able to exploit the extensive
25X1
25X1
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family ties between Muslims in China and those in
the Soviet Union to gather intelligence and interfere
in Chinese internal affairs
Despite a lack of firm evidence to document Soviet
activities in the border areas, Chinese suspicions are
at least partly justified. The Russians were always
deeply involved in the Byzantine and sometimes cut-
throat minority politics of China's northwestern bor-
der regions, and there is every reason to assume that
the present Soviet regime continues the practice.
Chinese accusations that the Soviets are the primary
cause of minority unrest, however, overstate the case.
Improving relations with Moscow might relieve some
of the stress, but the minority problem in the north-
west, as well as in other minority areas, is based on
grievances that are deep and longstanding.
Outlook
Two years after its inauguration, the new minority
policy appears to be stagnating. Beijing has honored
some of the promises made in 1980-loosening re-
strictions on minority peoples, making symbolic ap-
pointments of minority personages to senior govern-
ment positions, and granting concessions to local
interests. These have improved life marginally in the
border areas, but no significant progress has been
achieved in the more difficult task of rebuilding the
economies. An enormous task in itself, the revitaliza-
tion of the minority areas is further complicated by
the lack of economic infrastructure, by a desperate
shortage of qualified personnel, and by continued
Chinese-minority tensions. Although minority areas
receive a greater percentage of the total national
budget than before, overall economic retrenchment
means that the allocated funds will be far below the
level expected when the policy was announced.
The border areas, with the possible exception of Inner
Mongolia, are likely to remain areas of tension and a
drain on Beijing. The strategic importance of the
border regions and the resilience of local nationalism
make it impossible for Beijing to loosen its grip much
more than it already has. Chronic and occasionally
violent incidents such as those that erupted in Xin-
jiang during the last two years will continue. Regard-
less of its good intentions, Beijing is unlikely ever to
win over the minority groups, whose hostility toward
the Chinese is, in most cases, implacable.
A resurgence of Chinese-minority violence in the
border areas could complicate China's foreign rela-
tions. China is already competing with some of its
neighbors for the allegiance of minorities. An out-
break of serious violence in the northwest or in the
south could exacerbate already tense relations with
the Soviet Union or Vietnam. Similarly, a new crack-
down in Tibet would become an issue in relations with
India, as such crackdowns have in the past. Any
highly publicized incidents involving the Turkic peo-
ples could set back efforts to win friends in the Middle
East. Moderate Arab states, however, seem impressed
by the lifting of restrictions on religion, and Beijing
has used representatives of its Muslim minorities as
ambassadors of good will.
The minority problem could also become a factor in
the leadership succession, especially after Deng leaves
the scene and jockeying for influence intensifies. Hu
and his supporters are closely identified with the new
policy. Opponents, particularly. in the military, might
use the lack of progress or continuing violence-
especially if it occurred in conjunction with other
policy setbacks-to criticize Hu and thus question his
qualifications for leadership.
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