THE OPPOSITION LEFT IN MEXICO

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00225R000100300002-6
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• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
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• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence "`"
25X1
The Opposition Left
in Mexico ~ 25X1
A Research Paper
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State Dept. review completed
Secret
ALA 82-10090
June 1982
Copy
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Intelligence
The Opposition Left
in Mexico
Information available as of 23 June 1982
has been used in the preparation of this report.
This paper was prepared by
Office of African and Latin American Analysis.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Middle America-Caribbean
Division, ALA,
This paper has been coordinated with the Directorate
of Operations and the National Intelligence
Council.
Secret
ALA 82-10090
June 1982
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in Mexico
The Opposition Left
Organizational activity among Mexico's opposition left has increased
significantly over the past few years. Although some progress toward leftist
unity has been made with the formation of the Communist-dominated
Unified Socialist Party of Mexico (PSUM), Mexico's opposition left
generally remains weak and divided. Four opposition leftist parties are
participating in July's general elections, but voter apathy remains the
major concern of the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). The
PSUM will probably not be able to replace the center-ri ht National
Action Party as the PRI's major opponent. 25X1
Although Mexico is experiencing serious economic difficulties and the next
administration may have fewer resources for co-opting opponents with
subsidies and political rewards, a good deal would have to change before
the legitimate opposition-much less a violent revolutionary left-could
emerge as a potent force. The ruling party's flexibility enhances intraparty
balance and effectively contests the attempts of small opposition groups to
lay exclusive claim to almost any constituency. In addition, the ruling
party's tactics for containing, co-opting, or eliminating opposition elements
continue to be effective. 25X1
Parties of the opposition left recognize that at present they can survive only
by following the government's rules. During the 1970s they refused to aid
radical-terrorist groups such as the 23rd of September Communist League.
While leftist groups currently support Central American insurgencies
ideologically and politically, they have declined to take up arms against
their own Government ~
The formation of the PSUM reflects a commitment to nonviolent reform
and is part of a Communist effort to build abroad-based coalition to
undercut the ruling party's claim of representing the Mexican left. The
refusal of the Mexican Workers Party to join the fusion effort, however,
will limit the PSUM's ability to attract significant support from other than
its usual sources among youths, intellectuals, teachers, and some peasant
groups. The party still has not succeeded in its efforts to build a firm base
in the middle class and has made few inroads into the unions controlled by
Secret
ALA 82-10090
June 1982
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the PRI. The Communists' desire to appeal to a broader spectrum of the
domestic left has contributed to their move toward a Eurocommunist
image and efforts to win friends within the media, the Church, and
educational institutions.
Remaining opposition leftist parties are a complex mixture of co-opted and 25X1
inde endent entities.
(Mexico City employs a variety of
traditional tactics to aggravate the Marxist left's chronic disunity. Among
independent leftist groups, Herberto Castillo's Mexican Workers Party
probably has the greatest potential to rally the opposition left, but this
depends largely on Castillo's personal appeal. Realizing that fact, the
government has refused to recognize the party officially.
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The Opposition Left's Struggle for Influence 1
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Role and Influence of the Opposition Left
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The Opposition Left
in Mexico
Organizational activity among the opposition left in
Mexico has picked up substantially over the past two
years, and may enable leftist parties to improve
significantly their 1979 vote totals in the general
elections on 4 July. A good deal would have to change
in Mexico, however, before the legitimate opposi-
tion-much less a violent revolutionary left-could
become a significant force. Despite Mexico's glaring
socioeconomic inequities and growing disenchantment
with politics-as-usual, the opposition confronts one of
the most effective contemporary political machines in
the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI).
PRI Tactics Toward the Opposition Left
Governing Mexico since 1929, the PRI has provided
political stability in which Mexicans generally take
considerable pride. The party and the government
employ a variety of control techniques to mobilize
support from three main sectors-organized labor, the
peasantry, and an amorphous group dominated by
middle echelon, white-collar workers. The PRI's
amoeba-like flexibility both maintains intraparty bal-
ance and effectively denies the existing small opposi-
tion groups the opportunity to challenge the party's
preeminence.
Throughout the PRI's history, its pragmatism has
usually overridden revolutionary principle. The gov-
ernment has followed a generally conservative course,
particularly in the domestic arena. The ruling party
and the government nevertheless jealously guard their
revolutionary, nationalistic image. They see serious
opposition from the left as threatening their claim to
the revolutionary mantle, whereas opposition from the
right merely reinforces their credentials. In this pecu-
liar political atmosphere, the PRI-government com-
plex is well served by numerous small and divided
opposition parties. For example, through its financial
assistance for the Socialist Workers Party and the
Popular Socialist Party, we believe the PRI has
prevented them from joining in Communist-sponsored
unity efforts and has otherwise assured their general
responsiveness to ruling party manipulation.
Reflecting the government's flexibility, its apprehen-
sion over future political instability, and its determi-
nation to maintain the appearance of a multiparty
system, five small parties-including the Communist
Party-have been granted official status. This fol- 25X1
lowed enactment in 1977 of a reform program that
liberalized guidelines for party registration and guar-
anteed minority parties one-fourth of the seats in the
nation's lower house. 25X1
Although electoral reforms have enabled the opposi-
tion to gain greater public exposure, US Embassy
reporting indicates the government aimed at co-opting
the opposition by bringing it into the system rather
than providing an avenue for meaningful competition.
Recent modifications of federal electoral laws illus-
trate the government's continued resistance to open-
ing up the political system. The changes, which
include creating one more district in which deputies
are elected by their proportional strength, will guar-
antee the survival of small opposition parties but limit
the influence of larger opposition groups. Strongholds
of the largest opposition party, the center-right Na-
tional Action Party, as well as the recently formed
Communist-dominated Unified Socialist Party of25X1
Mexico (PSUM) will be split. Minority parties can
earn two deputy slots by winning 1.5 percent of the
votes in a proportional representation district. With
eight minority parties now eligible to field candidates,
no single party, regardless of overall strength, is likely
to win more than a dozen seats in a district.
The Opposition Left's Struggle for Influence 25X1
Playing by the Rules. Opposition party leaders, as
indicated by conversations with US Embassy political
officers, recognize the facade of liberalization for
what it is, but they understand that at present they
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Party/Year Formed
Leaders
Membership a
(Estimates)
Unified Socialist Party of
Mexico (PSUM), 1981
Arnoldo Martinez Verdugo,
Pablo Gomez Alvarez
80,000-
125,000
Mexican Workers Party
(PMT), 1974
Heberto Castillo
19,000
Popular Socialist Party
(PPS), 1948
Jorge Cruickshank Garcia
25,000
Socialist Workers Party
(PST), 1975
Rafael Aguilar Talamantes
25,000
Revolutionary Workers Par-
ty (PRT), 1976
Jose Manuel Aguilar-Mora
8,000
a Total Population: 70,000,000
Registered Voters: 31,000,000
can survive only by playing by the government's rules.
The ruling party has an imposing track record not
only for containing legitimate opposition elements but
also for eliminating those that have tried to operate
outside the system. Moreover, radicalism has no
history of acceptance within the mainstream of Mexi-
can political thought. Indeed, the PSUM's vague
campaign demands for social justice and implementa-
tion of revolutionary precepts are formulated inten-
tionally to avoid the appearance of extremism.
Such enforced closeness to PRI policies suggests that
the opposition left will continue to play only a minor
role in Mexican politics. Yet, these groups are able to
exert some indirect impact on government policies by
encouraging the government when it is on a leftist
tack. The PRI is anxious both to avoid damaging its
carefully cultivated image as Mexico's only true
revolutionary party and to cater to the broad range of
forces within the party-including leftists-to avoid
deterioration of its political base. Mexican foreign
policy, especially support for Central American radi-
cal leftists, is in some respects a product of these
exigencies. At the same time, foreign policy and
Marxist-Leninist. Not automatically subject to Soviet
dictates. Formed by merger of Communist Party and four
smaller doctrinaire Marxist parties.
Marxist-oriented but nationalistic. Critical of govern-
mentoil and development policies. Refused to merge with
the PSUM.
Marxist, but submits to government guidelines on domes-
tic policy. Not automatically subject to Soviet dictates.
Marxist. Co-opted by the ruling party but strives to be
more independent than PPS. Pro-Cuban but not auto-
matically subject to Soviet dictates.
progressive domestic policies reflect an implicit con-
sensus among leftists inside and outside of govern-
ment and the ruling party on some of these questions.
The climate in which the Mexican left must operate,
however, is fluid. Mexico is experiencing serious
economic difficulties, and the next administration
may find it more difficult to sustain subsidies and
political rewards commensurate with those of the past
four years when economic growth exceeded 8 percent
annually. We believe the next few years could witness
mounting tensions between the government and orga-
nized labor as well as student demonstrations and
consumer protests. The PSUM as well as other oppo-
sition leftist parties will undoubtedly seek to take
advantage of temporary economic weaknesses.
The ProspectsJor Violence. The flexibility of the
ruling structure combined with a traditional commit-
ment to nonviolent reform has so far dissuaded oppo-
sition leftists from resorting to violence in their effort
to transform Mexican society. During the mid-1970s
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Jecre~
when radical-terrorist activity was near its peak,
organized Marxist parties publicly disavowed the
activities of such groups as the 23rd of September
Communist League and refused to support them. In
addition, although leftist leaders recognize the limits
of the political reform measures, PSUM spokesmen
recently told US Embassy officers that the reforms
could provide an opening to greater democracy and
that the registration of the Communist Party was
itself an important example of the opening of the
political system.
For whatever motives, a turn to violence against the
government by opposition leftists would probably be
suicidal. Moreover, although the PSUM and other
leftist parties may be able to take advantage of
current economic difficulties to garner additional
sympathy, there are no indications that significant
numbers of the populace are any more prepared to
support an insurgent movement now than the have
been durin the ast several decades.
Unified Socialist Party of Mexico
Structure. The formation in November 1981 of the
Unified Socialist Party of Mexico (PSUM) for the
first time raised attempts at leftist unity above the
level of temporary alliances. This amalgamation of
the Mexican Communist Party (PCM) with the small-
er Mexican Peoples Party (PPM), the Revolutionary
Socialist Party (PSR), the Movement for United
Socialist Action (MAUS), and the Popular Action
Movement (MAP) represents the largest and best
organized leftist grouping in Mexico, but still a minor
force in the Mexican political context. Its durability is
doubtful, given the fact that the PCM's legality and
size provide the chief centripetal force for the smaller
members of the coalition. 25X1
by former Communist Party members.
Communist Party members dominate the leadership
of the PSUM. Pablo Gomez Alvarez, a longtime
Communist Party official, is Secretary General and
Arnoldo Martinez Verdugo-Communist Party Sec-
retary General during the 1960s and 1970s and leader
of the party's dominant Eurocommunist faction-is
the PSUM's presidential nominee. Press reports sug-
gest that the PSUM's influential Central Committee
and Political Commission are also heavily populated
Reflecting the domination of ex-Communist Party
members, Embassy officials report the PSUM is
likely to maintain Communist efforts to enhance the
opposition left's long-term prospects by adhering to
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nonviolence, advocating nationalism, and incorporat-
ing as many leftist groups as possible in order to form
a mass party with effective popular support. Although
US Embassy officials report that party leader
Arnoldo Martinez Verdugo was a student in the
Soviet Union and although the pro-Moscow stance of
several of the parties merging with the Communists
may temper party criticism of Soviet activities, we
believe the PSUM will probably continue to remain
independent from outside direction.
Although exact figures are unavailable, PSUM mem-
bership probably numbers between 80,000 and
125,000.
l Recent US Embassy estimates
support this figure, but predate a decision by one
faction of the Communist Party led by Joel Ortega
and Rodolfo Echeverria not to join the fusion effort.
Further clouding the question of membership, a leftist
newspaper reported that in January and February
30,000 new members joined the PSUM.
We believe the Communist Party's immediate motive
for unifying the opposition left is to broaden its own
constituency. This is in line with its wider effort to
appeal to domestic sentiment by projecting a Euro-
communist image and attempting to win friends
within the media, the Church, and educational insti-
tutions. In existence since 1919, the party was pla-
gued by sectarianism and forced into a low profile
after the 1968 student disruptions. Only a handful of
Communists currently fill elected posts at the grass-
roots level. The Communist-sponsored Coalition of
the Left-formed to take advantage of the 1977
electoral reforms-garnered just 5 percent of the
popular vote in the previous national election and
holds only 18 of 400 seats in the Chamber of De u-
ties.
recent electoral
reforms will probably prevent the party from dramati-
cally increasing its congressional representation.
We judge that the four small parties that merged with
the Communists are motivated more by pragmatic
considerations than by ideological affinity. All are
Marxist and probably more pro-Moscow and doctri-
naire than the Communist Party mainstream, but
they lacked its legal status. Moreover, none has been
able to build wide support. Their membership is
overwhelmingly drawn from urban, educated ele-
ments of society.
cal opportunism.
The Mexican Peoples Party, largest of the four, is
strongest in the remote western state of Nayarit.
Currently headed by Alejandro Gascon Mercado, the
party split from the Popular Socialist Party in the
mid-1970s, claiming that the parent organization had
cast aside opposition to imperialism in favor of politi-
The Revolutionary Socialist Party, formed in 1975,
may be the new alliance's most unreliable member.
During the first PSUM congress in March, press
reports suggested that party leader Roberto Jaramillo
Flores-apparently upset by his party's limited repre-
sentation on the PSUM Political Commission and
concerned over the shallowness of the new group's
commitment to fostering change in Mexico-was
considering breaking with his fellow leftists. Such an
eventuality would have weakened the PSUM's image
as a leftist unity party.
The strongly anti-US Movement Jor United Socialist
Action was formed in the early 1970s by its present
leader, Carlos Sanchez Cardenas, and has been an 25X1
active advocate of leftist unity.
The Popular Action Movement was founded in 1981
but little is known of its organization or its leadership.
A press report, however, indicates the party has some 25X1
strength among electrical and nuclear workers labor
unions.
In an apparent move to reinforce its image as a
1 growing coalition, the PSUM has formed open elec-
toral alliances with several leftist splinter parties,
including the Socialist Current, the Unity of Commu-
nist Leftist Alliance, and the Party of Socialist Labor-
ers. Asimilar alliance with the Worker, Peasant, and
25X1
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Student Coalition (COCEI) of Oaxaca is probably
designed to exploit antigovernment sentiment in parts
of that state. Members of the four groups are among
the Unified Socialist Party's list of congressional
candidates.
Political unification of the Marxist left is a symbolic
milestone, but it will not affect the outcome of this
year's elections. Party leaders candidly admit that
victory over the ruling party's presidential candidate
is impossible and have told US Embassy officials that
the center-right National Action Party (PAN) may be
the chief benefactor of public dissatisfaction with the
ruling party's recent economic policies. They view the
electoral process, however, as an opportunity to reach
a wide audience and substantiate Communist claims
that the Unified Socialist Party constitutes a viable
alternative to continued PRI rule.
PSUM Recruitment, ~ffliates, and Front Groups.
According to numerous press and US Embassy re-
ports, university professors and students have been
more receptive to Communist organization than most
elements of society, and college campuses-particu-
larly Mexico City's huge National Autonomous Uni-
versity and the nearby University of Puebla-are
traditional Communist strongholds. The Communists,
however, have not been able to retain the support of
most university students once they leave school and
the emphasis on organizing students has made the
party appear unsympathetic to the problems of work-
ers and peasants. More significantly, the ruling par-
ty's well-entrenched organizational structure and its
policies of co-option and coercion have given it firm
control of the nation's urban and rural workers. ~
The Communist Party's most notable unionizing suc-
cess has been among university workers and profes-
sors. The party's vehicle-the Single National Union
of University Workers-seeks the nationwide integra-
tion of employees and teachers in all public universi-
ties. The union represented an estimated 60,000 per-
sons at the time of its inception in 1979. Members of
the union's executive council have included several
Communist Party Central Committee members, and
Evaristo Perez Arreola-a prominent Communist
leader from the northern state of Coahuila-is secre-
tary general of the union's largest affiliate, the Syndi-
cate of Workers of the National Autonomous Univer-
sity of Mexico. 25X1
The union has not been granted official recognition by
the government. According to US Embassy officials,
Mexico City prohibits university unions from embrac-
ing more than one campus out of concern that the
resulting, large organization might join forces with
other anti-PRI unions. In addition, and perhaps more
important, US officials report that the government
feared broader Communist domination of Mexico's
explosive university youth. 25X1
Communists also dominate the Revolutionary Teach-
ers Movement, a vocal dissent group within the large
government-controlled and traditionally leftist-lean-
ing National Syndicate of Educational Workers. Re-
cent dissident demands for salary increases and demo-
cratization of the union-old issues reinvigorated in
part by inflation-were punctuated by protest 25X1
marches and strikes in the states of Chiapas,
Guerrero, and Morelos. US Embassy reporting, how-
ever, indicates that the Revolutionary Teachers
Movement has managed to obtain only token conces-
sions from the union's national leadership with these 25X1
tactics. Press and Embassy reporting suggests that a
second dissident faction within the teachers union, the
Confederation of National Educational Workers,
probably has ties with the Communists.
Reflecting Communist problems in unionizing urban
laborers, the Soviet-backed Permanent Committee for
Latin American Trade Union Unity (CPUSTAL~
with headquarters in Mexico City since 1978-has
only one Mexican affiliate. Statistically, 95 percent of
Mexican workers are affiliated through their unions
with the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party, and
although Marxist opposition pockets exist in most
Mexican unions, labor dissidence has been inconse-
quential since the mid-1970s. A few unions that are
part of the ruling party's system, including power and
light workers and telephone workers, support Marxist-
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The main Communist organizations in the rural
sector are the General Union of Workers and Farm-
ers-Jacinto Lopez and the Independent Center of
Agricultural Workers and Farmers. The former is an
offshoot of the still active Popular Socialist Party's
General Union of Workers and Farmers, but, accord-
ing to US Embassy officials, it has probably no more
than a few hundred members. It is, however, the only
Mexican affiliate of the Permanent Committee for
Latin American Trade Union Unity.
The Independent Center of Agricultural Workers and
Farmers was created in 1976 by Communist Party
official Danzos Palomino. Danzos Palomino's claims
that membership in his organization ranges from
200,000 to 500,000 are unsupported-the PRI refers
to it as a paper organization. The Center, according to
press reports, is active in southern Mexico, particular-
ly in the state of Chiapas.
The Communist Party has had greater success in
sponsoring front groups that focus on foreign affairs.
The government's foreign policies are much further to
the left than its domestic programs, and this conver-
gence of interest enables the opposition left to be
outspoken on most foreign affairs questions.
The Mexican Peace Movement is the Communists'
most important front group in this regard. It is
associat w' h he Soviet-dominated World Peace
Council
The Mexican Peace
Movement frequently sponsors solidarity conferences
and demonstrations with which established parties
choose not to be formally associated. In recent years,
the movement has supported Puerto Rican independ-
ence, Haitian Communists, the Castro regime, and it
has staged anti-US rallies.
Leftist Ties With Cuba and the USSR. Cuba highly
values its close diplomatic ties with Mexico and
understands that the Mexican Government will not
tolerate interference in internal politics.
generally abides by the restriction on interference in
domestic politics.
An additional complication is that Cuba's formal
relations with Mexican Marxist parties have not
always been smooth. The Mexican Communist Par- 25X1
ty's move during the past decade toward an independ-
ent Eurocommunist image has frequently led to dif-
ferences with the Cubans over international issues.
For example, the Mexican Communist Party vocifer-
ously criticized the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
has sought to skirt these ideological differences-and
reduce the risk of offending the Mexican Govern-
ment-by supporting ostensibly nonpartisan organiza-
tions like the Mexican Peace Movement and the 25X1
Mexico Cit -based Latin American Federation of
Journalists. 25X1
While the USSR has stepped up its attempts to
expand state-to-state relations with Mexico, we be-
lieve it has continued to pursue active contacts with
local leftist groups. According to US Embassy offi-
cials, Moscow dispatched ahigh-level party delega-
tion to Mexico last August to discuss the formation of
a new Marxist varty with Communist leaders.
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The Mexican Government, aware that the country is
a traditional base for Soviet clandestine activities
directed against the United States and mainland
Latin America, sets limits on Soviet activities. The
expulsion of five senior Soviet officials from Mexico in
1971 for their minor role in the training of Mexican
guerrillas in North Korea was a lesson the Soviet
Union robably has not forgotten.
Mexican Workers Party
The Mexican Workers Party (PMT), one of the
remaining leftist parties outside the PSUM, grew out
of a mid-1970s reform movement inspired by disillu-
sioned intellectuals and political ideologues such as
Octavio Paz and Carlos Fuentes. Its current leader,
Heberto Castillo, is nationally known and, according
to US Embassy reports, the government-which re-
fuses to grant the party official status-recognizes
that the charismatic Castillo could help unify the left.
The government estimates party membership at
19,000, more than triple the 5,000 loyalists govern-
ment officials estimated in early 1979. The PMT's
appeal has never been tested at the polls, but US
Embassy officials indicate the party's major goals-to
transform society by peaceful means and to "end the
PRI-orchestrated sham democracy"-are attractive
to a wide range of nationalistic, reform-minded Mexi-
cans who do not find political expression in the PRI,
its rightist opposition, or the Communists. Conse-
quently, Communist efforts to unite the Marxist left
were dealt a blow when party leader Castillo refused
to join.
Embassy reporting indicates that the PMT does not
challenge Communist dominance among students, but
rather seems to attract university-educated Mexicans
who-while part of the system-are as displeased
with the ruling party's failures as they are with
orthodox Communist rhetoric. In our judgment, the
Communist Party's gradual move toward a more
Eurocommunist image can be viewed in part as an
attempt to appeal to the same constituency as the
PMT. 25X1
Castillo stands out as one of the system's rare failures
to incorporate such a charismatic opposition figure 25X1
under the party's broad umbrella or to silence him
before he gained nationwide recognition. Indeed, the
party's chief strength lies in Castillo's personal appeal
and in public acceptance of his nationalistic criticism
of government oil and development policies. Recog- 25X1
nizing this, the government probably will continue to
withhold official recognition, thus limiting the party's
influence to its impact on public opinion and to
possible participation in the United Socialist Party or
another leftist coalition.
Socialist Workers Party
The Socialist Workers Party was established in 1973
when party leader Rafael Aguilar Talamantes split 25X1
from Heberto Castillo's organization. The party was
nditional re istration in 1979
According to US Embassy reporting, the party em- 25X1
braces Marxist-Leninist principles by favoring the
creation of a government of the workers, but it does
not accept the supervision of foreign powers or organi-
zations. Moreover, the group views elements in the
ruling party's left wing-a so-called political bour-
geoisie-as capable of bringing about the transforma-
tion of Mexican society. Hence, although the party is
radical in doctrine, its acceptance of government
financing appears to put it in the ruling party's fold.
Critics of the Socialist Workers Party label it a PRI
clone.
The party has occasionally taken some actions that
appeared independent. In 1980 land seizures in Chia-
pas by the party's campesino wing-the National
Unity of Agrarian Workers-embarrassed the gov-
ernment. According to US Embassy officials, the
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party apparently has political contacts with the Pales-
tine Liberation Organization, and party leader Agui-
lar is associated with Latin American socialist leaders
as well as the Socialist International.
Popular Socialist Party
The Popular Socialist Party was founded in 1948 by
disparate, nondoctrinaire Communist Party members
led by Vicente Lombardo Toledano. The party had an
anti-US tilt and favored greater state participation in
the economy; by 1955 it had become a professed
Marxist party. Current membership is estimated by
the government at 25,000. According to US Embassy
officials, party Secretary General Jorge Cruickshank
Garcia holds a seat in the Mexican Senate as a
reward for not opposing PRI election fraud in Nayarit
in 1976. The party's decision not to join the PSUM
may engender additional benefits.
The party has steadily supported the PRI and current-
ly endorses ruling party presidential candidate Miguel
de la Madrid Hurtado. Nevertheless, officials of the
US Embassy in Mexico indicate that the party's rural
wing continues organizational efforts among rural
laborers.
Revolutionary Workers Party
The Trotskyite Revolutionary Workers Party was
founded in 1976 and granted conditional registration
in 1981. Jose Aguilar-Mora is the party's general
secretary. Its ideology supposedly eschews multiclass
coalitions in the drive to bring Communism to Mexi-
co, but press reports suggest it is interested in forming
an electoral alliance with other leftist opposition
parties.
The party underwent a major schism in 1979, and
membership is currently estimated
~at 8,000. According to US Em assy o icia s,
party members are primarily students, professors,
public school teachers, and doctors and, while labor
and campesino representation appears slight, the par-
ty has some strength within the electrical and nuclear
energy workers unions. Embassy officials report the 25X1
party also has links with other small Trotskyite
groups, including the Mexican Workers League and a
splinter organization, the Party of Socialist Workers.
Given its heretical Marxist philosophy, we believe this
group could aggravate disunity among the Mexican
left; this could be the reason for the government's
decision to recognize the party.
Party presidential nominee Rosario Ibarra de Pie-
dra-the first woman presidential candidate in
Mexico-is not a Trotskyite. She founded the Com-
mittee for the Defense of Political Prisoners, Exiles,
Fugitives, and Disappeared Persons when her son
disappeared after being arrested several years ago,
and has gained some national prominence as a result.
The party apparently believes that her broader appeal
will enable it to garner sufficient votes to retain its
official status.
Social Democratic Party
The Social Democratic Party was formed in 1978. It
grew out of a university organization-Communitar-
ian Action-which was once associated with the
ruling party's popular sector. The Social Democrats,
headed by Ernesto Sanchez Aguilar, call for national-
ization of the steel, glass, cement, chemical, and
pharmaceutical industries as well as federalization
and/or municipalization of all mass transportation.
The party would also place under state ownership the
administration of banks, financial institutions, and
insurance companies.
Membership is unknown, but US Embassy reporting
suggests that the party probably comprises primarily
academics and will play only a minor role in the July
elections. To take advantage of their official status,
press reports indicate the Social Democrats discussed
formal electoral alliances with several parties, includ-
ing the Mexican Workers Party and the Unified
Socialist Party of Mexico, before nominating ex-PRI
official Manuel Moreno Sanchez as their presidential
candidate.
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Party of Socialist Laborers
The Party of Socialist Laborers was formally estab-
lished in 1980, a year after its founders split from the
Revolutionary Workers Party. Atriumvirate-
Cuauhtemoc Ruiz, Raul Lezcas, and Alfonso Moro-
currently heads the organization. Membership, prob-
ably concentrated in Mexico City, is estimated by
Mexican officials at 3,000.
Socialist Current
The Socialist Current, not recognized by the govern-
ment as an official party, was formed in 1979.
According to US Embassy officials, party leaders
consider the organization a revolutionary vanguard
and hope to unite urban and rural workers, campe-
sinos, and the progressive middle class. Four members
of its central committee have served jail sentences for
political crimes, and one, Jorge Sanchez Hirales, was
in exile in Cuba. Allied with the PSUM for the
election, the party has at best a handful of adherents.
Unity of Communist Leftist Alliance
The Unity of Communist Leftist Alliance is a small
(perhaps 200 members), fledgling political organiza-
tion, which has recently entered into an electoral
alliance with the PSUM. It is headed by Manuel
Terrazas Guerrero.
Other Leftist Groups
A number of organizations-which may function in
the political arena but about which we have little
information-are considered by the Mexican Govern-
ment to be Marxist entities. Among them are: Inde-
pendent Workers Union, National Democratic Popu-
lar Front, Popular Union of Naucalpan Colonies,
National Federation of Bolshevik Organizations, Na-
tional Front Against Repression, and the "Plan de
Ayala" National Committee.
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