THE FRONTLINE STATES: LOOKING BEYOND NAMIBIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00225R000100230001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 10, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 1, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
The Frontline States:
Looking Beyond Namibia
State Dept. review completed
Seciret
Copy 260
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Intelligence
Directorate of Secret
The Frontline States:
Looking Beyond Namibia
Information available as of 14 May 1982
has been used in the preparation of this report.
This memorandum was written byl
Office of African and Latin American Analysis.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Southern Africa Division,
OALA,
Directorate of Operations and the NIC
Secret
ALA 82-10078
June 1982
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Summary
The FronQline States:
Looking Beyond Namibia
Recent changes in the power relationship between the Frontline States and
the South-West Africa People's Organization appear to signal a growing
Frontline preoccupation with regional security issues in general and with
the aggressive behavior of South Africa in particular. These changes are
evident in SWAPO's successful insistence on rejecting Western electoral
proposals on Namibia and in the growing Frontline pessimism about the
entire settlement process.
This deepening pessimism among Frontline leaders probably stems from a
belief that a settlement may not be attainable. Some Frontline leaders
seem to believe that virtually any negotiated settlement would inevitably
favor South Africa, and that even with such a settlement, Pretoria would
not change its hostile, aggressive approach in dealing with its neighbors.
Given these attitudes, it will be more difficult to engage the Frontline on
Namibian matters, and the Frontline probably cannot be counted on to
play a constructive role in Western efforts to promote peaceful solutions to
the region's problems.
The Frontline States already appeared to be looking beyond Namibia at
their summit meeting in Maputo in early March. Unlike most such
meetings, the Maputo summit did not primarily address Western initiatives
on Namibia, but instead concentrated on exploring regional security
problems. It resulted in pledges to increase Frontline security cooperation
and to expand support for the insurgencies of the African National
Congress and SWAPO.
The Frontline States know they could not counteract Pretoria's superior
military and economic power without a dramatic increase in external
support. Although the Frontline States decided at Maputo not to accept
Communist offers of increased military aid, the summit may have marked
the beginning of a process by which the black governments will be moved
along by a flow of events and incremental policy shifts toward a point
where recourse to longstanding offers of expanded military support from
the USSR and its allies becomes irresistible.
Secret
ALA 82-10078
June 1982
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The Frontline States:
Looking Beyond Namibia
Introduction The Frontline States' inability over the past several months to budge the
South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) from its hardline
rejection of the Western Contact Group's electoral proposals on Namibia
may mark an important turning point in Frontline attitudes toward
Western settlement efforts.' The general pattern of Frontline behavior in
recent months suggests to us that the black governments' disillusionment
with the glacial pace of the Namibian talks, coupled with their mounting
concern over what they have called "South Africa's undeclared war against
its neighbors," has led them to discount the value of Western efforts to pro-
mote regional stability. Indeed, they appear to be searching for new ways
to cope with Pretoria and to persuade the West-particularly the United
States-to restrain South Africa. 25X1
This paper looks at the increasing circumstantial evidence that significant
changes may be occurring in Frontline attitudes, changes which would
have major implications for US policies in the region.
into southern Angola in late August
The Past Year of The Frontline States initially were distrustful of US efforts to regain
Namibian Negotiations momentum in the Namibian negotiations. Many black African govern-
ments expressed a belief that the collapse of a Geneva conference on
Namibia in January 1981 was due to Pretoria's perception that it could get
a better deal from the new US administration. Frontline distrust was fed
by reports leaked in March that the United States wanted a "comprehen-
sive" settlement that linked Namibian independence to Angolan accommo-
dation of the National Union for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)
and to withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. The new US administra-
tion's early efforts to repeal the Clark Amendment were also disquieting to
the Frontline States, leading some to complain to US officials that
Washington wanted to subvert the Angolan regime. Frontline suspicion
probably reached its high point when the United States vetoed the UN
Security Council resolution condemning the major South African incursion
' The Frontline States are Angola, Botswana, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and 25X1
Tanzania; Nigeria has periodically participated in Frontline deliberations. The Western
Contact Group includes the United Kingdom, France, West Germany, Canada, and the
United States-the sponsors of the Namibian settlement plan contained in UN Resolution
435 25X1
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SWAPO's continued refusal to accept Contact Group proposals on
electoral procedures for a Namibian constitutional assembly and its
rejection of the phased approach to negotiations reflect:
? Its determination to resist settlement arrangements that do not ensure
its dominance in an independent Namibia.
? The lack of any significant military or political pressure compelling it to
compromise.
SWAPO has maintained that the Contact Group's refusal to go back to
the South Africans on the electoral issues confirms its suspicions that the
West is colluding with, Pretoria. SWAPO leaders fear that a proposed
mixed electoral system would deny them the two-thirds majority needed
to control a constitutional assembly.
South African attacks on SWAPO bases in southern Angola and Preto-
ria's current occupation of a buffer zone north of the Namibian border
have made SWAPO's military operations more difficult, but have not
made it more flexible in negotiations. Although the insurgents have had to
move farther north, SWAPO is still able to infiltrate terrorist groups, into
northern Namibia; its political support in the territory appears undimin-
ished.
The Soviets and Cubans have lobbied hard to derail the negotiations and
have encouraged S WAPO to disengage from the Western-sponsored
process. SWAPO leader Nujoma's decision to go to Havana rather than
meet the Contact Group in Luanda in early April apparently was the
result of Soviet efforts. 25X1
SWAPO's tough line on negotiations also reflects a radicalization of its
leadership. Since the organization moved from Zambian to Angolan bases
in the late 1970s, an increasing number of SWAPO moderates have been
isolated within the organization or driven from its top ranks.
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Despite the initial skepticism of the Frontline States about the US-led
Contact Group effort, a consensus on a negotiating approach emerged from
the Contact Group and the South Africans appeared to be going along.
Botswana, Zambia, and Tanzania enthusiastically supported the US 25X1
negotiating initiative and expressed optimism about the prospects of
support for Tanzania's suggestion early in January 1982 that the Frontline,
in the interest of maintaining negotiating momentum, give early approval
to the Phase I package-proposals dealing with election procedures in
Namibia. 25X1
SWAPO, however, continued to oppose elements of Phase I, particularly
the "one-man, two-vote" electoral provision, and the negotiating momen-
tum dissipated. A Frontline meeting was called for late January, presum-
ably to press SWAPO to accept. After Nujoma toured Frontline capitals,
however, the Frontline foreign ministers joined SWAPO in refusing to
accept the electoral provisions of the Phase I proposals. 25X1
Despite pressure from the Contact Group, the Frontline states made little
effort during February to overcome SWAPO's opposition. Instead, they
asked the Contact Group to go back to the South Africans and persuade
them to accept either a proportional representation or a single-member
constituency scheme. 25X1 25X1
At the same time, Communist efforts to obstruct negotiations increased:
it is clear that the Frontline leaders spent
little time at their meeting in Maputo in early March discussing the 25X1
impasse over Namibian electoral procedures. The Contact Group's de-
marche-which provided a detailed rationale for the "one-man, two-vote"
proposal-was dismissed as adding nothing new and warranting no change
in the Frontline position.
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 SWAPO's statements of its intention to step up the fighting in Namibia.
25X1
SWAPO seemed emboldened after the Maputo meeting. It delivered on
behalf of the Frontline States a stiff reply to the Contact Group's Maputo
demarche, stepped up its guerrilla raids, threatened to pull out of
negotiations if delays continued, and called for direct talks with the South
Africans. Nujoma declined to meet with a Contact Group delegation that
visited Luanda in early April for the express purpose of consulting with
SWAPO, and Western diplomats in Luanda believe he did so with Soviet
encouragement. Nujoma instead went to Havana for an extended visit.
25X1
SWAPO's confidence in its ability to shrug off Frontline pressure was
reflected in its unexpected announcement prior to the Frontline meeting at
Dar es Salaam in early May that SWAPO not only rejected the Western
Contact Group's proposals on the electoral system for Namibia but the
phased approach to negotiations as well, calling instead for a UN-
sponsored conference of all parties. Despite their anger at Nujoma over
being presented a fait accompli, the Frontline States told US officials that
they could not force Nujoma to reverse himself. The Frontline States
attempted to soften SWAPO's position somewhat by implicitly inviting the
West to go back to the South Africans on the electoral issue, but they sup-
ported SWAPO's hard line despite their preference to the contrary.
Present Stand on Since the meeting in Dar es Salaam, there have been several indicators
Namibian Talks that Frontline unity on Namibia is eroding. Although Angola supported
Zambian President Kaunda's initiative in meeting with South African
Prime Minister Botha on 30 April to discuss Namibia and other issues, in-
formation from a variety of sources indicated that the other Frontline
States opposed the meeting, believing that it would only give Pretoria a
propaganda victory. Moreover, some Frontline States have told US
officials they are not enthusiastic about the prospect of another all-parties
conference, and we believe they are only supporting SWAPO's call for
such a meeting to avoid blame for a breakdown in negotiations
The factors underlying the Frontline's current paralysis are complex:
? Although Luanda desperately wants a settlement in order to end South
African incursions in the south, the weak and factionalized Angolan
leadership appears incapable of controlling SWAPO. SWAPO is main-
tained in Angola by international aid, exists largely in a series of self-
contained refugee camps in the south, and is trained and protected mostly
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by Cuban personnel. Inasmuch as the Soviet Union and Cuba also
provide vital support to the Angolan regime, SWAPO leaders can defy
President dos Santos because they are secure in the knowledge that
Moscow-along with pro-Soviet hardliners in Luanda-will prevent him
from acting against them.
Despite strong Contact Group entreaties, Tanzania continues to play a
low-key role. We believe that Nyerere may simply be waiting for a more
propitious moment and is unwilling to expend much effort when the
prospects for successful negotiations do not seem good.
? Zambia and Botswana also want a negotiated settlement but until
recently have let Tanzania take the lead.
o Both Zimbabwe and Mozambique are preoccupied with their own
problems. To the extent they have focused on Namibia, the Zimbab-
weans tend to be sympathetic to SWAPO, while Mozambique has been
following Tanzania's low-key lead.
The Frontline States, in our view, may now see the negotiating task as
more formidable than they previously believed. The continuing impasse
over seemingly minor electoral issues is likely to have made them skeptical
about resolving the more difficult Phase II issues-those dealing with the
modalities of international truce and election supervision. Moreover, the
Frontline States have been briefed on the US-Angolan talks and are aware
that a regional settlement centered on Namibia must realistically include
movement on related Angolan issues, namely Cuban withdrawal and
accommodation of UNITA. The Frontline States may believe not only that
there is little prospect for a successful outcome but also that the likely
terms of settlement would be too favorable to Pretoria. Such fundamental
pessimism about the future of negotiations appears to be central to the
reduced Frontline willingness to expend much effort over the current
impasse.
Security Concerns The pessimism of the Frontline States about the prospects for a Namibian
Paramount settlement has grown in direct relation to their concern and preoccupation
with perceived South African "destabilization" policies. Specific events
that have given rise to this concern include:
? South Africa's continued control of large portions of south-central
Angola.
o Alleged South African involvement in coup plots in Zambia and the
Seychelles.
o A significant expansion of South African-backed insurgent activity in
Mozambique.
? Sabotage of Zimbabwe's transportation routes through Mozambique
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Events and Decisions The Frontline's changing priorities were reflected at the Maputo summit,
at Maputo which concentrated mainly on exploring regional security problems and
seeking ways to respond collectively. The relatively scant attention paid to
the impasse in the Namibian negotiations suggests that Frontline leaders
may no longer view the Namibian issue as central to their efforts to cope
with South Africa.
The Frontline leaders maintained in their communique that Pretoria's
growing aggressiveness was aimed at increasing Frontline dependence on
Pretoria, delaying Namibian independence, and preventing the "liber-
ation" of South Africa. The Frontline leaders also announced their
intention to increase regional cooperation to counteract South Africa and
to provide more support for SWAPO and the African National Congress
(ANC) to enable them to intensify the armed struggle.
Few concrete security decisions, however, were taken at Maputo. The
Frontline States agreed to send a military team to Angola to assess the se-
curity situation and make recommendations.
Actions Since Maputo Cooperation and Aid
The Frontline States have not moved dramatically toward greater regional
..i e 25X1
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earlier de
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t
Tanzania h
coo
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ow
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on
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an
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on
modest military training support to Mozambique,
Frontline pledges to increase military cooperation are unlikely to amount to
much. They have little money, and many face pressing economic and
internal security problems that would prevent them from aiding their
neighbors
The inability of the Frontline States on their own to counter South African
aggressiveness will lead them to seek additional external security assist-
ance. All the Frontline States except Zimbabwe have accepted substantial
arms assistance from the Soviets and some rely on large numbers of Cuban
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advisers. In varying degrees, however, these governments are dissatisfied
with the quality and level of Soviet and Cuban assistance, and distrust
Communist motives with the result that they have shown increasing
interest in alternate sources of aid.' Mozambique, for example, recently
signed a military cooperation pact with Portugal and even Angolan
officials have discussed obtaining support from outside the Soviet Bloc.
Such alternative sources of aid are unlikely to satisfy the Frontline States'
needs, however, and they may become more receptive to longstanding
Communist offers of increased assistance despite their distrust of the
Soviets. 25X1
Support for Insurgents
Despite Frontline pledges to provide more support for SWAPO and the
ANC, we do not believe there will be a major increase in insurgent activity.
The Frontline governments are unlikely to follow through with much aid,
although training support may increase 25X1
SWAPO has stepped up its military activities in Namibia in an attempt to
make good on its promise at the Maputo summit to put more pressure on
South Africa and bring a sense of urgency to the negotiations. Nonetheless,
we believe SWAPO will not be able to resume the level of activity reached
before last summer, when the South Africans began their major operations
into Angola in an effort to drive SWAPO away from the Namibian border.
SWAPO activity probably will decline again as conditions for counterin-
surgency operations improve during the dry season this summer, regardless
of any increase in Frontline aid. 25X1
We believe, however, that
fears of South African reprisa deter most Frontline States from
following through on their promise of direct support for the ANC or even
from easing restrictions on ANC infiltration of South Africa from their
territories. 25X1
2 Tanzania in particular wants to reduce the role of the Soviet Union and its allies as the pri-
mary suppliers of military aid and is encouraging its neighbors to turn instead to other non-
aligned countries. Moreover, the Frontline States in general are bound to be skeptical that
more Communist support will deter Pretoria; Soviet arms and 20,000 to 25,000 Cubans did
not stop South Africa and UNITA from retaining control over a third of Angola during the
past year.
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Implications for Although the changing attitudes of the Frontline States are not irreversible
the West and are not fully shared by all group members, a growing consensus on the
futility of settlement and the inevitability of regional insecurity could be
self-fulfilling. At the least, it could make the Frontline less likely to play a
decisive role in Western efforts to promote peaceful solutions to the
region's problems.
The Frontline States still want a negotiated Namibian settlement as much
as ever-witness Kaunda's personal initiative to try to break the stale-
mate-but not just any settlement. Their disillusionment over a Namibian
settlement, as well as doubts that it would encourage more restrained
South African behavior elsewhere in the region, may cause them to lower
their expectations about Western efforts to promote regional stability.
They recognize, however, that only the West-in particular, the United
States-has the power and influence to reduce significantly regional
tensions. They are frustrated about having nowhere else to turn.
The Frontline States appear to be groping for ways to counter South
Africa's increasingly aggressive regional policy. At Maputo they spoke of a
more self-reliant approach, but they require external assistance in order to
have even a remote chance of success. 25X1
Their pledges of defense cooperation may be aimed at demonstrating to the
West their seriousness and determination to combat South Africa. Despite
growing apprehension about the relationship between Pretoria and Wash-
ington, the Frontline States probably would prefer that the United States
come to their aid by reining in the South Africans. The Maputo summit,
however, may be a warning that, if help is not forthcoming and if Frontline
security concerns are not eased, they will have little recourse but to
increase their reliance on military support from the Soviet Union and its al-
lies. They know that more Communist support is unlikely to help them
much; still, by implying a new willingness to accept it, they may hope to
provoke the United States into action .25X1
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