UGANDA: OBOTE S PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00225R000100210001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 9, 2007
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 1, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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Uganda: Obote's
Problems and Prospects
Secret
ALA 82-10067
Moy 1982
Copy ~ ~ V
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Intelligence
Directorate of Secret
Uganda: Obote's
Problems and Prospects
Irrjormation available as oj31 March 1982
has been used in the preparation ojthis report.
This memorandum was prepared b
the Office of African and Latin American
Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and
may be addressed to the Chief West and East Africa
Division, ALA,
Council.
This paper was coordinated with the Directorate of
Operations and with the National Intelligence
Secret
ALA 81-10067
May 1982
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are not necessarily authoritative.``? ~~J
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ACHOU Tribal group
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Summary
Uganda: Obote's
Problems and Prospects
0
Serious security and economic problems continue to plague President
Milton Obote's 16-month-old government. His success in attracting foreign
aid and adopting measures that could generate substantial economic
growth over the long term, however, gives his government a fair chance to
survive 25X1
A guerrilla attack on an Army barracks in late February increased tensions
and demonstrated the weakness of government security forces. Obote's
most pressing task now is to strengthen and to gain firm control of the
Army and police in order to protect his own position and to provide a
peaceful setting for economic recovery. Uganda's three main guerrilla
groups are attempting to capitalize on the disruption caused by the attack
on the barracks and the security forces' subsequent heavyhanded reprisals
against civilians. Despite some military aid from Libya, however, the
guerrillas appear to lack secure base areas in any neighboring countries, to
be short of arms, and to be divided by tribal and personal rivalries
Tribal dissension in the Army is potentially
a more serious threat to Obote than the guerrillas. Obote's opponents in the
militarv apparently still have significant support among Army personnel,
The economy of Uganda, still in deep trouble, is at least beginning to show
some positive signs of response to Obote's June 1981 reform package:
? Inflation, still over 100 percent, appears to be slackening.
? Higher prices for producers are relieving a serious food deficit and luring
some of the previously smuggled coffee back into regular trade channels.
Although generally depressed world markets for Uganda's traditional
exports will constrain progress, Obote may make enough headway with his
economic policies to avoid being challenged on this basis in the near term.
D
(1971-79) mean that much remains to be done.
The more difficult economic challenges will comprise measures to over-
come an excessively heavy dependence on coffee exports and to restore
momentum to public and private investment. The signs are encouraging in
this regard, but the eight years of neglect under President Idi Amin
Secret
ALA 82-10067
May 1982
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For the moment, Obote can bask in his success in securing about $750 mil-
lion in various forms of aid commitments from multilateral organizations
and Western governments. The bill for rebuilding and modernizing
Uganda will be much larger than this, however, and it is too soon to judge
how well Obote's administration will do in sustaining development.
Almost any successor regime probably would be less friendly toward the
United States and the West, and might establish closer ties with the Soviet
Bloc and the Libyans. Obote's ouster, particularly by violent means,
probably would cause the situation in Uganda to deteriorate badly once
again. This would cause new concern among neighboring countries about
security along their borders with Uganda, and might prompt some of them
to turn to the United States for increased military aid.
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Cpcret
Uganda: Obote's
Problems and Prospects
0
The Ugandan President's prospects for staying in power are clouded by his
government's inability to show rapid progress in dealing with the country's
deep-seated security and economic problems, which have plagued the
government since Obote's controversial election in December 1980. Al-
though Obote still lacks the political or military strength to improve the sit-
uation rapidly, his opponents are divided, poorly organized, and without
strong foreign support. This gives Obote a fair chance to survive unless he
fails to prevent conditions from deteriorating further. Over the longer term,
the security and economic measures he has introduced could be effective
enough to enable him to strengthen his position.)
Guerrilla Challenge The government's vulnerability to the guerrillas was highlighted by a
dramatic rebel attack on a Ugandan Army barracks in Kampala on
23 February. As many as 200 may have taken part in the assault-a
contrast with the usual guerrilla raids, which almost always have been
staged by small groups of less than 100. The guerrillas apparently were at
least partially successful in their immediate ob'ective of acquiring more
arms and ammunition.
25X1
The assault has kept tensions high and diverted the attention of senior
officials from dealing with major economic and political issues. The
guerrillas, who had been relatively inactive for several months, may have
attacked in part to prove to Obote and to their Libyan benefactors that 25X1
they are still an important force
Baganda-which has long been at odds with Obote.'~
25X1
Of the three guerrilla groups, Yoweri Museveni's National Resistance
Movement (NRM) and the Uganda Freedom Movement (UFM) are the
most troublesome for the government. They have made sporadic attacks on
Army and police outposts in southern Uganda over the past year.
Museveni, a reputed leftist, was a leader in the interim government after
President Idi Amin was overthrown. He went underground after running
in, and losing, the race for the presidency against Obote. The UFM, which
apparently staged the February attack, includes former members of the
opposition Democratic Party. It draws much of its support from Western
and business-oriented groups, particularly the country's largest tribe-the
' In 1966 Obote abolished the semiautonomous kingdom of the Baganda tribe and other
smaller tribal kingdoms, and subsequently sent troops to put down an attempt by Baganda
leaders to secede from Uganda. The Baganda constitute 16 percent of the population
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Yusufu Lule, titular chairman
(first President of Uganda after
Amin)
Major Ugandan Dissident Groups a
National Resistance Yoweri Museveni, effective
Movement leader (former senior official
in post-Amin governments)
Uganda Freedom Balaki Kirya, chairman
Movement
Andrew Kayiira, military
leader
Uganda National Moses Ali, chairman
Rescue Front (former Finance Minister
under Amin)
Felix Onama,
former minister in Obote's
first government (1960s)
e The three major dissident groups have united in an umbrella
organization called the Uganda Popular. Front.
back the leading Democratic Party politicians who have remained in the
Southern and southwestern
Uganda, particularly among
Museveni's Ankole tribe.
Mainly southern and
eastern Uganda;
particularly strong
among Baganda tribe.
Northwestern Uganda
(consists largely of former
soldiers from Amin's
army).
Members of the NRM and the UFM probably are capable of further hit-
and-run raids, although it is unlikely that they can conduct a sustained
campaign. They move freely in some southern areas of the country, where
they have sympathizers among the local population. They also have support
in the Army. Although some Baganda support the UFM, many members
of the Baganda and other southern tribes who dislike Obote probably still
National Assembly as a "loyal" opposition
The third guerrilla group, consisting largely of remnants of Amin's army,
controls parts of the West Nile and Madi Provinces in northwestern
Uganda. It is less organized than the guerrillas in the south and is split into
are not a direct threat to the regime's control in Kampala
at least two factions-the larger appears to be the Uganda National
Rescue Front. Although government forces are having trouble regaining
full control of the northwestern region, the guerrillas in this remote area
While each guerrilla group may be able to field as many as a few thousand
armed men, factional divisions and poor organization have thus far
prevented them from being militarily effective. The dissident groups have
talked of uniting to increase the military pressure on Obote, but tribal and
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Figure 2. Yoweri Museveni, Weekly Revrew
leader oI the National Resis-
tance Movement
personal rivalries have prevented effective cooperation thus far. Under
Libyan prodding, dissidents announced a new coalition late last year,
consisting of the three major groups, as well as former Presidents Lule and
Binaisa-the leaders of the first two interim governments after Amin was
overthrown. It is unlikely that the alliance-walled the Uganda Popular
Front-will be able to overcome the divisions among the dissidents. Lule
and Binaisa add some international prestige to the alliance, but they have
not been playing an active role in the dissident movement, and probably are
out of touch with events in Uganda. 25X1
Trouble in the Army Tribally inspired coup plotting and dissension between the two major tribes
in the roughly 15,000-man Army are potentially the most serious threats to
the government. Members of the Acholi tribe, who reportedly make up
about 60 percent of the Army, are unhappy over alle ed favoritism shown
to Obote's fellow Lango tribesmen.
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Most members of the Army come from northern Uganda. Thus, when
undisciplined troops rob and kill civilians in Kampala and other parts of
southern Uganda in the guise of antiguerrilla operations, they are endan-
gering Obote's chances of gaining greater acceptance in the south. Many of
the deaths during the recent fighting in Kampala apparently were caused
by troops shooting innocent bystanders. Such incidents are likely to
continue if nervous troops believe there is a significant risk of further
guerrilla attacks in Kampala.
Tensions also have increased between the Army and the police. The often
better disciplined police recently replaced soldiers on foot patrols in
Kampala in an effort to reduce looting and other criminal activity by the
Army. Cooperation at senior levels of the two organizations reportedly is
good, but personal and professional rivalry between lower level personnel
has led to armed clashes. The spread of such violence would be another se-
rious blow to Obote's effort to improve security in the capital.
Foreign Military Faced with the need to create an entirely new Army in the wake of Amin's
Involvement downfall, Obote has cast about for military aid. His problems were
aggravated by the withdrawal from Uganda last year of almost all of the
remaining Tanzanian troops who ousted Amin. The Tanzanians had been
the most effective security force in Uganda. Dar es Salaam reportedly will
continue to provide about 30 military advisers to train the Ugandan Army,
and some 700 Tanzanian police remain in Uganda providing protection for
senior government officials. The Tanzanian police alone could not block a
determined coup attempt, and Tanzanian President Nyerere-who is
weary of his involvement in Uganda and plagued by his own economic
problems-would be reluctant to send Tanzanian troops back to Uganda to
25X1 save Obote
Although Obote cannot hope to get enough foreign security help to replace
entirely the departed Tanzanians, he has been partly successful. A handful
of North Korean military advisers are in Uganda providing training, and
some Ugandan soldiers have gone to North Korea for training. Among
African countries, Egypt has sent arms to the Kampala government and
provided military training for Ugandan officers in Egypt, while Kenya and
Sudan have trained Ugandan personnel in their countries. In addition, the
United Kingdom recently persuaded Kenya, Tanzania, and several other
Commonwealth countries to participate in a small military training
program in Uganda, and several Ugandan officers are attending training
courses in the United States. These efforts are unlikely to transform the
Ugandan Army into a disciplined, effective force soon, but the foreign
support helps to improve Obote's international image and his prestige at
home.
25X1
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Foreign Training Assistance for Ugandan Army
Australia Participating in 36-man Commonwealth training group in Uganda.
Canada Participating in Commonwealth training group.
Cuba Twenty Ugandan soldiers recently returned from training course in Cuba.
Egypt Ugandan soldiers are attending training course in Egypt.
Guyana Participating in Commonwealth training group.
Jamaica Participating in Commonwealth training group.
Kenya Participating in Commonwealth training group; Ugandan soldiers also have
attended courses in Kenya.
North Korea Small group of North Korean military advisers providing training in Uganda.
Sierra Leone Participating in Commonwealth training group.
Sri Lanka Participating in Commonwealth training group.
Sudan Ugandan soldiers have attended training courses in Sudan.
Tanzania Has provided more training for Ugandan Army than any other country;
participating in Commonwealth training group.
UK Organized, and is providing the largest contingent for, the Commonwealth training
group; Ugandans also have received military training in the UK.
United Slates Six Ugandan officers are undergoing training in the United States.
The USSR and Cuba, which supported Obote's first regime in the late
1960s, are providing only limited technical aid. Some 20 Ugandan officers
recently completed military training in Cuba, but Kampala says it has no
plans to send additional trainees to Cuba. Obote probably does not want to
move closer to Moscow and Havana, in part to avoid jeopardizing Western
economic aid. Although the two Communist powers are not happy with
their lack of influence in Kampala, there is no indication that they have
tried to promote the establishment of a more sympathetic government by
supporting the Ugandan dissidents. 25X1
The dissidents, in fact, have gained little foreign support. Guerrillas have
been unable to develop an assured sanctuary outside of the country or a se-
cure source of arms supply. Guerrillas staging raids into northwestern
Uganda have used Sudanese and Zairian territory, but only against the
wishes of these governments, which lack the military strength to prevent
such activity. Kenya has permitted only low-key political activity by exiled
Ugandan dissident leaders in Nairobi.
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Libya has been the dissidents' only source of significant military aid, but
deliveries have been limited because of logistic difficulties and Tripoli's
frustration over the dissidents' inability to unite and increase military
pressure on Obote. Libyan arms deliveries to the guerrillas through
Burundi and Rwanda have been hampered in part by the reluctance of
these two countries to become conduits for such shipments.
Nonetheless, the guerrillas may have recently acquired new arms from the
Libyans. Ugandan officials claim that weapons with Arabic markings were
captured during the fighting in Kampala in February. The guerrillas'
attempt to seize arms and ammunition in the attacks suggests, however,
that they are still short of military equipment. They hope the success of
their attack will prompt Libya to give them additional weapons
Hopeful Signs in By the time Obote's current government assumed office in December 1980,
the Economy the economy had suffered from eight years of mismanagement and neglect
under Amin, as well as from uncertain security conditions and several weak
and indecisive governments after Amin was overthrown. During the last
decade, Uganda's real gross domestic product decreased by one-third and
per capita income shrank to among the lowest in the world. Although the
country had been largely self-sufficient in food crops, declining production
during the 1970s led to a need for significant food imports. The country
suffered additionally because of a sharp drop in world coffee prices after
1977, at the same time that the economy had become even more heavily
dependent on coffee earnin s (about 95 percent of Uganda's exports in
1980)
Obote's reforms, announced in June 1981, reduced the government's
involvement in the economy, allowing freer rein to market forces. Obote
removed price controls on consumer goods and increased producer prices
for coffee and food. He also allowed the shilling to float on the foreign ex-
change market-in effect devaluing Uganda's currency
There have been some positive signs that the reforms could lead to
significant economic growth, including improved performance prospects for
this year. Although Uganda has one of the highest annual inflation rates in
the world-more than 100 percent-some prices declined in response to
the reforms. The Uganda shilling has depreciated from 7.8 to 86 per US
dollar, severely curtailing black-market activities. Smuggling of coffee to
Kenya has declined considerably as a result of higher producer prices,
enabling Uganda last year to meet its international coffee export quota for
the first time since 1973 and allowing the quota for 1982 to be increased
from 120,000 to 174,000 metric tons. Coffee still makes up almost all of
the country's export earnings, but the government hopes to resume
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Uganda's economy was one of the most prosperous in Africa before Amin
came to power in 1971. At independence in 1962, the British considered it
one of the most promising of their African colonies. The average growth
rate during Obote's first regime in the late 1960s was more than 6 percent
per year. About 90 percent of the population was (and still isJ employed in
agriculture, which accounted for nearly 60 percent of gross domestic
product and provided about 75 percent of Uganda's export earnings.
Coffee made up over half the value of the country's exports, but cotton,
tea, and copper also contributed significantly to export earnings.
substantial tea exports and to reopen the copper mines. The IMF projects
that Uganda's growth will reach 6 percent this year-substantially higher
than it has been for the past decade. 25X1
Obote has helped his cause by attracting substantial economic help-
mostly from the IMF and the West. In response to Obote's reforms,
Uganda has received commitments of about $7S0 million in economic
assistance. The IMF and the World Bank have provided about $250
million in balance-of-payments support. In addition, Obote's government
has received promises of about $500 million in project-related assistance. A
number of Western countries also have agreed to ease Kampala's financial
burden by canceling nearly $70 million in payments on loans made to
previous Ugandan governments, while other debt has been rescheduled.
Obote's economic reforms may still fail unless he is able to secure 25X1
additional economic aid. Although the country will need substantially less
food aid this year-in light of increased food production-it will remain
dependent on substantial economic aid for some years to come. Some
private Western investors are showing interest in Uganda and could make
up part of the shortfall in financing from foreign governments, but these in-
vestments will not bring in urgently needed consumables, raw materials,
and spare parts. Urban wage earners who do not have easy access to farm
plots are finding it difficult to buy food at current prices. As a result, the
urban poor are now particularly susceptible to recruitment by the dissi-
dents
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The outlook for significant economic improvement also will depend on the
government's effort to stabilize the security situation, particularly in
Kampala and other parts of southern Uganda-the country's most eco-
nomically advanced region. Substantial increases in productivity or invest-
ment are unlikely until effective law and order in the area are reestab-
lished
Obote's Political After a faltering start during his first months in office, Obote has acted
Performance more confidently and decisively. He apparently has been encouraged by the
failure of his opponents to unite and exploit his weaknesses. This time, too,
Obote has followed more pragmatic and moderate policies than he did
during his first regime, when his leftist ideology and harsh measures
against domestic o onents eroded his support and paved the way for his
ouster by Amin. 25X1
Obote's ability to win greater acceptance in southern Uganda depends in
part on whether his economic program continues to show promise and
security improves. The Baganda, who make up about one-sixth of the
population and are concentrated in the south, are unlikely to forget Obote's
heavyhanded treatment of them. A clear indication that he will leave them
alone to pursue their traditional interests in business and agriculture,
however, probabl would enable him to gain grudging acceptance from
many of them.
Although Uganda has a multiparty system, Obote's Uganda People's
Congress (UPC) is strengthening its position at the expense of the
Democratic Party-the only significant political opposition. Since his
election Obote has paid lipservice to national reconciliation, but he has
little interest in bringing Democratic Party leaders into the government.
These leaders still believe that Obote's supporters rigged his election
victory and thus usur ed ower that rightfully belongs to the Democratic
Party.
Since the beginning of the year, UPC leaders have persuaded seven
Democratic Party members of the National Assembly to cross over to the
UPC. The switches may have been linked to the government's release of a
group of political prisoners, including several Democratic Party legislators.
UPC advocates of a one-party state probably will use further inducements
or pressure to encourage more Democratic Party members to defect. Such
defections could help to broaden Obote's support, although some veteran
UPC members are unhappy at having to share the spoils with the new
recruits. Obote, therefore, is being careful in encouraging further defec-
tions from the Democratic Party, lest he alienate longtime supporters.
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Ugandans, probably creating new recruits for the dissidents.
cure and less dependent on foreign aid. Such a move would alienate more
Figure S. V' r ulo
Muwanga.
25X1
Despite Obote's success in gaining some new support, the government's
heavyhanded tactics in the aftermath of the guerrilla attack in Kampala
and continuing atrocities by the Army against the Baganda and other
southern tribes threaten to exacerbate the country's tribal and regional
divisions and lead to increased instability. The arrest of large numbers of
suspects following the attack has probably created additional sympathy for
the dissidents. Obote and his followers, who have tolerated an opposition
party mainly to buy time and please potential Western benefactors, would
be likely to adopt even tougher measures to still dissent if they felt more se-
A failure by Obote to show results, either in improving security or in
making good on his economic recovery program, will jeopardize his position
within his own regime. No senior official has shown any disloyalty thus far,
but influential officials such as Vice President Muwanga probably still
have their own power bases within the government and could decide to
move against Obote.
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Implications for Obote realizes that he needs considerable economic and military aid to
the United States strengthen his position and promote stability in Uganda. For now he is
looking primarily to the West-including the United States-for economic
assistance, and Kampala probably is preparing formal requests to the
United States and other Western countries for additional military training
and arms aid. The realistic limits of Western aid and the continuing civil
disorder in Uganda, however, are likely to preclude any dramatic improve-
ment in economic and security conditions in the near term. An increasingly
hard-pressed Obote would not hesitate to turn elsewhere for an alternative
to insufficient Western aid. He probably would try to revive his once close
ties to Moscow or to seek reater assistance from Cuba and radical Arab
states.
A successor regime would be under pressure to demonstrate early progress
in improving economic and security conditions and would also be tempted
to establish closer ties with potential non-Western donors. Some possible
successors had previous ties with the Soviet Bloc and the Libyans. Vice
President Muwanga, for example, had friendly ties with Cuba when he
headed the last interim government before Obote's election and has
maintained contacts with the Libyans
Even without greater Soviet influence in Uganda, the fall of Obote's
government would affect US interests adversely, at least in the near term,
by increasing tensions throughout East Africa. All of Obote's potential
successors have even narrower bases of support than he, and none seems
capable of maintainin even the resent degree of government control over
the country.
25X1
Neighboring countries are already alarmed about the possibility of refu-
gees and violence spilling over their borders. Most of Uganda's immediate
neighbors have tried to cooperate with Obote to encourage stability in the
country. A breakdown of these efforts will prompt moderate countries such
as Kenya, Sudan, and Zaire to consider asking for greater US assistance.
0
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