THE MILITARY BALANCE IN NAMIBIA

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The Military B lance r' }~3
in Namibia j
25X1
An Intelligence Assessment
State Dept. review completed
Secret
ALA 82-10060
April 8 9
Copy VV
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 3r-vi
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Secret
ALA 82-10060
April 1982
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Directorate of
Intelligence
The Military Balance
in Namibia
An Intelligence Assessment
Information available as of 20 February 1982
has been used in the preparation of this report.
This paper was prepared by I Office
of African and Latin American Analysis. Comments
and queries are welcome and may be addressed to
the Chief, Southern Africa Division, ALA, on
This paper has been coordinated with the National
Intelligence Council.
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Figure 1
/Rundu
Kavango/and
otfon in
Bushmanland
~. , . h Africa
Population of Namibia, 1981*
Ethnic Group
Numbers
Percentage
Ovambo
470,000
44.8
Kavango
112,000
10.7
White
88,000
8.4
Damara
85,000
8.0
Herero
80,000
7.7
Nama
54,000
5.1
Colored
46,000
4.4
Caprivian
40,000
3.8
Rehoboth
Basters
31,000
2.9
Bushmen
27,000
2.6
Tswana
7,500
0.7
Others
9,500
0.9
- -. Ondangua
Ovambolan
Kst
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The Militar Balance
in Namibia
Key Judgments Six years after the insurgency in Namibia began in earnest, South African forces
and the guerrillas of the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) have
reached a standoff. Despite increasingly aggressive South African military
operations, SWAPO's guerrilla force-backed by the Cubans and the Soviets and
operating from bases deep inside Angola-has prevented pacification of the border
region in northern Namibia. The persistence of the guerrillas, the harshness of
Pretoria's counterinsurgency effort, and the increased resentment of white minor-
ity rule inside Namibia have gained SWAPO such popular and international
backing that it is likely to win an open election in the territory.
South Africa made a dramatic bid in the late summer and fall of 1981 to break the
military stalemate and undercut SWAPO's political clout by launching its most
substantial raids of the war into southern Angola. Pretoria hoped the attacks
would make clear to SWAPO's Angolan and Communist backers that they would
pay heavily for abetting the insurgency. But the South Africans also recognized
that they ran the risk of scuttling Western-sponsored settlement negotiations and
prompting massive new outside aid for SWAPO.
Neither South Africa's fears nor hopes have been realized. The Soviets and
Cubans have not substantially increased support for SWAPO, the settlement talks
have continued largely unaffected, and there are no signs of slippage in SWAPO's
popular standing inside Namibia.
Pretoria will continue to pursue a twofold strategy of prolonging talks over an
internationally supervised independence process for Namibia while chipping away
militarily at SWAPO. This allows it to hold out for a favorable breakthrough in
Western-sponsored negotiations while preparing for the possibility of a strictly
internal settlement excluding SWAPO.
SWAPO, despite being on the defensive militarily, will remain in the driver's seat.
The Namibia issue has become the cause of the moment for black Africa, and
SWAPO is assured high international visibility merely by maintaining the
insurgency at its current modest level:
? The Angolans are paying a high price for backing SWAPO, but they are
unlikely to abandon the insurgents.
? The Soviets and Cubans, for their part, appear to see a continuation of the
insurgency at its present level as their best means both of maintaining influence
with SWAPO and the Angolans and of creating political problems for the West.
Secret
Secret
ALA 82-10060
April 1982
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The military balance in Namibia could be quickly altered by outside forces or
events, particularly if Moscow or Havana substantially upgraded and expanded
the air defense network in southern Angola or committed Cuban combat units to
fight on SWAPO's behalf. To date, however, the Soviets and Cubans have been
hesitant to incur the heightened tensions with the West that would result from
such dramatic military measures. They have opted instead for a more subtle game
of using propaganda and disinformation campaigns, bilateral discussions, and
offers to expand existing military and economic aid programs as means to stiffen
black African resistance to key aspects of the settlement package.
As a result, the military standoff in Namibia is likely to persist at least over the
short term. This will provide a setting which, while conducive to a continuation of
the Western-sponsored negotiations, will not motivate either side to make the
concessions necessary for a definitive settlement.
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The Military Balance
in Namibia
The SWAPO Guerrilla Force
Exiled since a South African crackdown in the mid-
1960s on SWAPO political activities inside Namibia,
the organization's leaders have relied primarily on
their externally based guerrilla force-the People's
Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN)-in their bid to
force Pretoria to cede control over Namibia.
SWAPO's "internal wing"-that is, those who stayed
in Namibia-has remained aloof from the guerrillas,
and the South Africans still count it as one of
Namibia's more than 30 legal political parties. The
internal wing has experienced such harassment by
South African authorities and their Namibian
proteges, however, that it has seldom attempted open
political activity.
The withdrawal of the Portuguese from Angola in
1975 and the emergence of an independent black
government with Soviet and Cuban backing opened
the way for a major buildup of the PLAN in southern
Angola. Luanda agreed to facilitate the PLAN's
staging operations, Moscow increased arms deliveries
through Angola, and Cuban advisers in Angola
assumed the leading role in training PLAN recruits.
the
total of trained and armed guerrillas increased from a
few hundred in 1975 to at least 6,000 by 1979.
The PLAN has seldom followed an aggressive
strategy. The bulk of its forces have been held in
reserve in Angola or Zambia. The small guerrilla
bands inside Namibia usually have avoided contact
with South African troops except for ambushes of
patrols and infrequent mortar or rocket attacks on
military bases. Most guerrilla attacks have been on
black Namibians who have collaborated with the
South Africans and, to a much lesser extent,
Namibia's white residents. Their aim has been not
only to intimidate civilians but to compel Pretoria to
spread its limited military resources over an
increasingly wide area. The strategy of prolonged
attrition also motivates the many incidents of small-
scale sabotage, such as the mining of roads and rail
lines or cutting telephone lines and water mains.
In recent years this SWAPO strategy has been 25X1
occasionally modified. In July 1978 when SWAPO
leaders agreed in principal to the Western proposal
that a UN task force monitor a truce and conduct a
preindependence election, they stepped up guerrilla
infiltrations in order to bolster their claims of
territorial control and to prepare for increased
political proselytizing. Later, in order to disrupt
territorial elections held by South Africans in
December 1978, SWAPO leaders sent sabotage teams
into white urban areas to place bombs at several 25X1
polling stations. When UN Secretary General
Waldheim set a cease-fire target date of February
1979, jnfiltration was again increased.
Since mid-1979 the South African military command
in Namibia has claimed that its troops have killed
more guerrillas than were being recruited and trained.
Although the South Africans probably have 25X1
exaggerated PLAN losses, guerrilla strength may
have leveled off or declined slightly since 1979. The
frequent kidnaping efforts by guerrilla bands in 25X1
Ovamboland dwindled since 1975 and 1976, when
thousands of Ovambo youths fled across the border in
the wake of the Portuguese withdrawal from Angola.
The South Africans claim that guerrillas recently
killed or captured appear younger than those captured
a year ago. Moreover, the morale and ability of the
PLAN to recruit has been sapped by chronic food 25X1
shortages aggravated by the severe drought in
southern Angola and northern Namibia since 1979.
25X1
Nonetheless, the guerrillas encountered by South
African troops inside Namibia in recent years have
been increasingly well equipped. Last May, South
African military officers in Ovamboland told visiting
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diplomats that most of the guerrillas carried Soviet-
made AK-47 rifles, many of the small units had
60-mm or 82-mm mortars, and some units had
122-mm rockets. Many of the recently detected Soviet
landmines have been newly manufactured. Moreover,
the large stocks of arms and ammunition that South
African troops have found during their raids on
PLAN's bases in Angola indicate that since 1978
PLAN has had sufficient supplies to support many
more guerrillas than have been active inside Namibia.
Limited Extent of Guerrilla Activity
For the most part, the insurgency has been restricted
to the four ethnic homelands-Kaokoland,
Ovamboland, Kavango, and Caprivi-that make up
northern Namibia. Ovamboland has been the prime
area of guerrilla activity since 1976, when SWAPO
gained access to the adjacent sector of Angola for
staging purposes. The PLAN has seldom had more
than a few hundred active guerrillas inside
Ovamboland, although a peak of some 1,000 was
attained in early 1979, when implementation of the
UN truce plan appeared imminent. There is no solid
evidence that even the all-out effort in 1979 to
establish an effective presence resulted in the
guerrillas holding any fixed bases in Ovamboland-or
anywhere else inside Namibia.
Nevertheless, guerrilla incidents reported by the
South African authorities increased in frequency from
only nine in August 1977 to 93 in April 1979. During
the same period, guerrilla action spread from the
immediate border area throughout most of
Ovamboland. South African statistics indicate that
assassinations of "collaborators"-from village
headmen to policemen, schoolteachers, and senior
officials of the autonomous Ovambo government-
may have peaked in 1979 (see table).
South African officials claim that civilian casualties
inflicted by landmines are a critical reason for the
purported disillusionment with SWAPO among the
Ovambos. The South Africans also assert that the
substantial social services provided by their military
personnel stationed in Ovamboland have increased
popular tolerance for the South African presence.
Namibia: Deaths Resulting From
the SWAPO Insurgency a
Security forces
30
31
87
56
SWAPO guerrillas
900
1,000.
1,470
1,500 b
Local inhabitants
90
157
99
94
Assassinated
24
102
21
30
Landmine explosions
66
55
78
64
a Based on announcements by South African military spokesmen.
b Excludes SADF's rough estimate of 500 guerrillas killed in the
course of "Operation Protea."
Ovambo clergymen and European missionaries
maintain, however, that resentment of SWAPO
violence is more than offset by brutal behavior on the
part of the South African-recruited Ovambo troops
and occasionally harsh treatment from the South
Africans themselves.
Beyond dispute, however, is the fact that the South
African administration has failed to provide basic
physical security-except for the tiny elite group of
Ovambo officials who reside in the conspicuously
fortified areas of the principal towns. The majority of
the Ovambos are continually harassed by both
security forces and guerrillas. Significantly,
Ovamboland was excluded from the elections of
"second-tier" legislatures held in November 1980 in
the homelands of seven tribes and in the white areas.
SWAPO had called for a boycott of the elections, and
the South African authorities apparently expected
that fear of guerrilla reprisals would have resulted in
an embarrassingly low voter turnout.
In early 1981 small guerrilla bands for the first time
began operating for extended periods in Kaokoland
and Kavango, leading the South Africans to augment
their counterinsurgency forces in the two homelands.
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Guerrilla activity in these sparsely populated areas is
unlikely to approach the level in Ovamboland. One of
the most notable SWAPO operations-large-scale
mortar attack on the South African base at Katimo
Mulilo-occurred in Caprivi in 1978, but little
guerrilla activity has occurred in this homeland since
then. This apparently reflects the tightened control
Jonas Savimbi's South African-backed National
Union for the Total Independence of Angola
(UNITA) has exerted over adjacent areas of Angola
as well as restrictions the Zambian Government ma
have placed on SWAPO use of Zambian territory.
Small guerrilla teams have occasionally penetrated
white areas of Namibia since 1978, but their actions
have not yet appreciably affected the modern sector of
the economy despite occasional instances of railway
sabotage. The only apparent results of SWAPO's
efforts to intimidate whites during the election in
December 1978 were three bomb explosions in
Windhoek and one in Swakopmund which did not
cause serious injuries. In May 1979 several guerrilla
bands infiltrated the white farming area south of
Tsumeb and killed five white civilians. Local security
measures were stepped up and subsequent guerrilla
penetrations of white farming areas have been
repulsed with only a few civilian deaths.
SWAPO efforts at political action outside northern
Namibia have been equally unimpressive. In late 1978
SWAPO's internal branch held several public
meetings in the nonwhite suburb of Windhoek that
drew hundreds of spectators, but the speakers merely
called for a nonviolent boycott of the election.
Relatively few of the SWAPO sympathizers in the
urban or mining areas heeded the exiled leaders' call
for a general work stoppage.
Principal Counterinsurgency Measures
The number of South African troops regularly
stationed in Namibia increased from some 8,500 in
mid-1978 to between 12,000 and 15,000 by early
1981, and the total strength has risen to 20,000 at the
time of major operations. This excludes the 1,500
South African troops stationed in Walvis Bay, which
is administered as part of South Africa. About half of
the South African force is stationed within the Border
Operational Area, which is coterminous with the four
northern homelands. The South-West Africa
Territorial Command has its headquarters south of
the Border Operational Area at Grootfontein, which
is also the, logistics center for South African forces in
Namibia. 25X1
Within the Border Operational Area, Oshakati is the
headquarters and logistics center of Sector 10, 25X1
Ovamboland. Most SWAPO operations as well as
South African internal counterinsurgency operations
occur in Ovamboland. The Ondangua Air Base, 35 25X1
staging area for airstrikes into Angola.
Rundu is the headquarters of Sector 20, Kavango and
western Caprivi, and the site of a major South
African airbase. It served as the command post for
the South African operation into Angola in 1975. 25X1
Katima Mulilo is the headquarters of Sector 30,
eastern Caprivi. Kaokoveld comprises Sector 70
(see map, page 4).
Only a small portion of the South African force in
Namibia is directly engaged in the counterinsurgency
effort inside the territory. The augmentation that has
occurred since 1978 is a direct reflection of more
frequent and more extensive cross-border operations
against the guerrilla forces and their staging facilities
in southern Angola. Although most South African
military incursions have been limited in scope and
duration, ample reserves have been poised to respond
should Angolan or Cuban troops attempt to intervene
on behalf of the guerrillas.
An Indigenous Counterinsurgency Force
To supplement the South African force in Namibia,
the SADF has formed seven Namibian infantry
battalions since 1974. Six are "ethnic units"-each
recruited exclusively from a particular tribal group. A
seventh, composite battalion includes some whites. In
August 1980, the seven battalions, which then had an
aggregate strength of some 2,000 men, were
nominally integrated with embryonic Namibian
support and reserve units to form the South-West
Africa Territorial Force (SWATF). The Namibian
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Figure 2
Northern Namibia Border Area
^
ON=
National Assembly and the Council of Ministers were
granted titular authority over the SWATF, subject to
a veto of the South African Administrator General. In
September, the National Assembly adopted a plan,
submitted by the Administrator General, eventually
to extend military conscription to all Namibian
youths; hitherto only white residents had been
required to serve two years in the SADF.
Pretoria has portrayed the formation of the SWATF
as part of its effort to prepare Namibia for eventual
independence. In reality, however, the Namibian
battalions have remained under the operational
control of the commander of the South African troops
in Namibia. Most of their officers have been seconded
from the SADF, and SWATF units are entirely
Border sector limit
Ethnic homeland
boundary
0 150
Kilometers
dependent on the SADF for logistic support. South
African military spokesmen claim that Namibian
troops have performed effectively in some of the raids
on SWAPO bases in Angola. At the same time,
however, troops in the ethnic battalions apparently
have often mistreated civilians in Ovamboland and
elsewhere.
Military conscription has had a significant impact on
Namibian ethnic groups not previously directly
affected by the guerrilla conflict. Kaokolanders,
Ovambos, Kavangos, Caprivians, and Bushmen were
exempted from the first round of inductions in
January 1981, ostensibly because sufficient volunteers
had enlisted to fill out the battalions allotted to these
ethnic groups. One underlying motive for exempting
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"Operation Protea, " the South African incursion into
southern Angola in August and September 1981, was
exceptional in several respects. Although its dura-
tion-two weeks-was typical of many earlier pre-
emptive strikes, it involved some 5,000 troops and
was the largest incursion by the South African De-
fense Force (SADF) into Angola since Preto ria.'s
involvement in the Angolan civil war in 1975 and
1976. The airstrikes against Cuban-manned radar
installations at Cahama and Chibemba as well as the
attacks by South African ground forces against
Angolan military units also were new departures.
Until this operation, the South Africans had usually
avoided encounters with Angolan troops while attack-
ing SWAPO bases.
A mix of calculations underlay the South African
decision to launch "Operation Protea. " Militarily,
Pretoria hoped not only to preempt a threatened
guerrilla offensive but, more importantly, to prevent
the southward expansion of the Cuban-manned air
defense system in Angola and otherwise to deter
Angolan or Cuban support for the guerrillas in the
frontier area.
Politically, the Botha government plainly was setting
the stage for another round of hard bargaining over
the UN transition plan. Botha, in particular, probably
hoped to induce the black African parties to the
Western-sponsored settlement talks to accept revi-
sions of the existing UN plan that might prevent
inhabitants of the northern frontier sector evidently
was to avert an exodus of draft dodgers to Angola or
Zambia, where they very likely would have been
recruited by SWAPO. Indeed, the flow of Ovambo
youths to Angola apparently increased after the
conscription plan was announced, and there has been
a marked increase in the hitherto negligible flow of
young refugees from central Namibia to Botswana.
SWAPO from gaining control of an independent
Namibia. Whatever his hopes, Botha almost certainly
considered the risk that serious clashes between
South African and Angolan or Cuban forces would
bring additional Cuban troops and Soviet arms to
Angola to help curtail further military incursions by
the SADF.
Neither Botha's hopes nor fears about the military
impact of and international reactions to "Operation
Protea" have been realized:
? Pretoria announced that at least 1,000 Namibian
guerrillas and Angolan troops were killed in the
operation, but South African officers have acknowl-
edged privately that SWAPO's casualties were not
that high.
? The South Africans displayed some 2,400 tons of
captured arms and equipment, but much of it
plainly was taken from the Angolan armed forces
rather than SWAPO. In any case, the Soviets can
readily replace whatever arms SWAPO needs to
maintain guerrilla activity in Ovamboland.
? Indications are that the Cuban force in Angola has
been augmented, but the Cuban-manned air defense
system is not yet capable of curtailing SADF
incursions.
Shortly before the first inductions, the Administrator
General announced that the initial quota of some
2,000 inductees would be met from youths who
completed their schooling in January. The quota was
not met, however, and recruiting officers reportedly
have haphazardly picked up unemployed youths
around Windhoek. Because of its press gang tactics
and the alleged mistreatment of inductees, the
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conscription of nonwhites has become a political
liability for the Pretoria-backed Democratic
Turnhalle Alliance, the white-led coalition party that
nominally controls the territorial administration.F-
Obstacles to an Early Military Breakthrough
"Operation Protea," the large-scale South African
incursion into southern Angola in the fall of 1981,
showed that the SAD F's counterinsurgency effort has
been extended to include attacks not only on Angolan
Army units near SWAPO bases in southern Angola
but also on the Cuban-manned air defense system in
the area. Nevertheless, the South Africans are likely
to be highly selective in conducting any deliberate
encounters with Angolan troops or air sorties within
range of any effective air defenses. The SADF does
not have the logistics or replacement resources to
support a prolonged intervention against a Soviet-
equipped conventional force. Moreover, because of the
UN arms embargo and the limitations of the South
African defense industry, Pretoria must be especially
careful to conserve its aircraft.
As a result, the Cuban military presence in Angola-
particularly the air defense installations along the rail
line from Mocamedes to Menongue-will probably
continue to limit the geographic scope of the SADF'S
attacks on SWAPO's staging facilities. The SADF
will continue to hit regularly the staging facilities and
guerrilla units within 100 kilometers of the Angola-
Namibia border in order to deter any significant
guerrilla incursions into Namibia. Frequent airstrikes,
however, could prompt the Soviets and Cubans to
strengthen the existing air defenses in southern
Angola. This would compel a cutback in SADF
preemptive operations in southern Angola, which
could enable the guerrillas to step up their
infiltrations into Namibia.
Even a marked increase in guerrilla incursions into
the frontier zone, however, would not be likely to
result in a significant guerrilla offensive inside
Namibia. The South African troops already deployed
in the border zone-with all the advantages of far
superior equipment and logistics-very likely would
succeed in intercepting a major portion of the
infiltrating guerrillas without incurring heavy losses
or requiring reinforcements.
Pretoria's Long-Term Strategy
South Africa's wariness of a UN-supervised
independence process for Namibia reflects its basic
assumption that the SADF, with some help from
Namibian combat units, can contain the insurgency
for many years at an acceptable cost. The South
Africans acknowledge, however, that their troops can
never eradicate the guerrillas, and that blocking the
UN plan may provoke some increase in foreign
support for SWAPO.
Any appreciable increase in guerrilla activity in the
northern tier of tribal homelands-particularly in
Ovamboland-would further erode the influence of
the South African administration with the local
inhabitants, especially if the South Africans reacted
with such steps as forced relocations of villages,
curfews, dragnets, and other standard counter-
insurgency techniques. Such a setback would deepen
Pretoria's wariness of any genuinely open
preindependence election. The South Africans would
still believe that they could afford to put off a
negotiated settlement as long as they could prevent
serious terrorism or economic sabotage in the white
areas. They appear convinced that such a strategy will
be tenable unless the SADF contingents on the
frontier are confronted by a conventional force
capable of intervening inside Namibia.
The SADF command almost certainly has 25X1
contingency plans for coping with the remote
possibility that the feasible maximum level of
preemptive air and ground strikes into Angola may
not deter a major increase of guerrilla infiltrations
into Namibia. We do not know, however, how many
additional South African troops Pretoria is prepared
to send to Namibia. Some temporary reinforcements
to meet particular contingencies probably would be
tolerable. The SADF troops now on active duty in
Namibia-12,000 to 15,000-represent only a
portion of the total SADF active strength of
approximately 80,000. Moreover, the military
command perceives combat experience against
SWAPO guerrillas as the best training for an
eventual struggle with South African insurgents.
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As long as the SADF maintains even its present force
level in Namibia, however, it would be hard pressed to
mount a multibrigade deployment elsewhere. The
eventual maximum of SADF units that could be
committed to Namibia thus will be determined
largely by Pretoria's perception of military pressures
elsewhere along South Africa's periphery. Some
further SADF buildup in Namibia may be tolerable
as long as the terrorist activity inside South Africa
does not reach levels that lead Pretoria to contemplate
major preemptive strikes into black states that harbor
black South African nationalist groups.
By the same token, South Africa's white community
is likely to tolerate the present level of military
casualties in Namibia, and possibly some increase, as
long as the SADF does not incur comparable
casualties elsewhere. The Afrikaners, who comprise
some 60 percent of the exclusively white electorate in
South Africa, perceive no alternative to whatever
sacrifices are required to maintain white rule in the
nation. There is no indication that any influential
element in the ruling National Party doubts Prime
Minister Botha's belief that repulsing SWAPO is a
vital part of the broader struggle against foreign-
based black insurgency. Many Afrikaners would hold
it against Botha if he agreed to any transitional
arrangement that gave SWAPO even an outside
chance of gaining power.
probably will proceed to enlarge the SWATF by
training additional Namibian troops.
logistic support for the territorial force, if its combat
units prove capable of replacing South African units.
This might eventually make possible a gradual
phasing out of some SADF units, if the SWAPO
insurgency is contained at its present level. The
inevitably slow process of developing a qualified
Namibian officer corps would provide a valid case for
prolonging the presence of South African officers and
thereby maintaining actual control of the SWATF. If
the guerrilla conflict escalates, however, the South
Africans might attempt to speed up the expansion of
SWATF in order to minimize the need for additional
South African troops and the risks of higher South
African casualties.
SWAPO's Likely Response
Although SWAPO spokesmen have implied since the
collapse of the Geneva Conference in January 1981
that the PLAN was about to launch a major
offensive, no significant increase in guerrilla activity
has occurred inside Namibia. South African military
spokesmen claim that the latest series of preemptive
strikes has sharply reduced the PLAN's offensive
capabilities. The recent history of the guerrilla
conflict suggests, however, that even the most
extensive preemptive operations cannot long deter
resumptions of guerrilla infiltrations on a troublesome
scale. Nevertheless, the major incursions in the fall of
1981 have shown more dramatically than ever that
the SADF is fully capable of nipping in the bud any
major guerrilla offensive. 25X1
Unless the Angolans and the Cubans soon go further
toward confronting the SADF than they have done,
SWAPO must indefinitely postpone its goals of
inflicting intolerable losses on the security forces and
harassing white areas and interests in Namibia. The
long-exiled SWAPO leaders, however, are unlikely to
renounce armed struggle unless all foreign aid is 25X1
stopped or they perceive a good prospect of gaining
power by means of a transitional program under UN
auspices. 25X1
Soviet and Cuban Options
The Soviet and Cuban response to "Operation
Protea" and to smaller South Africa operations in late
1981 was fairly restrained, revealing Moscow's and25X1
Havana's unwillingness to become more deeply
involved in defending the extensive portion of Angolan25X1
territory where SWAPO staging bases have been
situated:
? In September 1981, three Soviet naval vessels spent
several weeks at Mocamedes-the first time that
any Soviet naval craft visited the southern Angolan
port. Moscow, however, did not publicize the visit.
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Secret
? A TASS report on 19 September, which belatedly
acknowledged that four Soviet advisers had been
killed in fighting between Angolan and South
African troops, stated that Moscow "will continue
to give political, diplomatic, and material support to
both Angola and the national liberation movement
in South Africa."
? Thirteen MIG-21 fighters-probably Cuban-
piloted-were dispatched to Lubango shortly after
"Operation Protea" began, and one was subse-
quently downed by a South African Mirage over
southern Angola. Following the incursion, Havana
also sent at least 2,000 and possibly as many as
6,000 additional Cuban military personnel to
Angola while redeploying other Cuban forces
already in the country to the southern rail line-
roughly 275 kilometers from the Namibian border.
Moscow's anxiety over the progress in the Namibian
talks has prompted it to make a variety of moves since
late 1981 aimed at fueling suspicion between the
Africans and the Contact Group-particularly the
United States-and reinforcing Moscow's position in
southern Africa. These moves include stepped up
propaganda strengthening bilateral
ties in the region, and lobbying key parties to back out
of the negotiations.
This suggests that the Soviets perceive a simmering
SWAPO insurgency as being their best bet. It would
deepen SWAPO's and Angola's dependence on
Moscow and Havana for military backing, while
prolonging security concerns of the other Frontline
States-thus making them receptive to Communist
military aid. As long as the United States and other
Western powers seek to mediate an intractable
conflict, the Soviets can depict the West as condoning
Pretoria's occupation of Namibia and military
incursions into neighboring states.
Namibia.
If Moscow perceives any future South African
invasion of Angola as a serious challenge to the
government in Luanda, the Soviets probably would
provide whatever additional military aid was needed
to prevent a collapse of the pro-Soviet regime. In the
absence of such a threat, it now appears unlikely that
Moscow would deliberately incur the heightened
tensions with the West that would result from giving
SWAPO-and the Angolans-sufficient assistance to
sustain a maior expansion of guerrilla activity inside
Castro probably would agree to send more troops to
Angola if the security situation along the southern
border deteriorates further. But if Castro believed
that the threat of US military action against Cuba
was growing, he might withdraw several thousand
military personnel, which would increase Angola's
vulnerability to South African attack. Ultimately,
however the Cubans will follow the Soviet lead in
Angola 25X1
Promoting a simmering guerrilla conflict exposes
Moscow to some political risks, such as some loss of
prestige with SWAPO, with the Angolans, and with
other clients whenever incursions into Angola show up
the limitations of Soviet military aid. Moreover, it 25X1
runs counter to the desire of Angola and the other
Frontline States to see the conflict terminated. The
Soviets have another option, of course, and can
dampen guerrilla activity by reducing arms deliveries
to SWAPO. 25X1
25X1
Implications for the United States
The United States is cast in a middleman role in the
Namibian equation, and US credibility in Pretoria as
an honest broker on Namibia depends on the success
of its constructive engagement policies. This enhances
the opportunities for SWAPO's Frontline backers to
call US impartiality into question-through either
real or disingenuous misunderstanding of US
intentions. These misunderstandings are readily
exploited by the Soviets and their allies, whose
interests and policies in the region are not clouded by
such apparent ambiguities.
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25X1
25X1
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With the current military standoff in Namibia
unlikely to change much over the near term, US
involvement in the problem will remain exposed to
double jeopardy. SWAPO is highly unlikely soon to
exert the kind of military pressure it would take to
break the spirit of whites as occurred in advance of
the Zimbabwe settlement. Nor are the South Africans
likely to defeat SWAPO so decisively as to force it to
accept a settlement on Pretoria's terms. The costs of
maintaining the stalemate for both the South
Africans and SWAPO's Communist backers are not
high enough for either side to feel compelled to seek
an early, dramatic change on the battlefield. The
Frontline States, particularly Angola, pay the highest
costs for maintaining the status quo, but there are
strong limitations on Luanda's ability to act as a
completely free agent because of Angola's deep
dependence on the Soviets and their surrogates.
Moreover, all sides clearly recognize the dangerous
implications of a complete break in the settlement
negotiations. The high costs now paid by Angola
would become unbearable with the level of military
escalation that would be likely to follow a breakdown
of the talks. For South Africa, current costs are
acceptable, but a substantial increase in the military
effort that would follow collapse is not an attractive
alternative to the minimal effort it takes to keep the
talks going.
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