SOUTH AFRICA: AFRIKANER PRESSURE GROUPS AND RACIAL REFORM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00225R000100100001-9
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• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 8, 2007
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 1, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

roved For Release 2007/02/09: CIA-R DP83B00225R00010010COO8 dential
irectora e ot
South Africa:
Afrikaner Pressure Groups
and Racial Reform
Confidential
ALA 82-10037
March 1982
Copy 3 4 3
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Directorate of Confidential
Intelligence
South Africa:
Afrikaner Pressure Groups
and Racial Reform
Information available as of 3 March 1982
has been used in the preparation of this report.
This paper was prepared by
Office of African and Latin American
Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and
may be addressed to the Chief, Southern Africa
Division, AL
This paper has been coordinated with the Offices of
Global Issues and Current Operations, the
Directorate of Operations, and the National
Intelligence Officer for Africa.
Confidential
ALA 82-10037
March 1982
25
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South Africa: Distribution of Afrikaner Population
Botswana
Transvaal 1,155,835
Cape 647,842
1 Orange Free State 252,618
Natal 115,672
Total 2_,175,$3%?
*Based on 1970 South African Census figures
Preliminary 1980 South African Census figures
list 4,453,273 whites of whom approximately
60 percent are Afrikaans speakers and 40
percent are English speakers
Namibia
Ocean
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Zimbabwe
PRETORIA
Johannesburg.
Bloorr~tontain
.ort Elizabeth
MAP O
MBABANE
Swaziland\ 7).
'Richard's
Bay
'Durban
Indian
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Confidential
South Africa:
Afrikaner Pressure Groups
and Racial Reform
Key Judgments South Africa's Afrikaans-speaking minority-almost two-thirds of its
white population-has maintained unchallenged political control of the
country for over a quarter of a century. It is one of the world's most
unified, single-minded, ethnic groups. Afrikaner society and political life,
however, are in flux and ferment, owing to a number of factors over which
the traditionally self-contained Afrikaners have little or no control. These
include the impact of the technological revolution, the rapid decolonializa-
tion of most of the territories along South Africa's borders, and the social
and economic changes that political success has wrought on the Afrikaner
community itself.
These changes have directly affected the most fundamental Afrikaner
tenets, calling into question the apartheid doctrine's vision of harmonious
racial coexistence in a white-ruled state. Few Afrikaners advocate surren-
dering white privileges and Afrikaner political dominance, but the murmur
of concern over whether undiluted apartheid is conducive to these twin
imperatives has over the past five years grown into a genuine debate.
A new generation of Afrikaner industrialists realize that rigid apartheid
works against their economic interests. They argue that the economy
cannot prosper and that the whites' way of life cannot be maintained
without the underpinning of a better educated, better housed, better fed,
and more mobile black labor force. A large and influential military
establishment is realizing that to maintain white power requires changes
that would make nonwhites feel they have a stake in the system. Afrikaner
newspaper editors and academics have emerged as opinion leaders and are
making suggestions meant to bend, though not break, the policy of
"separate development."
Prime Minister Botha and his political allies are attuned to the need for ra-
cial reform, but their moves in this direction are limited by the tolerance of
the Afrikaner electorate. Government initiatives must gain approval from
both the ruling National Party and the Parliament as a whole. Few
members of the newer and more progressive groups within the Afrikaner
community have significant influence in either arena. It is the older
entrenched conservative groups, such as farmers, bureaucrats, and trade
unionists, who-though declining in number and social influence-retain a
Confidential
ALA 82-10037
March 1982
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disproportionate share of political power. To most of these conservatives,
the very debate over the desirability of altering the status quo is anathema
as many of them demonstrated by shifting their loyalties from the National
Party to the ultraconservatives in the elections last April.
Despite his recent victory over the right wing of the ruling National Party,
Botha and any reform-minded successor will be reluctant to push far-
reaching racial reforms in the absence of fundamental shifts in Afrikaner
attitudes. The recent history of the Afrikaners indicates that any such
shifts will be evolutionary, reflecting the interplay of complex political,
socioeconomic, and security factors.
Pressure for racial reform from the United States or other outside powers
will have minimal effect over the short term. Any heavyhanded external
pressures would strengthen rightwing Afrikaners and could cause progres-
sives and conservatives to unite in the face of yet another threat to white
rule and culture. Over the longer term, however, as South Africa's social,
security, and economic problems compound, Afrikaners may begin to look
to the outside world for fresh ideas to help solve their problems.
US relations with other African states will continue to be complicated by
the slow progress of racial reform in South Africa. As long as South Africa
does not develop effective ways to defuse the potential for violent racial
confrontation, the neighboring black states-who perceive the United
States as having leverage with Pretoria-will be drawn further into the
fray. Many may turn to Moscow and its allies, who would welcome
additional opportunities to exploit regional instability.
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Key Judgments iii
The Military 2
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South Africa:
Afrikaner Pressure Grou s
and Racial Reform
Introduction
For over three-quarters of a century Afrikaner reli-
gious, cultural, and political organizations have
worked with energy and skill to transform the Afri-
kaner people from a group of downtrodden farmers
into a modern oligarchy. The National Party rose to
power in 1948 on the appeal of its promise to promote
and protect the basic interests of the Afrikaner com-
munity, and since then has single-mindedly catered to
the material, social, and ideological well-being of the
Afrikaners.
Success, however, has led to rapid social change. As
the major beneficiaries of government education poli-
cies and of the expansion of the public sector of the
economy, the Afrikaners have satisfied most of their
material needs. Traditional institutions such as the
church and cultural organizations, while still impor-
tant, no longer play a dominating role in society.
Politically, modernization has created new interest
and pressure groups that are competing for the atten-
tion of Afrikaner leaders. Ideologically, the growing
internal and external pressures for improvements in
the economic, social, and political lot of the nonwhite
majority has put strains on Afrikaner doctrines of
racial exclusiveness, and a vanguard of the Afrikaner
elite has come to recognize that traditional ap-
proaches toward race relations must be modified in
the interest of Afrikaner survival.
Even progressive Afrikaners, however, are advocating
only limited reform and, in trying to implement their
cautious program, have been stymied by powerful
conservative forces. Opposing Prime Minister Botha's
modest plans for racial reform, the conservatives
voted in large numbers for the ultraconservative
Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP) in the parliamen-
tary election of April 1981. While the HNP gained no
seats, it captured 13 percent of the popular vote-
representing about one-third of the Afrikaner elector-
ate. Since then, Botha has backed off from many of
his plans for racial reform in an effort to woo back
these Afrikaner voters.
Figure 1
South Africa: Population Estimates
by Percent, July 1980
Afrikaans speakers
9.8
English speakers
6.5
Non-whites
83.7
Businessmen
Few Afrikaners are among the giants of South Afri-
can industry, but those with power are exerting some
pressure for limited racial reforms. The majority of
Afrikaner businessmen, however, are in retail trade
and smalltown businesses, and they hold traditional
racial attitudes that are the bulwark of apartheid.
When the National Party took over the government in
1948, it actively encouraged Afrikaners to become
involved in industry and commerce, which were mo-
nopolized by English-speaking whites. Even now Afri-
kaners control no more than 30 percent of nonagricul-
tural private enterprise, although they make up 60
percent of the white population.
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During the 1950s and early 1960s the government
created large state-controlled corporations to operate
railroads, seaports, and other essential industries in an
effort to reduce English predominance in the major
industries and provide jobs for Afrikaners. Thus, a
large portion of the growing Afrikaner managerial
class was diverted from private enterprise into the
public sector. This trend continued through the 1970s
as the government established even more state-con-
trolled corporations aimed at ensuring military and
economic self-sufficiency.
The Quiet Men. For the first two decades of National-
ist rule, the party commanded the unquestioning
loyalty of Afrikaner businessmen who were benefiting
from its patronage. Businessmen concentrated on
making money, however, and few were active in the
party.
The economic slowdown in the early 1970s and the
Soweto riots of 1976 awakened many businessmen to
the danger apartheid posed to their economic future.
Industry and business in South Africa has long been
plagued by shortages of skilled labor. Restrictions on
the mobility of blacks, the poor quality of their
education, and laws prohibiting the hiring of blacks
for certain jobs add to this problem. These factors
contribute to high unemployment among blacks in
urban areas, which is a source of growing discontent.
The English-dominated business group, the Associat-
ed Chamber of Commerce, has taken the lead in
recommending upgrading the lot of urban black work-
ers. Although prominent Afrikaner businessmen
agree with this goal, the Afrikaanse Handelsinsti-
tuut-the Afrikaner Chamber of Commerce-has
avoided making public statements on racial issues.
Because of the Afrikaner inclination to maintain
ethnic solidarity in the face of outside pressure, even
those Afrikaner industrialists and financiers who want
to phase out the aspects of apartheid that hinder
economic growth refrain from public criticism of the
government. Nonetheless, they obviously discuss
problems related to such issues as black trade union
rights and residency restrictions in behind-the-scenes
sessions with the Prime Minister and key government
officials.
Growing Role in Policymaking. Prime Minister
Botha sees the economic leverage the South African
corporate sector has over black African states as vital
to Pretoria's efforts at restraining the support these
states give to anti-South African insurgent groups.
He also wants business to help in the economic
development of black homelands inside South Africa.
Most Afrikaner businessmen seem satisfied with the
Prime Minister's awareness of the need of private
enterprise for some, albeit very cautious, labor re-
forms. These businessmen are unlikely to become
more politically assertive as long as government poli-
cies are seen as responsive to their interests. Nonethe-
less, as Botha increasingly tries to forge a closer
alliance with business, this handful of influential
Afrikaner industrial figures will almost certainly play
an increasing role in developing future racial policies.
The Military
The military officer corps has evolved in the past two
decades into one of the most important Afrikaner
interest groups. Career military officers occupy key
positions in the inner sanctums of Prime Minister
Botha's government and have a role in policymaking
that extends well beyond purely military matters.
Coming of Age. From the end of the Boer war until
South Africa left the British Commonwealth in 1960,
the South African Defense Force was little more than
an English-dominated home guard militia. The mili-
tary began to increase in importance in the 1960s
after black unrest began in South Africa and the UN
called for a voluntary arms embargo against South
Africa. By late 1977, the emergence of black Marxist
regimes in Mozambique and Angola, the beginnings
of an insurgency in Namibia, the Soweto riots, and
the UN's imposition of a mandatory arms embargo
had added momentum to the military buildup.
Growing white concern over internal and external
security and pride in the military's growth into the
strongest and best equipped force in Sub-Saharan
Africa gave the defense establishment increased pub-
lic stature. Moreover, the flourishing partnership that
developed between the military and industry as a
consequence of the drive toward military self-suffi-
ciency contributed to a new rapport between business
leaders and senior officers.
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Confidential
From the Barracks Into Politics. When Botha moved
up to the premiership in 1978, he brought with him a
number of officers to serve as aides and advisers.
During his 12 years as Defense Minister, Botha had
become accustomed to the military style, and as
Prime Minister he moved quickly to mold government
decisionmaking along military lines. The State Secu-
rity Council, patterned after the US National Securi-
ty Council, was upgraded, and representatives from
the Ministry of Defense now sit on almost every
important executive branch committee. Military lead-
ers thus gained a direct say in policy matters.
The officer corps has acquired a reputation for being
more racially liberal than most of the white society.
Defense Minister Malan is often given credit for
formulating the "80-20" theory, which holds that only
20 percent of the threat to South Africa's stability is
external while 80 percent is internal, and that it is the
result of legitimate nonwhite grievances. Malan and
other senior officers also have pressed for increased
recruitment of blacks and the reduction of regulations
that make for racial discrimination in the services.
There are sound, practical reasons for opening up the
services to nonwhites: the number of draft-age whites
is relatively small and the constant callups of white
reservists have caused economic disruptions.
While the officer corps as a group is left of center on
the white South African political spectrum, it is
imbued with the same ethnic, historical, and cultural
values as the white community as a whole. Afrikaners
hold over 80 percent of the top positions in the
Defense Force. Most senior officers have strong ties to
the National Party and the Dutch Reformed Church.
At least 143 senior members of the Defense Force,
which carries fewer than 200 officers on its senior
roster, are said to be members of the Broederbond, the
Afrikaner secret society.
As South Africa has become alienated from most
Western countries, the tradition of study abroad by
military officers has mostly been abandoned. Thus,
South African military professionals have had little
exposure to other cultures or to a wide range of ideas.
They often are uninformed on issues of international
politics, and many of them tend to view South
Africa's external relations solely in the light of a
Communist threat.
In many ways the beliefs of the typical South African
military officer appear contradictory, although no
more so than the views of most white South Africans.
While not willing to give up any of their privileges as
whites, most officers see the necessity of sharing some
of them in order to retain white control of the country.
They are aware that there must be more economic
and educational opportunities for nonwhites, and are
willing to put this into practice by serving alongside
blacks in combat. Most, however, are adamant on
such issues as separate residential areas and separate
schools for their children.
The Press
The Afrikaans-language newspapers, long a major
buttress of Afrikaner nationalism, have moved away
from slavish adherence to the line of the ruling
National Party. The editors of the Afrikaner papers,
while loyal to the party, are relatively liberal in the
South African context. Even before Botha became
Prime Minister, they were advocating substantial
changes to accommodate black nationalism.
Handmaidens to the National Party. Throughout
most of their history, the Afrikaner press sought to
deepen the ethnic consciousness of the Afrikaners and
to represent their interests. Together with the Dutch
Reformed Church, the Afrikaner universities, and the
National Party, the Afrikaans-language press plays
an essential role in the Afrikaner cultural-political
network.
The Afrikaner newspapers had intimate ties with the
National Party long before the Nationalists came to
power. The newspapers saw it as a duty to promote
the party and the cause of Afrikaner nationalism.
After the National Party electoral victory in 1948,
most Afrikaans-language newspapers tended to act as
promoters of the new Afrikaner-dominated regime.
They were uncritically supportive of government poli-
cies, including apartheid.
A New Afrikaans Journalism. Several factors contrib-
uted to the growth of some journalistic independence
from the party and government. In general, the
change reflects increased self-confidence among Afri-
kaners. After 1958, with the third National Party
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The Afrikaner Language Monument was built in Cape Province in
1975 to commemorate the evolution of Afrikaans from a simple
farm dialect to a recognized modern language
electoral victory in 10 years and the decline of parties
based in the English-speaking community, Afrikaner
editors saw less need to parrot unquestioningly the
party line and became more willing to discuss intra-
party disputes. The newspapers remained generally
supportive of the government, but after the Sharpe-
ville "massacre" in 1960 some journalists began to
write about the gap between the government's racial
policies and reality.
Afrikaner editors set the style for the new Afrikaans
journalism. Typical of the new editorial breed is
Wimpie de Klerk, the editor of Die Transvaler, the
main paper in the Johannesburg area, who first used
the term verligte (enlightened) and verkrampte (nar-
row minded) to define the growing progressive-
conservative split, particularly over racial policy,
among Afrikaner politicians. Articulate, well-educat-
ed editors like de Klerk support the National Party
without reservation in elections, but they no longer
feel the need to accept Nationalist policies unques-
tioningly. Most would define their role as that of loyal
critics. Their views tend to be more pragmatic and
moderate than either government policy or Afrikaner
public opinion. For the most part they are solidly
behind any government modifications of the apartheid
system.
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Confidential
Prime Minister Botha no doubt sees that the newspa-
pers play a useful role in conditioning the public to
accept change. He has longstanding ties to some of
the most important Afrikaans press personalities and
obviously sees them as valuable allies against ultra-
conservatives who oppose his policies.
Afrikaner Universities
Afrikaner universities are deeply involved in the
debate over racial reform, and academics can be
found to support almost any position-verkrampte or
verligte-in the debate. In the last several years,
however, verligte intellectuals, particularly from pres-
tigious institutions such as the University of Stellen-
bosch, have argued aggressively in favor of racial
reform. These academics expose Afrikaner students to
an awareness that peaceful political reform is neces-
sary to forestall violent political change. They also
have relatively easy access to members of Botha's
government. While proposing a variety of solutions to
South Africa's long-term problems, almost all aca-
demics favor the preservation of white control of the
country's political institutions.
An Indigenous Academe. Until the 1920s much of the
teaching staff of South African universities came
from overseas, chiefly Britain. Since then South Afri-
ca has trained its own intellectual elite to staff its
institutions of higher education. By the early 1960s
the government had set up a system of separate
universities for English and Afrikaans speakers, and
had moved nonwhite university students into institu-
tions of their own.
Little was heard from the Afrikaner academic com-
munity until the 1970 census showed an unexpectedly
large growth in the black birth rate and the pace of
black urbanization. Since then, numerous Afrikaner
professors-aware of the need to rethink the future-
have published research that has influenced govern-
ment planning, and have taken part in the work of
government commissions recommending adaptive
changes.
Many recent government innovations in racial policy
were conceived on the Afrikaner campuses:
? The multiracial President's Council, now drafting
recommendations for limited political rights for
Coloreds and Asians, is the culmination of work
begun 20 years ago by two Afrikaner sociologists.
? Several Afrikaner professors have surfaced plans for
a federal framework that would include "independ-
ent" black homelands. Many of these have been
floated with the private encouragement of govern-
ment leaders to acquaint the public to the possibility
of change and to gauge popular reaction.
? The two major pieces of legislation that have re-
moved restrictions on the burgeoning black trade
union movement came out of government-sponsored
commissions chaired by prominent Afrikaner
academics.
Academics in Government. With the exception of the
late Prime Minister Verwoerd, Afrikaner academics
traditionally stayed out of politics. Now, however, the
career paths of academics and politicians are begin-
ning to cross and many former academics are now in
policy positions in the government.
Afrikaners are acutely aware of their rapid rise from
poor farmers to ruling elite. The prestigious role of
university professors in society thus makes them a
strong influence in a country where the political
leadership is small and easily accessible to prominent
Afrikaners.
The governing elite's hostility to outside interference
ensures that university professors who propose indig-
enous solutions to South African problems also have a
receptive audience at the policy level. Although some
Afrikaner intellectuals have offered radical solutions
to the race problem, the most acceptable proposals
have been adaptations of the status quo. As South
Africa's social and economic problems become more
complex, however, Afrikaner leaders may have to look
to the outside world for new ideas to help solve the
country's problems. In that event, the academic com-
munity, with its established contacts among foreign
scholars, stands as a ready channel for an exchange of
ideas.
The Students. Although Afrikaner university students
have grown more receptive in recent years to the need
for limited change, most still believe that continued
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white rule is essential to preserving their way of life.
By and large, Afrikaner students continue to have
traditional respect for authority and most still support
the National Party.
Most students enter Afrikaner universities from sec-
ondary schools that emphasize the history and values
of Afrikaner religion and culture. Although university
education broadens the intellectual horizon of young
Afrikaners, the learning experience is confined to an
Afrikaner world isolated for the most part from
English speakers and nonwhites. With the recent
expansion of compulsory military service for all white
males, many students are now completing their two
years' service before entering a university. They thus
bring to the campuses a more realistic awareness of
some of the military and social problems facing South
Africa.
The principal Afrikaner student organization is the
Afrikaanse Studentebond (ASB), which was until the
late 1970s often more conservative than the govern-
ment. The ASB has become more moderate during
the last few years. It has echoed government policy,
calling for consultations with Asians and Coloreds on
a new constitution and advocating the elimination of
"unnecessary" racial discrimination.
There are some pockets of even more liberal attitudes
within the student communities. In 1980 a small band
of Afrikaner students broke from the ASB and
formed a new student organization open to all races
and committed to nonviolent racial reform. This
group, the Political Student Society (POLSTU), has
met with prominent blacks such as Chief Buthelezi of
KwaZulu and Dr. Nthato Motlana, the Soweto lead-
er. It also recently collected 2,500 signatures at
Stellenbosch University to organize a debate on open-
ing the university to all races. Government pressure,
however, forced the group to back off.
The majority of students at Afrikaner universities
probably support the scrapping of many of the social
and economic aspects of apartheid. Afrikaner stu-
dents, like their elders, want the pace and degree of
change controlled by whites, however, and few would
want to see real political powersharing with blacks.
Only a small, albeit active, minority will probably
continue to participate in organizations like POLSTU
that advocate fundamental racial reforms.
The Broederbond
During the period of British dominance when Afri-
kaners were excluded from power, the Broederbond
was the principal mechanism by which Afrikaner
nationalists reached decisions and thus was a critical-
ly important organization. Broederbond influence has
waned as that of the Nationalist Party has waxed,
although it still retains significant latent power, large-
ly because of its elite membership.
The Broederbond's 12,000 active members are the
elite of Afrikaner society. Forty percent of Broeder-
bond members still work in the traditional Afrikaner
fields of agriculture and education, but many are
lawyers, bankers, and journalists. Prime Minister
Botha and most of his cabinet members, including
Minister of Defense Malan and National Education
Minister Gerrit Viljoen, belong to the Broederbond,
as do over 100 senior military officers, most top
Afrikaner academics, and the chairmen of the South
African Broadcasting Corporation and the SASOL
synthetic fuel project.
Everything about the organization is secret, including
its membership roster, monthly cell meetings, and
national conventions. Leaks of its confidential records
to English-language newspapers in recent years, how-
ever, have stripped away some of the mystery and the
aura of power from the organization.
Local politics, school board appointments, and com-
munity affairs have been the traditional focus of
Broederbond meetings. In recent years the group has
broadened its scope, sponsoring studies of national
problems. Study groups are often chaired by senior
government officials with expertise in the field being
investigated. Government leaders often use the
Broederbond's annual national convention to test re-
actions to reform proposals before making them
public.
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The Broederbond's exact position on the question of
racial reform is not public knowledge. The Broeder-
bond does not openly comment on national issues, and
the political views of its leadership have varied. Gerrit
Viljoen, who served three terms as Broederbond chair-
man before his appointment to the Cabinet, and
Minister of Cooperation and Development Koornhof
were two Broederbond executives who espoused
verligte positions, but Andries Treurnicht, the recent-
ly ousted leader of the National Party's verkrampte
faction, has also been a Broederbond chairman. The
present chairman is a conservative academic who
argues in favor of a separate white homeland.
The spectrum of views on racial reform that exists
among Afrikaners in general almost certainly is prev-
alent among Broederbond members as well. The
recent decision to readmit HNP members who were
forced out of the organization in the early 1970s
probably reflects the Broederbond's recognition of the
deep-seated conservatism of the Afrikaner communi-
ty. Nonetheless, the Broederbond probably has gener-
ally agreed with the cautious reform policies of the
Botha government.
The Churches
The Religious Legacy. The Dutch Reformed
Churches of South Africa are so closely identified
with the rise of Afrikaner culture that they have been
called the "National Party at prayer." The Dutch
settlers of the Cape of Good Hope brought with them
strict Calvinism, and for nearly 200 years the mother
church in the Netherlands controlled religious life in
the settler communities. When the British extended
their authority over the Cape colony at the beginning
of the 19th century, however, ties between the South
African congregations and the Netherlands were cut.
By the end of the 19th century an indigenous genera-
tion of Afrikaner theologians emerged. They viewed
church and state as inseparable and the different
races as specific creations of God, each with their own
God-given identity. These new ideas provided spiritu-
al sustenance to the Afrikaners in the hard times that
followed the Boer war. During this period the church
became a source of strength for poor, backward
Afrikaners who found themselves in economic compe-
tition with nonwhites. When apartheid became the
official Nationalist government policy in 1948, the
Afrikaner churches sanctioned it, using selected bibli-
cal passages to justify black subjugation. The
churches worked to build voter support for the Na-
tional Party, particularly in the rural areas, and
reached the peak of their political power during the
1950s.
The Modern Church. As the Afrikaners prospered,
the church's influence in society diminished, particu-
larly among urban Afrikaners. Nevertheless, mem-
bership in the reformed churches remains high; over
90 percent of Afrikaners belong to one or another of
the three branches of the Dutch Reformed Church.
The strong residual influence of the church is reflect-
ed in government efforts to regulate public morality
through censorship of books, magazines, and movies
and to enforce strict observance of Sunday as a day of
worship.
The majority of Dutch Reformed Church clergy still
hold the conservative values of their rural heritage
and either are comfortable with the pace of racial
reform under the National Party or would prefer an
even slower one. A small number of progressive
theologians, however, favor major political and social
change. Claiming a return to early theological princi-
ples, they argue that the separation of the races
cannot be exclusively nor explicitly justified on strict
Calvinist grounds. They have had little impact on
Afrikaner society, although they have drawn govern-
ment approbation. Nonetheless, the small, liberal,
Christian Institute, which split from the South Afri-
can Dutch Reformed Church in the mid-1960s, was
banned in 1977 for its outspoken criticism of the
government's apartheid policies.
The major impediment to change in the church and to
calls for reform has been the Afrikaner himself and
his strong conservative faith. In a period of declining
church importance, those Afrikaners who remain
most devout are, for the most part, those whose beliefs
are conservative and who feel most threatened by
modernization and its implications.
The Trade Unions
Easing of Racial Barriers. Afrikaner trade unions,
which have traditionally used their influence within
the ruling National Party to protect their members
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from nonwhite job competition, are declining in col-
lective importance as a pressure group and as an
impediment to the easing of economic apartheid.
The urban rioting of 1976 sensitized Pretoria to the
need to upgrade the status of black labor, both to
dampen discontent and to help the economy expand.
In 1979 the Botha government passed legislation that
ended the longstanding exclusion of blacks from
registered trade unions and removed legal barriers to
black employment in many skilled jobs. Although
working conditions for most blacks have not improved
significantly, the Prime Minister seems serious about
following through with a gradual phasing out of
discriminatory employment practices and an exten-
sion of collective bargaining rights to blacks.
Botha's ability to move ahead with labor reforms
reflects the easing of white concern over job competi-
tion that has occurred as Afrikaners have moved up
the economic and educational ladder. Indeed, because
of the shrinking pool of white blue,-collar workers, a
growing number of Afrikaner trade union leaders now
see no alternative to the removal of the job discrimi-
nation regulations. As a result, increasing numbers of
Afrikaner unions are beginning to emmulate non-
Afrikaner unions in opening their ranks to blacks. The
25,000-member railway artisans' union, once the most
sacrosanct haven of the Afrikaner working class,
recently voted to admit black apprentices, and other
railway unions are following suit.
Mineworkers. Despite the new mood among other
trade unions, the powerful Mine Workers Union
remains a bastion of conservatism. The Mine Workers
Union threatened to strike in 1980 over the govern-
ment intention to extend full legal trade union rights
to black contract and migrant workers. The strike did
not materialize because the mineworkers could not
mobilize support from other unions.
The Mine Workers Union retains significant political
leverage, however, in part because its membership is
concentrated in key constituencies in the Transvaal.
The Transvaal's seats in Parliament almost equal the
combined total of the other three provinces, and the
National Party's Transvaal party organization-
which has close ties to the mineworkers-wields
Some of the most conservative Afrikaners belong to the
18,000-member Mine Workers Union
considerable influence in the party's parliamentary
caucus.' The results of the 1981 election may have
magnified the miners' leverage. Miners were well
represented among the blue-collar voters who deserted
the Nationalists and cast their ballots for the HNP.
Botha is paying special attention to the interests of
these disaffected blue-collar groups in an effort to woo
them back into the Nationalist fold.
The Farmers
The farmers, who together with their families repre-
sent little more than 10 percent of the Afrikaner
population, also have a political impact out of propor-
tion to their numbers, and their basic conservatism
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Confidential
works as another natural brake on racial reform.
Parliamentary districts are weighted in favor of rural
areas, which can often have representation equal to
urban areas with nearly twice the population. Farmers
are active at the local level of the National Party and
play an important role in the selection of candidates
for Parliament, particularly in the Transvaal and the
Orange Free State.
Since 1940, farmers have been the largest single
occupational group among National Party members
of Parliament; about one-third currently list them-
selves as farmers. Farmers have been well represented
in the cabinet, although they have generally received
the less important portfolios.
The Farm Lobby. For the most part, farmers have
confined their active political lobbying to issues that
affect agriculture and the rural communities. The
South African Agricultural Union (SAAU), which
claims to keep out of national politics, is the major
national farm organization. SAAU leaders meet rou-
tinely with the Minister of Agriculture or his assist-
ants while Parliament is in session.
Farmers are unavoidably involved in two of the most
critical issues facing South Africa: border security
and the homelands' consolidation policy. The security
of border areas is central to government efforts to
guard against black insurgent infiltration, and work-
ing farms form a natural deterrent to guerrilla activ-
ity. In recent years, Afrikaner farmers, concerned
both with increasing security problems and the high
cost of transporting goods from remote areas to urban
markets, have been abandoning farms in the border
regions, particularly in the northern Transvaal. In
some of the border areas at least 25 percent of the
farmland is unoccupied. The government has tried
with little success to counter this migration by offer-
ing financial incentives-such as low interest loans-
to those who agree to stay in strategic locations.
Farmers have been largely successful in preventing
the government from consolidating the black home-
lands by turning Afrikaner farms into white spots
inside the "independent" black states. Rural National
Party strongholds in the eastern Cape Province have
successfully won their right to stay in South Africa
instead of being incorporated into the Ciskei
homeland.
Beyond the Fringe. Apartheid began as the political
philosophy of poor rural Afrikaners and it provides
farmers today with an abundant supply of cheap,
docile labor. Some farmers may sense the need for
change to reduce social tensions. Most, however, feel
that better educational and economic conditions for
their workers would only encourage social and politi-
cal unrest. Thus, there is little likelihood that the
farming community would push for a better deal for
blacks.
In protecting their interests, farmers have had as a
political champion Dr. Andries Treurnicht. Many
farmers, however, are even further right than
Treurnicht. In the April 1981 parliamentary election,
farmers probably voted in large numbers for the
HNP. Prime Minister Botha's general concern about
winning back disaffected Afrikaners could magnify
the farmers' already substantial leverage with the
Nationalists.
The Bureaucracy
The Afrikaner-dominated bureaucracy, which the
National Party built and which in turn has helped
build the party, now acts as a significant obstacle to
racial reform. Public service employment helped
many Afrikaners rise from the poverty in which many
of them lived during the first part of this century, and
the expansion of government corporations under the
Nationalists brought even more Afrikaners into the
public sector. Moreover, when the National Party
came to power in 1948, it created a huge bureaucracy
to administer the web of apartheid legislation it
enacted. As a result, over half the Afrikaner work
force-including civil servants, teachers, transport
and communications workers, the police, and workers
in state industry-now hold government-associated
jobs.
Blocking Change. The policy of padding the bureauc-
racy with Afrikaners paid handsome dividends for the
National Party. Civil servants became one of the most
important elements in the party electoral machine and
helped increase and solidify the National Party par-
liamentary majority during the 1950s and 1960s.
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By the late 1970s, however, the government realized
that in addition to being inefficient the bureaucracy
was a large drain on government finances. In an effort
to make the public service sector more responsive to
control from the top, the Prime Minister made a
sweeping consolidation of government departments
and abolished about 12,000 jobs.
Because of their basic conservatism, the bureaucrats
and other public-sector employees form a resident
opposition within the party to the verligte reforms.
The senior civil servants are able to exert direct
influence on cabinet ministers and other political
appointees, who must rely on the bureaucracy for
advice and guidance.
Even more important is the role played by lower level
bureaucrats, the police, and others involved in the
workings of government at the grass-roots level. As
administrators of apartheid, these members of the
bureaucracy enforce the web of racial regulations;
indeed they are dependent on doing so for their
livelihood. Moreover, the mass of legislation that
makes up the apartheid system effectively delegates to
these lower level bureaucrats and government employ-
ees the power to choose how and when to implement
change-and few of them favor change.
Civil servants and other public-sector workers were
heavily represented among those who shifted loyalties
from the National Party to the HNP in the last
election as the HNP capitalized on the conservatism
of the bureaucracy as well as on Botha's efforts to
pare it down to size. The HNP, as part of its attack on
Botha, charged him with deliberately holding down
bureaucratic salaries to force out whites and bring in
blacks. The National Party is now paying special
attention to the public-sector employees as part of its
broader effort to win back disaffected rightwing
Afrikaners. The result is that the bureaucrats-like
the miners and farmers-are, at least temporarily,
looming larger as a pressure group.
Outlook
Industrial modernization, economic advancement,
and urbanization have given rise to new groups within
the Afrikaner community that are competing with
traditional ones. Afrikaner unity has been diluted by
this evolutionary process. Newer groups-business-
men, academics, editors and journalists, and military
officers-have emerged since the Afrikaners rose to
power in 1948 and are slowly coming to see that some
racial reforms are necessary if only to preserve white
privileges. Over time, the influence of these groups
will grow and the influence of the traditional conserv-
ative groups will diminish. The pace, scope, and even
the direction of this change will be influenced by a
host of complex socioeconomic, security, and political
factors.
It will be a slow, painful, and uneven process, but the
long-term trend seems clear. Traditional Afrikaner
institutions such as the Church and the Broederbond,
once the dominating influences in Afrikaner life, are
losing ground and being supplanted by organizations
catering to social, economic, occupational, and recrea-
tional interests. This evolutionary process will further
divide Afrikaners along class lines, loosen ethnic
cohesion, and allow wider diversity of thought and
action. In this process the traditional groups will not
disappear. They will retain the potential of appealing
to the narrow ethnic nationalism that has served the
Afrikaner well in gaining and maintaining power.
Moreover, as a group, Afrikaners remain collectively
committed to preserving white political dominance
and protecting their privileges and culture.
Over the long run, farmers will gradually lose their
entrenched hold on politics as the farm population
ages, agribusiness grows, and younger and better
educated Afrikaners become politically active. In the
short term, however, despite recent redistricting, con-
stituency boundaries still favor the rural population
and add to their political clout. Moreover, reform-
minded leaders like Prime Minister Botha will use
tools like redistricting with extreme care so as not to
lose control of a very gradual process of change.
The white bureaucracy will remain one of the largest
pressure groups and is likely to continue to resist
racial reform programs. If, however, the government
pursues its present course of leaving vacant positions
unfilled, the size and political power of the bureaucra-
cy will be reduced. This will not lead to a backlash
from the white community, because the coming gen-
eration of prospective civil servants can readily be
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Figure 2
Range of Afrikaner Attitudes Toward Racial Reform
Farmers
Trade unionists
Small business
Bureaucracy
University students
Press
Academics
Big Business
Military
IN
Political influence
(on racial reform)
absorbed in higher paying jobs in the private sector.
Blacks may benefit because there will be fewer en-
forcers of apartheid laws and because they might
eventually be able to advance into the lower ranks of
the civil service.
Economic growth will affect the racial attitudes of
trade unionists and blue-collar workers. An expanding
Opposes Impressionistic depiction of
racial relative Afrikaner attitudes
reform toward racial reform and their
relative political influence.
Each group contains a wide
range of attitudes and member-
ship in these groups is
overlapping.
Supports
limited
racial
reform
economy will reveal the shortage of skilled manpower
and will provide both the climate and resources to
upgrade black skills and education. Economic slow-
downs would, however, generate competition among
skilled labor of all races and lower income whites
would work to block black advancement. In that case,
other trade unions would join the mineworkers in
pressing for white job protection.
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Those at the higher educational and economic levels
of Afrikaner society tend to realize that racial dis-
crimination serves no definable purpose in many
situations. Businessmen and the new professional
class-editors and journalists and academics-see an
increasing mutuality of interest with senior military
officers who want reforms to reduce internal security
threats and gain black support against what they see
as the coming Communist onslaught. As security
issues begin to have a greater impact on both domestic
and foreign policy, the military will become an even
more powerful force within the government. An elitist
coalition of businessmen, military officers, and politi-
cians might then be able to exert far-reaching pres-
sure for reforms as discussions crucial to security and
survival move from the area of public scrutiny into the
corridors of executive power, and decisions are made
and carried out behind closed doors.
Prime Minister Botha has already begun this process
of decisionmaking at the executive level. He has been
quietly restructuring the government to make it more
responsive to the executive than to Parliament. The
office of the Prime Minister has been strengthened
allowing the Prime Minister to implement some
changes without waiting for the unwieldy process of
formal political approval. Botha has upgraded the
State Security Council, the government's chief deci-
sionmaking body, and staffed it with personally loyal
cabinet members and military officers. He has used
the extensive network of advisory commissions, com-
posed of eminent academics and professionals, to
bypass the parliamentary caucus to introduce legisla-
tion such as the recent changes in labor laws allowing
black trade unions.
In keeping with this trend toward executive manage-
ment, Botha engineered the constitutional abolition of
the conservative Senate and replaced it with a multi-
racial consulting body now drafting plans for a new
constitutional system which will give some political
rights to Coloreds and Asians. The constitution that
emerges is expected to provide for an executive presi-
dency, giving the central government greater
authority.
While the government is adapting to the future needs
of South Africa, the National Party, Afrikanerdom's
primary vehicle for political expression and focus of
political pressure, has not yet changed. The structure
and function of the party still reflects the political
mission of the 1930s and 1940s-the mobilization and
economic advancement of the Afrikaner people.
Moreover, the party leadership has maintained a
single-minded dedication to Afrikaner unity, while
being pressured by a new set of complex and compet-
ing interests. By accommodating all points of view,
the party provides an open forum for factional infight-
ing between conservative and liberal forces within the
Afrikaner community. As a result innovative political
policies have been stymied.
Botha has recently won an overwhelming vote of
political confidence over the extreme right wing of the
National Party. He should now be able to move
forward on racial reform albeit within limits circum-
scribed by what the Afrikaner electorate will tolerate.
Botha or any like-minded successor will continue to
have trouble controlling the National Party until the
Afrikaner electorate's attitude toward racial reform
changes and the power of those groups supporting the
preservation of unaltered white supremacy can be
reduced. Botha will, however, continue quietly build-
ing a strong executive branch of government which
could promote beneficial change. This, of course,
could have the opposite effect if the strong executive
ended up in ultraconservative hands.
Against this backdrop, Afrikaner attitudes toward
racial reform will continue to evolve as they debate
their uncertain future, and some positive changes in
South Africa's racial policies and practices will gradu-
ally occur. Racial reforms will not be easy to accom-
plish. They will exacerbate the emerging differences
within the Afrikaner community and will be limited
and scattered. Whatever steps are taken will result
from Afrikaner perceptions of what has to be done at
the time to ensure the community's survival. As a
result, the pace and scope of reform will satisfy
neither black South Africans nor the outside world.
The debate over reform and those reforms that are
actually implemented will, however, contain the seeds
for further change and contribute to the evolution of
Afrikaner. attitudes.
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Implications for the United States. Over the short
term, the ability of the United States and its allies to
promote meaningful racial reform in South Africa
will remain limited. Even the most progressive Afri-
kaners have not reached the point where they give
serious consideration to anything but limited modifi-
cations of apartheid. Over the longer term, however,
as South Africa's social, economic, and security prob-
lems worsen, these Afrikaners may begin to look
beyond their own culture for new ways to deal with
their country's dilemma. Should that occur, external
influences might have some impact.
Nonetheless, aggressive advocacy of substantial re-
form by the United States or other outside powers
would have little positive effect. Such pressure prob-
ably would strengthen the resistance of rightwing
Afrikaners to change and might cause progressives
and conservatives to unite in the face of what they
would perceive as yet another threat to white rule and
white culture.
In the meantime, the racial problems of South Africa
will continue to have an impact on the United States,
both domestically and in the foreign policy arena.
Many of the 350 American companies doing business
in South Africa have already been pressured by US
shareholders, universities, and churches to divest
themselves of their South African holdings. Most
American companies in South Africa practice enlight-
ened labor relations and are, therefore, a positive
force in influencing change. Nevertheless, they are
not immune to labor troubles that spotlight US
involvement with South Africa and evoke calls for
economic disengagement.
US relations with other African states will continue to
be complicated by the slow progress of change in
South Africa. Because most African states believe
that the United States has leverage over the South
African Government, they will view any US encour-
agement of incremental racial reform as approval of
the apartheid system. They will also blame Washing-
ton for lack of initiative if no progress is seen.
More important, as long as South Africa does not
rapidly develop policies and institutions that could
defuse the potential for violence and racial confronta-
tion, the neighboring black states will be drawn
further into the fray and will see themselves as
increasingly vulnerable to Pretoria's efforts to destabi-
lize them. Many will turn for help to Moscow and its
allies who, with a minimum of effort and expenditure,
will be able to exploit regional instability in the name
of South African "liberation."
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