SOUTH AFRICA: THE GROWING INFLUENCE OF THE MILITARY
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
South Africa:
The Growing Influence
of the Military
An Intelligence Assessment
Secret
ALA 82-10023
February 1982
`Py 2, 6 6
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Directorate of
Intelligence
South Africa:
The Growing Influence
of the Military
An Intelligence Assessment
Information available as of 20 January 1982
has been used in the preparation of this report.
This paper was prepared b Office
of African and Latin American Analysis. Comments
and queries are welcome and may be addressed to
the Chief. Southern Africa Division, ALA, on
This paper has been coordinated with the Office of
Central Reference, the Directorate of Operations
and the National Intelligence Office for Africa.
Secret
ALA 82-10023
February 1982
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Secret
South Africa:
The Growing Influence
of the Militaryr
Key Judgments The South African military in a single generation has evolved from a home
guard militia to a militarily and politically powerful Afrikaner institution.
As US and other Western policymakers confront the "South African
problem," they deal increasingly with situations and policies that are
heavily influenced by the military. South African military leaders them-
selves involved in diplomatic dealin s with the outside
world 25X1
The growing prominence of military views in Pretoria poses problems for
US policymakers and diplomats. The military's drive for self-sufficiency
and its current preoccupation with the security threat posed by externally
based insurgents will make South Africa a cautious, often dogged negotia-
tor on issues such as the Namibia problem. Cut off from the West because
of the government's racial policies, South African military leaders are
increasing,ly insular in outlook and thus less susceptible to influence from
abroad
Secret
ALA 82-10023
February 1982
Over the longer term, the growing self-assurance and influence of the
military, which is among the most progressive of Afrikaner institutions,
could enhance the prospects for peaceful change within South Africa.
Having confronted more directly than others the constraints imposed by
racial policies and international isolation, the military constitutes one of
the country's most adaptive elites and has adopted racial reforms that
outdistance those in other major Afrikaner institutions. If the military
threat to South Africa stabilizes-which would allow the military to regain
its broader vision of the challenge facing white South Africans-the
increased prominence of the military could serve US interests by fostering
peaceful change in South Africa. 25X1
The government of Prime Minister Botha, who served as Defense Minister
for 12 years, has been at least partly structured along military lines. Botha
clearly relies heavily on military advisers who served him during his tenure
as Defense Minister. 25X1
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This interdependent relationship between South Africa's civilian and
military leaders carries with it some potential threats to the country's
Western democratic traditions. Although we think it unlikely that the
military will act on the occasionally discussed idea of an "enlightened
dictatorship," much will depend on how the domestic and regional situation
unfolds and how effective the military is in selling the need for racial
reform to the rest of society. The trend is clear, however, and as South Af-
ricans become increasingly anxious about their security, the role and
prestige of the military will continue to grow, perhaps including the
eventual elevation to Prime Minister of General Malan in a replay of the
Afrikaner tradition of soldier-statesman.
Secret iv
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South Africa:
The Growing Influence
of the Military
The Military Buildup
Afrikaners gained full control of South Africa's
armed forces by the late 1950s, but it took almost two
decades for the military to become a full-fledged
Afrikaner institution with significant political clout.
Prior to the 1960s, few South Africans saw any real
external threat, the police had primary responsibility
for internal security, and the military services re-
mained a budgetary backwater. Military spending
accounted for less than 7 percent of the budget (less
than 1 percent of GNP) and weapons consisted mainly
of a few tanks, armored cars, and outdated American
and British aircraft. 71
A series of internal and external shocks over the past
20 years, however, has transformed the military and
thrust its leaders into a central policy role. The
Sharpeville incident in 1960-in which the police
killed 76 and wounded 186 blacks engaged in a
nonviolent demonstration-triggered a sharp increase
in the defense effort. Between 1960 and 1965, mili-
tary spending increased fourfold, consuming over 20
percent of the budget and 2 to 3 percent of the GNP.
After the UN's imposition of a voluntary arms embar-
go in 1963, made mandatory in 1977, South Africa
turned to local arms production, spending over $1
billion during the 1960s. Defense expenditures leveled
off near the end of the decade as South Africans
believed the threat had stabilized and become man-
ageable at existing levels of funding.
The collapse of Portuguese rule in Mozambique and
Angola, the Soviet and Cuban intervention in the
Angolan civil war, and the Soweto riots in 1976
stimulated another major spurt in South Africa's
Creating an Afrikaner Institution
A bitter Parliamentary debate over whether South
Africa should enter World War II on the side of the
British climaxed a longstanding battle between a
coalition of internationally minded Afrikaners and
English speakers and intensely nationalistic, anti-
British Afrikaners. Prime Minister J. B. M. Hertzog,
who had favored South African neutrality, was nar-
rowly defeated on the war issue and was replaced by
his deputy, Afrikaner World War I hero Jan Chris-
tian Smuts. 25X1
General Smuts declared war on Germany in Septem-
ber 1939 and began raising a volunteer force for
service abroad. Only those willing to swear allegiance
to King George were eligible for wartime duty, howev-
er, and anti-British Afrikaners opposed to Smuts's
war policy found it difficult to advance within the
military or to find jobs in an economy dominated by
English speakers.
After taking power in 1948, the National Party
government began systematically to eradicate
English-speaking dominance of all key social and
political institutions. The effort to turn the govern-
ment into an Afrikaner institution was particularly
intense in the military. Many British-trained, Eng-
lish-speaking officers were forced to retire. Legisla-
tion was passed requiring that all officers, noncom-
missioned officers, and permanent force members-
that is, the professional regulars-to be.fluent in both
English and Afrikaans, effectively discouraging re-
cruitment of English speakers who were not inclined
to be bilingual. As was the case with the civil service,
the military rapidly became afavored career opportu-
military buildup. By 1977 defense spending was near-
ly five times its 1972 levels, accounting for over 5
percent of the GNP. National service requirements
for white males doubled from 12 to 24 months, and
today more than half of the white men between 18
and 45 serve in the active armed forces or in reserve
units. The Botha government announced last August
that defense spending would go up another 30 percent
in the next year.
nity for upwardly mobile Afrikaners who were still
largely excluded from business professions dominat-
ed by English speakers.
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South African Defense Force
(as of February 1981)
Active Duty Forces Reservists
Permanent force (25,000- Citizen force (100,000-120,000)
30,000)
Career cadre to provide train- Ready reserve.
ing, support, and leadership to
conscripts and called-up reserv-
ists.
Minimum tour of duty is three Called up for 30 days of refresh-
years. training each year for eight
years.
About 40 percent in Army, 40 Army, Air Force, Navy
percent in Air Force, and re- components.
mainder in Navy.
National servicemen Commandos (100,000-120,000)
(52,000-60,000)
Conscripts. Home guard.
All able white men must serve. Called up for 30 days of refresh-
er training each year for eight
years.
Two years continuous service Army Commandos organized as
before eight years reserve duty rural, industrial, and urban
in Citizen force or Commandos. units; Air Commandos being
phased out.
Military thinking has changed as well. South African
strategic doctrine adjusted to the deterioration of
military ties with the West-climaxed by South
Africa's failure to interest NATO in a South Atlantic
treaty and the British termination in 1975 of their
naval cooperation agreement with Pretoria-and
changed its emphasis from serving a conventional role
in the Western alliance to meeting the growing threat
of foreign-based insurgency. New priority missions,
such as counterinsurgency operations, close air sup-
port of mobile ground forces, commando strike oper-
ations, coastal patrol and interdiction, and riot con-
trol, replaced the previous focus on conventional,
large-unit training
A Homogeneous Military
The rapid expansion of the services accelerated the
process of Afrikanerization of the military as more
officer slots were created for Afrikaners eagerly seek-
ing professional careers but still largely excluded from
business professions. Afrikaners now hold at least 80
percent of the top positions in the South African
Defense Force (SADF) -85 percent in the Army, 75
percent in the Air Force, and 50 percent in the Navy.
White English-speaking officers generally hold less
responsible positions. The Afrikaner's historic distrust
of English speakers-long viewed as the internal allies
of former colonial masters and not members of Afri-
ca's "white tribe"-is refl ed in their careful moni-
rin of English speakers
The elevation of General Malan from SADF chief to
Defense Minister in 1980 marked the end of influence
of aging World War II veterans in the SADF hierar-
chy. The current leaders are young-most are in their
early fifties-and have had little combat experience
outside the region-for example, only 10 active duty
South African officers served in Korea. Virtually all
top SADF officers have had commands in Namibia;
the commanders of the Army in South-West Africa
have gone on to serve as chief of the Army, chief of
the SADF and, in Malan's case, Defense Minister{
South African military professionals have had little
exposure to outside influences. Since most Western
countries stopped admitting South Africans to their
training schools in the early 1960s-Malan was the
last to attend the General Staff College at Fort
Leavenworth-the South African military has be-
come increasingly insular. The SADF recognizes this
and in 1980 doubled its overseas training budget to
approximately $1 million. Its military exchange pro-
grams, however, are limited to other "pariah" states
such as Paraguay, Argentina, Taiwan, and Israel.
Generally, top officers increasingly receive all of their
military training within the SADF system and have
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Malan was appointed Defense Minister in October Viljoen was appointed Chief of SADF in October
1980. Previously, he was Chief of the SADF, Chief of 1980, previously having served as Chief of the Army,
the Army, Commanding General of the South-West
Africa Command, and Commandant of South Afri-
can Military Academy, often as the youngest ever to
hold these positions. Now 52, Malan is a close
confidant of Prime Minister Botha and a leading
government spokesman. The last South African to
attend the US General Staff College at Fort Leaven-
worth-he was there in 1961-62-Malan admires US
principles of military organization and Israeli defense
strategy. Malan never served as a foreign liaison
commander of the first division-size unified tactical
force in Namibia, and liaison officer to insurgent
groups in Angola. He received military training en-
tirely within the SADF educational system and has
traveled little abroad. Viljoen is viewed as a hard-
driving military professional with little of Malan's
political sophistication. Although only 48 years old,
Viljoen has long expressed the desire to retire to his
farms, but was prevailed upon to serve as Malan's
replacement. 25X1
officer, but in 1979, he visited Paraguay, Chile, r
Argentina, and Uruguay, apparently offering to sell L
South African arms.
little opportunity to travel abroad, particularly to
those Western countries still viewed by most military
men as South Africa's "natural" allies
25X1
determinedly self-sufficient and frequently asserts
proudly its ability to meet the challenge of Commu-
nist-inspired insurgencies without the help of its for-
mer Western allies. Great admiration is often ex-
pressed for Israel. Israeli strategic concepts and
practices, such as deep preemptive strikes and aggres-
The military's isolation, apart from other pariah sive cross-border tactics, figure prominently in South
states, contributes to its adoption of a harder and African military thinking. While acknowledging that
more aggressive line on security issues. The military is
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South African security problems must ultimately be
solved by political means, senior military leaders
frequently assert that political considerations must
not interfere with military operations, arguing that in
the short run it is imperative to provide military
security as a prerequisite for an lon -term political
solutions.
An Adaptive Elite
Despite their growing provincialism, military officers
probably constitute the most progressive Afrikaner
group in South Africa. More than any other major
institution, the military has directly confronted the
constraints imposed by South Africa's racial policies
and international isolation. The disruption of Western
military ties, the collapse of other white regimes in
southern Africa, the arms embargo, increased insur-
gent activity, and the limited pool of white male
manpower have forced the military to adapt to cir-
cumstances radically different from those in the
1950s. Their response has been to advocate "hard
line" foreign policies emphasizing preemptive military
actions while pressing for "soft line" domestic policies
stressing limited racial reform
Racial Policies. South Africa's military buildup could
not be accommodated by the limited pool of white
males, despite doubling their national service require-
ment and recently abolishing all exemptions based on
employment. In addition to expanded programs for
recruiting white women, manpower constraints have
caused the military to recruit nonwhites and to insti-
tute racial reforms within the various services.
? In 1963, the Colored Corps was created as an
auxiliary, noncombatant unit primarily serving in
the Navy. Although initially unarmed and not
eligible for career service, by the early 1970s Col-
ored enlistees could join the Permanent Force and
be trained for, but not assigned to, combat units.
? The Indians were the second nonwhite community
tapped for service. As with the Coloreds, the Indians
were treated distinctly and organized into their own
separate military unit, the Indian Corps commis-
sioned in 1974. Indians receive weapons training,
but are assigned only noncombatant duties, again
principally in the Navy.
? Recruiting blacks was a more contentious issue for
Afrikaner military officers, many of whom retained
traditional notions that "only the British would
think of arming Bantu." The first blacks were
admitted in the mid-1970s and were trained as
armed guards, drivers, clerks, and dog handlers.
Recently, however, the Army formed two black
Army battalions which are slated primarily for
counterinsurgency operations in. rural tribal areas
The South African military eliminated many racially
discriminatory regulations in 1978, and since then it
has commissioned a few Colored officers whom whites
must salute. Whites and nonwhites receive equal pay
for the same job, a reform in which the military takes
considerable pride. Despite this progress, senior mili-
tary officers have expressed dissatisfaction with the
slow progress in recruiting nonwhites, who now com-
prise almost 20 percent of the Navy's career personnel
and total 5,000 and 200 in the Army and Air Force,
respectively.
Despite their limitations, including little impact out-
side the military, these racial reforms outdistance
those in other major institutions in South Africa. The
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Table 2 Percent General Johannes Jacobus Geldenhuys
Racial Composition of Active Duty Personnel a
Whites
92.3
81.3
98.1
92.2
Coloreds
6.2
13.0
0.8
6.0
Indians
0
5.7
0.2
0.5
Blacks
1.5
0
0.9
1.3
Total
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
military probably has been the most forceful Afri-
kaner advocate of internal reform. Defense Minister
Malan is often given credit for formulating after the
Soweto riots in 1976 the "80-20" theory, which holds
that only 20 percent of the threat to the country's
stability is external while 80 percent is internal and
the result of legitimate nonwhite grievances
An Aggressive Foreign Policy. Malan's advocacy of
internal reforms, which presumably constitute 80
percent of the "total strategy" to meet internal threats
to South African security, has been overshadowed in
recent months by "hardline" rhetoric on military
preparations to meet the "Communist-directed total
onslaught." The increasing intensity of South African
cross-border operations, particularly into Angola, re-
flects the growing influence in Pretoria of the mili-
tary, which has long pressed for greater freedom to
act against externally based insurgent groups. Since
the major incursion into Angola in late August-early
September 1981, which resulted in the killing and
capture of Soviet personnel, senior military spokesmen
have not warned of the necessity to make racial
reforms, but have focused almost exclusively on pre-
paring to fight on the "second front," defined various-
ly as Mozambique, Zimbabwe, or terrorism within
South Africa
This change in emphasis-which in effect drops the
"80-20" formulation-has been reflected in the gov-
ernment-controlled media's traditional yearend wrap-
ups for 1981 and forecasts for the coming year. The
Geldenhuys was appointed Chief of the South African
Army in October 1980. He previously served for
almost 10 years in Namibia, including three years as
Commanding Officer of the South-West Africa Com-
mand, and five years as military attache in Portugal.
One of the most experienced senior officers, Gelden-
huys frequently is a member of South African negoti-
ating teams on Namibia. Only 47 years old, Gelden-
huys has held several top staff positions
25X1
challenge for 1982 is identified as the growing securi-
ty threat posed by the Soviet-orchestrated onslaught.
The South African Government's preoccupation with
military concerns, particularly evident in the public
comments by its military spokesmen, appears intend-
ed to prepare domestic audiences for increased securi-
ty measures, including higher budgets and new legis-
lation, not to make them more receptive to internal
reforms necessary for any long-term political accom-
modation with South African blacks
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Although they are not now stressing domestic political
issues, senior military officers continue to believe they
have an important role in preparing the country for
the long struggle to survive. In their view, national
service serves broader goals than simply providing the
manpower necessary to meet the growing insurgent
threat. The SADF's continued reliance on a force
comprised principally of conscripts and reservists-
rather than a larger permanent standing army-is
frequently justified by the need to introduce as many
whites as possible to the sacrifices of national service,
socializing them in the process of their patriotic
obligations as South African citizens. Much of the
military's pressure for a liberal policy on cross-border
operations reportedly stems from its conviction that
the best way to keep the troops on a prepared footing
is to keep them active, in effect training for the more
serious battles that lie in the future
A More Active Role in the Future
Since Botha became Prime Minister in 1978, the
military's voice in policymaking has grown substan-
tially. Not only did Botha continue to rely heavily on
advisers that served him during his 12 years as
Defense Minister, he also recast the overall govern-
ment decisionmaking apparatus along military lines
with military officers serving on all important com-
mittees. When security issues are involved, military
views prevail regularly over positions advocated by the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the civilian National
Intelligence Service. Military officers increasingly
represent South Africa in diplomatic dealings; for
example, General Geldenhuys is a regular member of
the South African negotiating team on Namibia, and
military officers frequently visit other pariah states.
Few observers believe that the military would ever
seize power from civilian authorities-as Malan com-
mented recently, "Coups are certainly not our South
African way of doing things." Greater concern is
expressed about the prospects of a "verligte (enlight-
ened) dictatorship," imposed by Prime Minister Botha
and supported by the military, in frustration over the
inability to initiate racial reforms over rightwing
opposition. After the strong rightwing backlash in the
general elections in April 1981, there was speculation,
particularly among verligte Afrikaners, over the possi-
bility that Botha would dissolve Parliament and rule
by executive powers if attempts at reform were unsuc-
cessful and domestic unrest was increasing
Such a scenario is difficult to envision, however, since
it requires of Botha considerably more political cour-
age than he has demonstrated so far, not to mention a
paramount concern for internal reform scarcely evi-
dent in his recent pronouncements. Another, consider-
ably more likely, scenario is the eventual elevation of
Defense Minister Malan to the premiership, a replay
of the Afrikaner tradition of soldier-statesman. Gen-
eral Malan's popularity is on the rise, and he was
recently elected to the executive committee of the
Transvaal Caucus of the National Party, an unusual
honor for a political newcomer. Even though Malan
probably would not follow policies significantly differ-
ent from Botha's, he would be in a stronger political
position to move forward than Botha appears to be.
Implications for the United States
The military's growing influence in Pretoria makes
South Africa a more cautious negotiator over security
issues, including Namibia. Senior military officials
have been forced to seek self-sufficiency-largely, in
their view, by undependable allies-and will be reluc-
tant to entrust South African interests to externally
backed arrangements. So far, the military has been
unwilling to allow international political repercussions
to affect battlefield operations, witness the scheduling
of a major action into Angola during the Western
Contact Group's tour of southern Africa last Novem-
ber in pursuit of a negotiated settlement in Namibia.
Considering the standing the military currently enjoys
in South Africa, it is unlikely that Botha would agree
to any Namibian solution not fully supported by the
military. This support may be difficult to obtain in
view of the military's current preoccupation with the
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security threat posed by externally based insurgents
and the substantial investment that the SADF has
made in facilities in northern Namibia
In the longer term, however, the military still is
among the most enlightened of Afrikaner institutions,
one that has actually acted upon perceptions that
internal reform is necessary for white survival. If the
military threat to South Africa stabilizes-which
would allow the military to regain its broader vision of
the challenge facing white South Africans-the in-
creased prominence of the military could serve US
interests by fosterin eaceful change in South Afri-
ca.