USG POLICY TOWARD TURKEY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00140R000100120003-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 36
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 9, 2008
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: September 5, 1981
• Content Type: MEMO

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(CONFIDENTIAL when
Enclosure removed.)
TO. See Distribution List
FROM: EUR - Lawrence S. EaglWrgpe"
SUBJECT: USG Policy toward Turkey
An interagency working group meeting on USG Policy
toward Turkey will,be convened on Friday, Se tei e 11, at
t
P
in 'the Department of State's onference
Room, Room-6-2-26 - NS. David C. Gompert will chair the
meeting. 6'~ ~S
The purpose of the meeting is to build on the earlier
Eastern Mediterranean IG study by pulling together a number
of major issues currently coming to a head in US-Turkish
relations.
The attached draft paper will serve as the framework
for the discussion.
Please give Jim Williams on the Turkish Desk (632-1562)
the name and title of your representative at the September 11
meeting.
DOD/OASD/ISP - Mr. Richard Perle
JCS I - Lt. Gen. Paul S. Gorman
CIA
ICA
T
PM
EB
S/P
INR
NEA
NSC
Draft Paper.
State Dept. review completed
- Mr. Terrence Catherman
- Mr. Buckley
- Mr. Richard Burt
- Mr. Robert D. Hormats
- Mr. Paul Wolfowitz
- Ambassador Ronald Spiers
- Ambassador Nicholas A. Veliotes
- Mr. James Rentschler
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GDS 9/4/87
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September 8, 1981
1. Importance of Turkey in Global USG Strategy
Geography and history make Turkey a crossroads of
fundamental USG security interests. Traditionally, Turkey has
served us in the context of NATO and Western Europe: i.e., a
fellow democracy, the eastern bulwark of the southern flank,
the guardian of the vital straits. Turkey is also an
inextricable part of the fabric of Eastern Mediterranean
issues. It greatly influences USG policy with respect to
Greece and Cyprus; the converse is no less true. For this
reason, we must consider Turkey also in the light of other
major USG interests in the Eastern Mediterranean.
The past two years have given Turkey a major new dimension
of importance to the USG. Together, the abrupt removal of our
presence in Iran, the Soviet seizure of Afghanistan and massing
of military might in the Transcaucasus, the downward spiral of
the Iranian revolution, and the uncertain outcome of the
Iran-Iraq war have moved Turkey to center stage in USG
strategic planning for Southwest Asia. Beyond its
traditional--and vitally important--role in NATO and Europe,
Turkey now has at least the potential to become an anchor of
the strategic structure we are seeking to build to deal with
the threat to and in Southwest Asia. The crucial test for USG
P.I)S-3 0-/8,/()l
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Policy will be to persuade Turkey that its national interests
are threatened by the situation in SWA and can best be
protected by expanded cooperation with the USG and NATO in
dealing with that situation.
We are a long way from that point, and we may not fully
succeed. Yet, Turkey's undeniable potential requires that we
make a maximum effort, without damaging our other vital
interests. More than any other country--including Egypt and
Israel--Turkey has assets which, if available to us, could be
critical in meeting some of our SWA requirements: a
well-disciplined and cohesive military force structure; a
substantial. network of in-place USG facilities which could be
expanded and upgraded; geographic proximity to SWA; and
reasonably good relations with all regional states, including
Israel. In addition, Turkey has a history--with-more "ups"
than "downs"--of defense cooperation with us dating back to
1947, and it shares our commitment to western values and
political systems, and to NATO. flow well we manage our
bilateral relationship with Ankara, including the concerns the
Turks deems vital to their interests, will in large part
determine whether the GOT will choose to work with us in
defense of mutually perceived security interests in SWA.
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In USG strategic thinking, Turkey is both a real asset and
a potential liability. In recent years, the. country. has
grappled 'with -looming financial/economic collapse, social
instability, political terrorism abetted to some degree from
abroad, and institutional paralysis. The military takeover of
September 1980 brought temporary relief and for the moment
broke the back of radical movements--including pro-Islamic
ones--which had come to the fore in the 1970's. It is too
early to judge whether the fundamental GOT reforms, now in
place or in prospect, will succeed. Some of them--particularly
the economic stabilization program and the modernization of the
Turkish force structure--depend heavily on sustained high
levels of external support. As far as Western Europe is
concerned, mounting political criticism of the Evren regime and
growing financial problems cast doubt on whether donor
governments will continue to bear their share of this burden.
Failure of the ambitious GOT reforms could produce a
disillusioned, destabilized Turkey lurching in directions
inimical to our interests: renewed internal strife; drift away
from NATO and Western-style government; alignment with Middle
Eastern states which supply oil and markets; possibly even
neutralism growing out of an accommodation with the USSR. None
of these possibilities seems likely to threaten the outlook for
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the near term. In a negative way, however, they illustrate the
fundamental. importance of Turkish stability, strength, and
western orientation to broad USG strategic interests.
II. The Nature of the Turkish-American Relationship
Despite mutual political values and commitment to NATO, the
Turkish-American relationship has no natural constituency in
terms of shared history, economic interdependence, ethnic or
family ties. The absence of a "Turkish lobby" in the United
States is indicative. .Coming out of different--and, in some
respects, antithetical--traditions, the Turkish and American
peoples are largely ignorant or, if not indifferent to, each
other. This is certainly true in comparison to USG
relationships with other allies, such as Greece. It is less
true in comparison to USG relationships with most other
countries in the world.
In any case, the Turkish- American relationship rests on a
very narrow base. It is primarily a government-to-government
tie defined in security terms: suspicion of, and opposition
to, the Warsaw Pact. This relationship suffers from a legacy
of accumulated Turkish mistrust arising from specific
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grievances: the unilateral withdrawal of the Jupiter missiles
in 1963; the Johnson letter of 1964; the USG restraining role
in the Cyprus crises of the 1960's and 1974; and the 1975-1978
partial arms embargo. Turkey also shares allied concerns,
stemming from recent American history, that the USG may not be
a wholly reliable or predictable partner.
At all times, the, key to the health of the Turkish-American
relationship is whether or not the GO!, perceives that the USG
is making a "best effort" to help Turkey in all respects.
.Beyond scrupulous implementation of our obligations under the
1980 Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA), Turkey
interprets "best effort" to mean sustained high levels of USG
security assistance on concessional terms, unremitting
political support in western European and other donor capitals,
"understanding" of the GOT position on Greek-Turkish issues,
and rhetorical comfort and practical aid in dealing with the
neuralgic issue of Armenian terrorism.
For the moment, the GOT perceives that the Reagan
Administration is making such a "best effort." The FY-1982
security assistance is 56% higher than in FY-1981. We have
effectively and aggressively taken the leadership in the OECD
consortium and the NATO Ad Hoc Group. We have weighed in
repeatedly with the IMF, the IBRD, the Saudis and other
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potential. donors on Turkey's behalf. Because the Turks view
our labors as a "best effort;" we currently have an excellent
bilateral relationship, perhaps the best since the 1950's.
Given the nature of the tie, however, this situation is
extremely precarious. It could end abruptly if the USG failed
to sustain the pace of performance which the Turks need and
want. The GOT is watching carefully to see whether we can
deliver the FY-1982 a.d levels that have been proposed.
So long as the Turks perceive a USG "best effort" in the
broad sense, the Turkish-.American relationship will prosper.
This gives us at least the chance to achieve our strategic
objectives for Turkey, including expanded cooperation in SWA.
Conversely, the bilateral relationship would suffer major
damage in the event of a precipitous drop in levels of USG
security assistance and political support. In the resultant
climate of diminished GOT confidence, other nettlesome
issues--e.g., Congressional badgering on Cyprus, on relations
with Greece, on the pace of return to democracy; and an
Armenian niche in the proposed Holocaust Museum--would become
more contentious. We would have little prospect of achieving
our strategic objectives for Turkey--whether in the context of
NATO, force modernization, democratic and stable government, or
cooperation in SWA.
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III. What the USG Wants from Turkey
Aside from the recent major exception of cooperation in
SWA, USG strategic goals for Turkey have varied little for the
past generation. We seek a stable, democratic Turkey committed
to the West and to mutual defense of Western interests. Such a
Turkey can be an invaluable asset for USG purposes in Europe,
the Middle East, and SWA. We seek an equipment modernization
of Turkish forces which will have an immediate payoff in NATO
.and a potential utility for SWA. We seek to foster and
maintain a climate of perceived mutual interest that will
enable us to persuade the Turks to cooperate in meeting the
strategic threat to SWA. The key to our ability to achieve
these goals is USG provision of levels of security assistance
sufficient to meet Turkey's real.--and perceived--needs.
GOT expectations from the relationship have been sim:1.larly
constant: protection under the mutual security guarantee of
the North Atlantic Treaty, supported by massive resources to
help Turkey acquire a more modern force structure, domestic
stability, economic health, and self-confidence. The Turks are
not seeking new defense responsibilities, in large part because
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they cannot yet meet existing-ones. To the degree that they
acquire this capability, they may be more willing to consider
new tasks, such as in SWA.
USG and GOT policy desiderata in the bilateral relationship
are compatible and--so long as the USG can maintain a "best
effort" and steer a middle course on Greek-Turkish
issues--perhaps mutually achievable.
This paper will discuss five primary strategic goals for
Turkey, all of which have operational implications. Without
seeking to draw up a rank order, these goals are:
-- Return to economic health and viable democratic
government, in order better to maintain Western orientation
and NATO alignment;
-- Enhanced cooperation in assessing and finding joint
means to deal with the strategic threat to Southwest Asia;
-- Resolution of bilateral differences with Greece;
-- Continued close cooperation in NATO, specifically
achievement of force modernization that could have benefits
in both NATO and SWA contexts;
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-- Promotion of a negotiation leading to a just and lasting
solution to the Cyprus problem.
IV. How to Attain these Objectives
(1) ECONOMIC HEALTH.AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT
Analysis
There is a firm linkage between these two goals. Sustained
high levels of external economic aid are essential to an
overall climate of recovery in Turkey, in turn a prerequisite
for early restoration of a viable democratic system. General
Evren and his colleagues have refrained from setting a
timetable for return to civilian rule. However, they have
persuasively made plain that such is their goal, and that the
tempo will depend largely on their ability to resolve the basic
problems which led them to take power last September. The most
optimistic forecast is that Turkey will return to civilian rule
by late 1982; the more likely date is 1983.- Until that time,
the challenge for USG policy is to persuade other donor
governments, mainly in Western Europe, to maintain undiminished
support while an essentially undemocratic process--the
C6hi.tituent Assembly and the National Security
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Council--produces a democratic-result: a new constitution, new
laws on elections and political parties, a referendum, and
general elections to choose a new parliament.
Reflecting real and imagined human rights concerns, Western
European criticisms of the Evren regime are placing a growing
strain on resources for Turkish recovery and hence on the
triangular relationship among Turkey, Western Europe, and the
United States. By reinforcing already tight budgetary
situations in Europe, these criticisms are having a direct
economic impact on Turkey. They have already caused the FRG
and the EC to delay disbursement of new aid. If this pattern
continues and others follow suit, there will be no prospect for
a successful consortium effort in 1982. Tlh erefore, it is
essential that the USG do everything possible to prevent a
further estrangement of Turkey from Western Europe. Part of
the answer lies in continued quiet efforts to persuade top
Turkish leaders to take account of Western European concerns.
The Turks show little disposition to do this, but the
prospective reduction of the 90-day detention period and the
October 23 convening of the Constituent Assembly may
temporarily improve their image problem. Another part of the
answer lies in persuading the Europeans to focus on the main
issue: sustained progress toward restoration of democratic
government in a reasonable timeframe. That goal--not charges
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of torture, or whether Ecevit may travel abroad--must be the
main focus of Western concern.
The likelihood is that the USG will have to maintain an
intensive dialogue on this subject with both Ankara and the
Europeans f. for the duration of the Evren regime. Moreover,
should Papandreou lead Greece after the October 18 elections,
his government can be. expected to seek redoubled European
pressure on Turkey. This, in turn, would require even greater
USG efforts in Western Europe.
We must be mindful of the basic triangular relationship in
formulating our bilateral assistance program for Turkey.,
Without careful management with the Congress and consultation
with-other donors, a substantial increase in FY-1983 security
assistance levels for Turkey could tempt some NATO/OECD donors
to lessen their efforts, particularly in view of their own
economic difficulties. Such a development would cause problems
in the Congress, whether or not the Turks were willing to do
more for us in SWA. The USG already provides more than 30% of
the OECD consortium assistance, and an even larger share of
NATO military aid for Turkey. It is imperative that Turkish
recovery not become, or be perceived as, primarily a USG
operation.
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Policy Recommendations
-- Maintain Pressure on all OECD donors and regional
European groupings (EC-10, NAA, WEU, COE) to: show
understanding for Turkey's special circumstances; mute
political criticism so long as the Evren regime sustains its
process of redemocratization within a reasonable timeyrame; and
maintain high levels of quick-disbursing aid flows;
-- Point out to all European donor governments that the
August 4 Turkish Cypriot proposals on territory and
constitutional issues indicate a GOT resolve to take determined
steps to achieve a negotiated solution to the Cyprus problem,
an issue of great importance to Europe as well as the United
States;
-- Aggressively use anticipated higher levels of USG
security assistance in FY-1983 to reenergize and increase
European efforts to support Turkey;
-- Continue close liaison with the IMF, the World Bank, the
Saudis, and other regional oil states to provide financial aid
to Turkey;
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-- Discuss privately but frankly with senior GOT officials
the need to sustain the process of return to democracy, in
order to defuse anti-Turkish criticism in Western Europe
-- Emphasize to the GOT the importance of continued, strict
adherence to the 1980 economic stabilization program and the
terms of the IMF Standby Agreement-
(2) COOPERATION IN SOUTHWEST ASIA
Analysis
We have successfully opened a political dialogue with
Turkey, bilaterally and in NATO, on the strategic threat to and
in Southwest Asia. The Turks have responded positively to our
initiative and welcomed the exchange of data and analysis. In
general, the Turks share our assessment of the problem but not
our prescription for resolving it. Rather than setting up a
mechanism to project the RDF, Ankara argues that the West
should first beef up Turkish force capabilities to pose a
credible deterrent to Soviet and Soviet-surrogate incursions in
the region. This argument should be read on two levels: (a) a
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reflection of a geniune GOT sense of vulnerability and (b) an
effort to elicit a clear Alliance commitment to provide Turkey
greatly enhanced levels of materiel.
There are three general caveats with respect to Turkish
cooperation in SWA. First, the Turks would almost certainly
work closely with us to counter a direct Soviet move into Iran
or elsewhere in the Persian Gulf region. There would be a
clear threat to GOT interests, and the Turks would support a
concerted Alliance response. The prospect for such cooperation
under other scenarios is much murkier. Here lies the first
task of our SWA consultations: to convince the Turks that
something less than a direct Soviet assault into the region
would also jeopardize their national interests and justify full
cooperation in a NATO or USG response.
Second, the Turks are acutely sensitive to the views of
Islamic states. They would therefore require firm assurances
that any SWA capability on Turkish soil would not be used to
intervene in the Middle East or to support Israel.
Third, in the event of SWA cooperation with Turkey, we
would have to manage the problem of heightened Greek
sensitivities with respect to preserving the balance of
military strength in the Eastern Mediterranean region, a
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legislative requirement that still has strong backing in the
Congress. The USG views this "balance" in NATO-Warsaw Pact
terms; the GOG and many on Capitol Hill persist in a narrower
interpretation that Greece must receive 70% of the military
assistance furnished to Turkey. A perceived "imbalance" in
levels of security assistance to Turkey and Greece would have a
profoundly negative impact on Greek-American and Greek-NATO
relations in general,,and on any resumed DECA negotiation with
Athens. The policy problem would be to provide higher resource
levels to Turkey, while taking care of GOG concerns so that the
"balance" would not act as ay brake on those levels.
There are two main avenues by which Turkey could help us in
SWA: a modernized Turkish force structure that would be useful
in both a NATO and a SWA context, and specific GOT quids in the
form of facilities for SWA purposes. We must be clear that GOT
cooperation in SWA will be very expensive for us, much higher
than the requested levels of FY-1982 security assistance ($400
million FMS, $3.5 million IMET, $200 million ESF). We should
not, therefore, seek such cooperation from Ankara unless we are
prepared to go for significantly higher and qualitatively
better levels of military aid. An important test for the
likelihood of Turkish SWA cooperation will be the fate of the
FY-1982 security assistance program. There is reasonable doubt
that, in this era of budget austerity, the USG could provide
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the resources that would be required to achieve its strategic
goals in Turkey, including cooperation in SWA.
The prospective meetings of Secretaries Haig and Weinberger
with their Turkish colleagues at the December NATO ministerials
will. be a major opportunity to probe GOT interest in working
with us in SWA. The GOT has already signaled its willingness
to share assessments-and discuss out-of-area (SWA)
contingencies, so long as this is done in a NATO context. For
Turkish purposes, the NATO label is essential: it mutes
probable adverse reaction by domestic groups and by regional
states--especially Islamic oil producers, on which Turkey
depends heavily--which have come to accept Turkish membership
in the Alliance. By staying within the Alliance framework, we
enhance the possibility of attaining a significant degree of
Turkish cooperation in SWA, under the NATO rubric of
burden-sharing and division of labor in dealing with
out-of-area contingencies. However, we must bear in mind
throughout these exchanges that USG measures to strengthen
Turkey directly serve major USG strategic purposes, whether or
not there is a payoff in terms of cooperation in SWA.
In operational terms, GOT cooperation in SWA is much more
remote. It, will depend primarily on USG ability to make good
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on commitments to enhance Turkish defense capabilities, and on
the GOT's assessment that specific measures of cooperation
serve Turkish national interests. Here, too, use of. the NATO
label can help achieve our goals. The Turks want to upgrade
selected facilities under a form of Collocated Operating Bases
(COB's) program. COB's is a U.S. program under a NATO
umbrella, designed to provide greater dispersal to
NATO-committed aircraft. As practiced in other NATO countries,
COB's requires funding by the host country. In Turkey's case,
the USG--not NATO--would pay most of the bill; some of the
resources might be available in the milcon budget. The Turks
also want to speed up defense industrial cooperation under the
DECA, an agreement limited by its own terms of reference to
NATO purposes.
To the degree that we can commit major new resources to
dual-purpose Turkish military infrastructure projects and
defense industries, we shall enhance GOT confidence in our
determination to help Turkey defend itself. This in turn, will
strengthen prospects for the GOT to work with us in deterring
and, if necessary, countering the strategic threat to SWA. We
have learned from hard experience (the partial arms embargo)
that withholding resources does not elicit cooperation from the
Turks. Therefore, the only feasible means for the USG to seek
specific GOT cooperation in SWA is to be prepared to commit
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high levels of resources in advance. To hold back resources in
hopes of eliciting a GOT commitment in SWA would be futile.
We should focus our pending high-level discussions with the
Turks on measures to help the Alliance better defend eastern
Turkey against the USSR; e.g., buildup of military
infrastructure and bases, joint air and ground exercises with
substantial deployment of U.S. and allied forces to the region;
prepositioning of supplies and equipment; deeper dialogue on
contingency planning, including measures to deal with Soviet
overflights and transit of the straits; and creation of a
Turkish capability for TACAIR interdiction. There is an RDF
application to each of these measures, but all could be
discussed in terms of Alliance efforts to counter the threat to
a vulnerable part of NATO turf: eastern Turkey.
The Turks will not shrink from this exchange. They have a
deep-rooted memory of Russian/Soviet expansion,'and they are
acutely mindful of the Soviet capacity to destabilize their
country. However, the GOT is also reluctant to provoke
unnecessarily its northern neighbor, a state with which Turkey
has normal relations and from which it obtains significant
economic aid (including oil) and trade. Laying concrete
foundations for a dual-purpose defense system in eastern
Turkey, and providing the level of resources Turkey will need
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to feel more secure in working with us to handle out-of-area
problems, will help to overcome such reluctance.
The GOT has shown a strong readiness to pursue such
discussions in NATO fora. The May DPC meeting in Rome was a
major success in this regard. We should, therefore, continue
efforts to focus NATO agendas on discussion of out-of-area
(SWA) contingencies.
Policy Recommendations
-- Expand the ongoing political dialogue and
intelligence-sharing on SWA, bilaterally and in NATO.
-- Build on the Rome DPC discussion of SWA by follow-up
discussion in the December meetings of NATO.
-- Blur the distinction between SWA and NATO by relating
SWA requirements to NATO programs and operations, and to the
upgrade of Turkish force capabilities to defend Turkish soil.
-- Discuss with the GOT specific approaches to dealing with
the strategic problem -- e.g., creation of defense
infrastructure in eastern Turkey; enhanced NATO deterrence via
joint exercises to be held in the region, more frequent use of
P-111 and other advanced aircraft to supplement the QRA
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squadron in Incirlik, creation.of a TACAIR interdiction
capability, etc.
-- Implement as rapidly as possible all USG obligations
arising from the DECA.
-- Move promptly to conclude the COB's MOU and a Host
Nation Support (HNS) agreement, keying both to NATO Purposes.
-- Find means to ameliorate Greek concerns arising from
higher levels of security assistance for Turkey--e.g.,
provision of higher assistance levels to Greece in recognition
of GOG out-of-area contributions.
(3) BILATERAL DIFFICULTIES WITH GREECE
Analysis
The preceding discussion makes clear that the USG is
inevitably drawn into the Greek-Turkish relationship, even in
the SWA context. Greece plays a key role in NATO, makes a
limited but important contribution to "non-NATO" activities,
and has a close but troubled relationship with the USG. The
Greeks look to us primarily for support, material and
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political, to strengthen their ability to deal with the Turks.
GOT resentment of this approach sharply marked the late phase
of the recent inconclusive USG-GOG DECA negotiation.-.The Turks
strongly opposed the political side letters which the USG was
prepared to give Greece. They will renew their objection with
force when the letters come up in a renewed DECA negotiation.
Because both Athens and Ankara depend on us to a significant
degree, we have a modest capacity to counsel restraint and
continuation of their bilateral dialogue. This consideration
also weighs heavily in our annual effort to fashion adequate
levels of security assistance for Greece and Turkey.
In the past few years, the GOG and the GOT have made
limited progress in addressing knotty, emotional bilateral
issues in the Aegean and elsewhere. There has been modest
progress with the 1980 lifting of the NOTAM's, which for six
years had blocked civil aviation across the Aegean, the
achievement of Greek reintegration into NATO's military
structure in October 1980, and the spring 1981 reduction in
Aegean restricted airspace. The onset of the Greek election
campaign has effectively put the bilateral dialogue on ice.
Recognizing the need to avoid incidents which could be
exploited in the supercharged Greek electoral atmosphere, the
GOT shows signs of holding to a non-provocative low profile for
the next few weeks. We may wish to exchange views with the GOT
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on the situation in Greece before October 18. If Rallis wins,
there is a strong likelihood that the Greek-Turkish dialogue
will resume its slow, but important, pace. A Papandreou
victory would, at least for the near term, likely mean the end
of the dialogue and a rise in tension with Turkey. However, we
should not categorically rule out surprises from Papandreou,
even pleasant ones.
In the past 18 months, Turkey--actually the Turkish General
Staff, which has the final say in Greek-Turkish relations--has
shown a capacity to make tough tactical concessions for the
sake of achieving broader objectives. The Demirel Government
took the initiative in clearing up the NOTAM tangle, and the
Evren regime made it possible for Greece to rejoin the
integrated command structure of NATO. The Rallis Government in
turn made some limited airspace gestures. Unfortunately,
Greece has a fundamental, perhaps permanent, lack of confidence
in its ability to deal with Turkey. It is, therefore, unlikely
that any Greek Government which emerges from the October 18
elections will be able to achieve substantial progress in
resolving bilateral issues with Turkey. For USG purposes,
therefore, the process of a sustained Greek-Turkish dialogue
without conflict or tension is probably the most feasible
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goal.. It is certainly an adequate one. Achieving actual
settlement of the contentious Aegean issues, which involve
major national interests for both countries, is utopian, at
least in the near term. Still, it is important that the USG be
seen as doing its best to ameliorate Greek-Turkish
difficulties, when they arise.
Policy Recommendations
-- After October 18, consult with the GOT and the GOG on
.prospects for their resumption of a productive bilateral
dialogue;
-- Continue strong background support for CINCSOUTH's
efforts to resolve issues left pending by the achievement of
Greek reintegration, taking care to minimize new irritants
between Athens and Ankara;
-- In event of a resumed Greek DECA negotiation, keep the
GOT broadly informed in line with Secretary Haig's commitment
that there will be "no surprises:" recognizing it will not be
possible to avoid political side letters for Greece, tackle GOT
political objections head-on as was done last summer: i.e., a
letter from the Secretary to Evren;
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-- Maintain GOG confidence with appropriate levels of
security assistance and concessionality, seeking to avoid
accepting or hewing to any fixed ratio vis-a-vis Turkey;
-- Meet GOG objections re new levels of SWA assistance for
Turkey (even if under a NATO rubric) by seeking a greater SWA
payoff from security assistance provided to Greece.
(4) NATO
Analysis
Membership in NATO is fundamental to Turkey's continued
Western orientation, and to any prospect for specific GOT
cooperation in meeting the strategic threat to SWA. The same
security concerns which brought Turkey into NATO in 1952 exist
today; indeed, they have been magnified by events in SWA. This
consideration explains why, despite occasional high levels of
irritation with Western European attitudes, no GOT has ever
seriously questioned the value of Turkey's continued membership
in the Alliance. Turkey's basic difficulty in NATO is not a
lack of commitment, but an inadequate capacity to carry out
existing obligations. Creating that capacity will necessarily
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require a long-term and expensive effort. On the other hand, a
credibly modernized Turkish force would have enormous deterrent
potential, in NATO as well as in SWA. Providing significant
numbers of modern aircraft to Turkey would help achieve this
purpose. Again, Greek sensitivities would have to be handled,
probably by providing the same kinds, if not the same numbers,
of aircraft to Athens.
The Turks are deeply concerned by the limited amounts and
low quality of military aid-which their European allies are
providing under the mechanism of the NATO Ad Hoc Group. We
share that concern, but we recognize that the same national
treasuries are being tapped to support the infrastructure
program, the Ad Hoc Group, the OECD consortium--all of which
benefit Turkey. Apart from the USG, the FRG is the only ally
which has a, bilateral military aid program for Turkey. That
program faces political pressure in the Bundestag, and
budgetary constraints cast a shadow over its future. The other
European allies are essentially transferring MAP-origin and
USG-license items which guarantee that Turkey will retain an
obsolescing arsenal--not yet an obsolete one, but fast
approaching that status. To bring Turkish forces up to a level
reasonably commensurate with the requirements of their NATO
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missions, the GOT will need for a long time a sustained,
quantitative increase in the volume, sophistication, and
concessionality of the material coming from.its allies-Turkey
will be better able to produce some of these items, as its
domestic defense industry develops.
Two operational considerations bear on the ability of the
Ad Hoc Group to help 'Turkey. First, its charter calls for aid
to Turkey, Greece, and Portugal. This means that the USG must
be careful to maintain some balance in approaching Alliance
donors on behalf of Turkey. Second, some of our European
allies--e.g., Belgium--are selling U.S.-origin items on a
sealed-bid basis in order to raise funds for F-16's and
AWAC's. The USG cannot credibly ask these allies to accept a
Turkish offer which is lower than that of other bidders
(Greece, Portugal). We can, however, urge them to give
preference to allied governments and, other things being equal,
to Turkey because of the GOT's relatively greater requirement
for aid.
A major problem in seeking to modernize the Turkish
structure is its sheer size, the largest in Europe. NATO could
explore with the GOT possible alternative configurations, such
as a leaner elite force which could be brought up to NATO
s?andar"d with current levels of resources (and which also might
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be more reassuring to the Greeks). If such a step were
feasible--and achieving it would require persuading the Turks
to abandon a major element of their national defense
policy--the balance of Turkish military manpower could be
retained as a territorial reserve, in order to fulfill the
non-military,
conscription.
socialization purposes of Turkish universal
Consistent with our strategic objectives in SWA, we must
also continue efforts to achieve a tacit broadening of the NATO
umbrella to cover out-of-area concerns. We can usefully build
on the last DPC exchange on this subject.
Policy Recommendations
-- Reinvigorate the NATO Ad Hoc Group program by redoubling
efforts to persuade other allies to provide Turkey--and Greece
and Portugal--surplus and/or phased-out material on a no-cost
or low-cost basis;
-- Use substantially higher USG security assistance levels
for Turkey to advocate a similar degree of effort by the allies;
-- Make a special effort with the FRG to ensure that it
maintains and increases its ongoing military aid program for
Turkey;
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---- Beef up NATO infrastructure funds which benefit Turkey;
?- Discuss candidly with the Turks ways in which at least
some of their forces could be brought rapidly up to NATO
-- Seek new multilateral Alliance cooperative projects to
promote Turkish force modernization, such as the UK-US-FRG
M48A5 tank upgrade program.-
--Continue steps to make discussion of out-of-area concerns
a regular focus for Alliance meetings.
(5) CYPRUS
Analysis
The Cyprus problem has never been part of our security
relationship with Turkey, but it retains a unique capacity to
damage that relationship.
For almost three decades, Cyprus has been an irritant in
Turkish-American relations, at times--e.g., during the
1975-1978 partial arms embargo--a fundamental blockage. The
1974 hostilities, which led to the almost total segregation of
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the two island communities, ended the risk of periodic communal
strife which had caused the Cyprus crises of earlier years.
(This is the main reason why a new Cyprus crisis is improbable
for the foreseeable future.) However, the 1974 events also
humiliated Greece by demonstrating Athens' manifest inability
to defend an oft-proclaimed part of Hellenism, and by creating
a swarm of Greek refugees reminiscent in kind, though not in
size, of the 1922 debacle in Asia Minor. This humiliation
galvanized Greece and its friends into political action around
the world. The aftermath of 1974 left a deep scar on
Turkish-American (and-Greek-American) relations. We have done
much since 1978 to undo the damage.
There has always been a strong convergence in the Turkish
and'American approaches to the Cyprus problem. Both want to
minimize its ability to damage their bilateral relationships;
both genuinely support a negotiation leading to a just and
lasting settlement; (perhaps with different contexts); and both
want to deny the island to a hostile power. However, Turkey
has larger security interests on the island than do we. The
GOT intervened in 1974 to undo the de facto enosis which the
Greek junta had wrought by its coup against Makarios and its
establishment of a puppet regime. Despite the blood and
treasure expended in defense of Turkish interests (not limited
to kinsmen) on Cyprus, Ankara has no insurmountable emotional
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commitment or policy imperative to retain large forces on the
island. Basically, the GOT wants a settlement which will
assure that Cyprus does not become a threat to Turkey--or
Turkish Cypriots--i.e., by becoming a part of Greece or an ally
of a Communist or radical Arab state.
Turkey understands the nexus between its deeds on Cyprus
and its standing in the West. It bitterly resents that linkage
but has learned from hard experience not to challenge it
frontally. The recent Turkish Cypriot proposals on territory
and constitutional issues mark a significant step forward in
GOT policy and should serve to strengthen Turkey's general
standing in Western Europe.
The USG favors a negotiated settlement to end Cyprus'
ability to bedevil our relations with Turkey and Greece, theirs
with each other, and the integrity of the southern flank of
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NATO. Given the history of the Cyprus problem, it probably is
more realistic to aim for a sustained process of negotiation
under UN auspices, perhaps interrupted by periodic bouts of GOC
attempts at internationalization of the issue. That, indeed,
is the course on which we are now embarked. There is no
acceptable alternative, no "viable option."
Policy Recommendations
-- Maintain strong pressure on both Cypriot communities to
show flexibility and initiative in their de facto negotiations;
-- Stress the importance of such an approach to the
respective metropoles;
-- Emphasize to Ankara that sustained momentum in the
intercommunal talks will help maintain a favorable
Congressional and public attitude toward Turkey in the United
States;
-- Continue close consultations with the U.K. on possible
use of Akrotiri and/or Dhekelia for SWA purposes.
SF '" RET
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Turkey is a vital country for a wide range of major USG
interests in the Eastern Mediterranean, Western Europe,
Southwest Asia, and NATO. It is the closest NATO point which
could directly threaten the Soviet heartland; it is also the
closest NATO point which could be used to move directly into
Southwest Asia. Turkey's value to the West, real and
potential, is therefore vast. So, too, are the liabilities
that would arise from the collapse of ongoing GOT reform
efforts.
Simply put, we must craft a set of policies which will both
help Turkey and serve USG strategic purposes. We can achieve
both objectives in several ways. One is to help Turkey regain
economic health, viable democracy, and self-confidence as a
member of the Western family of nations. Another is to create
a modernized Turkish force structure which would pose a
credible deterrent in the context of NATO. Still another--and
the most difficult of all--is to develop our bilateral
relationship to obtain Turkish assets for defense of mutually
perceived interests in Southwest Asia.
Even in the absence of an explicit link to SWA cooperation,
strengthening Turkey will itself serve an important USG
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interest. A stronger Turkey would offset to some degree the
Soviet military buildup in the Transcaucusus. The Soviets
would doubtless be more cautious in deciding to use. their
forces in SWA, if they thought that the GOT had agreed to USG
use of Turkish facilities to deal with SWA contingencies.
In seeking to deepen and broaden our relationship with
Turkey, we shall have to manage four basic considerations:
matching resources with objectives and tactics in dealing with
the Turks; taking care not-to displace European aid efforts;
defusing Greek concerns; and sustaining progress toward a
Cyprus settlement.
Resources, Objectives, and Tactics. A credible USG
commitment. to provide substantially higher levels of security
assistance in FY 1983 any beyond, and a sustained best effort
to implement that commitment, are essential first steps to
achieving GOT cooperation in SWA. We must be absolutely
certain of our ability to deliver on both points, if we are to
develop GOT confidence in our commitment and our constancy. We
can discuss SWA concerns and possible countermeasures within
the context of NATO. Concurrently, we need to widen the NATO
umbrella to cover out-of-area activities in response to threats
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to Alliance interests. At a minimum, NATO measures to defend
eastern Turkey will be a credible Alliance deterrent to Soviet
moves into SWA.
Commitment of sufficient resources to modernize the Turkish
armed forces and to build a suitable infrastructure are
preconditions for success in achieving our objective for SWA.
Holding back on resources will undermine that achievement. We
have learned from experience that the Turks respond well to
positive stimulation, but not to withholding. As security
assistance levels become clearer, we can make the linkage to
SWA more explicit. The Turks may be able to help us
considerably in the region, if we can keep up our best effort
performance and maintain the NATO mantle.
Europe. We must rivet Western European attention to the
main issues: the abiding strategic importance of Turkey to the
West, and sustained movement back to representative government
in a reasonable timeframe. The Evren regime is on the right
course but needs a year or two to achieve its basic goals. We
must convince the Europeans on this point. It is vital that we
not allow Europe to use other issues--Ecevit's travel, reported
human rights abuses, or domestic budgetary problems (which are
no greater than our own)--to excuse a diminished effort for
Turkish recovery.
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Greece. We must find. ways to reduce GOG concerns over
preserving a "balance" with Turkey. A USG security guarantee
explicitly directed at Turkey would meet GOG requirements but
would also scuttle our relations with Turkey and any chance of
cooperation in SWA. The less provocative formulation agreed in
the recent DECA talks with Athens could again suffice.
Nevertheless, we shall probably have to obtain increased
resources for Greece, in the context of an overall Alliance
response to the strategic threat in SWA.
.Cyprus. The process of a productive, sustained
intercommunal dialogue will make it easier to obtain external
resources for Turkey, from both the Congress and the Western
Europeans. We must build on the momentum from the Turkish
Cypriot proposals of August 4, seeking Greek Cypriot
counterproposals and additional input from Waldheim's Special
Representative, Gobbi.
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