SIG MEETING: CENTRAL AMERICA, MONDAY, MARCH 16, 1981

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP83B00140R000100090022-2
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RIPPUB
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S
Document Page Count: 
8
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
August 2, 2011
Sequence Number: 
22
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Publication Date: 
March 14, 1981
Content Type: 
MEMO
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PDF icon CIA-RDP83B00140R000100090022-2.pdf820.15 KB
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/02 : CIA-RDP83B0014OR000100090022-2 MA-e. o. 1 l1lDlrrl3 . Enders March 16, 1981 'Participants of SIG/Central.Amsrica' L. Paul'Bremer, III, Executive Sscrs sic Meetingz Central America, Monday, The attached paper on Nicaragua is for discussion, Francis J. West, Assistant 8acratary of Dotes" (TSA) (Attentiont Captain yredarick) JCS - Lt. General John Pustay (Attention Dig.: General DOD .. Frank Carlucci, Deputy Secretary of Defense -.. Granger) NBC - Richard V. Allen VP's OFPICS - Admiral Murphy At 1Wt*nt: _As stated '7T GDS /17 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/02 : CIA-RDP83B0014OR000100090022-2 ? ThU rsday, March 19, 1981. at the March 16 SIG to be chaired by Judge Clark with a view to preparing the issue for NBC consideration on CIA NSC PAPER ON NICARAGUA 777~ Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/02 : CIA-RDP83B00140R000100090022-2 t'Jtt now do we proceed with Nicaraguan assistance? BACR+GUOUND the Salvadoran insurgents probably continues- sunnnrts Bl Salvador troa Nicaragua since ?ebruary 1. However,. LL- .1 -1-? 1 & ----- -- -- - - ? - - - - That* is no hard evidence of arms arriving to countraos,:stockpiling, and planning future auppoxt_ ?~~,~o~...=rasping Salvadorans, operations in third Tba intelligence, agencies are oreaarina an assaggsnt overland., shipments from Honduran stocks are cited Our actions must accord with the law. if there is conclusive proor that, the Government - of Nicara- qua is currentl 'abetting violence in other. countries., a'detera as on must be ;made. If the evidence is less than''conelusive there is discretion' to decide whether Or not to Bake a determination depending on . wnicn cor. distributed separately. KEY COW IOID TIGNB' counterproductive. We need tine to develop government forces in R1 Salvador; a formal cut-off of U.S. aid would eliminate the leverage provided by the threat of a cut-off and could load to accelerated infiltration into E1 Salvador, even infiltration of combat personnel. A U.S. aid cut-off would weaken private sector and other non-Communist forces within Nicaragua, poo- sibly fatally. We would also 1; !to to Continue the operation of our Embassy in Nicaragua so that our intelligence assets can be strengthened. We must be concerned with h. sally ..? ems,,. -..~. the-- standard - of evidence applied. -- A confrontation iith Nicaragua now could be SL~;4ZET CDD 3/13/27 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/02 : CIA-RDP83B00140R000100090022-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/02 : CIA-RDP83BOO14OR000100090022-2 knaYly, a confrontation with $icaregua and with out suropean and Latin allies. Mexico, venexu*ls our-dialogue and assistance to Nicaragua. They either believe there is still hope for a non-communist Nicara- 9ua or want to avoid trouble with their public opinion actions that.;-show these countries they are wrong. As the Military buildup of Nicaragua's own forces continues, we shall eventually have to react regardless of whether or not Nicaragua is arming others. We cannot permit Nicaragua to become another Cuba, armed to the teeth and potentially intervening in:-other countries. whi.1o; we continue to provide substantial .public and worldwide opinion -- to delay out reaction on this point until the buildup is clearer and until we have;;a mor?.,.coiaprehensive Nicaragua strategy.- The interagency group has developed four -options to try;,to deal-.with all the above considerations. ..xTHt INTELLIC-l "' '" ,? ENT DOES NOT PROVIDE CONCLU$XVE PROO! i'",`'* rz,- IS CURRENTLY ASSTPING VIOLENCZ, ALL: FOUR ('?;` "i O# ARE AVAILABLE: i'. Postponement o? n Determination on ESF _pendin coon res. Resume mTtca Pie n of PL-480 million remains eusoen a ) or Ross v development assistance 10 mti.ton remains sus noea, Weimer . PL-480 nor eve opaent ezar s once are subject to the statutory determination. Would avoid a confrontation, and provide time to obtain better evidence of Nicaragua's ~- intentions. In the interim, a limited amountt of . _-_ PL-460 ($3 million) would show our interest in Maintain- . ing cod relations. Resumption of. assistance would be difficult ,to defend in Congress. 2.'stron9 Statement, no Determination. A strong public rr a ement woul ,... - made Indicating that the Government of Nicaragua had supported violence in El-Salvedor but that such activities were now reduced or stOd. Ne would further state that, nevertheless, Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/02 : CIA-RDP83B00140R000100090022-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/02 : CIA-RDP83B0014OR000100090022-2 :assistain 64 would be hell' 'in suspense until steps -are __.. `-?-M- and -that a formal determination would be made If there''- -'were a reversal of recent improvements. Some PL-480 ($3 million) would be made available in about three weeks. -It favorable trends continue some development assistance might. follow. Repayment of previous loans :_would not be required and it would not be necessary to use 614 authority to waive repayment-or subsequently an additional testing period. IF THE INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT PROVIDES CONCLUSIV PROOF THAT THE GRN 10 CURRENTLY ABETTING VIOLENCE, ONLY TEE FOLLOWING TWO O 1 NS ARE AVAILABLE: 3. Straight Determination' hake a"detersal notion that the Gin involved in terrorism, formally suspend assistance, and call outstanding ESP loans.-:' _ . Would probably force an isn~rediate confrontation. Does not buy time for our other objectives. Would be popular with some in Congress, but would damage. our ability to get wide support for our Salvador policy. 4.tNusnced Determination. A series ofsteps- --. would bo. woe a ou wi Lb the Congress. mnd the Vicara. 9 ans in advance of thtr i r comprehensive -announcement e elements are: ?. -- a determination that Nicaragua is involved In abetting violence, worded to concentrate on the. past more than the present and to recognize recent improvement; -- use of provision 614 authority to avoid making previously disbursed EST funds immediately- repayable; this would be presented to Nicaragua as' major concession and to congress as the price of buying times a finding that the waiver is important to V.B. national security interests is required as well as prior congressional consultations, -- announcement that, if favorable trends continue, PL-480 will be restarted in about three weeks; this is another major carrot for continued' Nicaraguan cooperrt?4" - **- humanitarian aspects would be stressed with Coe-..} ' . t.. j SECRET Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/02 : CIA-RDP83B00140R000100090022-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/02 : CIA-RDP83B00140R000100090022-2 It will expire at the end of FY 81 unless coonaoted by the Congress. It requires the President to tecminate ESP assistance to Nicaragua and makes all outstanding ES? loans di and as able immediately if t e preset etera rifts "that the Governme t of Nicaragua ... is aiding, abetting, or supporting acts of violence or terrorism in other countries...." (emphasis added) - S. aa~ s. avn -P.7.aj LJ va. ..+.a -- - - 7-- --- A A (text attachedy was originally enacted s 1 , a risen e , ___.- 196 in the Special Central American Assistance Act of 1913. The legislative hi,rrt,ry of the provision indicates b t 6-bb Pr sidsnt ha$ 1ii cretion as to the nature and ~ . a T. e Aft raft of roof;'to ~e rc? uire He is w out scre ion M V. an mu make a determination only if there is conclusiv* t l sup of .evidence that the iiu* t providing water sa as opposedi'to'-moral or politicol suppor to acts of violftnc..'in- a, foreign c untry. Tha plain language of the statute rovides for a determination only soh' re the evidence supports a finding - -- a the RNA -9 s eu oor~t i n amass of violence at the time We determination WE ire i ng e. s s consistent. with the view a t o purpose of the statute is to deter present and future involvement in arms traffic. rather than simply to puiniash 'Nicaragua for -past .activities- in-this area without re,,J nrd' to current GRN actions. nevertheless" the r I A *,s Want a~ay find the GRU to be supporting v1il:.yaa41%j Or, 11A11 4Q moaning the stitute, ass on past ac'Cfv-- t i t a if he considers those activities To-evidence a cons suing pattern of support for acts of violence. {There is -on inherent time lag in intel- ligence reports and therefore-the statute cannot reason- ably be interpreted as requiring a determination based on up-to-the-moment data.) On the other hand, if he is not persuaded that the evidence conclusively estab- ?-dishes current GRN support for violence he would not be obligated to make a determination irrespective of the degree of proof of sat GRi1 activities. Given the judgmental factors necessarily-involved in deciding whether or not a determination should be made under this provision, a certain degree of CosAgres- sional criticism is likely irrespective of the decision. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/02 : CIA-RDP83B00140R000100090022-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/02 : CIA-RDP83B00140R000100090022-2 Per a&cer a farther test# , development ass i rtancs co l u d be again considerirel. -.. ?. that he would~subsequ dicate pr W d ently esxaAine sit to ?N If what M1,- . - s ration the to rtatart ES? assistanceonai security Interests and otAer issues rarrantsa vvjn9 on support for violence that it-is im a further 614 detareinatiort portent to U 8 r-ati This option. is d jevliona in. Can, ...,_ theca is Serious author ~-~-..~^~??~ ~; :.act ion 614 Which is a valuable ity - in many other c~~nt.~xts am While winning time for ouneot.h to l .1th the ercobjective, by Drov1JI,.e assistance in moderAtn Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/02 : CIA-RDP83B00140R000100090022-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/02 : CIA-RDP83B00140R000100090022-2 Foreign Assistance Act of of th e Section 614 Sad? 1961, as amended (text attached) is dent inated a. `Special Authocity." It provides the President the important extraordinary flexib"lir to covide assistance to ford n countries "without r~?Var to a of er rov sloes o the -c~.` It bias trad:tiondlIy en use to avo ? application of outdated provisions or the application of statutory restrictions of a general nature to specific ly i ~~ elea were h ta*o ~ r eyi circumstances to which t: Se ? to apply. For exaaw plo , reopening the Sues Canal t in t E . o gyp provide assistance sed to in effect reprogras fan6a i be ng u from Egypt to El. Sa va or. 914 (s) W$:4 - a~sended this year to provide :,.: i on Sect itional authority to waive statutory ,the President add ~restri'c.tions? under the Aria1 Export Control Act. This amendment was oota3.raeu wal ",_ -- ? that Section d 14 Via} _ author itv would be use pro en - y. - ss has also established. a ?requirema-dt The Congre nt to eac~e in formal consultations id ' e Pres fort the s ng? s aut or ty. t ~ a o or s.pr with the on re Sec on G a authority could technically be used to.- of Section 533(1) to call""' nt s overcome the requireme outstanding loans to Nicaragua and to resume Est amsis- tance at some later date. However, it would be extxemel difficult to juntifv so uainq it to override a recently enacte pprovis iu+v t:n.i- . wti .:featly intended toproduce a specific . Such a departurer frcountcy om the under traditional cicoumstan tance$es uses of Section 614(a)would be challenged in the Con ress,. or severs y restr a i t i e na m by those who would like to el under this sect on. t i i y ~ uthor the president's broad Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/02: CIA-RDP83B0014OR000100090022-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/02 : CIA-RDP83B00140R000100090022-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/02 : CIA-RDP83B00140R000100090022-2