PROSPECTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00140R000100060025-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 30, 2007
• Sequence Number: 25
• Publication Date: April 17, 1963
• Content Type: NIE

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 53-63
NIE 53-63
17 April 196325X1
Prospects in South Vietnam
Submitted by tG.'.,
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
As indicated overleaf
17 APRIL 1963
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PROSPECTS IN
SOUTH VIETNAM
THE PROBLEM
To assess the situation and prospects in South Vietnam, with
special emphasis upon the military and political factors most
likely to affect the counterinsurgency effort.
CONCLUSIONS
A. We believe that Communist progress has been blunted and
that the situation is improving. Strengthened South Vietnamese
capabilities and effectiveness, and particularly US involvement,
are causing the Viet Cong increased difficulty, although there
are as yet no persuasive indications that the Communists have
been grievously hurt. (Paras. 27-28)
B. We believe the Communists will continue to wage a war of
attrition, hoping for some break in the situation which will lead
to victory. They evidently hope that a combination of military
pressure and political deterioration will in time create favorable
circumstances either for delivering a coup de grace or for a po-
litical settlement which will enable them to continue the struggle
on more favorable terms. We believe it unlikely, especially in
view of the open US commitment, that the North Vietnamese
regime will either resort to overt military attack or introduce
acknowledged North Vietnamese military units into the south
in an effort to win a quick victory. (Paras. 29-31)
C. Assuming no great increase in external support to the Viet
Cong, changes and improvements which have occurred during
the past year now indicate that the Viet Cong can be contained
militarily and that further progress can be made in expanding
the area of government control and in creating greater security
in the countryside. However, we do not believe that it is pos-
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sible at this time to project the future course of the war with
any confidence. Decisive campaigns have yet to be fought and
no quick and easy end to the war is in sight. Despite South
Vietnamese progress, the situation remains fragile. (Para. 32)
D. Developments during the last year or two also show some
promise of resolving the political weaknesses, particularly that
of insecurity in the countryside, upon which the insurgency
has fed. However, the government's capacity to embark upon
the broader measures required to translate military success into
lasting political stability is questionable. (Paras. 33-35)
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DISCUSSION
1. NATURE OF THE CONFLICT
1. The Communists have been struggling to win control of Indo-
China ever since the Indo-Chinese Communist Party was organized
in the 1920's. This struggle has passed through several stages, in-
cluding operations against the Japanese in the later years of World
War II and a major war against the French from 1946-1954. After
the French withdrawal, the Communists were apparently confident
that the South Vietnamese Government (GVN) would collapse, or
that in any event, the nationwide elections called for in the Geneva
Accords would soon deliver all of Vietnam into their hands. Although
guerrilla bands were left behind when the country was partitioned,
the Communists did not engage in armed operations against the GVN,
but attempted to undermine it by other means. Contrary to Com-
munist expectations, however, the GVN, under President Ngo Dinh
Diem, not only survived but developed sufficient strength, partly as a
consequence of Western political and economic support, to enable it
to ignore the 1956 election deadline and to make appreciable progress.
2. These developments confronted the Vietnamese Communists with
a new situation. They had developed substantial ground forces in North
Vietnam, but South Vietnam also, with US assistance, had substantially
improved its military capabilities. Open invasion, therefore, could not
be a walk-in, and in any case the strong US commitment, not only to
South Vietnam but to southeast Asia as a whole, made such a course
an undesirable one. The Vietnamese Communists thereupon resumed
guerrilla warfare combined with intensified terrorism, subversion, and
enticement. They evidently concluded that, by winning converts and
sympathizers in the countryside, by depriving the government of effec-
tive control, and by causing loss of morale and will within the govern-
ment cadres, they would pave the way for a final political victory. This
campaign was sharply stepped up in late 1959.
3. South Vietnam was and remains highly vulnerable to, rural ter-
rorism and guerrilla warfare. Its people have no tradition of loyalty
to a government in Saigon. The Vietnamese peasant has always ac-
commodated himself to whatever force was best able to protect or to
punish him-or offer him a vision, however illusory, of a better life.
The "government" meant the local officials with whom he was in
contact, many of whom tended to be ineffective and often venal. Vari-
ous forms of minor corruption and petty bureaucratic tyranny have
long been rife in the provinces, and the offenders were seldom disciplined
by their superiors. Most peasants are primarily interested in peace
and do not care who wins the military victories. Security is significant
to the peasant largely in terms of how it affects him personally.
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4. From 1954 to about 1957, major steps were taken by the Diem
regime to create a viable South Vietnamese state. The government
completed the resettlement of about one million refugees from North
Vietnam, developed promising Civic Action and public information pro-
grams in the countryside, extended governmental authority throughout
most of the country, substantially improved internal security, estab-
lished governmental institutions more responsible and representative
than had existed before, and brought into the bureaucracy an appreci-
able number of young and capable civil and military personnel. How-
ever, after 1957 Diem failed to expand this social, political, and economic
base. Perhaps most important of all, the government failed to develop
a capability to protect the peasant and the villager. Partly on US ad-
vice, the Vietnamese Army had been organized, trained, and deployed
primarily as a defense against open attack from the north. It proved
ill-qualified to protect the population against guerrilla attack and
terrorism.
5. With Diem's consolidation of his personal control over the bureauc-
racy. and the military establishment, he became increasingly reluctant
to delegate authority or take other measures to improve the efficiency
and morale of the military and civil services. Close operational control
from Saigon not only generated serious discontent within all levels of
the government but also inhibited the effectiveness of government
actions, particularly in the countryside. The launching of a full-scale
Communist insurgency in late 1959, finally led the Diem regime, partly
out of necessity and partly as a result of the substantially increased
US commitment to South Vietnam, to initiate broad measures to rectify
these conditions.
6. The Communist effort in South Vietnam is essentially one of po-
litical subversion in which extensive military activity presently plays
the predominant role. The primary aim of the Communists is to secure
the support of the rural population-support buttressed, where possible,
by positive loyalty. By various forms of military and terrorist action,
they endeavor to cow the recalcitrant, demonstrate that the government
cannot protect its adherents, and create a general atmosphere of in-
security. They also endeavor to weaken the government's position in
the countryside by assassinating its officials, defeating its forces, sap-
ping the morale of its cadres and supporters and, generally, tarnishing
its image in every way possible. They make extensive use of guerrilla
base areas and safe havens which they seek to protect, although they
seldom attempt to hold ground against appreciably superior govern-
ment forces. In addition, the Communists are continually developing
the capabilities of their "regular" units, with the apparent hope of
ultimately becoming able to engage government troops in at least quasi-
conventional combat.
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7. To counter the impact of increased US assistance, the Communists
are gearing for a long struggle and have reorganized their military
and political apparatus accordingly. They claim to be fighting in the
cause of the "National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam,"
organized late in 1960. This organization currently has little follow-
ing in Vietnam, is clearly a front for the Communists, and its ostensible
leaders are political nonentities. It is designed to provide the frame-
work of a governmental apparatus, if and when more significant gains
are made in the current struggle, and to serve meanwhile as a vehicle
for seeking international neutralist support.
II. COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES
8. Hanoi directs the Communist campaign against the GVN, although
it permits the Viet Cong commanders considerable tactical discretion.
The Sino-Soviet quarrel apparently has not affected the Communist
war effort. North Vietnam is being courted by both sides, but there
is no evidence that either Moscow or Peiping has offered to underwrite
a substantial intensification of the Viet Cong effort or that Hanoi has
sought greatly increased aid from either. In pursuing their interests
in southeast Asia and maintaining their independence, the North Viet-
namese probably feel that they need the support of both Moscow and
Peiping, and will probably continue therefore to attempt to avoid com-
mitment to either side.
9. Military Strength. We estimate that there are now about 22,000-
25,000 full-time Viet Cong military personnel organized into identifiable
units of up to battalion size. A substantial portion of these forces is
well trained, well disciplined, and well led. Their armament consists
of light infantry weapons, machine guns, bazookas, mortars, and a few
57-mm recoilless rifles. Viet Cong forces are not known to have artillery
or antiaircraft artillery weapons, though in recent months they have
become quite adept at using small arms and machine guns against
South Vietnamese and US aircraft.
10. Viet Cong regular units are supplemented by a large pool of lightly
armed, semitrained local guerrillas and militia who probably number
about 100,000. The guerrillas and militia sometimes are used with
regular units as a first or shock wave of an attack in their locality.
At other times, operating under local district committee supervision,
they are employed for terrorism, armed propaganda, and small am-
bushes. The militia are charged with protecting Viet Cong areas when
other units are absent. Both militia and guerrillas constitute a train-
ing and replacement pool for the regular forces. The bulk of the Viet
Cong regular troops consists of locally recruited or impressed South
Vietnamese peasants promoted as needed to regular units on the basis
of their previous experience and performance in militia and local guer-
rilla groups.
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11. Logistics. For weapons, ammunition, and related supplies, the
Viet Cong forces rely primarily upon capture from government forces.
Some stocks were left behind when the Communists withdrew north-
ward in 1954, some arms are brought in by infiltrators, and some are
fabricated by the Viet Cong themselves. They also rely upon indigenous
sources for food, shelter, and other nonmilitary supplies. Supplies are
frequently purchased, although they are seized if necessary. In areas
where the Viet Cong have established firm control, they operate as a
government, levying taxes and providing some services. Since most
of the cadres sent from North Vietnam are of southern origin and are
normally returned to their own provinces, they are able to draw local
support for the Viet Cong effort.
12. The limited evidence available indicates that some equipment,
such as recoilless rifles, mortar fuses, and medical supplies, together
with selected cadres, have for some time been infiltrated from the north.
As the scale of Viet Cong operations has increased over the last two
years, the amount of materiel and numbers of personnel brought in
from North Vietnam have probably also increased. While the basic
guerrilla effort could continue without outside support, this support
probably has been essential to the higher levels of effort which have
been achieved in the last year or so.
13. Men and materiel are evidently being infiltrated through Laos,
and to a lesser extent through Cambodia and by sea. The Laotian cor-
ridor, which is controlled by Communist forces, is an important military
asset. Due to the nature of the terrain, however, the Vietnamese in-
filtrators could almost certainly continue to make some use of the
area even if it were not under Communist control. Use of the corridor
would probably significantly increase if the Viet Cong decided to sub-
stantially step up the level of military activity.
14. Tactics and Effectiveness. The Viet Cong have proved themselves
a formidable enemy and an effective guerrilla force. Despite some set-
backs, they have generally proved adept at the classic tactics of surprise,
constant movement, concentration for attack, withdrawal and dispersal.
They have also demonstrated flexibility in modifying their tactics to
counter new South Vietnamese operational concepts. They have shown
themselves capable of company, and even battalion, size attacks and
of carrying out strikes against widely dispersed targets at about the
same time. One important factor in their success is their effective
intelligence system. Informants and sympathizers exist throughout
the countryside, and the Viet Cong evidently have been able to maintain
intelligence coverage of virtually every level in the South Vietnamese
military and civil establishment. This has enabled them to avoid some
government counteractions and effectively to combat others.
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15. Nonmilitary Capabilities. The Viet Cong possess two important
capabilities which they have not yet fully exercised-terrorism in the
cities and harassment of economic life. Although the Viet Cong almost
certainly have many adherents in urban areas, their terrorist activities
have been few and generally unsuccessful. Commercial road and water
transport continues to function, and rubber-the principal earner of
foreign exchange-continues to be produced and moved to market.
One reason the Viet Cong have not attempted to interdict these activi-
ties is that they receive considerable revenue from "taxation" of rubber
plantations and transport facilities. Another and perhaps more im-
portant reason is that the Viet Cong probably have felt that full exer-
cise of these capabilities would hinder rather than help them attain
their objective of winning popular support.
III. THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE RESPONSE
16. General Approach and Strategy. The initial South Vietnamese
response to the intensified guerrilla activity in the countryside reflected
neither a sense of urgency nor an understanding of the nature of the
challenge. There was a tendency to regard the strengthened insurgency
simply as a threat created and sustained from the outside; there was
a general failure to appreciate the internal support which the insurgency
generated or the grievances and basic conditions upon which it fed.
It was regarded as essentially a military problem to be dealt with by
military means. These views have become modified as a consequence
of the progress of events and as a consequence of. US effort to convince
the regime to regard the conflict in broader perspective. During the
past year and a half, the government has begun to see the conflict as
an internal one requiring socio-political as well as military measures
and to view the military problem as one requiring greater flexibility
in deployment and tactics. Government recognition of these factors
has resulted in the development, with US assistance, of a comprehensive
counterinsurgency strategy.
17. Military Capabilities and Weaknesses. The South Vietnamese
regular military establishment consists of about 215,000 men, of whom
almost 200,000 are army. The paramilitary services, (consisting of
the Civil Guard of about 75,000 men and a Self Defense Corps of about
100,000 men, are responsible for internal security as well as counter-
guerrilla operations. Supplementing these are another 40,000 men in
Citizens' Irregular Defense Groups, which embrace a wide variety of
units, some of which serve part-time.
18. During the past year, force levels have been substantially in-
creased. The various military and paramilitary forces have been re-
trained and re-equipped and their tactical mobility improved, princi-
pally through US helicopter and transport aircraft. As a result of
this improvement in tactical mobility, the South Vietnamese forces
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are now able to strike more quickly and in greater strength than ever
before. The establishment of Citizens' Irregular Defense Groups is
creating a paramilitary capability in certain areas not now reached
by regular forces. This program has also introduced the government's
presence into many hitherto remote areas and enlisted the active sup-
port of minority groups. Appreciable progress has also been made in
securing the support of ethnic minorities (Montagnards) in the Central
Highlands, long courted by the Viet Cong, though traditional sentiments
of reciprocal suspicion and disdain between the Vietnamese and the
Montagnards still hamper this effort.
19. In recent months, offensive operations have been stepped up sig-
nificantly, the Viet Cong have been engaged in small-unit actions and
caught in ambushes, and efforts have been made to destroy Viet Cong
forces rather than to drive them away and allow them to disperse.
Night operations and patrolling are increasing. Recent reorganization
of the army command structure, together with retraining of army per-
sonnel, is bringing about greater participation by the regular estab-
lishment in the counterguerrilla effort and more effective coordination
with the paramilitary services. Some 5,000-6,000 US-trained Montag-
nards are now conducting armed patrols designed to provide intelligence
and, to some extent, to interdict Viet Cong access routes from Laos.
20. Nevertheless, a number of factors still prevent the South Viet-
namese military and security forces from realizing their full potential.
The army still makes extensive use of conventional tactics against guer-
rilla forces. The Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps have borne a
major share of the fighting and have suffered heavy casualties. Al-
though the quality of intelligence is improving, there is still a lack
of reliable and timely combat intelligence at the provincial and dis-
trict level and of political intelligence on the Communist apparatus.
Also, available combat intelligence is often not exploited operationally.
These shortcomings, together with Viet Cong intelligence coverage-
including penetration-of the South Vietnamese establishment, reduce
the effectiveness of counteraction.
21. A shortage of experienced and aggressive leaders, especially at
the company grade and noncommissioned officer level, is one of the
GVN's most serious weaknesses. This in part reflects the problem of
adapting a conventional force to the requirements of counterinsurgency
and simultaneously expanding the size of this force. In part it also re-
flects political factors. For example, promotions tend to be based upon
presumed loyalty to Diem rather than upon professional competence.
Senior commanders frequently feel hampered by the fact that some
of their subordinates are directly controlled by or have direct access
to the Presidency. US support and presence and some increased dis-
position on the part of the Presidency to allow professional officers
greater freedom have tended to improve officer morale and to increase
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military initiative in the field. Some officers, however, still question
Diem's ability to lead the country to victory, and reports of military
coup plotting persist. Morale among the enlisted ranks is harder to
determine and varies from unit to unit, but desertions and AWOLs still
constitute a serious drain on manpower.
22. The political impact of government military operations has some-
times been diminished by mistakes and offenses committed by govern-
ment forces. Although such incidents are difficult to prevent, South
Vietnamese leaders generally recognize this problem and are trying
to correct it.
23. Politico-Military Programs and Their Effectiveness. In concert
with its military endeavors, the GVN is engaged in a number of social,
economic, and political programs. Especially important are two inter-
related politico-military programs: clear-and-hold operations and the
strategic hamlets. Both of these programs are designed to provide the
peasantry with protection from Viet Cong depredations and, conco-
mitantly, to deny the Viet Cong continued access to the peasantry.
Clear-and-hold operations are integrated pacification projects in which
priority areas are cleared by military force; political control is then
consolidated by building strategic hamlets and sending in Civic Action
teams to set up governmental services and help the villagers help them-
selves. The strategic hamlet program involves grouping the peasant
population in fortified, defensible settlements and undertaking various
measures within these settlements to weed out Viet Cong sympathizers,
improve the villager's lot, enhance the government's image, and give
the peasant grounds for identifying himself with-the government's fight
against the Viet Cong. The Citizens' Irregular Defense effort is a
related program also designed to separate the populace from the Viet
Cong. Its armed groups, for example, are designed to penetrate insecure
areas and establish enclaves of security; these, in turn, are to be ex-
panded and eventually linked with areas where strategic hamlets are
already established.
24. The strategic hamlet program is an undertaking of major im-
portance. It has enlarged the area under effective government control,
and there are many indications that the Communists consider it a
threat of considerable magnitude. If effectively implefnented it can
strike at the roots of Viet Cong strength. Most South Vietnamese
leaders regard the program as a key element in the counterinsurgency
effort. Some of them-principally Ngo Dinh Nhu-also regard the pro-
gram as a major step in the social reconstruction of rural Vietnam
and as a means of consolidating their political control over it.
25. The government claims to have completed more than 5,000 stra-
tegic hamlets and to have about 2,000 others under construction. The
"completed" hamlets vary widely in the quality of their physical defenses
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and the effectiveness of their political programs. The most successful
have been ones set up in areas where integrated and systematic pacifi-
cation has been undertaken; however, in many instances, hamlets have
been set up without the necessary basis for their continuing defense
having been established. Administrative deficiencies have also ham-
pered the execution of the program: excessive exactions have frequently
been levied on local resources, peasants have often not been compen-
sated for materials or labor furnished, and officials have tended to
show more interest in controlling the hamlet population than in im-
proving its living conditions.
26. Results of clear-and-hold operations conducted in a few provinces
last year were encouraging, and plans for similar operations have been
drawn up for all provinces. However, there is evidence that the gov-
ernment is becoming impatient with the time and effort such integrated
operations demand. Diem is apparently coming to feel that his armed
forces have improved to the point where they may now be able to
mount quick, "leap-frog" military strikes against the Viet Cong through-
out the country without worrying about the political consolidation of
such military gains.
IV. PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS
27. Current Military Situation. Although there is no satisfactory
objective means of determining how the war is going, we believe that-
all factors considered-Communist progress has been blunted and the
situation is improving. Strengthened South Vietnamese capabilities
and effectiveness, and particularly US involvement, are causing the Viet
Cong increased difficulty. There are some indications that the Viet
Cong are suffering from local shortages of supplies and a decline in
morale. There have been few desertions by Viet Cong regular per-
sonnel, but there has been some increase in desertions from the Viet
Cong militia and guerrilla forces. Although statistics of casualties and
figures on the numbers of villages under government control are not
very reliable or very helpful indicators, a greater degree of security in
the countryside has apparently been achieved and the government's
control of important population areas has expanded somewhat during
the past several months.
28. There are as yet no persuasive indications, however, that the
Viet Cong have been grievously hurt. They continue to operate in
most sections of South Vietnam, and much of the countryside remains
in their hands. Although the number of Viet Cong incidents and at-
tacks is below 1962 levels, this number has increased in the past few
weeks. Government military capabilities have increased markedly dur-
ing the past year, but so have those of the Viet Cong.
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29. Communist Intentions. The magnitude of the US commitment
and the increasing effectiveness of the South Vietnamese counterin-
surgency effort are almost certainly causing Hanoi and its Viet Cong
subordinates increasing concern. Although we believe that the Com-
munists have in no way relaxed their determination to win control
of South Vietnam, they must realize that their task is becoming in-
creasingly difficult, and they may be reappraising their general policy.
We believe it unlikely, especially in view of the open US commitment,
that the North Vietnamese regime will either resort to overt military
attack or introduce acknowledged North Vietnamese military units into
the south in an effort to win a quick victory.
30. For the present, at least, we believe that the Communists will
continue to wage a war of attrition, hoping for some break in the
situation which will lead to victory. They must be aware, for example,
of the disaffection engendered by the political methods of the regime,
and they are probably also aware of the dissatisfaction among many
Americans over the policies and practices of the GVN. They probably
hope for political deterioration which will make their task easier, or
that the US will tire of costly and frustrating guerrilla warfare and
accept some facesaving way out. At some point the Communists might
launch a serious effort to convene an international conference to con-
sider the neutralization of South Vietnam.
31. Any non-Communist coup effort would probably be regarded as
providing an opportunity for exploitation. We believe that at present
the Communists have neither the capability themselves to lead a suc-
cessful coup d'etat nor the ties with the non-Communist opposition
which would enable them to participate in a coup led by non-Commu-
nists. Nevertheless, they might be able in an unstable situation re-
sulting from either a successful or unsuccessful coup to gain some po-
litically strategic position. In any event, the Communists evidently
hope that a combination of military pressure and political deterioration
will in time create favorable circumstances either for delivering a coup
de grace or for a political settlement, say on the model of Laos, which
would enable them to continue the struggle on more favorable terms.
32. The Outlook. Whether the Communists are correct in their ap-
praisal will, of course, depend in some measure upon the extent and
nature of US involvement, but primarily upon the South Vietnamese
response to the developing situation. We do not believe that it is pos-
sible at this time to project the future course of the war with any
confidence. Despite GVN progress, the situation remains fragile. A
series of major Viet Cong successes, should they occur, might have a
shattering psychological effect. Nevertheless, the heavy US involve-
ment and close working relationships between US and Vietnamese per-
sonnel have fundamentally altered the outlook. Changes and improve-
ments have occurred during the past year which for the first time
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indicate that the Viet Cong can be contained militarily and that fur-
ther progress can be made in expanding the area of government control
and in creating greater security in the countryside. However, some areas
of Viet Cong control, such as the Mekong delta, will be very difficult
to pacify, decisive campaigns have yet to be fought, and no quick and
easy end to the war is in sight.
33. Developments in the last year or two have also gone some dis-
tance in establishing a basis for winning over the peasantry and in
improving the efficiency of the military establishment and the civilian
bureaucracy. It can, of course, be argued that only a highly centralized
regime, single-mindedly dedicated to independence, and placing a heavy
emphasis on personal loyalty can cope with the problems of guerrilla
warfare. However, we believe that a greater willingness on the part of
the regime to enlist the active support of those who have become disaf-
fected or discouraged in the face of Diem's techniques of government
would considerably speed the reduction of the Viet Cong insurgency.
34. Substantial reduction of Viet Cong military power, however, would
probably intensify rather than reduce the need for changes in the
philosophy and practice of the Diem regime, if revived insurgency were
to be precluded and military victory translated into political consolida-
tion. The achievement of physical security in the countryside would
in itself satisfy a major political requirement in convincing the peasants
of the government's ability to protect them. But the government must
be both willing and able to expand its efforts to bring social, political,
and economic improvements to the countryside if the peasant is to
recognize a stake in the survival of the government and to be fortified
against Communist blandishments. Effective action in this and other
fields, particularly with the removal of a substantial US presence at all
levels of the government, would almost certainly require a wider par-
ticipation in the development and implementation of policy and a con-
siderable reduction in the tight, personal control of the bureaucracy.
35. On the basis of its past performance, the ability of the Diem
regime to move willingly and effectively in these directions is question-
able, and may become even more so should military victory come within
sight. With the removal of the inhibiting effects of an immediate and
overwhelming military danger, political stability would be greatly
threatened if disappointment with the regime's performance mounted
among important sectors of the population and the conviction deepened
that legal avenues to change remained blocked.
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INDEX
TO PROVINCES
1. ANG TRI
L UA THIEN
). PANG NAM
4. AND TIN
S. ANG NGAI
6 NTUM
7. BINH DINH
8. PLEIKU
9. PHU BON
10. PHU YEN
II. DARLAC
12. KHANH HOA
13. NINH THUAN
14. TUYEN DUC
1S. QUANG DUC
16 LAM DONG
17. BINH THUAN
18. BINH TUY
19. LONG KHANH
20. PHUOC THANH
21. PHUOC LONG
22. BINH LONG
23. TAY NINH
24. BINH DUONG
25. GIA DINH
26. BINH HOA
27. PHUOC TUY
28. LONG AN
29. KIEN TUONG
30. DINH TUONG
31. KIEN HOA
32. VINH BINH
33, VINH LONG
N. KIEN PRONG
35. AN GIANG
36. PHONG DINH
37. CHUONG THIEN
36. KIEN GIANG
39. AN XUYEN
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Approved For Release 2007/04/02 : CIA-RDP83BOO140R000.100060025-2