NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP MEETING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00140R000100030035-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 1, 2009
• Sequence Number: 35
• Publication Date: November 4, 1981
• Content Type: MEMO

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? t 7rj-90 0 36
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASM1NGTON
CONFIDENTIAL
WITH SECRET/SENSITIVE
ATTACHMENT -
November 4, 1981
MEMORANDUM FOR THE '.VICE- PRESIDENT _,: r ....
.w1 TV OF ~~A l L
THE SECRETARY OP DEFENSE
THE COUNSELLOR TO THE P RESENiGE27CE
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
THE UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE
UNITED NATIONS
THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
THE DEPUTY CHIEF
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF PRESIDENT
THE CHAIBNAN, JOINT THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND
DI~p-RMA =T AGENCY
SUBJECT: National Security planning Group Meeting
The president will chair a National Security Planning Group
meeting in the Cabinet Room of the White House onmThursd Y,
November 5, 1981 from 4:00 p.m.
The agenda will be as follows:
(l) TNF Negotiations. zero. option
(2) Caribbean Strategy
2
)
Papers for agenda item (1)-are attached. Papers for item (
will be distributed separately.
FOR THE PRESIDENT:
NSC review completed.
Richard V. Allen
Assistant to the President
for National Security Af f airs
CONFIDENTIAL
WITH SECRET/SENSITIVE
ATTACHMENT 1gg2
Review on Novemmbez
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? OctobeIf 0,.1981
SUBJECT TNF Negotiations: Zero Option
This memorandum proposes that the United States open the
November 30 TNF negotiations by proposing a draft treaty that
-would mark a dramatic departure from the ideas of the previous
Administration and could capture the imagination of NATO and
indeed, the world.
The context of the 'negotiations: There is little argument with the proposition that we would
not enter into the TNF negotiations today if we had not agreed to
do so when NATO decided, in December 1979, to pursue the "two
tracks" -ofthe TN? modernization and arms control negotiations.
The-context of the negotiations could hardly be less favorable:
the Soviets already have a modern TNF deployment vastly larger and
more capable than the modest program we seek now to build.- The
Soviet weapons are already deployed and continue to enter service -
at a rapid pace. Ours are s = i ll iii development and the plans for
their eventual deployment, for which we need Allied consent, are
under attack in all of the five countries where they would be
located. One basing country, The Netherlands, has deferred (it
is cancellation in all but name). The Belgians have been unwilling
to announce participation but are apparently ready to proceed.
Chancellor Schmidt clings to German participation under extreme
pressure from his own party. Italian participation continues with
relatively little political opposition but mounting technical prob-
lems. Only the U.X. among the five basing states is reliably
proceeding, but a change of government before the U.K. program is
complete could very well leaL to its termination. -
The underlying problem in Europe is an apparently strong current
of pacifist sentiment that seems to get worse. We have seen only
the beginning of the demonstrations against the planned NATO deploy-
ment. The increasing involvement of church and civic groups in the
opposition to new TNF in Europe, the amalgamation of the press and
mounting political pressure within virtually all the governing
coalitions in Europe have weakened the resolve of our Allies. Pro-
ponents of the NATO modernization are trimming, running for cover.
In my j-Ldgment, without a new and dramatic initiative by the United
States, the center cannot hold.
z,aUled by -----
19 Oct 87
view
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U S negv s.i&+ P_.LJ0up 6i.w,a~
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tances we are impaled on tTie horns of a
In these circum
dilemma. We are negotiating because our Allies will not support
the modernization program unless we do so. But if the negotia-
tions produce an agreement that is essentially cosmetic--an agree-
ment that leaves the Soviet advantage in TNF largely undiminished-
there would be strong pressure to abandon the *planned NATO de"loy-
ment as unnecessary. Thus the modernization program is threatened
as much by what some might wrongly perceive as "success" in the
negotiations as by a failure to negotiate.
A protracted stalemate in the negotiations would seem to be
the condition most conducive to progress on modernization, pro-
vided that it resulted from a Soviet refusal to accept a U.S.
proposal that captured the imagination of, and received strong
support from, the broad public, especially in Europe. But the
Soviets understand this as well as we do. And given the fact that
they possess far more theater nuclear weapons than they need to
attack all the high value targets in NATO Europe, they are well
poised to open the talks with a deceptively generous offer to
scale back on their SS-20 deployment.
Pentagon-studies indicate that to achieve any significant'
reduction in the threat posed to NATO by Soviet TNF deployments
we must obtain an agreement approaching the zero level of SS-20
(and related) missiles. There is thus a formidable convergence of
what is militarily effective and politically sound. It is for this
reason that I believe we ought to propose a draft treaty, at the
outset of-the negotiations, that-would reduce to zero the number
of theater nuclear missiles of greater than battlefield range in
Europe and the Soviet Union.
The zero option:,
In my judgment, a zero outcome proposal has a number of
significant advantages.
First, it is sufficiently sweeping to offer some promise that
it will capture the imagination of Europe. Moreover, it would enhance
the image of the President as a man committed to significant reduc-
tions in nuclear weapons on a basis that is fair, equitable, veri-
fiable and militarily stabilizing. Overnight it could make him a
candidate for the Nobel Peace Prize.
Second, it would put the Soviets immediately on the defensive.
They would then be in the position of having to argue for TNF
missiles in Europe--and any ceiling subsequently agreed to would
have come about as the result of Soviet insistence.
Third, it would put our critics, particularly among the left
in Europe, in an extremely awkward position. They would be compelled
either to support us or to defend the notion (and the_Soviet position)
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missiles. while to ore cynical among tnern nL oe,prepared to
criticize our propoWll they would have diffic y persuading their
more sincere followers of their opposition to the zero outcome.
Fourth, such a proposal, if accepted, would be significantly
easier to verify than any ceiling that permitted some theater
nuclear ,Missiles to remain in inventories. One of our concerns,
for example, is to be sure that the Soviets are not permitted to?
retain refire or reload missiles- -because studies show that even
severe limits on launchers have little or no effect if refire
missiles are permitted. But this is extremely difficult to verify
at any level other than zero.
Fifth, we would find it a good deal easier to cope with
the political pressures that can be expected to attend a deadlock
in the talks if the deadlock is brought about by Soviet refusal to
accept a zero outcome. We would be entitled to don our white
hats. But we must be prepared to stand by our advocacy for as
long as it takes. We must not repeat the Carter Administration's
mistake of 1977 when they abandoned a far-reaching SALT proposal
after only six weeks.
Sixth, finally, it is really the right position to take.
It is morally and, if we can get it agreed to, militarily right.
Opponents of this proposal may well argue that a willingness
to abandon our plan to deploy S72 modernized systems in Europe in
exchange.for a Soviet willingness to dismantle their stronger or
already deployed forces will only encourage our Allies to halt
our own program before we secure Soviet agreement. I disagree.
The underlying logic of the zero option is well understood:
if the Soviets abandon their deployment we will abandon ours; and,
conversely, if they insist on retaining theirs, to which ours are
a justified (if inadequate) response, then we must proceed.
While well understood, this could be made a specific condition
of our participation in the negotiations. By contrast, we have
no reason to assume that our Allies will carry on with a partial
deployment in the aftermath of an agreement that permits some
number of TNF missiles on each side. I am afraid that, illogical
as it might sound, if any such agreement were reached with the
Soviets, many of our Allies would abandon the TNF program anyway.
But perhaps more importantly, our experience with arms control
in the past suggests that the need to support our negotiating
position by actually going ahead with our own programs is widely
appreciated. At the height of the opposition to ABM deployments-
in the early days of the Nixon Administration, for example, the
argument that prevailed in the Congress was precisely that. We
cannot now expect the Soviets to dismantle deployed missiles in
exchange for "paper airplanes." They will only do it if they
genuinely fear we actually will deploy Pershing II's and ground
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launched cruise missiles against them. And withdrawal by our Allies
from the modernization program in the midst of negotiations, with
a highly defensible proposal on the table, would end any hope of
an agreement. They will not assume that risk or bear that burden.
From some quarters we will undoubtedly hear the argument
that the zero option is not "'credible" or "serious." Credible
and serious, in this context, means "negotiable," and it is
largely the judgment of arms control experts that we must enter
the talks with a proposal sufficiently close to the Soviet position
to be negotiable. But no one who has studied the matter closely
believes that we have sufficient leverage to obtain an agreement
that serves our security interests if the terms approach those to
which the Soviets would be readily responsive. In short, the
USSR has 2S0 SS-20s deployed now and they are adding one new one
per week.
I believe that the zero option is in the U.S. interest.
It will certainly require skillful management of the negotiations
to sustain support for this proposal (and the modernization program).
But it is better to tackle the difficulties of selling a proposal
that is in our interest than to fall back to one that is not on
the doubtful grounds that it will prove easier to sell to. others.
In the end we must appeal over the heads of specialists' and our
critics to the larger public. If we move toward the Soviet position
even before the talks begin we run a significant risk of emerging
with an agreement that would be worse than none at all, such as a
"generous'! Soviet proposal to reduce their 2S0-?>S-20s to 150--to
our zero.
Summary:
I believe there is far more at stake than whether we succeed
in getting through the negotiations with the December 1979 moderni-
zation intact.
There is great danger that the negotiations will lead to an
agreement that entails only cosmetic cuts in Soviet forces while
weakening further NATO's all too tenuous resolve to improve its
military posture. At risk then would be not only NATO's TNF
modernization program, but its defense budgets and conventional
forces as well. If a cosmetic agreement were reached it would
almost certainly dissipate further an already diminishing sense
of danger--and the will to respond to it by redressing the military
imbalance in the Soviet's favor that has been nearly a t~ecade. a
a half in the making.
In these circumstances the easy assumption that the Soviets
will resist reductions in their SS-20 force would be imprudent in
the extreme. They just might propose such cuts in thz belief that
some SS-20s are surplus to their military needs and can therefore
be expended to achieve important political gains. We have to
remember that 150 (or some such number) of SS-20s to nothing, is
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just as bad as the So?t retention of 2S0 SS-2* to nothing. It
is indeed probably worse--for it would mean acceptance of the 150
to zero with no NATO will left to redress that fatal total.
The implications of this are clear: if NATO is to protect
its modernization program by putting the Soviets on the defensive
and turning the harsh light of reality on the large Soviet advantage
in theater nuclear weapons, our opening proposal must be dramatic;
and it must- anticipate probable Soviet responses with a view pro
serving the integrity of our position. Among the alternatives,-the"
zero option is most likely to accomplish this purpose.
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